CYPRUS: SPECIAL ADVISOR DOWNER BRIEFS THE SECURITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000453

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UNSC CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: SPECIAL ADVISOR DOWNER BRIEFS THE SECURITY
COUNCIL


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The SYG's Special Advisor for Cyprus,
Alexander Downer, told the Security Council on April 30 he is
"cautiously optimistic" about the current negotiations over
reunification of the island. The two leaders had made
"steady progress" since talks began in September 2008, but
the negotiations needed more momentum or they could "atrophy
and die". He warned against the international community
trying to impose solutions, but also said the two sides
needed reminders of the need to compromise. He asked the
Council to stay involved with the issue and to reinforce
through its statements and resolutions that it had "high
expectations." All Security Council members offered support
for Downer and backed a Presidential Statement (PRST) from
the Council to publicly underscore this support, though the
Turkish Ambassador made clear he did not think the PRST was
balanced. Ambassador Rice and several other speakers urged
the Secretary-General to look for ways to increase the
momentum of the talks and acknowledged the need to encourage
the leaders of the two communities to make compromises. END
SUMMARY.

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DOWNER "CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC"
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2. (SBU) The Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus
told the Security Council in closed consultations on April 30
that he is "cautiously optimistic" that the negotiations
between Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias and Turkish
Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat that began on September 3,
2008 could succeed. The current negotiations were an
unprecedented opportunity to reach a settlement, he said, and
the two leaders were sincere in their efforts. Downer
reported that the two leaders had made steady progress on
several "chapters" of the talks since they began in September
2008, including power sharing and governance, property, EU,
and economic matters. The "core of hard issues"--security
guarantees, territory, and status of settlers-- had not yet
been broached, and he thought he would have a better sense of
where things stood after the first pass through all chapters.
During the next phase of negotiations, he would try to
resolve areas where there was room for compromise and set
aside the most difficult questions until the end.


3. (SBU) Downer did not know when the process might reach its
final stages. The talks could not be spun out for years, he
said. They needed to maintain momentum or they would
"atrophy and die". The Greek Cypriots, were resistant to
setting timetables, but in broad terms, Downer assessed that
a certain momentum had been maintained. In addition to the
26 meetings between the two leaders, representatives of the
sides and subject matter experts had met on numerous
occasions. Downer emphasized that the two sides would need
"constant reminders" from the international community (IC) of
the need to compromise. This could not be seen as a zero-sum
game.


4. (SBU) Downer emphasized that the talks were being held
under UN auspices, but his involvement continued to be
part-time. He sees the role of his Good Offices mission as
assisting the sides to reach an agreement, but not to act as
an arbitrator or to impose solutions on them. He reinforced
that the issues need to be resolved by the local people
themselves, as they will need to be put to the populations in
simultaneous referenda. He said it is essential that the
solution have the support of the leaders who will have to
convince their people to support the settlement, adding that
the IC should be "cautious and thoughtful about how we
provide help." Downer thought the IC could be helpful by
finding opportunities to meet with the leaders and emphasize
their support for the talks. The Security Council could also
support the process by focusing on the issue from time to
time, and by emphasizing in its statements and resolutions
that the Council has high expectations for the process.
Downer thought the Presidential Statement to be issued by the
Council would also be a helpful signal.

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Strong Support from the Council
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5. (SBU) Speaking in response, every Council member offered
their continuing support to Downer's efforts through the UN's
Good Offices Mission, stressed the need to increase or
maintain the momentum, welcomed recent confidence building
measures, and acknowledged the need to reinforce with the
sides that they would need to compromise. United Kingdom
Ambassador Sawers, first to respond to Downer, remarked that
the current round of negotiations had a different quality
from previous efforts to resolve the Cyprus question, and

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that it was up to the communities to reach a solution. He
emphasized that the talks could not go on forever, and it
would be important to push toward a conclusion. Sawers
introduced the draft Presidential Statement (PRST),which he
said had been widely vetted with the parties.


6. (SBU) Ambassdor Rice commended the progress made so far in
the talks, as well as the confidence building measures that
had been undertaken by the leaders. She recognized that the
next phase of negotiations would require compromise from both
sides, and that the Council would need to support and
encourage them in bringing the talks to a conclusion. Rice
observed that UNFICYP had been in place for a long time, and
that it could not stay forever. She urged Downer to seek
ways to increase the momentum of the talks, so that the
unprecedented opportunity to reach a settlement would not be
lost. She reinforced that the United States stood ready to
assist the sides in reaching a lasting settlement that
reunifies Cyprus into a bizonal and bicommunal federation.


7. (SBU) Turkish Ambassador Ilkin also expressed optimism
that the current negotiations could be successful. He
lamented that former Greek Cypriot President Tassas
Papadapoulos had lobbied against Greek Cypriot approval of
the UN's reunification plan in 2004, but he thought that
current Cypriot President Christofias was sincerely working
toward a settlement. Ilkin expressed disappointment at the
pace of the negotiations and noted that the first pass
through all chapters had been slated to be complete by the
beginning of May. He also said he thought Special Advisor
Downer "should give more and more guidance" to the talks as
they progressed so that they could be completed by December

2009. Ilkin said he would go along with the draft PRST, but
he thought it was not a balanced text. He said he felt boxed
in by the fact that word had already spread that a PRST was
under consideration, and that if the Council now did not
issue a PRST, it would send the signal that the Council was
divided.


8. (SBU) France emphasized the need to ensure that the
negotiation process remained Cypriot-owned, and that Downer
needed to maintain the trust and confidence of both sides.
Russia, China and Libya echoed the French call for the
process to remain in the hands of the two leaders and also
emphasized that the settlement needed to be on the basis of
previous Security Council resolutions. Costa Rica recalled
Resolution 1251 (1999),pointing to its call on all concerned
to hasten the withdrawal of demilitarization of the island
and to reduce spending on armaments. Croatia urged that the
two leaders begin to prepare their people for an eventual
settlement. Some members, including Burkina Faso and
Austria, expressed the hope that the results of recent
Turkish Cypriot elections would not weaken Talat's
negotiating hand.
Rice