Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE50
2009-03-06 11:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA

Tags:  PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2387
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0050/01 0651102
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061102Z MAR 09 ZDK
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6252
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0707
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1262
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1202
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000050 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA
CALLS FOR NEW CSBMS (PART 2)

REF: A. USOSCE 0049

B. USOSCE 0046

USOSCE 00000050 001.6 OF 007


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000050

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA
CALLS FOR NEW CSBMS (PART 2)

REF: A. USOSCE 0049

B. USOSCE 0046

USOSCE 00000050 001.6 OF 007



1. (SBU) Note: This is the second part of a two-part cable
reporting the March 3-4 OSCE Annual Implementation Assessment
Meeting. See reftel A for the first part. End note.

--------------
Working Session 2: Other Documents
--------------

Conventional Arms Transfers
--------------


2. (SBU) Russia complained that states supplying Georgia,
"among the most militarized states on the planet," with large
numbers of arms and military equipment were violating the
Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers. Arms
supplied to Georgia continued to threaten peace and regional
stability and had made possible the targeting of civilians
and domestic repression. Ulyanov urged states to reconsider
the earlier Russian proposal for an embargo of, at least,
offensive arms to Georgia (FSC.DEL/155/08/Rev.1).


3. (SBU) The Czech Republic, on behalf of the EU, reported
that the earlier EU position (FSC.DEL/170/08) had not
changed: EU states complied with all relevant requirements,
including OSCE principles, in their arms transfer practices.


4. (SBU) Georgia replied that its arms acquisitions were
transparent and in compliance with OSCE principles and other
international norms. Georgia had been inspected many times,
by Russia among others, under CFE and VD99. Meanwhile Russia
had supplied separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with
heavy arms, including armor, aircraft, and artillery. How
did this jibe with the OSCE principles?


5. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) remarked that delegations had
heard this debate before. He contested Russia's description
of Georgia as "heavily militarized:" if so, why had Russia
been able to easily defeat Georgia in the August 2008
conflict? The U.S. had armed and trained Georgian forces in
response, in part, to Russian concerns over Chechen
terrorists based in the Pankisi Gorge. U.S. assistance had

been reciprocated by Georgia's participation in coalition
operations in Iraq. Could Russia explain how Abkhazia and
South Ossetia obtained their weapons? For the immediate
future, the U.S. supported robust EU and OSCE observer
missions in Georgia and the occupied territories and full
compliance with all provisions of the ceasefire.

Non-Proliferation
--------------


6. (SBU) Italy, Belarus, and the UK (Gare) agreed that
non-proliferation should remain on the agenda of the FSC,
Italy calling it "the heart" of work in the Forum. Gare
urged states to continue their efforts to implement UNSC
Resolution 1540 on preventing the proliferation of WMD to
non-state actors, noting that the recent UNSC Resolution 1810
extended the mandate of 1540 until 2011 and placed added
emphasis on the role of regional organizations like the OSCE.


USOSCE 00000050 002.4 OF 007


Stabilizing Measures
--------------


7. (SBU) Georgia reprised earlier remarks that such measures
were next to useless in South Caucasus without Russia's
political will to reach a peaceful solution.

Code of Conduct
--------------


8. (SBU) Switzerland confirmed it will sponsor another
regional seminar on the Code of Conduct; it hosted a Code
seminar in Almaty in 2008 for Central Asian states. Sweden
and Finland supported a German suggestion for a permanent
mechanism outside the AIAM to review implementation of the
Code. Georgia complained that "one participating State"
violated several provisions of the Code during the August
2008 conflict. The FSC Code coordinator (Eischer, Austria)
reported delegations appeared close to consensus on a draft
decision to update the Code questionnaire.

Small Arms and Light Weapons
--------------


9. (SBU) Finland asserted good decisions were taken last
year. Future work should build on 2008 work in the FSC on
brokering, air transport of SALW, and MANPADS and support the
UN Program of Action on SALW (UNPOA). The upcoming review of
the OSCE Document on SALW should follow the agenda of the
recent Third UNPOA Biennial Meeting of States (BMS). Future
emphases should include brokering, marking and tracing, end
use certificates, illicit transportation, transparency, and
information exchanges. Sweden concurred, adding that project
work should remain a priority. The session coordinator
(Schweizer, Germany) suggested the OSCE might host a regional
conference on the UNPOA before the Fourth BMS in 2010.


10. (SBU) Switzerland supported Finland's recommendations.
Over the last ten years the OSCE has developed a core
competence in SALW, but better ties with the UNPOA are still
needed. Future efforts should focus on improved
implementation, perhaps by strengthening experts in the field.


11. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) said it supported OSCE work on
SALW, noting its recent destruction of 15 MANPADS and
successful stockpile management program. Review of the
document should consider all other SALW-related decisions,
such as FSC.DEC/15/02 on expert advice on implementation.


12. (SBU) The UK recommended three guiding principles while
conducting the review of the OSCE Document on SALW:
implementation; consistency with the UNPOA; and no new
burdens on states already in compliance.

Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition
--------------


13. (SBU) Switzerland observed that in the field, work on
SALW and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) is done
together. Review of the SALW document should include SCA.
They are linked. Experts should participate in the review.
More outreach is needed; this could include translation of
the Best Practice Guides into non-OSCE languages. Finland

USOSCE 00000050 003.4 OF 007


supported the Swiss recommendations, noting its recent
contribution of a guide on melange rocket fuel oxidizer
disposition would be of interest to many states. Germany and
Switzerland supported the coordinator's suggestion of a
workshop on project implementation, including indicators of
surplus.


14. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) asked for the status of
negotiations between the OSCE and Ukraine over privileges and
immunities, including questions of legal liability, for OSCE
personnel working on the melange project in Ukraine. Ukraine
(Leschenko) reported that the MOU defining these immunities
was pending approval before the upper house of the national
parliament. The CPC (Geertsen) added that resolution of the
issue will also depend on the methods employed by the firms
awarded the contract for elimination.

MANPADS Export Controls
--------------


15. (SBU) Finland said there was a need for greater outreach
on the OSCE Principles for Export Controls of MANPADS,
including assistance to individual states. The U.S. reported
an outreach seminar in Vienna with the OSCE Mediterranean
Partners in October 2008 that addressed stockpile management
and export controls and led to further bilateral assistance.

End-User Certificates
--------------


16. (SBU) Switzerland recommended thorough analysis of the
results of the information exchange on end-user certificates
and related verification procedures in order to derive best
practices. Finland agreed, noting there is a lack of clear
binding commitment to these standard elements among the 56
participating States.

--------------
Working Session 3: CSBM Improvements
--------------

Russian Orthodoxy
--------------


17. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) took the floor first, striking a
familiar cord in lamenting the alleged stagnation of CSBMs
since 1999. He argued the need to adapt the document to
changing conditions and supported his position by noting that
the Russian Food-for-Thought on VD99 implementation
estimates that more than half of the provisions no longer
function. Ulyanov conceded that two years ago Russia had
abandoned the idea of seeking a comprehensive change to the
document. But, noting that "half-measures have not worked,"
Ulyanov said that lack of progress on Russian proposals,
including that on rapid reaction forces, had led them back to
their original concept of a full update of the document.


18. (SBU) Ulyanov complained that no matter how many times
Russia consults with its OSCE partners, they still
misunderstand Russia's intent. Ulyanov repeated that Russia
does not want to "abandon, freeze, or undermine" the current
document. Rather, Russia wants to identify shortcomings,
develop appropriate updates for those shortcomings, and open

USOSCE 00000050 004.4 OF 007


the document to codify those changes. Ulyanov compared the
OSCE to other international organizations, such as the
Wassenaar Arrangement, where the most important documents are
reviewed and revised. Why then, he asked, does the idea of
change bring panic in the OSCE, even though it updated VD99
four times during its first decade.

"What Has Changed?"
--------------


19. (SBU) Ulyanov characterized the silence that followed his
question, "What has changed since the 1990s?" as symptomatic
of a group used to ten years of stagnation. Ulyanov claimed
that the only change was the erosion of political will. He
repeated that he intended to discuss reopening the document
again in the FSC on March 25. Ulyanov responded to a
question on the value of the VD99 information exchange to
introduce what he characterized as a newly revised proposal
for naval CSBMs (FSC.DEL/120/08.Rev.1).

U.S. Cautions Against Reopening VD99
--------------


20. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) acknowledged a recurring theme
at the 2009 AIAM: that VD99 is not a perfect document. But,
said Neighbour, the document is working and it is important
for all pS to live up to their obligations as they are
currently written. Neighbour cautioned that reopening VD99
would be an uncertain and very long road that could call into
question the successful provisions of the current document.


21. (SBU) Neighbour asserted that much of the document is
fine, but agreed with Ulyanov that political will is lacking.
Chapter III on Risk Reduction, for example, is fine as
written. Making changes to Chapter III would not have
changed the outcome in August. The CiO went to extraordinary
lengths to avert a crisis, but what was lacking was the
political will to find a peaceful resolution.


22. (SBU) Neighbour also asked pS to look at Russia's
analysis from a broader perspective: to consider aspects
outside the OSCE. Neighbour reasoned that when one delegation
has suspended its implementation of the biggest CSBM of all,
that is CFE, it hardly seems the right time to reopen VD99.
Neighbour added that Russia cannot substitute VD99 for CFE.

U.S. Opposes Naval CSBMs
--------------


23. (SBU) Neighbour also recalled that Russia's naval CSBM
was earlier discussed in the FSC and noted that some 20 pS,
Allies and others, questioned the merit of Russia's proposal.
Neighbour remarked that:

- Russia did not identify any security concern that the naval
CSBMs would address. In essence, there is no "problem" to
solve via a CSBM.

- In the absence of any security concern to be addressed and
any substantive modification to the proposed measures, it
would not be productive for the FSC to spend time discussing
measures that will not provide any collective benefit to OSCE
states.

USOSCE 00000050 005.4 OF 007



- NATO Allies are open to engagement on a variety of naval
issues, in appropriate fora. For example, in the NATO-Russia
context, cooperation on maritime search and rescue has been
promoted by NATO Allies.

Neighbour concluded by stating that the U.S. is willing to
engage, in consultation with Allies and friends, on
substantive concerns to improve existing CSBMs based on
reciprocity, military significance, and verifiability.

Irish Support
--------------


24. (SBU) On the margins, Ireland (Donagh) approached USDel
and noted its satisfaction with the U.S. intervention.
Donagh said he thought he was talking for a number of smaller
non-NATO pS when he said that the tone and timing of the
intervention was very effective and much appreciated.
Similar sentiments were subsequently heard from Finland,
Switzerland, and some Allies.

How Significant Are Units in the Urals?
--------------


25. (SBU) Ulyanov replied that, if anything, naval forces
were certainly as "militarily significant" as Russian
artillery units stationed near the Urals. He noted that over
the last ten years there have been two major military
operations, the first in the Balkans and the second in Iraq,
and both of these operations relied heavily on naval forces.
Ulyanov said verifiability is a topic for negotiation and he
questioned concept of reciprocity, asking how reciprocity can
be achieved between, for instance, Russia and San Marino or
the Holy See.


26. (SBU) Ulyanov conceded that VD99 cannot replace CFE since
each has its own purpose. CFE sets limits on conventional
forces, which are verified through a strict inspection
regime. The verification of information exchanged on
conventional forces in VD99 is intended to build confidence,
not verify limits.


27. (SBU) Belarus thanked the U.S. and Russia for starting
the discussion and noted that while Belarus did not want to
go back two years, there are proposals on the table
(presumably the Russia/Belarus proposal on RRF) for which
they are looking for feedback.

CiO Greece: VD99 a Safety Net
--------------


28. (SBU) Greece (Sourani),the current OSCE
Chairmanship-in-Office, recalled Camille Grande's use of the
term "benign neglect" in his presentation at the FSC on
European security (reftel B). Sourani contended that VD 1999
is a victim of its own success and cautioned pS not to
underestimate the value of the current measures for
confidence-building through contacts. She suggested that, in
a period where CFE was not being implemented, VD 1999 became
a sort of safety net. She asked pS to consider what would
happen if VD 1999 became inoperable. Sourani empathized with
Russia's frustration at the lack of interest in their

USOSCE 00000050 006.3 OF 007


proposals but noted the proposals tabled in previous
sessions, commenting that the FSC would have some concrete
proposals to work on. She cautioned that the lengthy
discussions on the update to the Code of Conduct
questionnaire underscore how difficult it can be to gain
consensus at 56.

UK: Those Were the Days
--------------


29. (SBU) The UK (Gare) thanked Russia for circulating their
paper and for the U.S. intervention which presented the other
side of the coin. Gare took exception to one point made by
Greece and noted that only one pS had suspended
implementation of the CFE treaty and that all other States
Parties were continuing to implement CFE. Gare said the
level of trust and confidence during the 1990s was much
higher, with all pS sharing a common vision. Since 2000,
however, the level of trust and confidence has eroded and now
it is more difficult to find consensus. In these conditions,
it is important to find areas of common agreement.


30. (SBU) Turkey asked whether it was really necessary to
destroy the existing architecture in order to reestablish a
common direction. Turkey argued that pS should look for ways
to improve the current system rather than attempting to
rebuild the architecture from scratch.

Ulyanov: We're Gaining on You
--------------


31. (SBU) Russia conceded that we do not know where we would
end up when we opened VD 1999 and that it would be a long
road. But he said Russia does not see continued use of the
current document as a problem in the mean time. He also
agreed with the UK, that pS are now pulling in different
directions. However, he noted with satisfaction, the number
of pS calling for changes to VD 1999 increased from two last
year to five this year.


32. (SBU) The coordinator (von Arx, Switzerland) asked
whether it was possible to create a theoretical "box" in
which pS could freely discuss the concept of updating VD 1999
without impacting the implementation of the current document.
He asked whether pS could work inside such a framework. He
also asked whether a CSBM could be developed for reacting to
crises under "bad weather" conditions and how regional CSBMs
can help.


33. (SBU) Referring to regional measures, Ulyanov recalled
Russia's proposal to extend the Black Sea CSBM to the Baltic
Sea. He said that Russia was thinking in terms of a modest
measure that would not require additional financing or
significant increase in work.

U.S. on All-Weather CSBMs
--------------


34. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) said CSBMs were meant to be
"all-weather" measures. He noted that pS, including the
U.S., had implemented provisions under both CFE and VD 1999,
including inspections and evaluations, during operations in
the Balkans and in Kosovo.

USOSCE 00000050 007.3 OF 007




35. (SBU) Armenia commented that it considered regional CSBMs
of value and called on their more coordinated use. Armenia
noted, however, as conditions change so must the CSBMs and
therefore there should be a discussion on whether VD 1999
needs to be updated.
Azerbaijan noted that while the idea of regional CSBMs makes
sense, particularities of regional security concerns makes it
difficult for outsiders to assist in creating such measures.
Too often the result is erosion of confidence. Too many
CSBMs are not being fully implemented or are seen as
win-lose, when they should be developed an implemented on a
win-win consensus.


36. (SBU) Switzerland agreed with the coordinator's point on
creating boxes. Switzerland noted that one such box should
be the AIAM, and that another box should be the Heads of
Verification. Switzerland said it would make a proposal in
the FSC to hold the HOV permanently in December or January so
that the results of the discussions could be forwarded to the
AIAM in March for consideration.


37. (SBU) On the margins, Finland (Kangaste) indicated that
Nordic states might support this effort. Canada also
commented favorably on the idea of allowing HOV's to meet
separately on technical maters, but at a time that allowed
for the results to feed into the AIAM as appropriate.
NEIGHBOUR