FRAUD SUMMARY-(VIENTIANE): SPRING 2009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 VIENTIANE 000249

SIPDIS

STATE FOR CA/FPP (Overstrom)
STATE FOR CA/CI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LA
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY-(VIENTIANE): SPRING 2009

REF: (A) 08 Vientiane 558

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1. (U) SUMMARY: Vientiane is a medium fraud level post, with
significant percentages of immigrant visa (IV) cases returned and a
very large number of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) cases refused. The
Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) in Vientiane currently consists of one
full-time Locally Employed Staff (LES) who also heads NIV. The
Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) is the Vice Consul who has other
collateral duties at post, including visa and ACS interviews. The
most prominent fraud experienced at post involves K-1 petitions.
Fianc(e) and spousal related visa cases consume 83% of immigrant
visa workload, almost doubling in numbers since 2004 and straining
FPU resources. A newly hired LES member should allow devotion of
more resources to fraud prevention and detection. FPU logged a
total of 81 NIV, 157 IV and one ACS investigations, with 30 field
investigations, from September 2008 to March 2009. END SUMMARY.


A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS


2. (U) The Lao People's Democratic Republic is a least-developed
country with a single-party communist government. An estimated
US$572 per capita income ranks Laos as one of the poorest countries
in East Asia. Some 70% of the population live on less than $2 a
day; 23% live on less than $1 per day. Illiteracy is at nearly 50%.
Agriculture is the dominant sector of the economy, contributing 46%
of the GDP and employing approximately 79% of the population, mostly
through subsistence farming.


3. (U) Laos is a medium fraud level country. The main contributors
to fraud in Laos are the large proportion of the population with
family ties in the U.S., and the intention of many to work illegally
in the U.S. Most of the applicant pool at Embassy Vientiane, as
well as most of the fraud, comes from two of Laos's 49 official
ethnic groups: the ethnic Lao and the Hmong. Ethnic Lao are the
largest ethnic group in the country. The Hmong constitute less than
ten percent of the population but make up an estimated 25 to 30
percent of our visa applicant pool. The most recent U.S. census
estimated that 170,000 ethnic Lao and 170,000 ethnic Hmong currently
live in the United States. Hmong-American petitioners of K-1 visas
have tripled in number since 2004, possibly due to a change in Lao
immigration policy allowing longer stays for U.S. citizens born in
Laos.


B. NIV FRAUD


4. (U) Eighty-six percent of NIV applicants at post request B1/B2
visas, the majority of whom are applying to visit relatives.
Identity fraud is one of the largest problems currently facing the
consular section. Some applicants after being refused visas return
at a later time with a new identity which is reflected in a new
national ID card, new household registration, and new passport.
Vientiane has one of the highest adjusted NIV refusal rates in the
world at 68%. A 2006 B1/B2 validation study indicated a 39%
non-return rate and 2008 R-1 validation study indicated a 20%
non-return rate. Very few third country nationals apply at post; for
the reporting period only 66 third country nationals out of 3,558
applicants applied for nonimmigrant visas; forty seven were issued
visas.


5. (U) From September 2008 to March 2009, NIV applications decreased
27% compared to the same period last year. Refused applicants have
reported to officers during fraud investigations that family members
in the U.S have told them that finding work in the U.S. is now much
more difficult due to the economic decline in recent months. In
addition, many of those applicants who have family members in the
U.S. report that they can no longer depend on financial support from
abroad for their travel.


6. (U) Although the U.S. is still the most popular destination for
Lao travelers, an increasing number of those issued visas do not
actually use them for travel. Instead, they use them to bolster
their credentials to apply for visas from Australia, Canada, the
U.K. and other European countries.


7. (U) R-1 visa applications were previously rife with fraud. A
2008 validation study showed that 20% of issued applicants remained
in the U.S. and that many did not work at the temples that
originally sponsored them. Since December 2008, when USCIS began
requiring an approved I-129 petition for R-1 religious workers, post
has seen a dramatic drop in new applications, and did not see a
single approved petition in the first three months of 2009.


8. (U) Post does not handle many H and L cases. For the reporting

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period, Embassy Vientiane adjudicated one H1B for a Chilean citizen
and no L cases.


C. IV Fraud


9. (U) Relationship fraud is rampant in immigration cases; this
generally includes sham marriages and divorces, among close family
relatives, and relationships simply for immigration purposes. FPU
has developed a list of fraud indicators commonly seen in sham Lao
relationships. The limited education of most Lao applicants and the
culturally accepted practice of arranged marriages means that some
bona fide applicants and their fianc(e)s in the United States who
have every intention of marrying and following immigration law may
not have strong evidence of relationship that one might expect (such
as specific knowledge about each other's lives, interests, etc.).


10. (SBU) Over the past four years, post has seen a 66% increase in
K-1 petitions, from 472 in 2004 to 783 in 2008. During this period,
K-1 applications stayed steady at 75% of the total IV application
intake. However, given their complexity and high fraud potential,
K-1 petitions take up the bulk of FPU resources and time in
examining relationships and fraud indicators. FPU recently
conducted a K-1 visa validation study of applicants issued in 2004
that showed 14% of issued visa cases contained fraud. Fraud rates
seem to be increasing significantly. For example, in 2004 only 29
cases were returned for revocation, where as 150 cases were returned
for revocation in 2008. The primary reasons for requesting petition
revocation were a lack of evidence of relationship (66%),hidden
spouses and pseudo-bigamous petitioners (21%),invalid divorces
(8%),and suspected underage beneficiaries (5%).


D. DV FRAUD


11. (SBU) Post experiences high fraud in managing diversity visa
cases. Many 2007 DV lottery "winners" could not substantiate
education, bona fide marital status, or vocational qualifications.
Many students either do not receive or do not keep school documents
issued at the time of graduation. Few receive formal vocational
training in qualifying skills. Derivative spousal relationships can
often be documented only after principal applicants have been
notified of being selected for the DV program. In 2008 and 2009, a
U.S. citizen visa consultant, who served as the primary form filler
for Lao DV applicants in the U.S. turned her efforts to K-1 visas.
Since then, we have seen a large drop in the number of successful DV
applicants coming to interview. Only two cases reached Post in
2008, and both were unable to complete the requested documents
before the September 30th deadline.


E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD


12. (U) FPU experiences low fraud rates for ACS and passport
services. The number of American citizens traveling to Laos for
tourism, business, or retirement continues to increase, but so far
without apparent increased fraud.


F. ADOPTION FRAUD


13. (SBU) Adoption fraud rates remain at a medium rate. Adoption of
Lao children by foreign citizens is prohibited in Laos. However,
because it was prohibited by Prime Ministerial decree, the Prime
Minister's office can waive the restriction. Until recently, post
saw very few adoption cases (seven in 2007). This number increased
to 23 in 2008 as a number of expatriate U.S. citizens resident in
Laos adopted Lao infants. FPU and the IV Unit are working closely
with the Ministry of Justice office that oversees the adoption
process to monitor potential fraudulent applications and potential
child trafficking issues. To date, no cases of "child buying" or
other fraud indicators have been detected.


G. USE OF DNA TESTING


14. (U) In cases of suspected relationship fraud, or where
sufficient evidence of relationship is lacking, post has requested
DNA tests to prove a biological relationship. Five mala fide
applicants were discovered through DNA testing in the last 12
months, two involving CRBA cases. Laos has several complicating
factors, including lack of a centralized civil records system, lack
of popular awareness of any need to register births or other
important life events, and poor record keeping in general. It is not
uncommon to have extended and polygamous families living together.
Often, cousins or family friends are listed as children of the head
of the household, and are commonly referred to in conversations as
siblings or children. Post is increasing its usage of DNA testing,

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and now monitors CRBA and IV cases for possible abandonment after
requesting DNA. In the last six months, it appears that about 60 to
70 percent of cases follow up on DNA requests within one to three
months.


H. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD


15. (U) There is little or no asylum or DHS benefit fraud from the
limited number of Visa 92/93 cases that post processes.


I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORIST
TRAVEL:


16. (U) Laos is a source and transit country for Trafficking in
Persons (TIP). Applications by third country nationals, outside of
resident NGO foreign employees, are rare. Consular officers do rely
on translators for applicants who do not speak Lao, Hmong or
English. In some cases, applicants supply their own translator,
which could provide opportunities for traffickers. Post also works
closely with the Regional Fraud Prevention Manager and the
Department of Homeland Security for cases suspected of involving
regional smuggling rings. For cases with a U.S. nexus, the Regional
Security Officer works with U.S. and local law enforcement for
arrest and prosecution.


J. COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES


17. (U) The Consular Chief meets regularly with working level
counterparts at the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to discuss an array of issues, including Lao passport fraud.
Each month, three to five applicants present duplicate passports
issued with new names, surnames and dates of birth. This is done to
hide prior refusals or derogatory information in our database.
Post's consular officers confiscate these passports, which are
detected by the IDENT system, and return them to MFA with
information about the applicants and their claimed identities. MFA
officials have stated that the false identity problem is a local
problem, as vital documents are issued at the village level,
household registrations are issued at the district level, identity
cards are issued at the provincial level, and passports are issued
based on those local documents.


18. (U) While the MFA has stated that holding two identities is a
crime under Lao law, they have not clarified what penalties these
crimes might warrant, and what procedures one must follow to legally
change one's name (a common occurrence in Laos, generally to change
one's luck). The MFA has requested that we send any fraudulent
identity passports to them for their action, but there seems to be
little follow-up by authorities to punish offenders.


19. (U) Consular officers at post also work in close coordination
with Bangkok's Immigration Compliance Experts (ICE) Team in training
Vientiane immigration officers at the Wattay International Airport
and at the Friendship Bridge land border connecting Laos to
Thailand. Training sessions are taught on a variety of immigration
issues such as detecting imposters, false documents, passports, and
visas, and working with Thai immigration and airline colleagues.


20. (U) Post holds consular lunches with other Embassies' consular
representatives on a quarterly basis to share issues of concern and
fraud trends. Consuls and immigration officers from Australia,
France, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Singapore usually attend.
FPU recently cooperated with counterparts at the Australian Embassy
on detecting fraudulent bank books and marriage certificates. We
shared exemplar mala fide documents to improve our adjudications.


K. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS


21. (U) The consular section requests assistance from the Regional
Security Office to investigate one to three suspected cases of NIV
and IV fraud each month. A local RSO investigator assists with
verifying employment, identity and claimed relationships of visa
applicants.


L. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CIVIL REGISTRY


22. (SBU) Laos does not have a well-established system for issuing
civil documents. There is no standardized form for birth or
marriage certificates and no centralized authority for the issuance
of such documents. Many documents are handwritten and issued by a
village chief. Passports and national ID cards are the only
nationally issued forms of identification. The information on a Lao
passport or ID card cannot always be accepted at face value. False

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or duplicate identities are common among visa applicants. Forged or
false business licenses, bank books, identity cards, and household
registration books are common. Detection of altered or fraudulent
documents is also common, as production is generally
unsophisticated.


M. Areas of Particular Concern


23. (U) Adjudicating officers have encountered applicants who have
purchased visa packages and interview coaching from nefarious
individuals and businesses throughout the capital. In March 2009, a
woman appeared for an NIV interview with a falsely claimed purpose
of travel and counterfeit government and supporting documents. When
interviewed for an hour by FPU, she admitted to purchasing a visa
package from an individual outside of MFA for $3,000-$4,000. The
package even included borrowed clothing (to look professional),
jewelry, and a designer name purse. It turned out that the
applicant sought to engage in unauthorized employment in the U.S.,
either at a farm or a restaurant in California, should her visa be
granted.


N. Staffing and Training


24. (U) In March, the Regional FPM based in Bangkok and one FPU
LES-Investigator visited Vientiane and provided valuable training
for officers and LES on interviewing methodology, field visit
techniques, maintaining fraud statistics and reporting.


25. (U) The Fraud Prevention Manager at post is Neal Turner. Post
has no LES Investigators at this time, but selects LES from the Visa
Unit to assist with cases. The LES NIV Manager serves as the
designated FPU LES and works closely with the FPM on SOPs and
caseload management.

HUSO