THE OSCE'S ROLE IN ADVANCING U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000095

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA,
EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR HAYES, MCFALL, DAVIDSON, HOVENIER, SHERWOOD-RANDALL
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
JCS, EUCOM, AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2012
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PHUM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: THE OSCE'S ROLE IN ADVANCING U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS
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REF: USOSCE 00085

Classified By: Classified By: CDA Kyle Scott. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: As efforts to press the reset button in our
relations with Russia proceed, the OSCE can be a valuable
forum to channel Russia's desire for a larger role in
discussion of broad European security themes. With the
London summit commitment to start a dialogue on security and
stability in Europe, confirmed at Strasbourg-Kehl, it is time
to move beyond a defensive posture and begin charting a plan
of action that uses the OSCE to advance this process and U.S.
interests. This message lays out a suggested series of steps
to help us move this process forward and thus contribute to
efforts to advance U.S.-Russia relations. END SUMMARY.

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Warming Up to Leverage the OSCE
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2. (C) Ever since President Medvedev launched his ill-defined
proposal for a new binding treaty on European Security in
June 2008, we and our Allies have been waiting for details.
In the OSCE, Russia has declined to define its goals further.
One explanation is that they themselves don't know how to
frame a binding international treaty such as they propose.
They have an idea, but not a proposal. Tactically, Russia
appears comfortable to sit back and see if their grand idea
creates divisions in the Alliance or otherwise gains them
tactical advantage.


3. (C) Moscow's ambivalence toward the OSCE's human rights
agenda has also made Russia reluctant to place their emphasis
on Vienna. At the OSCE's Helsinki Ministerial in December,
for example, Russia objected to language in the Chairman's
summing up document that suggested the OSCE is "a natural
forum" to follow up on initiatives on European security.
Since Helsinki, however, Russia's opposition to using the
OSCE appears to have abated somewhat in the face of a steady
chorus of statements by Allies, such as that issued at the
NATO Summit, that the OSCE provides an appropriate, inclusive
format to carry on this dialogue. Although Russia's clear
intention is to focus on "hard security" measures, and they
are still not prepared to see the OSCE as the sole forum for
carrying forward these discussions, recent statements by
Russian officials appear to have accepted the inevitability
of discussions in the OSCE on a comprehensive approach that
also includes the human and economic dimensions to security.

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Calendar of Meetings on European Security Intensifies
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4. (C) Like athletes preparing for a race, OSCE delegations
are limbering up for a fresh look at security in Europe. The
Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE is pressing ahead, and the
calendar of meetings devoted to this issue is growing full.
In the next three months prior to the U.S.-Russia summit,
OSCE delegations will hold an informal PermReps "retreat"
to discuss broad European security themes (late April),
Austria is hosting a seminar on the future of European
security clearly aimed at an OSCE audience (early May),many
OSCE delegations will participate in an informal NATO HLTF
"stock-taking" session (late May),and Germany will host a
seminar on the future of CFE in early June. These meetings
will tee up higher-level discussions later in June, with FM
Lavrov coming to the OSCE's Annual Security Review
Conference on June 23 to present Russia's vision for a new
treaty, and the Greek Chairmanship is preparing for an
informal meeting of all OSCE Foreign Ministers on a Greek

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island at the end of June.


5. (C) Many allies are concerned that the pace is picking up,
while neither NATO nor the EU have had a chance to discuss in
detail how they want this process to unfold. We should use
this series of meetings leading up to the U.S.-Russia summit
in July to refine our approach, get input and buy-in from the
Allies, and present a coherent set of goals and objectives
for this broad security dialogue.

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A Game Plan Before the July Summit
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5. (C) USOSCE believes we should adopt a gameplan that U.S.
and Russian leaders can endorse at their July summit to
provide a roadmap on a future European security dialogue. We
need intensive consultations with the Allies this month to
define objectives. This should include a willingness to
launch a process of negotiations in two major tracks:

-- A conventional arms control track aimed at overcoming the
current impasse on CFE and updating other CSBMs, specifically
the Vienna Document 1999; and

-- A broad dialogue aimed at adopting an updated
comprehensive security strategy for the OSCE region that
would adapt the 1990 Charter of Paris and the 1999 Charter
for a New Europe to the challenges of the next decade. In
the latter track, Russia can press its case for a binding
international agreement, but we suspect they will find few
buyers for this approach.


6. (C) If our friends and allies are prepared to accept this
long-term goal, the next two months can help us advance
toward that aspiration. The May visit of FM Lavrov to the
U.S. should be used to indicate our willingness to launch
such a process, but also indicate firmly to Moscow that
Russian behavior will have an impact on how far this dialogue
can go. In particular, from a USOSCE perspective, Lavrov
should be encouraged to indicate Moscow,s good faith as
well. An agreement on the future of the UN and OSCE
presences in Georgia, including approval of a mode of
operation for international monitors inside South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, would be a clear signal.


7. (C) We can in turn send signals of our own. Holding
another round of talks on the Parallel Actions Package prior
to the June 10 Berlin seminar, or even better before the HLTF
"stock-taking" session May 27-28, would be an important
sign of commitment to conventional arms control and a means
of gauging where the Russians are on CFE now. Indication of
willingness to consider a limited package of revisions to the
Vienna Document 1999 after 10 years would also be received
warmly. The Secretary's commitment to attend the informal
ministerial proposed by the Greek Chairmanship would likewise
indicate the seriousness with which we are approaching this
process.


8. (C) In the meantime, we should be using this period to
develop with the Allies further ideas on key questions
facing us in these areas. Will we continue to pursue the
current Parallel Actions Package approach and where it is
taking CFE, or would it be wise to adjust course? Are we
prepared to adjust conventional arms control instruments to
accommodate new weaponry and more lethal but smaller rapid
reaction units? What elements would we like to see included
in a new European security strategy? Can we strengthen human
rights commitments, or develop more effective monitoring or
enforcement mechanisms in this field? How would we like to

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incorporate newer threats, such as missile proliferation,
cyber-security and terrorism, or better reflect environmental
security and energy security concerns in a new document? Are
there mechanisms short of a binding treaty that we are
prepared to entertain that would help assuage Russian
concerns about being left out of security decision-making in
Europe? And how can we use this process to make progress on
the unresolved conflicts in the OSCE region? USOSCE is
prepared to engage actively in the policy discussions of all
these items as we move down this path.


9. (C) If all this work progresses as suggested, we should be
prepared for a wide-ranging discussion at the informal OSCE
ministerial in late June, which could also result in an
agreement in principle on steps forward in this process.
This could then be endorsed at the July U.S.-Russia summit as
another area of cooperative efforts to move the relationship
forward, in parallel with the host of other difficult issues
we are tackling on the bilateral agenda. More intense
negotiations would be required in the fall of 2009, with
important stock-taking at the Athens Ministererial at the end
of the year. That would also be an appropriate time to take
a decision on our willingness to aim for an OSCE summit to
finalize this process, the first such summit since Istanbul
in 1999.
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NEIGHBOUR