AMBASSADOR MULL BRIEFS MOSCOW SUMMIT TO POLES;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000738

SIPDIS

EUR/CE FOR MARY GLANTZ; T FOR COSTA NICOLAIDIS; OSD FOR
BRAD MITCHELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV MAPP MARR PL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MULL BRIEFS MOSCOW SUMMIT TO POLES;
HEARS SOFA AND PATRIOTS IN RETURN

Classified By: CDA Quanrud for reasons 1.4 b and d



1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Stephen Mull reassured senior
GOP officials July 8 that President Obama had protected U.S.
redlines during the Moscow Summit and bartered neither
European missile defense (MD) plans nor future NATO
enlargement to gain Russian cooperation on ballistic missile
defense. Poles were reassured and grateful for the
timeliness of Mull's visit. FM Radoslaw Sikorski set a
positive tone, saying "better U.S.-Russia relations are also
good for Poland" and congratulating the Administration on a
successful summit. Understanding that an MD decision was
still pending, Sikorski sought assurances that last August's
bilateral Declaration on Strategic Cooperation remained in
force, while Mull stressed that the U.S. needed to understand
more completely how the proposed U.S. Patriot
rotation/deployment fit into Polish air defense thinking.
The Polish side hoped that the next plenary SoFA negotiations
will bring the two countries closer to final agreement, but
Sikorski and others pressed for the U.S. to schedule the
first Patriot rotation this year under the auspices of the
NATO SoFA. END SUMMARY.

SIKORSKI SETS POSITIVE TONE


2. (S) In conversations with FM Sikorski, Mull outlined the
current state of play in post-START negotiations, as well as
U.S. thinking on Russian insistence on linking offensive and
defensive systems. Sikorski welcomed the explanation that
the U.S. would not agree to limits on either numbers or
locations for defensive systems. In response to Mull's
confirmation of the President's threat-driven mandate for the
ongoing MD review, Sikorski praised the U.S. for not
conceding MD to Russia -- "you made it clear that your
decision will be based on your assessment of the threat -
good."


3. (S) Sikorski noted that better U.S.-Russia relations was
also good for Poland. That said, should the U.S. decide to
drop the European Interceptor Site (EIS),we would need to
calibrate carefully how to manage Russian glee. Poland had
made a serious political investment, and a hasty walk away
from the EIS would not look good for either Prime Minister
Donald Tusk or, frankly, for Sikorski himself. Mull
emphasized that the fate of the EIS was tied to the
assessment of Iran's ICBM capability.


4. (S) Sikorski asked if the U.S.-Polish Declaration on
Strategic Cooperation was still in force, and was assured on
that point. Mull acknowledged that there had been mixed
expectations with respect to the Patriots, but that in any
case, we needed to finish the SoFA talks to move forward. A
Pentagon team would visit in a few weeks to walk through
details about the Patriots and to get a better sense of how
Poland envisioned its own air defense systems. Sikorski
thought we could find a way ahead on the SoFA by examining
recent examples of other U.S. SoFAs. That said, Poland would
like the U.S. to accept the NATO SoFA as a legitimate basis
for the initial Patriot rotation, so that we could keep to
the 2009 deadline established in the Declaration.

FLEXIBILITY ON SOFA?


5. (S) SoFA negotiations were more central in Ambassador
Mull's earlier meeting with Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw
Komorowski and Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Kremer.
Komorowski said several times that the GoP could not
negotiate a bad agreement because it would risk a tough
ratification battle in Parliament from the more nationalist
Law and Justice (PiS) party. He hoped for significant
progress during the July 13 experts meeting and July 14-16
plenary in Washington, and urged flexibility for both sides.


6. (S) Komorowski previewed Sikorski's position on
Patriots, asking Mull if there really needed to be a
supplemental SoFA. It was his view that the NATO SoFA, with
a complementary MOU, would be sufficient, at least for the
first rotation. He said there would be substantial negative
political effects if Patriot did not arrive on Polish soil in
2009 per the Declaration, noting that the climate of public
opinion would turn against the U.S. He added that Poles had
been disappointed with their experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as well as with MD and the lack of a visa waiver
program.

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7. (S) COMMENT: The Polish leadership welcomed Ambassador
Mull's visit, and the U.S. accomplished its goal of assuaging
fears that Poland's interests would be sacrificed for the
sake of better relations with Russia. The lead-up to the
Moscow summit had produced considerable anxiety among Poles,
as both GoP officials and the general public questioned
whether Poland would become yet again a bargaining chip for
more influential powers. We would note, however, that we are
not home yet, and Poles will likely remain cautious until a
final deal takes shape with Russia on the BMD threat
assessment and other issues currently under discussion. Our
interlocutors were impressed that President Obama had thus
far held firm against Russian demands to link the future of
the European sites with U.S.-Russia cooperation on MD, and
would welcome further high-level consultations with the U.S.
on strategic security issues. END COMMENT.


8. (U) Ambassador Mull has cleared this cable.
QUANRUD