(S) ALLEGED PLOT TO KILL BIYA "PLAUSIBLE, BUT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YAOUNDE 000275

SIPDIS

NDJAMENA FOR TIERNAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PINS ASEC CM
SUBJECT: (S) ALLEGED PLOT TO KILL BIYA "PLAUSIBLE, BUT
UNLIKELY" SAYS JUSTICE MINISTER

REF: A. LIBREVILLE 104

B. YAOUNDE 256

C. IIR 5 505 0033 09

D. 07 YAOUNDE 1315

E. 07 YAOUNDE 1235

Classified By: Political Officer Tad Brown for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S) Summary. According to Francis Dooh Collins, a
French national of Cameroonian origin who has proven to be
politically well-connected but of dubious credibility,
Minister of Defense Remy Ze Meka and a group of disgruntled
senior military officials intend to assassinate President
Paul Biya during the weekend of March 21-22. Dooh Collins
called Poloff March 19 and 20 claiming to have reviewed
telephone intercepts indicating Ze Meka planned to kill Biya
with an attack on Biya's convoy as he traveled to or from the
Presidential palace in Yaounde. On March 20, Poloff and DAO
briefed Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Amadou
Ali, who Collins said he had tried unsuccessfully to contact.
Ali said Ze Meka and other members of Biya's ethnic group
posed a real and immediate threat to Biya, but Ali admitted
he was unaware of Dooh Collins' allegations and did not
believe an attack would happen this weekend. End summary.


2. (S) Dooh Collins, a shadowy figure with remarkable
access and connections in Cameroon and across Africa (ref e),
telephoned Poloff on the evening of March 19, saying he
wanted to alert the Embassy that Minister of Defense Ze Meka
planned an attack "in Yaounde on Saturday or Sunday." Dooh
Collins said Biya and some Government of Cameroon (GRC)
officials were aware of the situation and he promised to call
Poloff back to provide further information, which he did on
March 20.


3. (S) Claiming he obtained the information from telephone
intercepts of Ze Meka's phone conversations, Dooh Collins
said Ze Meka planned to attack Biya during the weekend of
March 21 and 22. Dooh Collins said Ze Meka and a group of
senior military officials were angered that Biya's recent
decision to shift responsibility and resources from the
regular military to the Rapid Interventions Battalions (BIR)
would cost them substantial portions of their budget (ref c).
(Note. Biya recently decided to shift responsibility to the
BIR because the regular military had been decimated by Ze
Meka's corruption and that of other senior military
officials. Biya has more faith in the BIR, which is
commanded by Israeli national Colonel (Ret) Abraham Sivan,
who reports directly to Biya. End Note.)


4. (S) Dooh Collins said Ze Meka was backed by Akame
Mfoumou, a powerful former Minister of Finance and member of
Biya's own Bulu ethnic group. Dooh Collins said he had
briefed Sivan and Rene Sadi, the Deputy Secretary General at
the Presidency, and that Sadi had convened an emergency
meeting and put Presidential Security forces on alert. Dooh
Collins speculated that Ze Meka would attack Biya while he
was traveling to or from the Presidency in either a motorcade
or helicopter. Dooh Collins noted that Biya could be
expected to attend the funeral services for the recently
deceased wife of Gabonese President Omar Bongo (ref a).
(Note. Biya did not travel to the state funeral, which was
held March 19 in Libreville. Post does not know if Biya
intends to attend a ceremony in Congo (Brazzaville) scheduled
for March 22. End note.)


5. (S) Not wanting to add credibility to Dooh Collins'
claims, Ambassador sent Poloff and DAO to meet with Vice
Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Amadou Ali, who, from
previous experience, shares Post's reservations about Dooh
Collins' credibility (ref e). Ali thanked Emboffs for coming
to him with the information, saying he knew Dooh Collins was
trying unsuccessfully to reach him while he (with the rest of
the GRC's senior leadership) had been occupied with official
ceremonies related to the visit of the Pope, who departed
Cameroon around 10:30 on March 20.


6. (S) Ali, who served as Cameroon's Minister of Defense
from 1997-2001, said he believed it was "entirely possible"
that Ze Meka would undertake such an attack, but noted that
he was unaware of any information that an attack was imminent
and had not seen any sign that GRC security forces were

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reacting to such a threat. Ali said he had personally and
repeatedly warned Biya that members of Biya's own Bulu ethnic
group, including Ze Meka and Mfoumou, posed a serious and
immediate threat to Biya because they felt Biya would not
sufficiently protect their interests in determining his own
succession (ref b).


7. (S) Ali cautioned that Dooh Collins was a "loud-mouth,
chatty, self-promoter," but admitted that Dooh Collins had
proven relationships with powerful and influential people in
Cameroon and internationally. Ali said he believed Dooh
Collins was connected to Adolphe Moudiki, the powerful
General Manager of the National Hydrocarbons Company (SNH),
and to members of the Israeli intelligence community. Ali
said he would delicately try to determine if other GRC
officials were cognizant of and concerned by the claims, but
told Emboffs: "I have an internal compass about these things
in Cameroon, and right now my compass tells me that this is
not going to happen this weekend."


8. (S) DAO spoke with a member of Sivan's staff who said
that Sivan is currently out of Yaounde on routine business
and is not aware of any pressing security concerns.

Comment: Don't Trust, But Verify
--------------


9. (S) We have learned to take Dooh Collins' claims with a
healthy dose of skepticism. Despite making often outlandish
and outright false statements, Dooh Collins does have
significant connections in and out of Cameroon. Some of his
previous claims--most notably his report in 2007 that Ze Meka
concocted a coup plot to frame Ali (ref d)--have proven
accurate, and we share Ali's hesitancy to ignore Dooh Collins
completely. We have no independent substantiation of Dooh
Collins' allegation and we are wary of repeating them to our
contacts for fear of lending them credibility and associating
ourselves with Dooh Collins.


10. (S) That Sivan has not been alerted and called back to
Yaounde suggests that the threat, if it exists, is not being
taken too seriously by Biya or his security team (and further
undermines Dooh Collins' credibility). The mere fact that
Ali was willing to openly entertain the possibility that the
Minister of Defense would assassinate the President in the
coming days is, in itself, indicative; even Cameroon's most
powerful leaders are gripped with uncertainty and anxiety
about the transition beyond the 26-year reign of President
Biya.
GARVEY