UN FERNANDEZ-TARANCO BRIEFS USUN REGARDING RECENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001041

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SY
SUBJECT: UN FERNANDEZ-TARANCO BRIEFS USUN REGARDING RECENT
VISIT TO BAGHDAD

REF: BAGHDAD 02929


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 11, Ambassador DiCarlo met with
UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Oscar
Fernandez-Taranco, following his recent return from Baghdad.
Fernandez-Taranco reported that Iraqi officials have accepted
that Taranco's mission was not an investigation; however,
they continue to seek repeat visits which they see as a
deterrent to further possible incidents. Fernandez-Taranco
said that GOI officials presented a coordinated story line
and level of sophistication that the UN does not often see in
such Iraqi efforts. PM Maliki explicitly named Syria as
being behind the bombings, although he did not blame the
government directly. While Fernandez-Taranco did not hear a
direct link between AQI and Baathist activity in Syria, GOI
officials repeatedly told him that the August and October
bombings "could not have occurred without funding and
assistance from Baathist elements in Syria." At no time did
Iraqi officials discuss GOI decisions to remove protective
barriers or the possible role of GOI complicity - either
purposeful or otherwise - showing Fernandez-Taranco little
evidence of any serious internal-focus to the on-going GOI
investigation. While Fernandez-Taranco feels he cannot
return to Baghdad with the same limited mandate, he is
paradoxically concerned that the "illusions of what the UN is
doing, but is not doing, could crumble if additional bombings
occur." End summary.


2. (C) On November 11, Ambassador DiCarlo met with UN
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Oscar
Fernandez-Taranco, following his recent return from Baghdad.
He characterized his job upon return as "managing
expectations" and noted the strong interest of many Council
members and other parties who had requested bilateral
briefings immediately upon his return. His report to the SYG
is not yet final and provided no timeline for completion.
While Fernandez-Taranco expressed his hope that once the
report is sent to the SYG that "this matter ends there," his
questions to the Ambassador about possible next steps in the
Council and his expectations for the conversation with the
Iraqi PermRep - who was waiting to meet Fernandez-Taranco
following our meeting - underscored his expectation that this
matter will neither end quickly nor quietly.


3. (C) In his meetings with the Prime Minister, Foreign
Minister, Justice and Defense Ministers and the special
commission (headed by FM Zebari) investigating the attacks,
Fernandez-Taranco felt all were still in a state of shock,
with the core of the government "completely rattled." He
heard over and over again that this was "not just any attack,
but a symbolic and real attempt at regime change."


4. (SBU) GOI officials appeared to have reluctantly accepted
that Fernandez-Taranco's mission was not an investigation.
Taranco reported he neither accepted documentation nor asked
investigative questions as a way to underscore his limited
mission. While satisfied with the visit, GOI officials told
Fernandez-Taranco they wish to see a continuing process since
they see UN involvement as a deterrent to further incidents,
showing that the UN and the world are watching. PM Maliki
rejected Fernandez-Taranco's offer of UN help though the UN
counterterrorism division (CTED),stating that Iraq receives
enough CT assistance from the USG and other international
partners; however, the National Security Minister and other
Iraqi officials expressed interest in receiving support and
further capacity building from CTED.


5. (C) Fernandez-Taranco was impressed with the "coordinated
story line" he heard from Iraqi officials. While he did not
hear a direct link between AQI and Baathist activity in
Syria, and noted that GOI officials are still grappling with
whether Syria is directly involved or is rather knowingly
enabling and hosting terrorists, GOI officials told Taranco
that the August and October bombings "could not have occurred
without funding and assistance from Baathist elements in
Syria." Fernandez-Taranco was also impressed with the level
of legal sophistication from the Iraqis, as they pointed to
UNSCR 1483, UNSCR 1618, and Lockerbie as precedents for
possible ways of continuing UN involvement. (Note: 1483 set
up a number of Chapter VII mandates, including DFI, the UNAMI
SRSG, and the Tarasov mandate; 1618 is not a Chapter VII
resolution but condemns terrorism and was passed following
the bombing of the Iraqi Electoral Commission in 2005. With
regard to Lockerbie, GOI officials were likely referring to
the investigation and international tribunal that was set up

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in the Hague. End note.) Fernandez-Taranco also noted that
while GOI officials blamed Syria for the bombings frequently
and loudly in private meetings, they were careful not to name
Syria when talking with the press during his trip, and
Fernandez-Taranco believed it was clear that the Iraqis did
not want to draw Syria into a "conflict situation, but did
not think they were not getting the kind of cooperation from
Syria that they needed." At no time did Iraqi officials
discuss GOI decisions to remove protective barriers or the
possible role of GOI complicity - either purposeful or
otherwise - showing Fernandez-Taranco little evidence of any
serious internal-focus to the on-going GOI investigation.


6. (SBU) Fernandez-Taranco mentioned his meetings with
Ambassador Hill and General Odierno, saying that Hill
requested continuing UN trips for their deterrence value
given the major anxiety of possible future bombings.
Fernandez-Taranco found Odierno's briefing to be thoughtful
and analytical, calling it the "best information received on
the ground."


7. (C) Fernandez-Taranco summed up Iraqi views as 1) they
want this to be a continuing UN process; 2) they see the UN
involvement as a deterrent to further attacks (Comment: how
real that deterrent value might be is questionable. End
comment.); and 3) fears about the likelihood of further
attacks. While understanding the GOI hope for a continuation
of visits, Fernandez-Taranco believes he cannot return with
the same mandate. Paradoxically he is concerned that the
"illusions of what the UN is doing, but is not doing, could
crumble if additional bombings occur." And, any possibility
of bilateral or trilateral work seems distinctly unlikely
since PM Maliki told Taranco that the Turkish-led
negotiations between Iraq and Syria were "dead" and
"impossible to revive."
Wolff