FSC FEBRUARY 25: EXPERTS SAY CFE-FROZEN CONFLICTS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000046

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STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
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UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC FEBRUARY 25: EXPERTS SAY CFE-FROZEN CONFLICTS
LINK FAILED


1. (SBU) Summary: At the Forum for Security Cooperation on
February 25, international security experts from European
think tanks agreed that NATO and Europe have been the victims
of their own success in structuring a stable security
environment for the last twenty years and, now, the security
acquis urgently needs adjustment. One expert said NATO's
link of ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty to resolution
of frozen conflicts through Russian fulfillment of its
Istanbul commitments was irretrievably broken. U.S.
"disinterest" or benign neglect of European security was
partly to blame for the present impasse over CFE and
uncertainty over the future shape of the European security
architecture.


2. (SBU) Later, Russia announced it would address reopening
the Vienna Document at the March 11 FSC. The working group
approved the draft decision to extend the deadline for Code
of Conduct questionnaire responses to June 15. Russia
announced a number of edits to the draft update of the Code
of Conduct questionnaire. The FSC Chair recommended the
Annual Security Review Conference be held June 23-24. End
summary.

Disarmament is Back, but Europe Has Its Own Problems
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3. (SBU) Wolfgang Zellner, at the Center for OSCE Research at
the University of Hamburg, claimed disarmament was "back on
the agenda," noting information of the White House website
that President Obama is seeking to "achieve dramatic
reductions" in the numbers of U.S. and Russian nuclear
weapons. Although some, he noted, hoped progress in
strategic arms control would lead to improvement of the
current climate for conventional arms control in Europe, this
was not a foregone conclusion. Zellner said the needs of the
European states were more heterogeneous and the U.S. did not
place a high priority on European arms control. It was
therefore up to EU states to take the initiative. Zellner
added the security issues and conflicts that concern Europe
are essentially European, with the possible exception of
missile defense.


4. (SBU) Zellner included the August 2008 conflict in Georgia
and Russia's suspension of CFE implementation among the
issues that confront Europe. He decried the mutual mistrust
between NATO, which suspects Russia wants to reestablish a
sphere influence in the QS area, and Russia, which views
NATO enlargement with unease and doubt.

Istanbul: Can the Circle Be Squared
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5. (SBU) Zellner recommended NATO follow Germany's advice to
find a way to modify the Parallel Action Package so that
continued insistence on Russian fulfillment of its Istanbul
commitments does not derail movement toward the adapted
treaty and threaten the survival of the entire CFE regime.
He wondered if the Geneva Conference on Georgia could find
another course, but doubted any solution would be timely. He
noted with approval the Merkel-Sarkozy article that suggested
a rapid solution to the Transnistria issue in Moldova was
possible.


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Link Between A/CFE and Istanbul a Failure
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6. (SBU) Zellner asserted that the impasse over A/CFE was
linked to sub-regional conflicts, as reflected on the
Istanbul commitments and the "flanks" issue. He concluded
that the attempt to resolve the issues in Georgia and Moldova
by linking them to ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty
(A/CFE) was a failure. Europe will, in any case, have to
move beyond A/CFE as many of the region's ongoing security
issues are not addressed by existing arms control mechanisms.
A new model is needed hat will ensure pan-European stability
a la CFE while resolving and presenting sub-regional
conflicts.

Medvedev Proposal Faute de Mieux
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7. (SBU) Zellner said conventional arms control will be
needed to support strategic arms reduction and this
relation, when combined with sub-regional conflicts and
emerging issues such as missile defense illustrates the
inadequacy of the existing negotiating fora. If only because
of the need to tie the different security areas together, he
endorsed the Medvedev and Sarkozy proposal for a European
security conference. Zellner also noted that the current
financial crisis is the greatest immediate threat to security
for all members of the OSCE, whose weaker members might face
economic and even political collapse without international
support.

Current Acquis Successful, up to a Point
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8. (SBU) Camille Grand, director of the Foundation for
Strategic Research in Paris and formerly the French
representative to the "NATO High Level Task Force" on
conventional arms control, described the relative success of
the current European security arrangements, although he noted
existing conflict prevention mechanisms could not prevent the
conflict in Georgia. The current security system was
undermined by the impasse over CFE and "unilateral" measures.
It was no surprise the Russian suspension had led to erosion
of the acquis.


9. (SBU) Grand said tensions between Russia and the West were
at the core of the present crisis. Benign neglect had led to
a return to a Cold War mentality that could degenerate into
an arms race and the reassertion of spheres of influence
modeled on the Westphalian balance of power.

Shopping List for Medvedev
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10. (SBU) Grand suggested the Medvedev response to these
problems, describing it as comprehensive and treaty-based,
might be feasible. It would need to balance hard and soft
security, as at the OSCE, include Canada and the U.S., uphold
values sovereignty, territorial integrity, and restraint from
use of force, incorporate existing alliances, and somehow
improve on the existing arrangements. This would means a new
European security architecture would still include classic
arms control, but would also contain crisis management and

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conflict prevention mechanisms and address new and emerging
threats like terrorism, transnational crime, and
proliferation.

Constructive Mistrust
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11. (SBU) Grand argued it was mistake to think mutual trust
was a precondition for negotiating a new architecture. A
certain amount of "constructive mistrust" might actually be a
goad to beginning work. Discussion should be open-ended and
should not fixate on the format of an agreement, which might
be a treaty or a political declaration or something else: its
shape would emerge naturally as a by-product of the
negotiations. No issues should be pre-judged and parties
should avoid an "all or noting" approach.

CFE Suspension: the Point of No Return
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12. (SBU) Zdzislaw Lachowski, at the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, observed that while the Adapted CFE
Treaty was needed by both Russia and NATO to address
post-Cold War realities, the fundamental strength of the
existing acquis meant that Europe still felt secure despite
the impasse over A/CFE and Russia's suspension. He warned
that this situation could not be indefinitely sustained: the
treaty's erosion, leading to reduced transparency and the
re-emergence of rivalries is bound to reach a point of no
return. Lachowski said South Caucasus states and Ukraine
have begun to recalculate their security positions should CFE
collapse.

Asymmetry of Strategic Perspectives
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13. (SBU) Lachowski argued that NATO and Russia must overcome
the "asymmetry of strategic perspectives" if the CFE crisis
is to be resolved. He said U.S. and NATO indifference to
Russian perceptions allowed the stalemate to develop. The
shift in U.S. focus away from Europe and classic arms control
has exacerbated the situation. Some way must be found to
bridge NATO's continued insistence on fulfillment of Istanbul
commitments with Russia's insistence on defining its own
security needs and separating arms control and hard security
issues from elections, the rule of law, and energy.

Accept No Substitutes
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14. (SBU) Lachowski concluded that, despite the almost
insuperable obstacles to resolving the impasse over the
treaty, the CFE regime remains essential to Europe's
continued security and stability. The Vienna Document or
bilateral agreements are not adequate substitutes. Russia
seems to recognize this, as it attempts to use its suspension
for accelerating movement toward the adapted treaty.

Russia: We Just Want to Help
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15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) commented that it no longer viewed
Istanbul commitments as an obstacle because it had fulfilled

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them: attention should shift instead to commitments made by
Georgia and others. Russia did not seek to drive wedges into
NATO, which would only enhance the solidarity of the Allies.
Instead, Russia sought to restore balance to Europe and
viability to conventional arms control. NATO enlargement
needs to be compensated for, especially on the flank.
Russia, after all, is no more interested in arms control than
any other state. Some thought they could use our commitment
to arms control against us with regard to the Istanbul
commitments, but this has been a failure.

Georgia and Moldova Remain Unconvinced
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16. (SBU) Georgia asked if any new arrangement could
guarantee the security of small states against their more
powerful neighbors when Russia had violated all of its
existing commitments by invading Georgia in August 2008.
Moldova added it did not accept that Russia had fulfilled its
Istanbul commitments. Host nation consent and the CFE Treaty
continued to be very important to Moldova, and it supported
the Parallel Action Plan.

Allies' Views
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17. (SBU) Germany asked for more focus on the
multi-dimensional nature of any new arrangement and suggested
a separate discussion soon at the OSCE of the "third
dimension" component. The UK agreed that "benign neglect" of
the faltering security system had worsened the impasse.
Luxembourg declared that all should have seen in 1999 when
they agreed to the Istanbul commitments that arms control
mechanisms could not resolve intra-state conflicts. A
mechanism relevant to such conflicts was still needed.

Echoes from the JCG
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18. (SBU) Responding to mention of South Caucasus security
issues in the experts' presentations, Azerbaijan and Armenia
exchanged recriminations over arms holdings in excess of
(CFE) treaty limits and unaccounted for treaty limited
equipment.

Reopening the Vienna Document
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19. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) announced it intended to initiate
discussion of the weaknesses of the Vienna Document 1999 in
the March 11 FSC, presumably under the Security Dialogue.
Ulyanov noted the document had been amended four times in its
first ten tears but had not been touched since. Despite the
march of time, Ulyanov said, some delegations saw reopening
or adjusting the document as taboo: they needed to explain
themselves.

ASRC Dates
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20. (SBU) The FSC Chair's letter to the Permanent Council
Chair recommending the Annual Security Review Conference be
held June 23-24 was sent without objection, although Turkey

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announced it reserved the right to make an interpretive
statement.

Code of Conduct
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21. (SBU) The working group agreed to submit to the plenary a
draft decision to extend the deadline for Code of Conduct
questionnaire submission from April 15 to June 15
(FSC.DD/1/09).


22. (SBU) Russia then announced it had several "technical
responses" to the latest version of the draft update of the
Code of Conduct questionnaire (FSC.DD/14/08). These included:

- remove the compilation form summarizing responses;

- make optional responses to question 1.4 on efforts to
prevent and combat terrorism in addition to those not
mentioned in questions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3;

- remove the words "of war" from the phrase "international
humanitarian law of war" from question 4.1;

- insert the word "technical" before the word "update" in the
title of the draft decision;

- support for Belarusian proposals for the decision's
preamble that would substitute language on the Helsinki Final
Act for the existing reference to the principles of the
United Nations Charter (FSC.DEL/186/08); and

- change the deadline for the first reply to the updated
questionnaire to June 15, possibly adding a provision to
excuse states that have already answered the current version
from needing to also answer the update.


23. (SBU) Belarus welcomed the Russian proposals. Finland
reminded it still wants a reference to UNSCR 1325 on the role
of gender in security affairs.


24. (SBU) The FSC Code of Conduct coordinator (Eischer,
Austria) announced an informal meeting on February 27 to
review Russian and other proposals for the draft. He will
circulate a compilation of these proposals shortly.

End Use Certificate Exchange
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25. (SBU) In response to Denmark's question, the chairman of
the Informal Group of Friends of Small Arms and Light Weapons
(Schweizer, Germany) explained that responses to the
information exchange of sample end use certificates
(FSC.DEC/12/08) could include documents prepared by the
exporting or importing party per the language in the
decision, "end use certificate . . . or other pertinent
documents."

Ukraine Melange
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26. (SBU) The Conflict Prevention Center (Geertsen) reported
a successful conference and site visits in early February for

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firms responding to the OSCE-Ukraine request for bids on the
destruction of melange rocket fuel oxidizer. Geertsen said
the project was still on track for melange elimination to
begin in the summer.

Next Meeting
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27. (U) The next FSC plenary and working groups will be on
March 11. The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting will
be on March 3-4.
SCOTT