PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SYG

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 VALLETTA 000498

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/SEMEP
DEPT ALSO FOR D, P, EUR AND NEA
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSA JONES, ROSS, SHERWOOD-RANDALL, KUMAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS MT
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SYG
URGES "COMPLEMENTARY STRATEGY" FOR U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE
PLAN INITIATIVES

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas Kmiec, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY. U.S. Ambassador to Malta Douglas Kmiec met
November 12 with Mr. Sergio Piazzi, Secretary General of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM),at
Piazzi's request. Piazzi urged U.S. support for and
participation in PAM's planned February meeting in Malta on
the Jerusalem issue as a "complementary strategy" in support
of the Quartet Roadmap and U.S. Special Envoy George
Mitchell's efforts. Piazzi offered examples of where "Track
Two" discussions brokered by PAM might be fruitful, including
on the issue of settlements. In a call to PolOff November
14, Piazzi reiterated his request and advised that Deputy
Palestinian National Council Speaker Tayseer Qubaa also
supported this approach. On a related topic, with regard to
upcoming Palestinian Authority elections, Piazzi reported
Qubaa's belief that PA President Mahmoud Abbas would remain
in office following elections, that an election postponement
was not desired but likely, and that Fatah would retain the
PA Presidency regardless of who its candidate was. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) On November 12, U.S. Ambassador to Malta Douglas
Kmiec (along with DCM and PolOff) met with Parliamentary
Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM) Secretary General Sergio
Piazzi, who has held his current position since April 2007.
Piazzi's reason for seeking the meeting was to discuss
developments in the Middle East, meetings that PAM has had
with parliamentary representatives from the region, PAM's
recent trip to Washington, DC, and discussions there, and to
encourage the U.S. to participate selectively in
PAM-organized meetings as part of a "complementary strategy"
in support of the Quartet Roadmap and U.S. Special Envoy
Mitchell's efforts. Piazzi sees PAM as a potential venue for
"Track Two" diplomacy which could be used to explore
potential solutions to problems where direct talks would be
premature or counterproductive, and he sees the February
meeting on Jerusalem as an opportunity for the USG to support
such Track Two initiatives.


3. (S) Piazzi expressed a clear understanding of the
exclusivity of the Quartet's position as mediator in the
MEPP, but suggested that PAM could play a "complementary"
role by facilitating discussion of issues which were not ripe
for Quartet review. As one example of such a topic, Piazzi
raised the issue of Israeli settlements and Arab recognition
of Israel. He offered his opinion - based on his contacts
with PAM Arab delegates and others in the Arab leadership -
that many Arab governments would be ready to recognize
"tomorrow," but that some sort of a freeze on settlements was
needed to allow them to satisfy internal political demands
and public opinion. Noting that the amount of land on which
Israeli settlements are situated is relatively small in
absolute terms, Piazzi suggested that there was some Arab
willingness to negotiate land swaps - of plots with
comparable water resources, access, arability, etc. - in
order to arrive at an acceptable definition of a "freeze" and
fix a new border. This was an issue of such emotional
explosiveness, however, that it likely could not be resolved
solely within the Quartet framework. PAM could provide its
good offices in a "Track Two" scenario to bring together
influential parties from both sides who could develop a
consensus within their own countries for the general outline
of what such a swap would look like before it was brought to
the Quartet for discussion.


4. (C) According to Piazzi, PAM would be a productive and
successful venue for such discussions because it enjoys the
support of both Israeli and Arab/Palestinian
parliamentarians, can count on high-level attendance from
both sides, and has been successful in brokering such talks
in the past. He cited the example of recent discussions on
the Cyprus issue and special task forces PAM has established
to support the last point. Piazzi stated that PAM has Arab
(and in particular, Syrian) confidence as an honest broker
for discussions of issues related to the Middle East Peace
Process (MEPP). With respect to Israeli participation, he
noted the presence at PAM meetings of current Arab
Likud/Kadima party MP and former Deputy Knesset speaker
Majalli Wahabi. Per Piazzi, Wahabi's presence at PAM

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meetings has been accepted by Arab delegations and has not
prompted walk-outs, even by hard-line states such as Libya
and Syria. Israeli parliamentarians have also indicated to
PAM that they will be participating in the February meeting
on Jerusalem in Malta. Prior high-level PAM participants
have included Turkish PM Erdogan during discussions on
Cyprus, and Egypt has reportedly suggested that President
Hosni Mubarak would be willing to attend or meet on the
margins of a PAM meeting if circumstances warranted. Piazzi
also reported he had received some U.S. support for this
approach, from U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (MD),U.S.
Representatives Robert Wexler (FL) and Darrell Issa (CA),and
from NSC staffers.


5. (S) On related matters, Piazzi indicated he had been told
by Arab delegates that the current Israeli position on East
Jerusalem was unacceptable to both Jordan and the Palestinian
Authority, because it would split any Palestinian state into
two parts, making it unsustainable. He also indicated that
his Egyptian, Palestinian and Syrian interlocutors had
expressed "disappointed" at recent statements by Secretary
Clinton, but that President Obama had "fundamentally changed
the perception and sentiment of Arab States toward the U.S."
by his remarks in Cairo and other action. Piazzi urged that
the U.S. should take advantage of that shift to urge bold
action now, as the impact was likely to fade with time.


6. (S) Following up in a call to PolOff on November 14,
Piazzi advised that he had phoned Deputy Palestinian National
Council Speaker Tayseer Qubaa, who offered his support to
PAM's approach. Qubaa also emphasized the importance of not
interfering with the Quartet process, but viewed PAM's
"complementary" mechanism as an opportunity to reinvigorate
the MEPP and get the parties to "commit to stand by what they
have already agreed to." With regard to upcoming Palestinian
Authority elections, Piazzi reported Qubaa's belief that PA
President Mahmoud Abbas would remain in office following
elections, that an election postponement was not desired but
was likely, and that Fatah would retain the PA Presidency
regardless of who its candidate ultimately was.


7. (C) Ambassador advised Piazzi that Post would pass his
suggestions to Washington, and urged him to continue to avoid
any action which would be seen as injecting PAM into Quartet
discussions. If U.S. participation in PAM's February Malta
conference is contemplated, post is prepared to assist.


8. (S) COMMENT: (S) Ambassador has had several conversations
with the Palestinian Ambassador to Malta and with Suha Arafat
(widow of Yassir Arafat). Increasingly, these conversations
indicate a sense of loss of confidence in President Obama,s
ability to carry out the spirit of the Cairo speech. Both
Palestinian sources are "distressed" that the President does
not seem to have personally committed to the peace process,
for both conclude that had he done so, he would have secured
by now some tangible improvement in the situation in the
Gaza, especially with the onset of winter and the reported
continued Israeli interdiction of basic foodstuffs and
building materials. These Palestinian sources are also less
optimistic with respect to the continued role of a moderate
voice like Abbas, or according to Arafat, Salam Fayad. These
Palestinian sources expressed strong support for the PAM
conference as a complement to the Quartet process, and in
addition, both would favor greater UN involvement, especially
as it relates to the rebuilding of basic infrastructure in
Gaza supported by UN relief funding.
KMIEC