UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE: TRENDS AND ANALYSIS OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001056

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: CD CDG KN PARM PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE: TRENDS AND ANALYSIS OF THE
2009 SESSION


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Changes in the U.S. voting pattern on key
resolutions on nuclear disarmament and conventional arms
control highlighted the 2009 session of the UNGA First
(Disarmament) Committee. In place of the ten negative votes
it cast in isolation in 2008, this year the United States did
not vote in isolation even once, and the United States also
reduced its total number of negative votes from 23 to 10.
The greater willingness of the U.S. to engage with the
sponsors of key resolutions and to take a more positive
approach won a lot of positive commentary and should pay
dividends in more operational forums. The U.S. changes were
particularly noted in the Japanese nuclear disarmament
resolution, which the United States co-sponsored this year
after voting against since 2001 and which receives a good
deal of attention in Japan; the CTBT resolution, which the
United States (along with all the other P-5 states) also
co-sponsored; and the resolution on an Arms Trade Treaty
(ATT),a UK initiative, which the United Stat
es agreed to support in return for agreement that
negotiations on the ATT would be undertaken under consensus
rules.


2. (C) Amid the generally better atmosphere, less positive
signs were apparent as well. Pakistan took an obstructionist
line in its approach to the resolutions on the CD and on a
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Both resolutions
were so watered down in the process of reaching consensus
that they retained significantly less substance as compared
to the initial drafts. Pakistani representatives were
clearly trying to walk back the progress made in the CD's
2009 session and prevent the early start of FMCT negotiations.


3. (C) Another worrying sign was the increasingly hostile
tone and number of Arab-Israeli confrontations, certainly
exacerbated by the conflicts in the IAEA General Conference,
positioning for the upcoming NPT Review Conference, and the
lack of progress on Middle East peace. While the outcomes of
the two resolutions involving the Middle East ("The risk of
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" and a "Middle East
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone") did not change, the more pointed
rhetoric did not bode well for the future in any of these
areas. The dominant corridor discussion after the session
focused on the need to concentrate and coordinate the
collective efforts of the CD members, including the
nonaligned, to improve prospects for a successful RevCon. END
SUMMARY

Nuclear Issues
--------------


4. (U) Except for the attention given to the Arms Trade
Treaty, the session of the UNGA First Committee reverted to a
concentration on nuclear disarmament and related subjects.
President Obama's attention to those issues in speeches in
Prague and New York, the resumption of U.S.-Russian
negotiations on strategic nuclear reductions, the UN Security
Council Summit on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation
held just prior to the start of the First Committee, the
revived hope of an early start to FMCT negotiations, and the
impending 2010 NPT Review Conference all contributed to a
renewed interest in nuclear issues. In the First Committee
that interest was manifested by the attention paid to
resolutions on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(introduced by Australia),nuclear disarmament (introduced by
Japan),and nuclear disarmament in the NPT context
(introduced by the New Agenda Coalition or NAC). On all
these and others the big news was the change in U.S. position
or engagement with others in light of new U.S. policies.


5. (U) Thanks to the change in the U.S. position to support
ratification and entry into force of the CTBT; the
Administration's willingness to embrace the vision of a world
without nuclear weapons; and instructions to the U.S.
delegation to seek engagement, rather than isolated
statements of positions, the U.S. voting pattern changed
dramatically. In place of the ten negative votes it cast in
isolation in 2008, this year the United States did not vote
in isolation even once, and the United States also reduced
its total number of negative votes from 23 to 10.


6. (SBU) CTBT: The CTBT resolution became entangled in the
issue of the North Korean nuclear program, as the sponsors
(in particular, Australia, the lead sponsor this year) did
not want to propose a resolution on nuclear testing that did
not mention the DPRK's nuclear test earlier in the year.
China, however, pressed very hard to water down the
reference, and in the end, in order to secure P-5
co-sponsorship for the first time, the resolution was left
with merely a reference to the UN Security Council
resolutions on the DPRK test.


7. (U) Japanese Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament: The United

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States had made clear through explanations of vote in
previous sessions that it considered the Japanese resolution
("Renewed determination toward the total elimination of
nuclear weapons") to be the most balanced and most in line
with its positions. Since 2001, however, the United States
had voted against this resolution, primarily because of its
endorsement of the CTBT. This year, after careful review,
the U.S. decided that it could support and even co-sponsor
the draft resolution if its call for irreversibility of
nuclear disarmament was softened by calling it a "principle
of irreversibility." This resolution attracts considerable
interest in Japan, and the U.S. co-sponsorship was widely
noticed there, with the Japanese press at the UN seeking
official commentary on the changed U.S. position form the
head of the U.S. Delegation.


8. (SBU) New Agenda Coalition (NAC) resolution on Nuclear
Disarmament: The United States considered the NAC resolution,
"Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: accelerating the
implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments," less
balanced than the Japanese resolution and had voted against
it for many years. However, because the U.S. could support
much of its language and in light of the significance of the
NAC countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
South Africa, and Sweden) in the disarmament/nonproliferation
arena, the U.S. engaged the NAC on proposed modifications
that would enable the U.S. to vote for the resolution or
abstain.


9. (SBU) Specifically, in return for a U.S. abstention, the
delegation proposed a "softening" of the reference to the "13
Practical Steps" toward nuclear disarmament, which had been
agreed at the 2000 RevCon; the inclusion of a reference to
FMCT as part of the nuclear disarmament agenda; strengthening
of the reference to the need for compliance with NPT
obligations; and a revision in the language on NPT
universalization. Despite several rounds of consultations,
the NAC countries decided they could not accept the U.S.
proposals, and the United States, along with four other
states, voted "no" on the resolution. In explaining the
vote, the U.S. representative regretted that consultations
had proved unsuccessful but appreciated their seriousness and
committed the United States to remaining in contact with the
NAC. For their part most NAC members agreed that
consultations should continue. (Comment: It is our
understanding that with a little more time, the co-sponsors
of the NAC resolution might have been able to coordinate
further and reach agreement on many of the U.S. proposals.
End Comment)

Conventional Weapons
--------------

10. (SBU) ATT: The most prominent resolution on the
conventional disarmament side dealt with the proposed Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT) and called for negotiations to take place
in 2012 after preparatory committee meetings in 2010 and

2011. Intensive high-level contacts between the United
States and the UK, the principal supporter of the ATT,
resulted in a U.S. decision to support the resolution and the
negotiation of an ATT. In return the British agreed that the
negotiations would be conducted on the basis of consensus.
During the course of the UNFC session, this decision led to a
spirited and at times acrimonious debate between some
European and other countries which saw consensus as
potentially blocking action or resulting in a weak treaty,
and others, including major states, China, and Russia, which
thought the British were rushing things and that consensus
should apply even to the Preparatory Committees. The latter
argued that if key arms producers and exporters were not
included from the start, they would never join an ATT. After
some symbolic changes to meet the concerns of Germany and
others, the ATT resolution passed, 153 yes (U.S.) - 1 no
(Zimbabwe) - 19 abstentions. The abstentions came from
China, India, Pakistan, Russia, a few radical Latin American
states, and some of the Arab states, including Egypt.


11. (U) SA/LW: Another positive development on conventional
weapons was the U.S. turnaround on the resolution entitled
"The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its
aspects." Last year the U.S. was the lone dissenter in the
final vote. This year the U.S. delegation was able to
persuade lead sponsors South Africa, Colombia and Japan to
make minor changes and then build support for those changes
among the many co-sponsors, so that the U.S. not only voted
with the majority but co-sponsored the resolution.


12. (U) Once again, as in recent years - and even despite the
greater interest this year in nuclear disarmament -- more
countries participated in the "thematic debate" on
conventional weapons than in the debates on other subjects.
While many of the statements on nuclear weapons sounded as if
written by the same "nuclear weapons speech factory," those

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dealing with conventional weapons were frequently based on
states' direct experience with the problems created by the
illicit trade in such weapons.

Conclusions
--------------


13. (SBU) The new U.S. approach of greater engagement
received widespread praise. For example, at an October 26
informal dinner hosted by the Indians for CD delegates from
Geneva, Canadian, Indian, Japanese, and Egyptian
representatives spoke in strongly positive terms about the
United States, noting that that if one country should be
given credit for a new approach and flexibility in First
Committee this year, it was the Untied States. All were quite
effusive in lauding the more open-minded approach by the U.S.
This was not an isolated incident, as many delegates during
the First Committee session took positive note of the
dramatic changes in the U.S. voting pattern. Representatives
from several moderate non-Western states expressed an
interest in greater engagement with the United States and
aligning their policies more closely with those of the United
States. This development could foreshadow more positive
outlooks for other multilateral disarmament and
nonproliferation forums, including the CD's upcom
ing 2010 session, if we are able to get beyond the few -- but
serious -- remaining issues described below.


14. (C) The 2009 UNFC session was not an unalloyed success.
In consultations on the resolutions on the CD and FMCT,
Pakistan made clear that it had not changed the position it
had taken in Part III (August/September) of the 2009 CD
session where it refused to accept the CD work program
providing for FMCT negotiations, as it insisted on changes in
the resolutions, which watered them down considerably.
Pakistan even seemed to be walking back its grudging
acceptance in May 2009 of the CD's program of work (CD/1864):
it indicated in a First Committee statement that all of the
core issues on the CD agenda -- a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative
security assurances, and nuclear disarmament -- should
receive equal treatment (i.e., negotiations) in the CD's 2010
program of work (POW). This approach would be a clear
departure from CD/1864, which provided for negotiations only
on FMCT, while the CD would engage in "substantive
discussions" on the other issues.


15. (C) The tenor of discussions on the Middle East focused
on the resolutions on the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone (MENWFZ) and on the "Risk of nuclear proliferation in
the Middle East" and was more contentious this year than even
in the past. Whether because of the dust up over this
question at the IAEA General Conference in September, the
impending NPT Review Conference, or the continuing stalemate
in the Middle East peace process, the language and extent of
Arab and Israeli interventions exhibited more animosity this
year than in the recent past. The increased contentiousness,
which was first notable in the September 2009 IAEA General
Conference, may be limited to the UNFC, but it could well
prove a harbinger of difficulties in upcoming multilateral
forums, including the NPT Review Conference.


16. (C) By a number of measures, the change in U.S. tone
succeeded in shifting the subtext in advance of the 2010 NPT
RevCon away from a predominant focus on disarmament to one
also spotlighting the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT.
Pakistan, Iran and the DPRK were clearly isolated on a number
of issues, both in substance and style; whether their
isolation and the clearly negative high profile generated by
their approach in the UNFC will lead to tactical or
substantive changes by them or the NAM in general at the 2010
CD and in the NPT RevCon remains unclear. However, corridor
discussion after the session focused on the need to
concentrate and coordinate the collective efforts of the CD
members, including the nonaligned, to improve prospects for a
successful NPT RevCon.
Wolff