CFE IMPASSE: HOW DID WE GET WHERE WE ARE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000098

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR HAYES, MCFALL, DAVIDSON, HOVENIER, SHERWOOD-RANDALL
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
JCS, EUCOM, AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: CFE IMPASSE: HOW DID WE GET WHERE WE ARE?

REF: A. WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE 11/19/99

B. 01 USOSCE 01038

C. USOSCE 000095

D. USOSCE 000085

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Hugh Neighbour for Reason 1.4 (b & d)


1. (C) Summary: At the London Summit, Presidents Obama and
Medvedev pledged to explore a comprehensive dialogue on
strengthening Euro-Atlantic and European security. The CFE
agreement has long been considered a "cornerstone" of
Euro-Atlantic security, and at Strasbourg-Kehl, NATO
reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to the Treaty regime.
Regrettably, that won't change the reality: CFE is in a
coma, and will likely never recover. The Parallel Actions
Package pursued since July 2007 has not yielded the hoped-for
breakthrough. The impasse on implementing what the West
considers to be Russia's "Istanbul Commitments" of 1999
remains the key stumbling block, compounded now by Russia's
suspension of its treaty obligations for 16 months and its
occupation of Abkhaz and South Ossetian parts of Georgia.


2. (C) As the new Administration reviews its policy options
and prepares the way forward on this, as on many other issues
in the U.S.-Russia relationship, it may be useful to review
how we got where we are today. This message adopts an
intentionally contrarian point of view to our conventional
policy on CFE. It seeks to review the evolution in the
"Istanbul commitments," including how the
originally-articulated 1999 U.S. conditions for submitting
the agreement on adaptation of CFE (A/CFE) for ratification
had changed by 2002. This is not to open a historical debate
on what was said 7 to 10 years ago, but rather to show that
differences of emphasis and interpretation of the "Istanbul
Commitments" -- which are necessary for the current policy
options review )- were present from the beginning in
Istanbul. To this end, de-linking the submission of A/CFE
for ratification procedures from the explicit
preconditionality regarding Russian forces in the separatist
regions that has characterized the U.S. position for many
years may offer one way forward. End Summary.

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Early History of CFE
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3. (U) CFE negotiations began in early-1989, before the fall
of the Berlin Wall. The Treaty entered into force prior to
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As such, the original
CFE Treaty was very much a Cold War document. Although
revised in 1996 largely to accommodate Russian concerns
regarding limitations on Russian ground equipment in the
flank, the existing CFE Treaty still retains many outdated
provisions, including the structure of groups that previously
represented the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.


4. (SBU) As NATO accepted new members, they retained their
original group affiliation from a CFE perspective, leading to
a situation in which all East European (former Warsaw Pact)
members of Russia's "group" are now members of NATO. This
led to intense negotiations to update the Treaty, culminating
in the comprehensive package of revisions to the Treaty which
was signed in November 1999 at the Istanbul Summit, which is
known as the Agreement on Adaptation, or A/CFE. The A/CFE
was the only legally binding instrument adopted in Istanbul,
but there was also a package of other political commitments
made at the time of signature of A/CFE contained in the Final
Act.

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One Explicit Pre-Condition: Meeting the Flank Limits

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5. (C) When A/CFE was signed in Istanbul in November 1999
along with the other documents, the only stated precondition
for U.S. and Allied ratification was for Russia to lower its
military equipment in flank regions inside Russia to within
adapted Treaty levels. This was made clear by a statement on
19 November 1999 by President Clinton (Ref A),who stated: "I
will only submit this Agreement to the Senate for advice and
consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact been
reduced to the flank levels set forth in the adapted Treaty."
(Note: The "flank" which President Clinton referred to are
northwestern Russia, largely as defined by the Leningrad
Military District, and southwestern Russia, largely as
defined by the North Caucasus Military District. A/CFE
places specific numerical limits on the amount of heavy
military equipment Russia can place in these sensitive
regions. At the time of Istanbul in 1999, Russian forces
exceeded the new limits due to ongoing operations in
Chechnya. End note.)



6. (C) The President did not mention any other
pre-conditions, even though the Istanbul documents included a
large number of other bilateral commitments that had
separate, future deadlines, including those related to
withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. The
only pre-condition he announced at Istanbul was that related
to flank levels.


7. (C) The approach within NATO was similar. In December
1999 meetings of NATO defense ministers and foreign
ministers, communiques mentioned weapons in the North
Caucasus and then said entry into force "can only be
envisaged in the context of compliance by all States parties
with the Treaty's limitations." NATO foreign ministers in
May 2000 took a similar approach, saying entry into force
"can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all
States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels of armaments
and equipment, consistent with the commitments contained in
the CFE Final Act." Their communique also noted Russia's
"pledge to reduce to CFE limits...its forces in the North
Caucasus. It is on this basis that Allies will continue to
work towards bringing the Adapted Treaty into force."


8. (C) The U.S. approach was later confirmed, inter alia, by
U.S. opening remarks at the Second CFE Review Conference in
mid-2001 (Ref B). Assistant Secretary of State Avis T.
Bohlen stated on 28 May 2001, "We have concerns relating to
the commitments from the Istanbul Summit, first and foremost
relating to the Russian Federation's equipment reductions to
agreed "flank" levels. It will be impossible for the United
States and for a number of others around this table to ratify
an agreement that is not being complied with in one of its
central provisions." Bohlen went on to underline the
importance of Russian commitments on military withdrawals
from Georgia and Moldova because they would be "critical in
convincing our legislatures to move forward with ratification
of the adapted Treaty." Although it was debated in the U.S.
interagency before the CFE Review Conference, she did not/not
list Georgia/Moldova as a precondition for submission for
ratification.


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Careful Read of Istanbul Documents Supports This View
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9. (C) An interpretation that supports the USG linkage of
submission for ratification to Russian equipment in flank
regions at A/CFE levels is confirmed by the CFE Final Act

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itself. In its 14th paragraph, the parties undertook "to
move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of
national ratification procedures...." This call for
ratification was directly linked to the flank, since the
paragraph also takes note "in this context" of Russia's
commitment "to all obligations under the Treaty, and in
particular, to agreed levels of armaments and equipment."


10. (C) Strenuous efforts by U.S. and Georgian negotiators at
the time to insert comparable language regarding Russian
forces in Georgia and Moldova into this paragraph were
unsuccessful. Instead, references to the Russia-Georgia and
Russia-Moldova commitments were placed in subsequent
paragraphs of the Final Act immediately following the above
citation, but not linked directly to ratification procedures.


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Georgia-Russia Annex to CFE Final Act
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11. (C) The CFE Final Act also "welcomes" a joint statement
by Georgia and Russia contained in Annex 14 to the Final Act
regarding Russian withdrawals from Georgian territory.
Russia missed the 1 July 2001 deadline in paragraph 2 of
Annex 14 to disband and withdraw "military bases" at Gudauta
and Vaziani. Nonetheless, Russia eventually withdrew
entirely from Vaziani, Batumi, Akhalkalaki, as well as their
repair facilities in Tbilisi, and by late-2007/early-2008,
the only remaining issue was Gudauta, a facility almost 100
km from Georgian-controlled territory in the breakaway region
of Abkhazia. Russia maintained a minimal presence there )
it claimed in order to support its peacekeeping forces
operating under a mandate. The best solution seemed to be a
"documentary transfer" of the facility from Russia to
Georgia, with Russia then getting permission from Georgia to
use elements of the facility, which Georgia was prepared at
various times to accept, with appropriate transparency
measures.

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Moldova in Istanbul Summit Declaration
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12. (C) The situation regarding Moldova is even more
ambiguous. In the Istanbul Summit Declaration, a separate
document by Heads of State or Government also adopted in
Istanbul, paragraph 19 "welcomes the commitment by the
Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian
forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002."
This text follows immediately after the last sentence of
paragraph 18 which takes "note of the positive role of the
joint peacekeeping forces in securing stability in the
region." Russia argues that its troops in the Transnistria
region of Moldova are peacekeepers operating under agreement
with Moldova, and in any case, in CFE terms they possess no
declared TLE ) only 33 ACV look-alikes according to the
latest Russian CSBM data declaration for 2009 ) down from 35
in their last CFE data declaration in 2007.


13. (C) The Russians consistently divided the Istanbul
Commitments up into those that were CFE-related, i.e.,
related to treaty obligations on Treaty Limited Equipment
(TLE),and those that were not. Consequently they removed or
destroyed the declared TLE in Moldova and lowered their
holdings in Georgia. The Russians have argued that the
Istanbul Commitments were not intended to solve the
unresolved conflicts in former-Soviet territory. Once they
reached a point when all that was left in Moldova and Georgia
was related to peacekeeping (pre-2008 war in the case of
Georgia) and protecting the ammunition depot at Colbasna,

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Russia claimed it had done everything required and prudent.

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NATO's Position Evolves
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14. (C) In fact, after subduing Chechnya and in CFE data as
of July 1, 2002, Russia's declared TLE in the flank had been
reduced to within A/CFE limits. Thus, Russia expected U.S.
and Allied ratification procedures of A/CFE to begin after
mid-2002 -- the sole explicit U.S. condition for moving
toward ratification having been met. Failure to adhere to
NATO expectations regarding other Russian commitments in
Istanbul, however, gave pause for concern. In particular,
Russia failed to meet deadlines regarding withdrawal of
forces from Moldova and Georgia. Although Russia eventually
also withdrew all of its forces from Georgian-controlled
territory, it maintained what it labeled peacekeeping forces
deployed under international agreements in the separatist
areas, including a small contingent at Gudauta in Abkhazia.
Progress on withdrawing Russian ammunition from Transnistria
ground to a halt in mid-2004, and the Orange and Rose
Revolutions changed many people's way of looking at former
Soviet Republics. Georgia also contributed combat forces in
Iraq from 2004 until mid-2008, when Georgia's force in Iraq
totaled a full brigade of 3000 troops, winning Tbilisi
further support for its position.


15. (C) These and other political and strategic realities
caused the U.S. and other allies to place added emphasis on
the package of political agreements at Istanbul regarding
Russian troop withdrawals from Moldova and Georgia. By the
NATO Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO's position had
changed. While welcoming the results of Russia's efforts to
reduce forces in the flank to agreed levels, the Allies in
Prague urged "swift fulfillment of the outstanding Istanbul
commitments on Georgia and Moldova, which will create the
conditions for Allies and other States Parties to move
forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty." Thus, by
the end of 2002, the Russians argue that the original
Istanbul pre-conditions for ratification had evolved into
additional preconditions. The Georgia/Moldova-related
preconditions subsequently became a central part of repeated
NATO statements from 2002-2007. The Parallel Actions Package
proposed by the U.S. and NATO in mid-2007 to resolve the
resulting CFE impasse sought to find a way forward to meet
these demands.

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Facing Lose-Lose Scenario: Time to Review Policy?
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16. (C) It must be admitted, however, that these
preconditions have failed utterly to achieve their objectives
if the aim was to encourage Russia to complete its
withdrawal. The carrot of A/CFE ratification was never
powerful enough to induce Russia to make progress on the
unresolved conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, nor to finalize
troop withdrawals from those territories. By insisting on
this linkage, we have not advanced our objectives in Georgia
and Moldova, and by failing to move ahead with A/CFE
ratification, we now also risk losing CFE in the process ) a
classic lose-lose scenario.


17. (C) The August 2008 war and Russian occupation of the
Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia has further
compounded the dilemma. Russian troops and Treaty Limited
Equipment (TLE) such as tanks, armored combat vehicles, and
artillery are not going to be withdrawn in the foreseeable
future. The Russians have publicly put the number at about
3,700 troops in each region. A/CFE is not such a tempting

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prize that Russia would consider withdrawing from the
breakaway regions or leaving Russian troops there without the
protection of TLE. While we need to continue efforts to
resist legitimizing the Russian troop presence in Georgia and
Moldova, it may be time to re-think whether the linkage to
A/CFE is the best vehicle for our policy.

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Could De-linking Arms Control from Regional Conflicts Help?
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18. (C) By indefinitely delaying ratification of this
conventional arms control measure in Europe pending
resolution of Georgia's and Moldova's territorial integrity,
we are choosing a path that sacrifices the predictability and
military/political constraints offered by CFE and A/CFE. We
are on the brink of the complete collapse of a major
conventional arms control agreement, an unwelcome step from
the standpoint of U.S. and Allied interests, and an
unnecessary distraction from a host of issues on our
bilateral agenda with Russia. If this approach were leading
to a greater good, it would still be worth it. But it is
difficult to argue that the Istanbul linkage has gained us
anything: it has not helped deliver a political settlement,
and in the process the entire CFE regime is now in jeopardy.

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The Parallel Example of Nagorno-Karabakh
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19. (C) Returning to the conditions for Allied submission for
ratification of A/CFE to where it originally was at Istanbul,
i.e., linked only to Russian equipment levels in the flank
regions, may provide a path toward breathing new life into
conventional arms control in Europe. Arguably, intractable
regional issues should not be allowed to unconditionally
hamstring major U.S. and European conventional arms control
interests. There is an almost precise parallel: At Istanbul
the U.S. urged Azerbaijan to sign A/CFE despite the
occupation of some 20% of its territory and large quantities
of undeclared military equipment held by another CFE State
Party, i.e., Armenia. The Azerbaijanis were advised they
could not solve the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh with A/CFE if
they could not solve it otherwise. Azerbaijan eventually
acquiesced and signed.


20. (C) De-coupling Georgia's and Moldova's issues would
not/not mean the U.S. or NATO were abandoning Georgia or
Moldova to the mercy of Russia. Quite the contrary.
President Obama has made it clear the U.S. will never
recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia. For half a century, the
U.S. steadfastly refused to recognize Soviet annexation of
the Baltic States, yet we proceeded with a CFE agreement that
covered those territories as part of the Soviet Union because
it was sound disarmament policy. It may take just as long to
get Russia out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Entry into
force of A/CFE may be the first step towards getting Russia
out of the remainder of Georgia, especially if there are
provisions for transparency and verification regarding the
two breakaway territories. Indeed, host nation consent for
troops remains a requirement under A/CFE in Article I, Para
3, as it was in the original CFE in Article IV, Para 5.

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Comment: Put Russia on the Spot and Move Forward
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21. (C) Adjusting positions held over several years and
adopted by NATO at the most senior level will undoubtedly
prove difficult. This message argues for serious
consideration of just such a course, because we believe we

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are at a juncture when it is time to re-think some of our
approaches as we seek a path forward with Russia (Ref C). A
decision to offer to begin the ratification process of the
A/CFE as signed in 1999 will serve the interests of the U.S.
and the interests of security in Europe, and would
temporarily take the steam out of Russian efforts to modify
the treaty to eliminate the flank regime. It is unclear that
NATO agreement to move toward ratification now would have any
impact on treaty parties Moldova and Georgia, whose agreement
is also needed for entry into force of A/CFE.


22. (C) Obviously, intense and extensive consultations with
Allies, the Russians and other Treaty partners would first be
necessary. Before actually submitting for ratification, some
necessary hard work would undoubtedly follow on remaining
parts of the Parallel Actions Package, such as regarding
flanks, Baltic accession and the definition of "substantial
combat forces." Perhaps part of the solution would be an
arrangement regarding Moldova, which already is tantalizingly
close, and a kind of enhanced transparency regime for Georgia
and the North Caucasus, which could be modeled on Dayton
Article IV. But getting this issue off the list of
grievances in the Russia-U.S. relationship would also place
the onus on Moscow if it refused to support and implement a
treaty that it signed in 1999 and ratified in 2004.
Delinking the political-related "Istanbul Commitments" on
regional conflicts from A/CFE and pushing forward with
ratification is an option that deserves careful consideration.
.
NEIGHBOUR