Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USUNNEWYORK384
2009-04-10 12:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: USUN DELIVERS USG PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UNOMIG RS GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5363
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0384/01 1001241
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101241Z APR 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6314
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000384 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: USUN DELIVERS USG PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO
UN NON-PAPER

REF: A. SECSTATE 33583

B. USUN 326

Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000384

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: USUN DELIVERS USG PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO
UN NON-PAPER

REF: A. SECSTATE 33583

B. USUN 326

Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Per Ref A instructions, Deputy PolCouns and
Poloff shared the USG preliminary response to the UN
Non-Paper on the future UN presence in Georgia (Ref B) with
DPKO Director for Europe and Latin America, David Harland.
Harland acknowledged U.S. views on the dimensions of the
proposed security zones, but doubted that Russia would allow
zones that were more expansive than exist today. Harland
said he agreed in principle with the six U.S. objectives for
the UN mission, saying he would quibble only with the attempt
to phase in executive policing as unattainable. On the
process for achieving a new mandate, Harland thought the
ideal scenario would be for the U.S. and Russia to find
common ground on security arrangements and elements of a
mandate, which then could be used as the basis for achieving
buy-in from Georgia and Abkhazia. He thought pursuing a
legal mandate for the UN without specifying a security regime
would play into Russian attempts to weaken the UN presence on
the ground. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On April 8, Deputy PolCouns and Poloff delivered Ref A
preliminary reaction to the UN's March 26 Non-Paper (Ref B)
to DPKO Director for Europe and Latin America, David Harland.
The Non-Paper outlined recommendations for a future UN
presence in Georgia, including a detailed description of a
proposed security regime for Georgia/Abkhazia, which would be
included in the SYG's report to the Security Council
requested by Resolution 1866 (2009). The discussion with
Harland covered elements of the proposed security regime,
U.S. objectives for the UN mission, and U.S. suggested
options for reaching an agreement in the Council on a new
mandate.


3. (C) Responding to the U.S. response to elements of the
security regime, Harland commented that the UN proposals
"already cross all three Russian red-lines"-- they are
symmetrical, they bind Russian forces to the regime, and they
include the Kodori Valley. Harland did not think it would

make sense for the UN to propose something that was too far
beyond either Russian or U.S. red-lines, since such proposals
would be quickly discounted. He said that earlier UN
thinking on the "zones of confidence" had thus been revised
in an attempt to find a proposal that could achieve some
consensus. In any case, Harland doubted that Russia would
allow Ochamchire to be included in the regime, due to
Russia's intention to use the port as a future home of the
Black Sea Fleet. He also explained why the UN had drapped an
earlier suggestion for a 700 meter zone between border posts
and the boundaries, commenting that the UN had feared it
could create conditions that would allow for criminal
activity in the areas between border posts.


4. (C) Referring to U.S. objectives for a UN mission, Harland
said he agreed with all of them, but he questioned whether
the objective of establishing armed UN police units was
achievable, pointedly saying, "if the Russians have not given
a millimeter on this since 1994, what makes you think you
will get this now?"


5. (C) Referring to the process for achieving a new mandate,
Harland stressed that he thought the best shot at getting a
"credible" security regime confirmed by the Council in June
would be for the U.S. and Russia to engage bilaterally in
advance of the release of the SYG's report in order to reach
an understanding on what is and what is not achievable, given
our respective interests and redlines. Harland believed that
if the U.S. and Russia to come to an agreement on the basic
elements of a security regime, based upon the UN non-paper,
the U.S. and Russia would then be in a position to use our
leverage with Georgia (U.S.) and the separatist entities
(Russia) to obtain their agreement to the arrangement. The
Security Council would then be in a position to endorse a
regime outlined in the SYG's report that would benefit from
the support of all parties.


6. (C) Harland said he thought the option of defining a
mandate in the SYG's report without defining a security
regime would play into Russian attempts to incrementally
diminish the international presence in Abkhazia. He did not
believe it likely that Russia would want to give the UN any
flexibility to grow its mandate, but instead would likely use
delay tactics to prevent eventual agreement on a security
regime, meanwhile using the lack of a regime to continue
establishing de facto arrangements suitable to its interests
on the Abkhaz side of the administrative boundary. Harland
said UNOMIG SRSG Johan Verbeke had a similar fear of Russian

USUN NEW Y 00000384 002 OF 002


intentions after watching Russia inflict what Harland cited
as, "death by a thousand cuts" on the OSCE, after Russia had
first agreed to a vague mandate that left the OSCE in Georgia
too institutionally weak to resist Russians bent on its
demise.


7. (C) According to Harland, the United Kingdom had proposed
a different option, whereby the SYG would present the Council
with his best assessment of what was necessary, and the
Security Council would then endorse it. Harland thought this
was not a viable option, because it would put the Council in
the position of imposing its will on the parties, rather than
endorsing an agreement among them. Even though both the U.S.
and U.K. options would give the Security Council a necessary
fig-leaf to establish a mandate, he said, the parties,
including Russia, would not be likely to honor a security
regime that they had not been explicitly involved in
creating. He believed the outcome of such a process would be
a "very weak arrangement on the ground", and therefore
reiterated his suggestion for U.S.-Russia bilateral
engagement.


8. (C) According to Harland, the likely default option would
be for interested parties to feed their comments on a
security regime into DPKO, and expect DPKO to find common
ground. Harland did not think this method would yield the
best result, since DPKO could only guess at the parties'
redlines and would in the end have to make the determination
about what trade-offs were necessary.
Rice