AMBASSADOR RICE MEETS JAPAN'S AMBASSADOR TO IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000344

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR JA UNSC
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE MEETS JAPAN'S AMBASSADOR TO IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Rice, For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Rice on March 31 met with Akio
Shirota, Japan's Ambassador to Iran, to hear Japan's
assessment of U.S. outreach to Iran and Shirota's analysis of
Iran's internal political situation. Shirota said President
Obama's Nowruz message to the Iranians on March 19 gave
Iranians hope, albeit vague, that relations with the U.S.
would improve. He cautioned, however, that the Iranians and
their government are busy preparing for national elections
and therefore immediate outreach and dialogue could be
postponed until the formation of a new government. Shirota
assessed that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would
likely win the presidential election in June. Ambassador
Rice highlighted three key messages that the Japanese could
reinforce with the Iranians: the U.S. goal of improving
relations with Iran should be taken seriously by the
Iranians; the P5 1 share the same goal with regard to Iran's
nuclear program; and the U.S. expects the safe and swift
return of American detainees, including Iranian-American
journalist Roxana Saberi. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Ambassador Rice on March 31 met with Akio Shirota,
Japan's Ambassador to Iran, at the request of Japanese
Permanent Representative to the UN, Yukio Takasu, to hear
Japan's assessment of U.S. outreach to Iran and Shirota's
analysis of Iran's internal political situation. Shirota
said President Obama's Nowruz message to the Iranians on
March 19 gave Iranians hope, albeit vague, that relations
with the U.S. would improve. He cautioned, however, that the
Iranians and their government are busy preparing for national
elections and therefore immediate outreach and dialogue could
be postponed until the formation of a new government.
Shirota said President Obama's message to Iran was "smart"
but being used by all political factions to their own
advantage. Ambassador Rice said that perceived U.S.
impatience with regard to Iran was based on the fact that the
"clock is ticking" on its nuclear program and that each day
that passes Iran is closer to completing its goals. She
emphasized that the U.S. and its partners, including Japan,
need to be prepared to tighten sanctions and national
measures on Iran to show strong collective action in the
event Iran fails to comply with its IAEA obligations.


3. (C) Shirota judged that the U.S. tends to concentrate on
Iran's nuclear file at the expense of other issues, such as
U.S.-Russian relations in the region and oil and natural gas
supplies. He said other countries' relations with Iran were
not defined by one issue. Ambassador Rice countered that the
U.S. clearly views Iran in the context of broader issues,
such as its influence in Afghanistan. She said Iran's
presence at the Afghanistan conference in The Hague on March
31 demonstrates the U.S. assessment that Iranian issues are
more complicated than its nuclear file. However, Ambassador
Rice reiterated that the nuclear issue overwhelms all other
factors.


4. (C) Shirota assessed that Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad would likely win the presidential election in
June unless conservative Tehran mayor Mohammad GHALIBAF
entered the race in a serious way. He dismissed the
reformist candidate Mousavi's campaign because it lacked
sufficient support. On the economy, Shirota said its poor
performance is affecting every Iranian and damaging the
prospects of reformist candidates, although he did not
explain why the reformists in particular were being
undermined. He opined that economic sanctions were having
little effect on Iran. Shirota defended Japan's
implementation of Security Council resolutions and its own
bilateral economic ties to Iran by saying that Japanese
business had shrunk to a minimum in Iran.


5. (C) Ambassador Rice asked that Shirota underscore three
key messages to the Iranian leadership. First, the U.S.
effort at engagement is serious and the U.S. expects a
serious response. Second, the P5 1 share the same goal
vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear program and expect to see progress.
The P5 1 is prepared to act collectively if Iran fails to
comply with its IAEA obligations. Third, the U.S. is very
concerned about the fate of American detainees, including
Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi, who is currently
being detained in Iran, and expect her safe and swift return.
Shirota responded that Saberi's mother is Japanese and the
GOJ takes this matter seriously.
Rice