Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ZAGREB118
2009-03-04 07:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

CROATIAN-SLOVENIAN BORDER DISPUTE: THE VIEW FROM

Tags:  PREL PGOV NATO HR 
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FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9047
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000118 

"NOTE: BY CIB: DO NOT/NOT PROCESS, GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE."

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO HR
SUBJECT: CROATIAN-SLOVENIAN BORDER DISPUTE: THE VIEW FROM
ZAGREB

REF: LJUBLJANA 43 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Poloff Daniel Meges for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000118

"NOTE: BY CIB: DO NOT/NOT PROCESS, GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE."

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO HR
SUBJECT: CROATIAN-SLOVENIAN BORDER DISPUTE: THE VIEW FROM
ZAGREB

REF: LJUBLJANA 43 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Poloff Daniel Meges for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT We see little prospect that
significant progress can be made in resolving the
longstanding border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia
before Croatia formally joins the NATO Alliance. Assuming
Croatia achieves NATO membership in time for the April 3
Summit there may be an opening to move the dispute to
mediation or arbitration for final resolution. However, such
a scenario would require flexibility and political courage in
both capitals. Croatia's redlines vis-vis the border
dispute involve the utilization of an established
international legal forum or process to resolve the dispute.
The GoC will also seek a mechanism that guarantees the
implementation of the resolution in the event that the
judgment does not fully satisfy Slovenia so that the GoS
would then not be able to block Croatia's EU bid in an
attempt to wrestle further concessions.


2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONT. Our European partners should
take a leading role on this issue, and there is a need to
consult with high-level officials in Brussels in order to
better guide the parties toward ending the impasse. We
expect the EU will press the GoC and the GoS in the coming
weeks to accept a deal to allow for mediation of the dispute,
but we are pessimistic that Brussels can bridge the
differences between the two sides. Unfortunately, should a
formula for resolving this issue not be found in next several
months, the dispute could derail Croatia's entry into the EU
for at least several years. Ultimately, entrenched positions
in both capitals that preclude compromise over the maritime
border could deliver a body blow to the EU's enlargement
policy and the stabilizing force it brings to the Balkans.
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT


3. (C) Until Croatia formally joins NATO, it is unlikely
that we will see a breakthrough that could lead to a solution
to the 17 year long border dispute between Croatia and
Slovenia. Tackling the border dispute will take creative
thinking, and we appreciate recent reporting from Embassy

Ljubljana laying out Slovenia's redlines vis-Q-vis the border
dispute (reftel). Embassy Zagreb's assessment is that it is
difficult for the Croatian leadership to envision a
face-saving compromise from the GoC's perspective while its
NATO bid is held hostage. As long as the GoC sees Slovenia
as holding up Croatia's two main foreign policy priorities of
joining the NATO and the EU, the political price is likely
too high for Zagreb to make any deal with the GoS vis-Q-vis
the border. The recent decision by the GoS to block the
closing of Croatia's EU chapter 6 on corporate law because it
prejudged the border was viewed in Zagreb as another sign
that it would be extremely difficult to reach a mutually
agreeable solution with Slovenia at the moment.


4. (C) Slovenia's redlines are seen by the Croatians as an
ultimatum: cede a maritime corridor without the cover of an
internationally recognized legal process or forgo EU
membership. Because of its recent wartime legacy,
Croatia--its public, politicians, and media--are quite
sensitive to potential losses of territory. Furthermore, the
prospect of returning to the bargaining table to hammer out a
bilateral deal, at least with the Pahor government, is very
likely a non-starter in Zagreb. A previous bilateral attempt
to resolve the dispute, the so called Racan-Drnovsek deal
which included Croatian concessions on the maritime border,
was torpedoed in Croatian parliament in 2001, and the
resulting public outcry nearly toppled the government.


5. (C) The meeting on March 2 between the Prime Minister,
President, and the heads of all the parties in Parliament
underscored the unanimous support the GoC has for its
position that Croatia shouldn't be forced to trade its
territory for its EU bid absent a dictate from an
international legal body. The GoC will formally respond to
the EU mediation proposal next week, and will describe its
answer as a "yes" but with conditions. All Croatian parties
have signaled they will endorse the views of President Mesic
and Prime Minister Sanader that an Athisaari-style mediation
would be acceptable only if it facilitated the dispute being
placed before an international legal body for final
resolution. The Croatian response will also insist that all
their EU negotiating chapters that are currently blocked by
the GoS be allowed to progress once any deal on a mediation
is agreed, without having to wait for a judgment to be
delivered.


6. (C) Efforts to get the GoC to abandon its desire to have

the case heard before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) are further handicapped by the common presumption that
should a mediation or arbitration body apply UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea to the dispute, Slovenia would be highly
unlikely to gain direct access to international waters. In
the same light, Slovenia's economic case that its maritime
claims are crucial to the port of Koper rings hollow to
Croatian ears, as for the past 17 years boats heading to the
port have enjoyed unfettered free passage, and both sides
agree that maritime borders within the EU community are,
practically speaking, irrelevant. Frank discussions with
senior Croatian officials, however, have indicated that GoC
may consider moving off their entrenched position of the ICJ
in favor of another "established" international legal forum
or mechanism to arbitrate or mediate the dispute. However,
any chance for the GoC to make such a concession would likely
have to wait until Croatia was a member of NATO.


7. (C) Additionally, the GoC worries that if prior to its EU
entry a deal emerges to seek mediation or arbitration to
resolve the dispute and if the subsequent judgment is
unsatisfactory to Slovenia, then Croatia would still see its
EU bid put on hold pending further concessions regarding the
maritime border through a referendum process. The recent
experience regarding Croatia's NATO bid makes the GoC view
this as a very likely scenario.


8. (C) Because this dispute has halted Croatia's EU
negotiations, our European partners over the past several
months have put forth a few proposals to end the impasse
between the two parties. On March 2 European Commission
Ambassador to Croatia Vincent Degert said that EU is
aggressively seeking a deal to unblock Croatia's EU bid
before the European Council meeting set for March 19 and 20.
(Note: The EU intergovernmental accession conference with
Croatia is scheduled for March 27. End Note) However, Degert
acknowledges the two parties are still far apart regarding
the potential mandate for the EU mediation. Furthermore,
there is still no agreement between the EU Commission and the
GoS that should Croatia and Slovenia both accept the
mediation proposal that the GoS would then necessarily
unblock Croatia's negotiating chapters. Given these
obstacles, it appears unlikely that the EU will meet its
timeline for getting a deal on resolving the dispute.


9. (C) Our efforts to be helpful in this process are
hamstrung by insufficient detail and coordination on the EU's
strategy for resolving this dispute. While it is natural
that Europeans should take the lead when dealing with matters
involving EU membership, discussions with senior members of
EU's Enlargement and Foreign Policy teams might facilitate
our ability to positively influence the process. Should the
current EU plan fail, it still may be possible to revive the
French proposal, particularly if it had the active support of
either the current or a future EU presidency, to put the
border issue on ice and allow Croatia's EU bid to progress.
Although it is a long shot, there may exist satisfactory
legal wording that would stipulate that no material submitted
during Croatia's EU negotiation process was intended to
prejudge the border and that Croatia's negotiating material
would have no bearing on any subsequent mediation or
arbitration regarding the border.


10. (C) It is clear that both Zagreb and Ljubljana need to
abandon entrenched positions. Should no formula be found to
break the impasse in the coming months, then the derailment
of Croatia's EU bid may well follow. Unfortunately, our
sense in Zagreb is that the GoC is reconciling itself to the
notion that the impasse will continue and its entry to the EU
in late 2010 or early 2011 is all but lost. Ultimately, this
disagreement over a maritime border could cause the entire
region--chock full of contentious bilateral disputes--to
re-think its prospects for integration into NATO and the
European Union. Sadly, without a credible Euro-Atlantic path
for the region, the costs and effort to maintain stability in
the Balkans go up immeasurably.
BRADTKE