Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USUNNEWYORK1156
2009-12-23 21:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

NORWAY PREVIEWS PM,S TOPICS FOR POTUS MEETING;

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UN AF CG SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #1156/01 3572149
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 232149Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7913
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0335
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 1741
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0963
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001156 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UN AF CG SU
SUBJECT: NORWAY PREVIEWS PM,S TOPICS FOR POTUS MEETING;
RAISES AFGHANISTAN, SUDAN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND MDGS

Classified By: Ambassador Susan E. Rice, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001156

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UN AF CG SU
SUBJECT: NORWAY PREVIEWS PM,S TOPICS FOR POTUS MEETING;
RAISES AFGHANISTAN, SUDAN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND MDGS

Classified By: Ambassador Susan E. Rice, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. In a December 8 meeting with Ambassador
Rice, Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Larsen
previewed the topics that Prime Minister Stoltenberg will
raise with President Obama during his upcoming visit to Oslo
- an action plan for UN Millennium Development Goals Four and
Five and Afghanistan civilian coordination. Norway believes
that an Afghan civilian coordination plan should be in place
prior to the January London conference and left behind a
non-paper outlining Norway's proposals. Larsen praised
Ambassador Rice's efforts to bring conflict-related sexual
violence to the forefront of the UN agenda and noted Norway's
wish to work together with the U.S. on DRC victims assistance
and capacity building. On Sudan, Larsen emphasized that the
referendum should not be postponed and raised concerns about
the precarious situation there. End Summary.


2. (C) In a December 8 meeting with Ambassador Rice,
Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gry Larsen
discussed the two issues that Norwegian Prime Minister Jens
Stoltenberg will raise with President Obama during his visit
to Oslo. Stoltenberg will ask the U.S. to be a strong
partner in Norway's campaign to advance UN Millennium
Development Goals Four, on reducing child mortality, and
Five, on improving maternal health. Norway is currently
working with the United Kingdom and the United Nations to
ensure that a strong action plan is in place by the time the
Millennium Development Goals are reviewed in September 2010.
On Afghanistan, Stoltenberg will emphasize the importance of
synchronizing civilian coordination efforts prior to the
January 28, 2010 London Conference . Norway belives that
UNAMA should be strengthened and other donors encouraged to
"come on board" and allow themselves to be organized by UNAMA
or other international coordinating bodies. Larsen
underscored that the Joint Steering Committee should be
comprised of UNAMA, central donors, ISAF, and international

organizations. She left a non-paper that outlines Norway's
proposals on organizing UNAMA and JCMB, coordinating
international assistance and coordinating operations (see
paragraph 7 for non-paper text).


3. (C) Ambassador Rice stated that President Obama shares
Norway's urgency on the need for civilian coordination in
Afghanistan, and that capacity building will be critical to
make a lasting difference. Ambassador Rice agreed that UNAMA
should be strengthened, while cautioning that it must
recognize its inherent abilities and limitations. She noted
that UNAMA's strengths include its political liaison role,
humanitarian and election work, as well as reconstruction
efforts. UNAMA is hindered in the coordination of civilian
assistance as major donors resist coordination in the
traditional sense. Ambassador Rice noted that approximately
seventy-five percent of all Afghanistan donors are members of
either ISAF or NATO and that successfully coordinating these
countries would bring significant progress. Ambassador Rice
agreed that time is short and said that although donors
should strive for optimal coordination, at a minimum there
should be a transparent depository of information available.


4. (C) Larsen praised Ambassador Rice's efforts to move the
conflict-related sexual violence issue forward in the
Security Council and emphasized the importance of ensuring
that UNSCR 1888 is operationalized. Larsen will travel to
Washington in January or February to explore projects that
Norway can work on with the U.S., related to victim
assistance and capacity-building in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC). Larsen noted Norway's hope to hold a
conference in the Great Lakes region with UN support that
will coincide with both the tenth anniversary of UNSCR 1325
and first anniversary of UNSCR 1888. Ambassador Rice noted
the gap between what the DRC government has stated publicly
on the sexual violence issue and what it has actually done,
and asked if Norway had concrete ideas for operationalizing
the women, peace and security resolutions' mandates. Larsen
responded by describing Norway's plans to encourage hospital
construction and send victims assistance expert teams to the
DRC. She also noted that France is training Burundi police
on victims assistance. Larsen added that Norway supports
Swedish candidate Margot Wallstrom for the new Special
Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Situations
position.


5. (C) Larsen noted that the situation in Sudan is
precarious on multiple fronts and that Norway is worried

USUN NEW Y 00001156 002 OF 003


about calls for the Government of Sudan (GOS) to postpone the
elections scheduled for 2010. Ambassador Rice agreed that
postponing the elections is not the answer, in spite of the
fact that the SPLM is unlikely to perform well on the first
run. The upcoming elections provide the SPLM a dress
rehearsal for 2011, allowing it to build critical electoral
mechanisms and structures now. On the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA),Ambassador Rice stated that it is getting
close to "white knuckle time," pointing to the recent
violence in Khartoum directed at the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political leaders. She noted
that it is important to enhance UNAMID's ability to protect
civilians and identify ways to increase pressure on the GOS.
Rice stated that the U.S. and the international community
have identified benchmarks for both the GOS and the
Government of Southern Sudan, and intend to actively measure
performance. The international community is also giving
serious consideration to placing additional pressure on the
GOS by either the Security Council or other states to spur
progress on the CPA.


6. (SBU) Larsen concluded by noting her participation in the
Central Emergency Response Fund Conference in New York the
week of November 7, and Ambassador Rice praised Norway's
announced $58 million contribution to the fund. Larsen
explained that Norway believes that it is important to signal
that in spite of the economic crisis, humanitarian donations
to the UN will not be cut.


7. (C) The following is the text of the nonpaper on
Afghanistan left by Deputy FM Larsen:

BEGIN TEXT:

The cooperation and coordination between the UN, ISAF and
other international partners and the Afghan government should
be among the key issues to be addressed in the lead up to the
upcoming London Conference. Succeeding in Afghanistan will
also depend on our ability to improve and strengthen our
capacity to coordinate international civilian and political
efforts. We need to consider different methods.

General principles

The aim of our efforts should be to enable Afghans to fulfill
their responsibility for transparent and competent management
of Afghanistan's institutions and national and regional
programmes. All major donors should step up international
coordination and accept to be coordinated in order to avoid
duplication, fragmentation and missed opportunities to
strengthen Afghan capacity. Military and civilian efforts
must be mutually supportive.
International civilian efforts in Afghanistan must combine
legitimacy and effectiveness to ensure results. Enhanced
coordination should produce more focused priorities, better
delivery according to Afghan priorities and more
accountability by both donors and recipients.

Proposals

UNAMA and JCMB:

Significant changes are needed in the way UNAMA and JCMB are
organized and work. Today's organization around UNDPs not
sufficiently robust to face the huge challenges and the need
for coordination. UN's overall mandate should be protected,
but UNAMA's key tasks should be streamlined JCMB is today
unwieldy and ineffective and only to a very limited extent
holds the Afghan authorities and ourselves to account. We
should consider the following ideas:

SRSG: To maintain legitimacy and broad international buy-in,
the UN needs to play a leading role. At the same time, we
need to recognize that it is difficult to combine the
political mandate of the SRSG with the role of coordinating
international civilian assistance efforts. It would
therefore be necessary to separate the SRSG's political
mandate from the responsibility for coordinating civilian
assistance. Assisted by a small secretariat, the SRSG should
focus on the international, regional and political dimensions
of the mission at a strategic level. Regionally, the SRSG
should take the initiative to establish a mechanism for
meetings between Afghanistan's neighbors and donors.

Coordinating international assistance:

USUN NEW Y 00001156 003 OF 003



Steering committee: The JCMB should be replaced with an
international steering committee in Kabul co-chaired by a
member of the Afghan Government (i.e. the Finance Minister)
and the UN SRSG, and including the civilian representative in
ISAF, the World Bank, ADB and limited number of key donors.

Operational coordination:

Various options could be considered, all reporting to the
steering committee:

a) Strengthen UNAMA with Deputy SRSGs who are
operationally in charge of development assistance,
humanitarian assistance and administrative and budgetary
affairs.

b) Appoint three or four teams or clusters of donors and
international organizations within different fields headed by
operational managers, fully tasked to run and coordinate the
international assistance and head the efforts of the
international donors vis--vis Afghan authorities within
their respective areas.

c) Appoint a high level representative with ISAF,
responsible for coordinating the civilian assistance
channeled through the PRTs and for coordinating with other
donors, international organizations and Afghan authorities.
(We should be aware that such arrangement could be seen as a
brake with some of the more fundamental concerns of
international assistance and would be met with resistance
from many donors.)

International experts: Whichever option is being considered,
the need for strengthening recruitment of international
experts to assistance efforts in Afghanistan should be
addressed. Nations should second experts to the UN or the
operational structures suggested above.

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: Channeling a greater
part of the funding through the World Bank ARTF would provide
donors with a simple mechanism for coordination and
contribute to Afghan ownership for social and economic
development according to national priorities. We should work
for increasing absorption capacity through this key mechanism
providing consistent and successful efforts by Afghan
authorities in their fight against widespread corruption.

ISAF: While military and civilian efforts must be mutually
supportive, we think there needs to be clear division of
labor between them. At the same time, civilian assistance is
crucial to the fulfillment of our tasks in Afghanistan. It
is therefore necessary for ISAF to strengthen its capacity
and competence on civilian assistance as an integral part of
our overall strategy. ISAF should appoint a high level
representative responsible for political and civilian efforts
with ISAF. The position should have a particular
responsibility to coordinate civilian assistance channeled
through the PRTs. This could enable us to move away from
fragmented efforts by individual PRTs and set these efforts
clearly within the framework of Afghan plans and priorities.
The PRTs should-where and when possible-hand over civilian
efforts to Afghan institutions in order to build their
capacity and enable national and local ownership.

END TEXT
RICE