Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USUNNEWYORK409
2009-04-21 23:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNSC REFORM: P-3 DISCUSS FRENCH-UK INTERMEDIATE

Tags:  PREL KUNR UNGA UNSC GE JA BR IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 1041
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 1091
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2268
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000409 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR USUN/W AND IO/UNP; NSC FOR POWER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNGA UNSC GE JA BR IN
SUBJECT: UNSC REFORM: P-3 DISCUSS FRENCH-UK INTERMEDIATE
OPTION

Classified By: Ambassador Susan E. Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000409

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR USUN/W AND IO/UNP; NSC FOR POWER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNGA UNSC GE JA BR IN
SUBJECT: UNSC REFORM: P-3 DISCUSS FRENCH-UK INTERMEDIATE
OPTION

Classified By: Ambassador Susan E. Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The UK and France formally raised with the
United States their "intermediate option" initiative for
Security Council expansion in an April 16 meeting of P-3 Perm
Reps and IO Assistant Secretary-equivalents. Ambassador Rice
emphasized the Administration's preference to articulate its
broad principles on Security Council reform, its openness to
an enlargement, and its decision not to favor one proposal
over another at this time. The British and French
delegations emphasized that they do not yet have a formal
proposal to share. Ambassador Rice noted that while the
intermediate option afforded adaptability in the long-term
for an evolving international framework, the P-3 would have
little leverage over the elections to choose the member
states to occupy the seats. UK Perm Rep Sawers said that
eventually a P-5 position on the issue would be needed as the
African Group would only revisit the Ezulwini Consensus if
there were momentum towards another proposal. While the UK
and French delegations said they were hearing positive
signals from the Russians and Chinese, USUN believes they are
closer to our own position than that of the British and
French. End summary.

UK and France seek U.S. views on
intermediate option initiative
--------------


2. (C) In an April 16 meeting of P-3 Perm Reps and IO
Assistant Secretary-equivalents, the UK and France formally
presented us their "intermediate option" which evolved from
the Sarkozy-Brown summit a year ago. UK Perm Rep Sawers said
that the UK and France have been supporters of Security
Council enlargement greater than the U.S. has been
historically ready to support. Sawers said a more modest
expansion involving a third category of seats has a greater
chance of success, given the lack of an overwhelming majority
in favor of additional permanent members. While the UK and
France do not have a formal proposal to share on the
intermediate option, he hoped the new Administration would
look at the initiative favorably.


U.S. prefers to articulate
broad principles on reform
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Rice emphasized that the new
Administration has preferred to articulate its broad
principles of Security Council reform, including that: the
Council should reflect the current realities of the 21st
century, any expansion should not impede the Council's
efficiency and effectiveness, there should be no change to
the veto structure, and additional permanent members need to
be state-specific and chosen based upon their capacity to
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
security. She underscored that the United States is open to
an enlargement but does not plan to voice favor for one
proposal over another at this time in the negotiating
process. Both Ambassador Rice and Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs Esther Brimmer emphasized
that the ratification process will be difficult and there may
only be one opportunity for reform of the Council in the next
20 years.


4. (C) French Perm Rep Ripert commented that, while the P-3
may not consider the Council's legitimacy to be at stake,
others are questioning it, creating a different climate than
only a few years ago. IO A/S Brimmer stressed that the P-3
should be careful in how they frame Council reform questions
so as to not imply a current lack of legitimacy. Sawers
acknowledged that we want to be mindful of how we proceed
since the Security Council is currently effective and our
interests are protected. French Director of UN and
International Relations Sylvia Berman, however, noted that
with the ongoing reforms of the international financial
infrastructure, a lack of progress on Council reform will be
noted.

Few specifics on actual mechanics
of intermediate option
--------------




5. (C) When pressed on how the intermediate category of
members would be chosen, neither the French nor the British
offered clear answers. Ripert suggested that he thought
Japan and Brazil would easily win election for intermediate
seats but was not as positive about Germany beating out Italy
or India defeating Pakistan, given the strength at the UN of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Ambassador
Rice raised whether we would want Libya, for example,
currently popular as an African Union leader, on the Council
for five years in the intermediate category. She noted that
the P-3 would have little leverage over these elections.
Berman suggested that a reform proposal might be structured
as a package so as not to require elections. (Comment: USUN
believes it would be almost impossible to pursue an
intermediate category without resorting to an electoral
process, given the Uniting for Consensus bloc's constant
chorus that elections are needed to ensure accountability.
End comment.) All agreed that if the intermediate option was
ultimately pursued, it could end up becoming permanent and
not an interim step towards additional permanent seats, so
all needed to be comfortable with its long-term consequences.



6. (C) UK Head of International Institutions Directorate
Anwar Choudhury asked Ambassador Rice if the U.S. has a
preference -- additional permanent seats or the intermediate
option. Ambassador Rice responded that we remain open-minded
about an enlargement but had thought of it as a one-off
update for the 21st century. She noted that an attractive
feature of the intermediate option is that it does allow for
the adaptation of the evolving international framework. For
example, if an African state grows in prominence in 20 years,
it might then have a better claim on a longer-term seat than
would South Africa in 20 years. She suggested that a more
permanent solution with equal flexibility could be more
attractive.


7. (C) Berman said that it would be helpful to have overall
U.S. support for the process, but not necessarily for a
precise solution. Ripert suggested that Ambassador Rice
again voice U.S. openness for the idea of an enlargement.
Ambassador Rice replied that she did convey U.S. openness in
her February 19 statement and U.S. statements since then have
reiterated the same theme and have conveyed our parameters
for reform but she could certainly re-emphasize the point in
the next round of intergovernmental negotiations. Sawers
noted that the UK and France would like to continue to share
their thoughts privately with the U.S. on the intermediate
option, as they are developed. Ambassador Rice agreed but
stressed that we do not want to weigh in publicly on their
proposal at this time.

UK/French seek eventual P-5 position
on proposal to move African Group
--------------


8. (C) Sawers said that eventually it would be useful to
have a "P-5 sentiment" on the proposal. He said that the
Africans will only deviate away from the Ezulwini Consensus
if they see "there is momentum toward something else," but
noted that we should not press them until there was broader
sentiment in favor of a specific proposal. Sawers and Ripert
both noted that their capitals are hearing positive signals
from the Russians and Chinese about the intermediate option.
Sawers said he believes Russian Perm Rep Churkin's tone has
moderated significantly in the last six months. Choudhury
commented, "Their positions have evolved." Ripert said that
Beijing had called in the French Embassy at the start of
intergovernmental negotiations to emphasize its support.


9. (C) Comment: USUN does not share the French and British
assessment of the Russian and Chinese positions. While the
Russians and Chinese may be willing to discuss the
intermediate option and are closely following
intergovernmental negotiations, we do not think they are
ready to stand side-by-side with France and the UK and press
for the intermediate options as the optimal solution. The
Russian and Chinese positions are closer to our own (i.e.,
let the membership take the lead for the time being),than
that of the French and British. End comment.


Rice