AD HOC COMMITTEE ON MEASURES TO ELIMINATE

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000692

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL CT
SUBJECT: AD HOC COMMITTEE ON MEASURES TO ELIMINATE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MEETS JUNE 29 TO JULY 2


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Ad Hoc Committee on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism met from June 29 to July 2
to discuss the Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism (CCIT). While all countries publicly expressed the
belief that terrorism must be condemned and professed the
desirability of bringing the negotiations to a conclusion in
the near future, the continued refusal of OIC countries to
accept the text from other counterterrorism conventions on
the exclusion of the acts of armed forces from the scope of
the Convention (e.g. Article 18) and the desire to exclude
the actions of national liberation movements from the scope
of the convention prevented any meaningful progress, as they
have for the past eight years. The OIC reiterated its
previous alternative proposal on this provision and publicly
remained steadfast that groups under foreign occupation and
fighting for their right to self-determination should be
exempted from the CCIT. In private, Pakistan indicated
during bilateral consultations that there may be an
opportunity to reach a compromise with a number of OIC
countries.


2. While the 2007 Coordinator's proposal did not receive
strong support during the plenary or informal consultations,
many delegations outside the OIC, including most EU
countries, India, Russia and China, have signaled a
willingness to accept the 2007 Coordinator's proposal as a
way forward. The USG advocated a return to the 2002 text,
which was based on a formulation used in five other
counterterrorism conventions, and signaled discomfort with
the 2007 proposal while not formally rejecting it. Both
publicly and bilaterally, India stressed their desire finally
to complete work on the CCIT (their initiative) in the near
future. Despite the lack of true progress, at the closing
session the Chair, the Coordinator and many delegations
stated that momentum had been generated and that the CCIT
could soon be agreed upon, perhaps as soon as this fall. END
SUMMARY.


3. (SBU) ACTION REQUESTED: USUN expects considerable
pressure on the USG, particularly by India, between now and
this fall's UNGA session to take constructive steps to move
the process forward, either by embracing the 2007
Coordinator's text or by proposing an alternative. USUN
requests that the Department assess whether the benefits of
concluding the proposed convention are worth additional USG
concessions. If so, we request Department advice whether a
further compromise along the lines of the 2007 Coordinator's
proposal is consistent with protecting fundamental USG
interests, or if the USG is prepared to suggest another
approach that might similarly resolve the pending impasse in
an acceptable manner. There will be a Perm Rep-level session
in mid-August in New York with India to discuss bi-lateral
cooperation at the UN, and the Indians have made clear that
the CCIT is their top priority. USUN requests guidance in
advance of those meetings, including any new Department
proposals, that might provide a way forward.

BUREAU AND US DELEGATION


4. (U) The Bureau for the meeting was:
Rohan Perera (Sri Lanka),Chairman
Maria Telalian (Greece),Vice-Chairperson
Ana Cristina Rodriguez-Pineda (Guatemala),Vice-Chairperson
Namira Nabil Negm (Egypt),Vice-Chairperson
Andi Xhoi (Albania),Rapporteur


5. (U) The USG was represented by:
Clifton Johnson, Assistant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement
and Intelligence (L/LEI)
Mary McLeod, Legal Adviser, USUN
James Donovan, Deputy Legal Adviser, USUN
Peter Gutherie, Attorney-Adviser, L/LEI
Timothy Schirmer, Intern, USUN

OIC GROUP


6. (U) Syria, on behalf of the OIC Group, spoke first at the
June 29 morning plenary session, reiterated the previous
(2002) OIC proposal on the scope of the draft proposal and
stressed the need to make "a clear distinction between
terrorism and the exercise of legitimate right of peoples to
resist foreign occupation." As in the past, Syria said that
the OIC Group "supports a comprehensive strategy to combat
terrorism that must address the root cause of terrorism,
including unlawful use of force, aggression, foreign
occupation, festering international disputes, denial of the
right of peoples living under foreign occupation to
self-determination, political and economic injustices and
political marginalization and alienation." Qatar, Egypt,
Morocco and Saudi Arabia seconded the OIC statement.


7. (U) At the June 30 plenary, Egypt repeated its call for a
high-level conference on international terrorism (HLCIT)
prior to conclusion of the CCIT to discuss counterterrorism
issues, including the definition of terrorism, root causes of
terrorism, the interplay of terrorism and human rights, and
so on. Syria chimed in that such a conference would be an
important step toward adoption of the CCIT.
Europe


8. (U) The Czech Republic spoke on behalf of the European
Union. The EU indicated that it supported reaching agreement
on the CCIT based on the coordinator's proposal of 2002 or
the coordinator's proposal of 2005 (A/59/894) (note: the text
of Article 20 of the 2005 proposal is the same as the 2002
Coordinator's text for Article 18),but were "willing to
examine any legally sound and well-founded proposals," and
looked forward to an exchange of views with other delegations
"including with regard to the coordinator's 2007 package
proposal," which they were prepared to "consider seriously."
As in the past, they said they would only support a HLCIT
once the text of the comprehensive convention was agreed
upon. Comment: The UK and France have indicated to us that
they oppose the 2007 Coordinator's proposal, and appear to be
blocking a EU position in support of the proposal.


9. (U) Switzerland expressed the view that although the
coordinator's proposal "still has room for improvement, it
provides a basis for compromise."


10. (U) Liechtenstein, noting the concerns expressed by some
delegations about the coordinator's 2007 proposal, asked
whether other delegations agreed to its assumption that the
proposal did not change the obligations of states under
international humanitarian law, and that while it was
important to protect the "integrity" of international
humanitarian law, "integrity" was different from "uniformity."

WHA


11. (U) Mexico spoke on behalf of the Rio Group. While
condemning terrorism, they stressed their "unequivocal
conviction that the measures to combat international
terrorism must comply at all times with international law,
including international human rights law and refugee law."
They expressed disappointment over the fact that an agreement
has not yet been reached, due to differences over Article 18,
and said it was their understanding "that the moment has
arrived to reach a solution which reflects the common
expectations and interests of all delegations." With respect
to the timing of a HLCIT, they echoed the EU and U.S.
positions in advocating conclusion of the CCIT prior to
convening a conference.


12. (U) Cuba expressed support for the OIC's position that
those parties fighting for their right to self-determination
be exempted from the coverage of any definition or convention
adopted by the Committee. Cuba favored holding the HLCIT
prior to adoption of the CCIT.


13. (U) Ecuador summarized the actions taken by their
government to combat terrorism, specifically stricter
enforcement and regulations related to terrorist financing
and drug trade. They also expressed the need for the
Committee to address the victims of terrorist attacks, not
just the perpetrators. Ecuador also explicitly expressed
support that UN actions taken to combat terrorism be taken at
the regional level.

ASIA


14. (U) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea made a
thinly veiled attack on the United States. They expressed
concern about "state-sponsored terrorism," states using the
threat of terrorism as an excuse to overthrow governments
they feel are hostile to their goals, and cited Iraq and
Afghanistan as the prime examples of "state-sponsored
terrorism."


15. (U) India, which originally proposed the CCIT, championed
speedy conclusion of the CCIT, both publicly and in bilateral
meetings. In their plenary statement, they stressed that
"(n)o cause can ever justify terrorism," expressed optimism
that an agreement on the Convention would be reached soon,
and called on all delegations to "seriously examine the
proposals before us." In informal consultations, they
indicated they supported the 2002 coordinator's text, but
stated that the coordinator's 2007 proposal deserved serious
consideration. They supported waiting to hold the HLICT
until after conclusion of the CCIT.


16. (U) China indicated that it could live with either the
2002 coordinator's text or the 2007 coordinator's text.


U.S. POSITION


17. (U) Cliff Johnson addressed the Committee for the USG on
June 29. He stated that the U.S. remained supportive of a
CCIT "that would strengthen the existing international
counterterrorism legal regime and reinforce the critical
principle that no cause or grievance justifies terrorism in
any form." He emphasized that the United States saw the CCIT
as a law enforcement tool that must be predicated on a shared
and clear understanding of two principles: (1) that the CCIT
cannot provide a pretext for terrorist groups to claim their
criminal acts are excluded from the scope of the convention
in the name of national liberation, resistance to foreign of
occupation, or any other justification or motivation and (2)
that, as with prior counterterrorism conventions, the CCIT
should not reach state military action, which is subject to
other regimes. He noted that these issues had been
successfully and consistently dealt with in five previous
counterterrorism instruments, and stated that the USG had not
"been persuaded
that there are deficiencies that need to be remedied in this
standard language that the international community has
adopted five times before." At the June 30 session, Peter
Gutherie reiterated the long-standing USG view that
consideration of a HLCIT would be appropriate only after work
was completed on the CCIT. Otherwise, such a conference
risked divisive and unconstructive divisions among states in
their perception of and efforts to combat terrorism rather
than global cooperation and commonality in fighting it.

ISRAEL


18. (U) Israel stated that the CCIT must reflect the firm
resolve of the international community against any terrorism,
in any form; any ambiguity was not acceptable. The CCIT must
also reflect the basic moral and legal principle that the
murder of innocents can never be justified. While the 2002
coordinator's text was most in line with their view, they
were prepared to discuss "all new ideas." Finally, in
Israel's view, any HLCIT should be conducted after an
agreement by the Ad Hoc Committee.
Africa


19. (U) Senegal and Ghana urged countries to show flexibility
on wording and to strive to reach an agreement as soon as
possible.

COORDINATOR'S INTERVENTIONS


20. (U) Telalian remained a staunch proponent of her 2007
proposal for Article 18. In her report to the plenary on
June 29 concerning bilateral contacts and informal meetings
she held prior to the meeting, she stated that despite nine
years of negotiation and "recognition among delegations that
the negotiations are in a state of inertia," she detected
"guarded optimism" that delegations might "begin to project
periods within which the current process may be concluded."
"A little push of goodwill and a realization that the
twenty-fifth mile of the marathon has been reached might help
the process move forward." She decried a persistent tendency
"to hold on to previously held positions while signaling a
willingness to remain engaged," and to "read specific
situations, events and circumstances into the proposed text."
"Natural as that mindset might be for lawyers, it needs to
be eschewed when involved in a legislative exercise of the
type that we embarked upon," where "the essential role is to
project principles."


21. (U) Telalian sought to "distill" "principles and points
of convergence" as follows: (a) the draft convention is
designed to serve as a law enforcement instrument, an
instrument for ensuring individual criminal responsibility on
the basis of an extradite or prosecute regime; (b) the draft
convention cannot be viewed in isolation of other rules of
international law, but as an additional building block in an
already existing legal framework; (c) three existing legal
regimes are implicated by the draft convention-law under the
UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international
and national "security law" (which separates when
administering justice the activities of the civil
administration from those of the military)-and IHL in
particular is not to be prejudiced by the draft convention,
i.e., the draft convention is not intended to impose
international humanitarian standards on States that are not
otherwise bound by them or to supersede such obligations
where they exist; (d) there is precedent in other
counterterrorism instruments for excluding activities of
armed forces during an armed conflict (but given the
exclusion, consideration might be given to changing the work
"comprehensive" in the draft convention's title); (e) such
exclusions do not grant armed forces impunity.


CLOSING SESSION


22. (U) Talelian spoke first in the July 2 plenary on her
consultations during the meeting and doggedly touted her 2007
proposal. She asserted: "There was no desire to revert to
the pre 2007 position." She noted that her proposal was
aimed at overcoming the impasse that had been reached and had
to be understood as part of an overall CCIT package, and
argued that "any attempt to slice the elements would mean
affecting the overall balance that ought to be achieved. It
is not in the spirit of the proposal nor was it the
motivation behind it that it would be open to delegations to
pick and choose which parts of the elements they found
favorable and to discard those they disliked." Looking
forward to a "concrete outcome" in the fall, she argued that
delegations should not be too concerned about alleged
vagueness or ambiguities in her proposal, because the
interpretation and application of the convention are the
primary responsibility of the parties to the convention :"The
words or terms which may appear vague, obscure and
indeterminate will have their own dynamic and assume
concreteness, clarity and determinacy in specific fact
situations as relevant authorities assume their roles of
interpretation and application. That is the functioning of
law in society and it is happening now as we speak."


23. (U) In their closing statements, most delegations that
spoke asserted that there is momentum in the process and
expressed hope that agreement was just around the corner.


24. (U) Sweden spoke first on behalf of the EU. They stated
that the CCIT should and would become a vital instrument in
criminal prosecutions, but should not alter or create new
obligations for countries under IHL. They said they were
committed to reaching an agreement, welcomed the
coordinator's efforts and reiterated that they were open to
considering the coordinator's 2007 proposal seriously.


25. (U) Syria spoke on behalf of the OIC, and reaffirmed the
OIC's commitment to the process of negotiations. Syria
reiterated the OIC's previous (2002) proposal on the scope of
the CCIT, but was "still willing to consider the
coordinator's proposal."


26. (U) Brazil spoke on behalf of the Rio Group and stated
that the coordinator's proposal was "a good basis for
discussion." This sentiment was shared by Cuba; however,
Cuba reiterated its view that legitimate political struggles
aimed at self-determination should be exempted.


27. (U) Norway attached great importance to conclusion of the
CCIT.


28. (U) India stated that given the increasing momentum
within the Committee the time was right for formal adoption
of the CCIT. Pointing to the 2002 text and 2007
Coordinator's proposal, they trusted that with the guidance
of the Chairman and the collective wisdom of delegations
final agreement could be reached. They urged member States
to show flexibility to achieve their common goal.


29. (U) Argentina thanked the coordinator for her efforts,
and said there was a need to make progress to finalize the
CCIT.


30. (U) Russia noted (erroneously) that the CCIT had been
under negotiation for 13 years. Russia believed it was time
to move to conclusion and give terrorist organizations a
clear message that the UN took the issue very serious and
would do all in its power to bring groups that engage in
terrorist activity to justice. Russia detected positive
signals from the bilateral consultations held during the
week, and was prepared to facilitate negotiations.


31. (U) Ghana stated that delegations need to trust the U.N.
and fellow member-states to enforce the provisions of the
CCIT in a reasonable way and not be concerned about latent
ambiguity. Rather delegations should focus on the underlying
principles of the document condemning terrorist activity.
Ghana could support the 2007 Coordinator's proposal.


32. (U) The U.S. stated that it supports conclusion of a
convention that condemns terrorism in all its forms and that
it looked forward to working with the Chairman and other
delegations toward that end.

BILATERAL MEETINGS


33. (SBU) The U.S. delegation met with Pakistan, Russia,
India and Telalian in bilateral sessions to discuss the draft
resolution and progress of the CCIT. Pakistan took a
relatively moderate stance, and asserted that there was room


to meet a compromise with most OIC countries in Article 18.
Pakistan did not offer any details of what the elements of a
compromise might be, however. Further, it gave no indication
that the Coordinator's 2007 proposal would be acceptable to
the OIC and suggested that it needed modification.


34. (SBU) Consistent with what it had previously told USUN,
Russia said that it wanted to get the CCIT completed and was
willing to be very deferential to the agenda of other
delegations in meeting this goal. The Russian representative
also indicated that they refrained from openly supporting the
2007 Coordinator's proposal during the opening session due to
our statement in support of the 2002 text.


35. (SBU) The Indian Deputy Perm Rep told the USDEL that the
OIC and others had understood the opening USG intervention as
a clear rejection of the 2007 Coordinator's proposal. He
pressed the USDEL hard to urge the Chair to "take the bull by
the horns" and move the process forward by, for example,
issuing a Bureau text. The Indians made clear that they
would be happy with either the 2002 or 2007 texts, and that,
if the USG is not prepared to accept the 2007 proposal,
wanted us to put forward an alternative, e.g. returning to
the 2002 text perhaps with some preambular language giving a
nod to the OIC position. They did not seem inclined to
introduce an alternative to the 2007 proposal themselves.


36. (SBU) Telalian stated that she believed the OIC was ready
to make some concessions on the text, but wanted to maintain
a united front until someone else (presumably the USG) made
the first move. She stated that she believed her proposal
was reasonable and that it represented a "package" proposal
that was not subject to modification. Furthermore any
concerns about ambiguity would be effectively dealt with by
courts in an appropriate manner. She called on the U.S. to
make statements in support of her text to rally support
within the Committee as a whole.


37. (SBU) Comment: Despite the rhetoric, there were no
concrete signs that the OIC had moved off positions that have
stymied conclusion of this Convention for the past eight
years. Likewise, European interest in the Convention seems
to have waned and few countries seemed (with the significant
exception of India) to view its conclusion as a priority.
The OIC reiterated its position that certain acts which would
otherwise be covered by the CCIT should be excluded from the
scope of the CCIT because they are undertaken in the name of
national liberation. This position not only runs contrary to
USG interests, but also to the universally accepted principle
that no cause or purpose justifies terrorism. OIC countries
similarly questioned text adopted in five previous
counterterrorism conventions that excluded State military
conduct from their scope. While there is renewed political
momentum to conclude the CCIT, a "compromised" CCIT will
undercut the existing international counterterrorism legal
framework that has been steadily built up by the United
States and its allies over the past two decades through the
conclusion of 16 sectoral specific international conventions.
As such, the U.S. participants stressed throughout
consultations that any resolution will only be worthwhile if
the result is a Convention that makes a meaningful addition
to this framework and respects the approach taken in other
conventions of excluding state military actions from its
scope while ensuring that terrorist acts of national
liberation movements are included within the scope of the
CCIT.


38. (SBU) While a number of delegations are looking to the
United States to take the lead in resolving the present
impasse, it is far from clear that such a role would actually
result in a satisfactory text rather than a new baseline from
which OIC countries and others would seek further
compromises. Looking ahead to the late summer and fall, the
USG will need to assess whether the benefits of entering into
this convention is worth further concessions. If so, the
Department should consider whether the USG could accept the
2007 Coordinators proposal (or another alternative) as a
final compromise and, if so, how best to create the
conditions for such a solution to emerge in the negotiations
in a way that lead to its adoption rather than further OIC
demands for concessions. End comment.
RICE