Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USUNNEWYORK163
2009-02-20 01:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

GAMBARI BRIEFS AMBASSADOR RICE ON BURMA AND THE

Tags:  PREL PHUM UNSC BM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUCNDT #0163/01 0510115
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200115Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5898
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0313
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3542
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000163 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: GAMBARI BRIEFS AMBASSADOR RICE ON BURMA AND THE
IRAQ COMPACT

Classified By: Ambassador Rice for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000163

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: GAMBARI BRIEFS AMBASSADOR RICE ON BURMA AND THE
IRAQ COMPACT

Classified By: Ambassador Rice for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During a February 18 meeting with Ambassador
Rice, Special Advisor Gambari outlined the main challenges to
progress in Burma, including a fundamental division of the
international community on the issue. He reviewed his goals
for his recent visit and added that for different reasons,
neither the regime nor Aung Sun Suu Kyi (ASSK) were
comfortable with a visit by Secretary-General Ban. Gambari
reviewed the positions of key players in the region,
including China, India, Russia and Japan, and stressed the
need to provide the SYG tools to engage the regime.
Ambassador Rice emphasized that U.S. priorities were the
release of all political prisoners, including ASSK, and
inclusive dialogue. She cautioned Gambari against
squandering the SYG visit without assurances of concrete
progress. After the meeting, Gambari's Special Assistant
sought U.S. guidance on inviting the Burmese to the upcoming
Group of Friends Meeting. On Iraq, Gambari asked for the
U.S. to press the Iraqi's to reconsider the timing and venue
for the Iraq Compact conference. End Summary.

Three Main Challenges in Burma


2. (C) Special Advisor Gambari said there were three main
challenges in Burma. First, there is no international
consensus on the reality on the ground or whether Burma
belongs in the Security Council. Gambari said that because
the Security Council was fundamentally divided, the
Secretary-General had convened the Group of Friends. When
the same division crept into the Group of Friends, the good
offices mission tried a smaller group, convened by the
Indonesians, comprising China, India, Burma and the UN. When
the Indonesians tried to elevate the level of discussion in
the group, the Indians distanced themselves from the
discussion. Unity in the international community is needed
to make progress in Burma, Gambari insisted. The second
challenge, Gambari noted, was identifying how to engage the
Burmese authorities on Gambari's five-point plan. The third
was pulling ASSK and the opposition (namely the National
League for Democracy (NLD)) into the political process.

The Recent Trip to Burma


3. (C) Gambari said his goals for his recent visit were to

identify the bottom line; to mediate between ASSK and the
regime with the objective of nudging them toward dialogue;
and to assess and prepare for the Secretary-General's
possible visit to Burma. Gambari said the Burmese were wary
of a Ban visit, noting the likelihood of high expectations
for concrete results - a price they were unsure they could
pay. He added that ASSK also thought Ban should not come
until the regime released all political prisoners, including
her. Gambari said the junta wanted to proceed with elections
with or without the opposition. They also told Gambari that
they were ready to dialogue with ASSK. ASSK and the NLD, on
the other hand, will not participate in elections and ASSK
refuses to dialogue with the regime until she is assured the
dialogue will be meaningful. Gambari commented that it was
critical to narrow the gap between the regime and ASSK and
the opposition on these issues. Gambari stressed that the
Secretary-General needed tools to engage the regime,
including possible development assistance, which can be
coordinated with concrete progress on the political track.
In response to Ambassador Rice's inquiry as to why Ban could
make a difference, Gambari opined that the regime sees Ban as
a fellow Asian who can "get things done." If they could
accommodate Ban's wishes, he continued, Ban would be in a
position to convince countries that have imposed sanctions,
including the United States, to reconsider their policy
toward the regime.

China, India, Japan and Russia


4. (C) Gambari said China was unwilling to engage on Burma,
stressing that stability - not human rights or democracy - is
its top priority. He said the key to engaging the Chinese is
to convince them there will be no long-term stability without
democratic reconciliation. India's competition with China
for contracts and investment in the Burma complicate its
policy, he added. The Indian Government is not true to the
will of its people and does not have a consistent policy on
the issue. Gambari said Japan believes that excessive
pressure will alienate the regime and galvanize Chinese
interests in the region. He remarked that Russia is building
a nuclear research center and has oil and gas interests in
the country.

U.S. Perspective

USUN NEW Y 00000163 002 OF 002




5. (C) Ambassador Rice emphasized that Burma is one of the
most isolated regimes in the world with an egregious record
of human rights violations. The regime must take concrete
action, she added, beginning with the release of all
political prisoners, including ASSK. Ambassador Rice said
that if Ban were to travel to Burma without concrete
progress, the UN would squander a very important tool and
erode the SYG's credibility. Ban can only visit Burma after
there is concrete progress, she stressed, like the release of
all political prisoners, including ASSK. Rice told Gambari
the good offices mission needed to propose to the regime (and
get buy-in on) a package of real pressures and meaningful
incentives and overcome what has, up to this point, been an
impervious regime.


6. (C) After the meeting, Gambari's Special Assistant, Erwan
Pouchous, told USUN that the Secretary-General is considering
inviting the Burmese to the upcoming Group of Friends
meeting, and sought U.S. guidance on the matter.

Iraq Compact


7. (C) As Special Advisor on the Iraq Compact, Gambari
conveyed Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki's intention to hold
the next Iraq Compact conference in Baghdad in May. Gambari
said he did not think donors would be ready in May and the
venue would be problematic. He asked for U.S. support in
pressing Iraq to reconsider the timing and venue for the
conference.
Rice