Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE71
2009-03-26 15:26:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

FSC MARCH 25: RUSSIA CALLS FOR LIMITED REVISION OF

Tags:  PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1045
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0071/01 0851526
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261526Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6297
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0718
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1273
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1213
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000071 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC MARCH 25: RUSSIA CALLS FOR LIMITED REVISION OF
VIENNA DOCUMENT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000071

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC MARCH 25: RUSSIA CALLS FOR LIMITED REVISION OF
VIENNA DOCUMENT


1. (SBU) Summary: Russian arms control delegation head
Ulyanov told the March 25 Forum for Security Cooperation that
half of the Vienna Document, last revised in 1999, was a
"dead letter" and even its provisions for information
exchange, inspections/evaluations, and contact visits were no
longer robust and in danger of decaying into irrelevance.
Reprising a theme he has argued for the last three years,
Ulyanov asserted the only way the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99)
could avoid "the fate of the CFE Treaty" would be immediate
and rapid revision of some of its key portions, similar to
what was done several times in the 1990s. Revision could be
limited by an FSC decision that would reopen only certain
paragraphs of VD99, set a fixed time limit, and underline
that VD99 would remain in effect until revision was complete.
Greece cautioned that reopening VD99 could jeopardize all
its provisions as the European security climate had changed
since the early 1990s when it was first negotiated. The U.S.
noted Russia itself had, despite its gloomy report, actively
implemented Vienna Document verification provisions in 2008
and 2009.


2. (SBU) French MFA security policy DAS Audibert explained
Paris' views for next steps on European security. Audibert
minimized the significance of the recent French decision to
rejoin the NATO military structure and insisted France had
always been "Atlanticist," although some believed it had
championed the European Security and Defense Policy to
compete with NATO. European defense strategy will require
continuing reliance on the "twin pillars" of NATO and the EU
even though many European nations need to invest more in
defense. Although France saw a major role for the OSCE in
any new European security arrangement, considerable
imagination and flexibility would be needed to surmount
frozen conflicts and restore the political-military acquis,
including CFE. End Summary.

Who's Afraid of the Vienna Document?

--------------


3. (SBU) Russian arms control delegation head Mikhail Ulyanov
said participating States responded warily, if not in
outright panic, to his standing question why had the Vienna
Document not been changed since 1999 when it had been amended
four times in the first ten years of its existence. Ulyanov
doubted the explanation proffered by the UK that the European
political climate had changed since the document was first
written. He recalled the Helsinki Final Act was created in
the mid-1970s when the "common purpose" was presumably no
greater. The Stockholm document on CSBMs was adopted in

1986. More recently, the adapted CFE Treaty was negotiated
despite tense NATO-Russia relations in the wake of the
Yugoslavia conflicts. The actual explanation, Ulyanov
concluded, was a lack of political will compounded by
diminishing interest in CSBMs. Many states, he said, are
comfortable with the present document and allergic to
anything that would limit their latitude for military action.

"A Dead Letter"
--------------


4. (SBU) These attitudes, Ulyanov warned, are at odds with
current reality. Not all states are comfortable with the
position that the Vienna Document performs well enough.

USOSCE 00000071 002 OF 005


Referring to an earlier Russian Food-for-Thought paper that
reviewed each of the document's chapters (FSC.AIAM/2/09),
Ulyanov asserted that at least half of the provisions were
not functioning, "a dead letter," as exemplified by Georgia's
recent refusal of a Russian inspection request. He added
that pS submission under VD99 vary widely in the degree of
detail, itself an "abnormal state of affairs." Atrophy of
VD99 was part of a larger stalemate over the last decade in
the core mandate of the FSC. Innovation is viewed by some as
taboo even though change is acknowledged elsewhere as needed,
as in discussions of European security architecture. "Yet
while every howitzer was counted, naval forces were not even
considered." Not only the Vienna Document, but the OSCE
Document on SALW, Principles of Non-Proliferation, and Code
of Conduct also are in need of serious review. If nothing
were done, the document would completely cease to function
within ten years.

Selective Pruning
--------------


5. (SBU) Anticipating the objection that reopening the Vienna
Document would threaten the existing CSBM regime, Ulyanov
assured that only selected sections need be considered, and
this could be done without jeopardizing the rest of the
document. Just a few new provisions were needed to update
the document, including Russia's earlier proposals for
information exchanges and notifications on naval forces and
(with Belarus) multinational rapid reaction forces. Also, in
Chapter IX on verification, a definition of "force majeure"
was needed. The recent proposals by Norway on inspection
quotas (FSC.AIAM/5/09) and Denmark on the size of inspection
teams (FSC.AIAM/6/08) should also be considered, he said.
Chapters V through VIII could be left intact, except that the
definition of "major military activities" needed to be
updated.

Immediate and Urgent Revision Needed
--------------


6. (SBU) Ulyanov assured that pS could agree in advance which
provisions to reopen, and that protracted negotiations would
be in no one's interest. He proposed a date certain by which
any changes would have to be approved, e.g., before the
Athens Ministerial (in December). Review of the document
should then occur every four or five years, as is done with
core documents at the UN, the EU, and NATO. Ulyanov urged pS
to begin revision immediately: it should become the main work
of the FSC for the next two or three months if the document
is to avoid "the fate of the CFE Treaty." Ulyanov asked that
his presentation be considered as a Food-for-Thought and part
of dialogue to ensure European security.

Allies and Others Resist
--------------


7. (SBU) While Belarus gave a blanket endorsement of the
Russian position, Switzerland demurred that only the Vienna
Document provisions on conflict resolution were moribund,
largely for political reasons. Austria complained that it
had attempted a review of the Code of Conduct in 2006 but
lacked any support to go forward. The UK reminded that it
had recently co-sponsored with Russia a draft Best Practices

USOSCE 00000071 003 OF 005


Guide on contact visits, hardly an example of inactivity.
Latvia suggested the problem was lack of will, not an
inadequate instrument.


8. (SBU) Germany (Kantorczyk) expressed general satisfaction
with the Vienna Document, but conceded the Russian point that
the document had not been revised since 1999, attributing
this to the absence of the consensus present in the 1990s.
Kantorczyk noted the document lacks a mechanism for regular
review but revision should be undertaken when needed. Germany
would be making its own proposal for improving the document
soon. Germany did not share Ulyanov's pessimism about OSCE
political-military documents generally: the Forum had
recently agreed to undertake a review of the SALW document.

U.S.: VD99 Seems to Work for Russia
--------------


9. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) countered that the discussion
should not be whether to reopen the document but allow Russia
to explain what issues it had with the document beyond some
of the issues it had already raised that were discounted by
other pS, e.g., its proposals on naval and rapid reaction
forces. Neighbour said it was hard to understand Russia's
assertion that VD99 was not working considering its own very
heavy implementation of the document in 2008 and 2009.


10. (SBU) Greece (Sourani) repeated the common apprehension
that revising any part of the document would entail reopening
all of it. She asked delegations to recall their substantial
revision efforts in 1995-1999, which led only to a chapter on
regional measures. Responding to Ulyanov's claim that there
were fewer notifications, she said the document was a victim
of its own success in reducing tensions and building
stability.

Allons Enfants
--------------


11. (SBU) French MFA DAS for security policy Jacques Audibert
discussed European security on the eve of the NATO Summit.
Audibert minimized the magnitude of the change represented by
France's return to NATO's integrated military structure,
asserting it had always been committed to the trans-Atlantic
partnership and France never intended EU defense institutions
to compete with NATO as events continue to prove that Europe
needs the U.S. and vice versa. For the future, France will
work to strengthen "the twin pillars" of European security,
NATO and the EU, including the latter's European Security and
Defense Policy.

OSCE a Keystone
--------------


12. (SBU) Acknowledging the problems at the OSCE with
continuing impasse over frozen conflicts and an "erosion of
commitment" to the political-military acquis, he said France
viewed the OSCE as a keystone of the European security
structure, which should be based on the trans-Atlantic link;
preservation of extant institutions including NATO, the EU,
and the OSCE; a comprehensive, multi-dimensional concept of
security including human rights; and renewed commitment to
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter

USOSCE 00000071 004 OF 005


of Paris.

European Defense Deficits
--------------


13. (SBU) While noting that the NATO-EU partnership still
needed work, Audibert said Europe's own defense efforts were
still insufficient, noting perennial equipment and other
shortfalls resulting from declining or static defense
budgets. There was, he said, something wrong when two
European countries had 75 percent of the airlift capacity of
the EU. Nevertheless, he said the EU had proven its worth,
citing its observer mission in Georgia, naval response to
Horn of Africa piracy, and rule of law mission in Kosovo.

U.S. Needs Time
--------------


14. (SBU) Audibert added that any future European security
arrangement would need to address new and emerging threats
such as global warming, proliferation of WMD, energy
security, terrorism, and cyber attacks. States would
reaffirm their adherence to the principles of avoidance of
force and the right to elect security arrangements. Regional
conflicts had to be addressed and the CFE Treaty, although
"not in crisis," should be restored to its central position
in the European security architecture through adaptation and
subsequent "modernization." To do this will require all
parties to show imagination and flexibility. He cautioned
that many states, particularly the U.S. with the change in
administration, need time to take stock before committing to
an OSCE summit.

SALW
--------------


15. (SBU) In the working group , the FSC chairman of the
Informal Group of Friends of SALW (Schweizer, Germany)
reported many delegations share a common understanding of the
way ahead in fulfilling the 2008 ministerial decision to
review the OSCE Document on SALW. At an informal meeting on
March 19, most delegations agreed on a general approach
instead of a "line-by-line" review of the document.
Schweizer will circulate a notional work plan shortly that
will draw from proposals made by delegations, including:
descriptions of current OSCE norms and programs; support of
related international organization and NGO efforts; and a
major meeting by September. Schweizer described an emerging
consensus for future work on brokering, end-use certificates,
marking and tracing, and stockpile management.

Code of Conduct
--------------


16. (SBU) Responding to the latest revision of the draft
decision for an update to the Code of Conduct questionnaire
(FSC.DD/14/08/Rev.2),Belarus said it still preferred a
"direct reference" to the "indivisibility of security" in
preamble paragraph 3, despite a U.S.-suggested edit to the
paragraph that quotes from Code paragraph 3 that "security is
indivisible." In any case Belarus is still waiting for
instructions.


USOSCE 00000071 005 OF 005



17. (SBU) Germany proposed editorial changes to questions
II.4.1. and 4.3 and II.1.3., substituting "how does your
state" for "how do you." Germany can accept the draft with
just these changes, although it also repeated a
recommendation that preamble paragraph 5 recalling the
earlier technical update of the questionnaire (FSC.DEC/4/03)
be deleted as superfluous.


18. (SBU) Turkey requested the word "any" be deleted from
question I.1.4 soliciting information on "additional efforts"
to combat terrorism. Russia immediately counter-proposed
"possible" in place of "any." (Note: Turkey has consistently
sought strengthening the obligation to provide this
information, while Russia just as consistently has sought to
dilute it. End Note.) The FSC Code coordinator (Eischer,
Austria) may prepare another revision after consulting with
delegations. If consensus appears likely, the chair will
call a working group meeting before the plenary on April 1.


ASRC
--------------


19. (SBU) The chair (Lebedel, France) announced that Loic
Simonet (France) would be the FSC chef de file for the Annual
Security Review Conference (June 23-24). Lebedel also
invited comment on his perception paper on the terms of
reference for the chef de file (FSC.DEL/62/09). There was no
further discussion of the paper.

Next Meeting
--------------


20. (SBU) The next and last FSC meeting under the French
chairmanship will be on April 1.
SCOTT