ENGAGEMENT IN CAMEROON: PULLING TEETH, CHASING TAILS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YAOUNDE 000396

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, INL
USDOC FOR ITA - BURRESS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS: ASEC PREL PGOV EAID KCRM KJUS CM
SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT IN CAMEROON: PULLING TEETH, CHASING TAILS

YAOUNDE 00000396 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Political Officer Tad Brown for Reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Cameroon's governance problems--and the challenges
they create for USG assistance--are illustrated in the painstaking
process required to send Cameroonian officials on an all-expenses
training program in the US. Cameroonian President Biya told the
Ambassador he wanted the training, and it had the support of the
police hierarchy, but it took weeks of extensive Embassy lobbying at
the most senior levels and, eventually, a phone call from the Prime
Minister to President Biya, vacationing in Europe, to generate the
official permission needed for nine Cameroonian police to travel on
April 23 to International Law Enforcement Academy training in the
U.S. End summary.

Once Bitten
--------------


2. (SBU) In April 2008, Cameroon's ten candidates for an ILEA
program had their boarding passes in hand when the airport police
turned them away at the gate in Yaounde. They had been issued the
visas and had a letter of endorsement from the General Delegate for
National Security (DGSN - the head of national police - who had
personally selected the candidates). They were blocked by the
Cameroon's Border Police because they lacked Mission Orders, official
travel documents that need to be personally signed by the Secretary
General at the Presidency, Laurent Esso.

Try, Try Again
--------------


3. (SBU) Our contacts in the Government of Cameroon (GRC) told us
the travel had been refused because the Presidency was hesitant to
let security officers depart Cameroon in the wake of social unrest
that had rocked the country in February 2008. Concerned that the USG
had lost funds in forfeited travel and other expenses, the Embassy
refrained from offering further police training for the subsequent 12
months. Cognizant of the pressing need to improve governance in the
security sector, however, the Embassy decided to accept GRC
assurances that there would be no problems to send nine candidates to
an Advanced Management Course in Roswell, New Mexico, in April 2009.
More than a month in advance, the Ambassador solicited President
Biya's personal support for the training, and officers from the
Regional Security (RSO) and Pol-Econ Sections obtained assurances
from officials in the DGSN and Presidency, including Esso and the
Deputy Secretary General at the Presidency Philemon Yang.

You Can't GIVE This Stuff Away
--------------


4. (SBU) Despite these assurances from the most senior levels of
the GRC, the police officials were unable to obtain their Mission
Orders with less than a week before the training. Not wanting to
repeat the costly fiasco of April 2008, the Embassy launched a
multilayered full-court press. On April 21, we wrote to Esso saying
that if we did not have mission orders in our hands by 5 p.m. on
April 22, the offer would be rescinded so we could recoup the cost of
the tickets. Despite renewed assurances from Yang and dozens of
unreturned phone calls to various offices throughout the Presidency,
the Embassy's April 22 deadline for receiving the Mission Orders
passed without action from the GRC.

If You Want Something Done Right . . .
--------------


5. (C) At 6:00 on the evening of April 22, a family member of Prime
Minister Inoni (to whom Post had back-channeled its communication
with the Presidency) contacted Poloff at home to connect a phone call
from Inoni who said: "I have just spoken with the President in
Geneva. He is furious and cannot understand why this (the Mission
Orders) is not being done. He wants these officials to travel. Can
we still send them?" Inoni followed up with a call to the Charge,
promising that we would have the orders by 10 a.m. the next day. The
Embassy never received a response from Yang, Esso or anyone at the
Presidency to our repeated phone calls, faxes and emails, but the
Mission Orders were finally delivered at 4:10 p.m. on April 23, less
than four hours before the officials traveled. In an April 30 call
with Charge, Yang offered no apologies for not having returned our
calls, confirmed that President Biya personally has to approve all
such travel and offered to facilitate future clearances if we contact
him "early in the process."

Comment: Knock, Knock.
Who is There?
--------------


6. (C) This episode is emblematic of Cameroon's crippling
governance problems and the challenges the USG faces in trying to
engage with the GRC to advance U.S. interests from enhanced security

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to strengthened democracy. We still do not know if the Mission
Orders were lost in the bureaucratic shuffle or held up for a reason
(Esso is widely believed to be suspicious of growing U.S. engagement
in Cameroon). Yang's assurances of future facilitation are small
comfort; we did engage him and others at his level early and often,
with no discernible effect.


7. (C) No matter the underlying cause, this saga is one more
example (reftel) of Biya's inability to make his own office within
his own government carry out his own instructions. This revelation
is all the more troubling in light of the manifold challenges--from
growing socio-economic pressures and rising insecurity to the
uncertain transition to the post-Biya era--that confront Cameroon's
leadership.

FOX