Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE66
2009-03-25 16:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

U.S.- RF CYBERSECURITY BILATERAL ON MARGINS OF

Tags:  EINT FR KCFE KHLS OSCE PARM PREL RS KCIP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9803
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0066/01 0841629
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251629Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6288
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1728
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0090
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000066 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, OES
NSA FOR STANAR-JOHNSON, T FOR KATSAPIS, OSD EUR/NATO,
OSD/NII FOR HALL, DHS FOR DENNING, NSC FOR HATHAWAY, NSC
FOR DONAHUE, NSC FOR CUMMINGS, WINPAC FOR FRITZMEIER, ISN
FOR KARTCHNER,
NSC FOR HAYES
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018
TAGS: EINT FR KCFE KHLS OSCE PARM PREL RS KCIP
SUBJECT: U.S.- RF CYBERSECURITY BILATERAL ON MARGINS OF
OSCE CYBER WORKSHOP

REF: A. USOSCE 0064

B. USOSCE 0065

Classified By: Charge d' Affairs a.i. Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000066

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, OES
NSA FOR STANAR-JOHNSON, T FOR KATSAPIS, OSD EUR/NATO,
OSD/NII FOR HALL, DHS FOR DENNING, NSC FOR HATHAWAY, NSC
FOR DONAHUE, NSC FOR CUMMINGS, WINPAC FOR FRITZMEIER, ISN
FOR KARTCHNER,
NSC FOR HAYES
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018
TAGS: EINT FR KCFE KHLS OSCE PARM PREL RS KCIP
SUBJECT: U.S.- RF CYBERSECURITY BILATERAL ON MARGINS OF
OSCE CYBER WORKSHOP

REF: A. USOSCE 0064

B. USOSCE 0065

Classified By: Charge d' Affairs a.i. Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a bilateral meeting on March 16 before
the start of the OSCE Workshop on a Comprehensive OSCE
Approach to Enhancing Cybersecurity (March 17-18, Vienna),
U.S. and Russian Federation dels met to discuss their
differing approaches to cybersecurity and to identify common
ground if possible. There was little change, if any, between
U.S. and Russian long-held views on cybersecurity. The U.S.
stressed layered defensive strategies as the most effective
way to deal with challenges to cybersecurity. Russia alleged
that an arms control race was unfolding in cyberspace and
that constraints on state capabilities were necessary, but
failed to address concrete U.S. concerns raised regarding
this approach. For participants, see para 11. END SUMMARY.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.S. Concerns with Russian Approach
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (SBU) U.S. head of del (Markoff) reviewed her guidance,
explaining that cyber security was high on the Obama
administration's agenda and that a 60-day review of national
cyber security policy was currently ongoing. Markoff gave a
detailed account of U.S. concerns regarding the RF approach,
as it was outlined in Sherstyuk's published remarks. She
underscored the key theme that the U.S. did not think that
the threats of cyber attack could be usefully addressed by
traditional arms control-type constraints. She noted that
constraining state capabilities were meaningless when

governments have no particular monopoly on attack tools and
attacks could be carried out by proxies. She noted that
layered "dynamic defenses" are the best way to handle any
attack, whatever the source.


3. (C) Russia (Krutskikh) gave a long monologue about how he
thought the U.S. and Russia could work together in the area
of cyber security. He said that Russia was willing to
demonstrate flexibility and "listen to the American
experience." Krutskikh also said that the U.S. and Russia
had not engaged on cyber security since "the impasse began in
the UN." Krutskikh said Russia did not expect that the U.S.
and Russia would "act like two gladiators to amuse the
world." He said that "both Russia and the U.S. had a new
president," and hoped this would portend a change in
long-standing U.S. policies. He noted that Russia was not
pushing the idea of a new international agreement to "create
a headache for the U.S." and that it was not really a
"disarmament approach," only that it "sounded" like one,
asserting that this was a "stereotype." Krutskikh lastly
stressed the need for agreement on "terms and definitions."
Russia and the U.S. needed a "common vocabulary" in order to
take the next step. He expressed a sense of hope when he
heard the U.S. was conducting a 60-day cyber policy review,
and believed the U.S. and Russia might eventually be able to
issue a joint statement on working together.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Russia Alleges Arms Race in Cyberspace
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) Russia (Sherstyuk) believed that "an arms race in
cyberspace" was at hand. Sherstyuk said that is was the U.S.
who first recognized that cyber capabilities could be more
destructive that WMD. He stressed that Russia considered

USOSCE 00000066 002 OF 003


cybersecurity a "political-military" issue. He also agreed
that the U.S. and Russia had made little progress in moving
forward on this issue bilaterally.


5. (C) The U.S. (Markoff) replied that the U.S. had put
forth a list of serious, concrete concerns regarding the
Russian Federation's arms control proposal, but that Russia
as of yet still had not addressed them. Markoff welcomed a
serious response to U.S. concerns. She stressed that until
Russia was ready to engage constructively, it would be
difficult for conversations to go any further on other
matters related to cyber security. Markoff also noted that
it was disappointing that a member of the G8 had not signed
on to the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime. She
explained that the U.S. thought it was odd that Russia
appeared to be calling for another treaty instrument when
Russia had every opportunity to amend for four years a
convention that Russia calls "so flawed." Markoff sought to
end on a high note with a hope to find common ground during
the OSCE workshop over the next two days.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Russia Objects to Cybercrime Convention
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) Russia (Sherstyuk) explained that it specifically
objected to paragraph 32.b of the Council of Europe
Convention on Cyber Crime. Russia (Miroshnikov) said that IT
crime was wider than cybercrime. Miroshnikov stated that in
2008 there were approximately 5500 criminal cases involving
IT and roughly 75% of those cases were categorized as
"cybercrime." He cited specific examples of Russian
collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Medvedev-Obama Meeting in July?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) In a separate aside on day one of the workshop
(March 17) Russian Federation head of del (Krutskikh) told
U.S. head of del (Markoff) that Russian President Medvedev
will raise their long-standing "information security"
concerns and proposals with President Obama during their
"planned July meeting." Krutskikh indicated that Russia is
flexible in their approaches to constraining the "information
arms race" and that options could include "codes of conduct."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Russians Want Meeting in Washington Before GGE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


8. (C) In preparation for the UNGA Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) on this issue scheduled to have its first
meeting in Geneva in November 2009, Krutskikh said that the
Russian Federation proposes a follow-up to conversations had
on the margins of this workshop in the format of "large
delegations, with all the generals" in Washington in
September 2009.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Russia Has Message for OES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -


9. (C) On other issues, Krutskikh wanted to let his
counterparts in State/OES know that the Russian Federation
has issued blanket guidance that no technical exchanges on
any topic, i.e., space, information security, etc. can be
concluded without first completing the Technology Safeguard
Agreement (TSA) that had been under negotiation.

USOSCE 00000066 003 OF 003




10. (U) This cable has been cleared by INR/CCT Markoff;
OSD/NII; and, OSD/P.


11. (SBU) Participants included:

U.S. side:

-- Hugh Neighbour, Chief Arms Control Delegate, U.S. Mission
to the OSCE
-- State/INR Michele Markoff, Acting Director, Office of
Cyber Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Head
of Delegation
-- State/INR Peter Juliak, analyst
-- State/EB John Rodgers, Director APEC and OECD Affairs,
Office of International Communications and Information Policy
-- DHS John Denning, Director of External Affairs, Office of
Cybersecurity and Communications
-- DOD Robert Doheny, Program Executive, Defense
Cybersecurity Implementation and Principal Director, Crisis
Management and Mission Assurance
-- DOD Anthony Bargar, Senior Strategy and Policy Advisor,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Information and
Identity Assurance
-- DOD Forrest Hare, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force,
Senior Information Operations Officer
-- State/VCI Toniann Wright, Political Military Affairs
Officer and notetaker


Russian side:

-- Mikhail Ulyanov, Head of Delegation for Military Security
and Arms Control
-- Vladislav Sherstyuk, Assistant Secretary of the Security
Council of the Russian Federation
-- Andrey Krutskikh, Deputy Director of the Department on New
Challenges and Threats, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
-- Boris Miroshnikov, Head of the Bureau of Speical Technical
Activities, Ministry of Interior; Dmitry Votrin, Senior
Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
-- Sergey Boyko, Expert, Ministry of Defense
-- Sergey Komov, Minitary Academy of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces.
NEIGHBOUR