GEORGIA: QUAD AMBASSADORS DELIVER NON-PAPER TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000435

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNOMIG UNSC GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: QUAD AMBASSADORS DELIVER NON-PAPER TO
U/SYG LE ROY

REF: A. DICARLO-BRIMMER EMAIL OF 4/23/2009

B. SECSTATE 39134

C. USUN 326

Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Permreps/Deputy Permreps of the United
States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Quad)
delivered Ref A non-paper to U/SYG for Peacekeeping
Operations Alain Le Roy and SRSG for Georgia Johan Verbeke on
April 24. The Ambassadors argued for robust and ambitious
recommendations that could provide a solid basis for
negotiations with Russia on a meaningful UN mandate. Le Roy
and Verbeke said that they agreed in large part with the
non-paper's content, but they thought the 15 kilometer
security and restricted weapons zones were unrealistic.
Verbeke thought that the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire
agreements should not be the basis of a new mandate, since
they were being interpreted differently by the parties.
Verbeke and Le Roy agreed that a UN new mandate should have a
new security regime as its basis. Le Roy and Verbeke did not
believe it was within their UN mandate to provide
recommendations on the situation in South Ossetia, but
allowed that the report would provide a "hook" for the
Security Council to include South Ossetia within a new
mandate. END SUMMARY.

--------------
QUAD Ambassadors Deliver Non-Paper
--------------


2. (C) Ambassadors DiCarlo (U.S.),Ripert (France),Mattusek
(Germany) and Parham (U.K.) delivered Ref A Quad-agreed
Non-Paper to U/SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy
and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Georgia Johan Verbeke on April 24. In delivering the
non-paper, all Ambassadors made the point that the
Secretary-General's report on Georgia due to be released on
May 15 needs to provide a solid basis for the Council to
fashion a strong and meaningful mandate, and therefore the
SYG should propose an ambitious security regime to include
symmetrical security zones that apply to all forces.
Additionally the Ambassadors pointed out that a strong UN
mandate should be based upon the August 12 and September 8
cease-fire agreements.


3. (C) U/SYG Le Roy said that in general terms, the UN was in
agreement with the concepts outlined in the Quad non-paper.
SRSG Verbeke agreed, saying "80-90%" of the Quad draft was
the UN's "common thinking." Le Roy said the
Secretary-General would be hosting an internal meeting to
discuss the report's recommendations later on April 24. The
report would be completed within the following week, edited
and finalized by May 7, and distributed by May 15. Verbeke
added that the report would include only one option, so as to
provide a strong starting point for the Council's
deliberations.

--------------
Security Zones
--------------


4. (C) LeRoy questioned the width of the Quad-proposed
symmetrical 15 km security zones and 15 km restricted weapons
zones, saying he could not see a justification for increasing
the size of the zones beyond what had existed in the prior
security regime. According to LeRoy, Russia had argued for
an asymmetric 0 km zone in Abkhazia, which he thought
unreasonable, so the SYG would need to propose something in
between the two options. Verbeke acknowledged it was a "fair
ambition" to propose 30 km zones on both sides of the
cease-fire line, but agreed with LeRoy that it would be a
non-starter with Russia. He cautioned that if the UN were to
propose such a regime, Russia might reject the report
entirely as biased and one-sided. In this case, Verbeke
said, "you will be starting the negotiation with 0 km rather
than something more reasonable." He pointed out that the 6
km security and restricted weapons zones he had included in
his draft non-paper (Ref C) were based on advice from his
military advisors as to the required dimensions for a
separation of forces regime.


5. (C) Verbeke suggested one way around the disagreement
might be for the report to make no recommendation at all as
to the width of the zones, while otherwise describing their
purpose and limitations they would impose on forces. In this
way, the Council could have a free hand to negotiate the
width of the zones in consultation with military advisors.
Ambassador Ripert said that he thought it essential to have a
clear recommendation in the report about the width of the
zones, and wondered whether the report might skirt the issue

USUN NEW Y 00000435 002 OF 002


of width by referring to dimensions outlined in other
agreements, such as the former Moscow agreement. Verbeke
said he did not think it wise to refer to the Moscow
Agreement, since all sides had repudiated it. He pointed out
that his proposal of 6 km zones had actually been based on
the 2005 Gali Protocol (see Security Council document
S/2005/453, paragraph 4). Verbeke thought a different option
would be to recommend an additional "transparency zone"
beyond the security and restricted weapons zones, as had been
outlined in the UN non-paper. There would be no limitations
on forces within these zones, but the parties would be
required to report on the activities of their forces and
would be subject to monitoring. Verbeke pointed out,
however, that Russia had unequivocally rejected the
transparency zones in its response to the non-paper. He said
he was still considering whether to propose omiting a
reference in the report to the width of the zones.

--------------
August 12 and September 8 Agreements
--------------


6. (C) Verbeke argued against having the August 12
cease-fire agreement and September 8 implementing
clarification serve as the basis of a new mandate. Russia
and the West could not agree on what the August 12 and
September 8 agreements mean today, he said, so "on day one of
a mandate" its terms would be disputed and "nobody would
respect it." He thought a new mandate based on a new
security regime would be the only way to get a meaningful
mission respected by all forces. Verbeke said the report
would clearly state that relevant Security Council
resolutions have not been respected by any party since August
2008, and to the contrary, "infringement has increased." He
thought it unwise for the Council to adopt a mandate that it
already knew would be interpreted differently by the parties.


--------------
"Hooks" for South Ossetia, EU
--------------


7. (C) Verbeke also understood the Quad desire to have a
"hook" in the report that could serve as a future basis to
expand the scope of the UN mandate to South Ossetia.
However, he said (and LeRoy nodded in agreement),the UN
could not substitute itself for the OSCE in South Ossetia,
and it was not in the SYG"s existing mandate to report on, or
make recommendations about, the situation there. He said the
"Observations" section of the report would offer a context
for its recommendations by reviewing the situation in Georgia
since August 2008, and would make the point that the August
2008 conflict began in South Ossetia. Verbeke also
understood the importance to the EU of a "hook" in the report
to support continuation of the EU Monitoring Mission, and
said the report would reference the role of the EUMM.
Rice