DPKO-UNIFIL JOINT TECHNICAL REVIEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001102

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2019
TAGS: PREL KPKO UNSC IS LE
SUBJECT: DPKO-UNIFIL JOINT TECHNICAL REVIEW

Classified By: Political Counselor Jeffrey DeLaurentis for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On December 1, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) hosted a meeting with Security
Council Lebanon experts to share initial findings concerning
the ongoing joint technical review of UNIFIL. DPKO's initial
findings recommend the creation of a southern sector in
UNIFIL's area of operations; a new training structure
designed to enhance staff officer performance; and
maintaining the Maritime Task Force (MTF) with a minimum of 8
ships. Each of the two parties, Lebanon and Israel, has
shared its input on the review with some council members.
The Lebanese Mission sent an October 19 letter to the
Security Council concerning the DPKO/UNIFIL review that
focused on political, not technical issues. On the Israeli
side, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) liaison to UNIFIL, COL
Brovender, visited New York on November 30. In a meeting at
USUN, he stressed Israel's continuing support of UNIFIL;
preference for no decrease in force strength, troop
composition, or distribution of forces; and he urged an
intensified use of the tripartite process. End summary.

RE-EXAMINING UNIFIL, THREE YEARS IN
--------------


2. (SBU) The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are
currently conducting a joint technical review of UNIFIL, as
set out in Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's August 6 letter to
the Security Council and United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1884. (Note: This review coincides with
the scheduled hand-over of the UNIFIL command. Though the
formal announcement remains pending, USUN understands that
Secretary-General Ban has approved the nomination of Spanish
Major-General Alberto Asarta to succeed Italian Major-General
Graziano as the new UNIFIL force commander in late January

2010. End note.)


3. (SBU) The review is being conducted in a two-stage
process. The first phase, already launched by UNIFIL, is
comprised of working groups and a steering committee tasked
with making recommendations in adjusting force structure,
assets and requirements. In the second phase, a UNHQ
mission, led by DPKO's Office of Operations, will visit
UNIFIL units, installations and other locations, and,
together with UNIFIL, will assess and make recommendations on
the findings of the initial phase. The review team will
report its conclusions to the Secretary-General by January
2010, with a summary of those conclusions to be included in
the Secretary-General's next quarterly report on the
implementation of UNSCR 1701 in February 2010. The UNHQ
mission is scheduled to travel to Lebanon during the week of
December 7, 2009.


4. (SBU) On December 1, DPKO hosted a meeting with Security
Council Lebanon experts concerning the review. DPKO Middle
East Team Leader Kristina Segulja led the meeting with
Italian Brigadier General Dario Ranieri, acting director of
the UNIFIL Strategic Military Cell (SMC). Throughout the
meeting, they stressed that the technical review would focus
solely on the operational capacity of UNIFIL, and not on its
mandate, its Rules of Engagement (ROE),or its performance.
Segulja outlined the review's objectives, which also appear
in the review's terms of reference. (Note: The terms of
reference will be e-mailed to IO/UNP. End note.) The
objectives are as follows:

(a) Determine appropriate forward-looking adjustments to the
Force structure in an effort to adapt UNIFIL's operational
capacity to changes in the operational environment that have
taken place since 2006;

(b) Review the Mission's force requirements, including the
appropriate number of infantry, engineering, and specialized
units, as well as ground and air assets, and mobility and
rapid reaction capabilities;

(c) Review the operational effectiveness and asset
requirements of the Maritime Task Force;

(d) Assess the Mission support structure, clarify existing
support capabilities, and determine the adequate ratio of
forces and support units;

(e) Assess the liaison and coordination arrangements with the
parties;

(f) Evaluate the current level of coordinated operational
activities and capacity-building activities with the Lebanese
Armed Forces;


USUN NEW Y 00001102 002 OF 003


(g) Assess mission integration and coordination processes;

(h) Assess the Mission's security structure and force
protection arrangements;

(i) Assess the Mission's communications strategy and
resources, including outreach and civil affairs activities;
and

(j) Identify budget and personnel implications of proposals
for any changes to the force structure assets and
requirements.

RE-ORGANIZE UNIFIL SECTORS?
--------------


5. (SBU) During the meeting, Segulja and Ranieri emphasized
that the initial findings of the review do not indicate a
need for any radical changes in the overall number of UNIFIL
personnel, but do recommend a reconfiguration of UNIFIL
forces, to match the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF). Ranieri explained that UNIFIL currently organizes its
operations into East and West sectors, with those sectors led
by Spanish and Italian forces, respectively. However, the
initial review recommends the addition of another sector in
the South, so that UNIFIL forces better align with the LAF's
distribution of three brigades in southern Lebanon. Austrian
military advisor Bernd Lubenik questioned whether the need to
expand to a third sector was necessary or wishful thinking.
Segulja responded that it was not an operational requirement.
(Note: USUN understands from UNIFIL SMC sources that UNIFIL
is recommending the maintenance of two sectors unless a
troop-contributing country (TCC) comes forward and offers a
third sector headquarters battalion and associated staff,
which would include another Brigadier General. UNIFIL is
most likely looking for a French or Indonesian commitment, as
they have the third and fourth largest forces in UNIFIL,
respectively. End note.)


6. (SBU) The initial findings of the joint technical review
also suggested that UNIFIL implement a dedicated training
structure to increase its forces' capabilities as well as
those of the LAF and the Lebanese Navy. Lubenik asked what
the specific goals of the new training would be, to which
UNIFIL staff responded that it would focus on educating staff
officers in order to enhance planning, cooperation, and
organization abilities, as well as improve demining
activities. They stressed that nothing controversial would
be taught in this training. When asked to rationalize why
the UNIFIL force had maintained its size three years after
the cessation of hostilities, Segulja claimed that the
mission was worth its cost, but that the situation is still
precarious and therefore a robust UNIFIL presence is needed.
She reminded the room that, although Phase 2 of UNIFIL's
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) could not be completed until
Israel ends its occupation of northern Ghajar, progress was
already being made on Phase 3. She added that both the LAF
and the IDF feel that the review is timely and that past
cooperation has been good.

MTF -- 8 VESSELS MINIMUM
--------------


7. (SBU) Ranieri fielded a number of questions regarding
whether the minimum number of ships supplied to the Maritime
Task Force (MTF) was sufficient and sustainable. He reported
that although a ship-to-task review found that the MTF could
operate best with a fleet of 12 vessels, it was currently
working with 8 ships. Segulja added that the MTF has hailed
over 26,000 vessels in search of contraband, while the LAF
Navy has only stopped approximately 200 ships. She stated
that the LAF has not officially documented any contraband as
a result of its searches. Although she acknowledged the fact
that MTF fleet size depends on international support, Segulja
said that the fleet cannot maintain current levels of
operation with less than 8 ships.


8. (SBU) The Lebanese Deputy Perm Rep who was invited to the
meeting as an incoming Council member observer only,
nevertheless spoke up at the meeting as a party to the
conflict, saying that she was sure the LAF would respond
positively to all the issues raised by DPKO. She also asked
what the benchmarks might be for assessing violations to
Lebanon's sovereignty, and stressed that all violations by
all parties must be addressed.

LEBANON FOCUSES ON POLITICAL ISSUES
--------------


9. (SBU) The Lebanese mission sent a letter dated October 19
to the Security Council President outlining the Government of
Lebanon's (GOL) position on the DPKO/UNIFIL joint technical

USUN NEW Y 00001102 003 OF 003


review. The letter reiterated the GOL's call for Israel to
stop breaching its obligations under resolution 1701,
including violations of land, air, and water, utilization of
spy networks and devices, and continued occupation of Ghajar,
the Kafar Shuba Hills and the Lebanese Shab'a Farms. The GOL
also called for an enhancement and expeditious marking of the
Blue Line, and called upon the international community to
consider further assistance for the reconstruction and
development of Lebanon, as well as in building up the LAF.
The letter stated that no new weapons were found within
UNIFIL's area of operation as a result of patrolling and
search activities, and underlined the importance of a
permanent cease-fire replacing the current cessation of
hostilities.

ISRAEL SUGGESTS IMPROVEMENTS TO UNIFIL
--------------


10. (C) On November 30, USUN POL and MSC officers met with
Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Colonel Shai Brovender who is the
IDF's liaison to UNIFIL, Lieutenant Colonel Avi Elayhu from
the Israeli Embassy in Washington, and Israeli Mission
PolCouns Amir Weissbrod. Brovender, whose visit was timed to
coincide with the review, emphasized that UNIFIL is indeed
operating well, but that the situation continues to be
fragile. Therefore, he stressed, the GOI does not want to
see a decrease in UNIFIL troop levels or European troop
contributions. The GOI is supportive of the MTF even at its
reduced size, noting that it believes it likely has
successfully deterred maritime smuggling operations. He also
underscored that the GOI does not want to see a reduction or
consolidation of UNIFIL posts or bases, believing that a
wider dispersal of UNIFIL assets keeps Hezbollah on the
defensive. Brovender added that with a new incoming UNIFIL
commander, a recently formed Lebanese government, and Iranian
influence constantly looming overhead, now is not the time to
scale back UNIFIL operations.


11. (C) Brovender also had a number of suggestions on how to
improve UNIFIL operations, including the tripartite process.
He recommended that tripartite meetings be held at the
subcommittee level as well, for example to mark the Blue
Line. He urged that there be a maritime tripartite meeting
to discuss a maritime buffer zone to further ease tensions at
sea. He recommended that direct field-level communications
be opened up between DPKO brigade commanders and IDF field
commanders (currently, all correspondence between the two is
directed through UNIFIL headquarters). Finally, he suggested
that UNIFIL take full advantage of its mandate, such as
investigating in the streets of villages and only calling in
the LAF at the last minute to inspect a suspicious building,
since, he claimed, the villagers are often warned by the LAF
that an inspection will happen.
RICE