DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG MEETS KAZAKHSTANI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000293

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG MEETS KAZAKHSTANI
FOREIGN MINISTER

Classified By: CDA Carol Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. Summary: (C) In a December 1 meeting with Deputy Secretary
James Steinberg at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Athens,
Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev repeatedly
pressed for the U.S. to drop its opposition to Kazakhstani
desires for an OSCE Summit in 2010. The Deputy Secretary
explained that an unsuccessful Summit would reflect badly on
Kazakhstan and on the OSCE--a scenario the U.S. wanted to
avoid. Pointing out that Kazakhstan "bends over backwards"
to do anything it can to assist the U.S., Saudabayev said he
was finding it difficult to explain to colleagues at home how
or why the U.S. opposed the GOK on this issue. He outlined
Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev's counsel to Iranian
President Ahmadinajad to come clean on Iran's nuclear
intentions and his blunt comments that Iran's position was a
losing one and that the world was right to doubt Iran's
intentions when it was hiding something. Saudabayev asked
the U.S. for the "minuscule favor" of agreeing to language
reflecting favorably on Kazakhstan's call for a Summit. The
following day, Saudabayev requested an additional brief
meeting with the Deputy Secretary wherein language was agreed
upon for use in a Ministerial Declaration on the summit (see
text below)--to the great joy of the entire Kazakhstani
delegation. In the end, however, Uzbekistan refused to
permit the use of the language in the decision. The Deputy
Secretary made clear to Saudabayev that if there is a summit
in 2010, POTUS had made no commitment to attend, and it was
unlikely he would be able to do so. End summary.


2. (C) On the margins of the Athens OSCE Ministerial
(December 1-2),Deputy Secretary Steinberg and FM Saudabayev
met on December 1 to discuss Kazakhstan's approaching OSCE
Chairmanship in Office (CiO). Saudabayev thanked the Deputy
Secretary for the (eventual) support of the U.S. in Madrid
2007 where Kazakhstan achieved consensus in its bid to chair
the organization. Noting that the U.S. initially stood in
opposition to Kazakhstan as OSCE Chair, Saudabayev said it
was "nearly impossible to explain (the U.S. position) to our
people after so many years of close cooperation - the closest
in the region. When the U.S. asks anything of us, we bend
over backwards to fulfill it." Then, referencing the
Kazakhstani desire for a Summit in 2010, he said, "but on
this important decision, now, the U.S. does not support us
and again we find it difficult to explain to our colleagues
at home why this is so."


3. (C) Outlining Kazakhstan's priorities for its year as CiO,
Saudabayev said Kazakhstan was committed to the fundamental
principles of the OSCE and would preserve a balance in all
three dimensions. He assured Deputy Steinberg that
Kazakhstan had made a number of serious steps forward in the
past couple of years in the Human Dimension and that one of
the landmark events of the next year would be a high-level
conference on tolerance and non-discrimination which will pay
close attention to fighting nationalism, religious
intolerance and anti-Semitism. Saudabayev also pointed to
"the whole gamut" of presidential and parliamentary elections
taking place in 2010 in the OSCE area and said Kazakhstan
would work actively and closely with ODIHR to see they are
held. He promised that the GOK would "support and work to
hold" the Warsaw Human Dimension Implementation Meeting
(HDIM).


4. (C) Saudabayev said his government was aware that
stability in Central Asia was not possible until the security
situation in Afghanistan is stabilized first, which he said
was not possible without U.S. participation and involvement.
Saudabayev noted that despite the ongoing economic crisis,
Kazakhstan announced days earlier that it would fund fifty
million dollars for 1,000 Afghan students over the next five
years to study subjects such as agriculture, engineering,
medicine and policing in Kazakhstan.


5. (C) On the subject of a Summit in 2010, Saudabayev said
the idea had been put forward by Kazakhstani President
Nazarbayev as a way of dealing with important issues like
Afghanistan. "But again we face a situation where our friend
holds back its support while so many other nations support
us. We ask only this minuscule favor: for the U.S. to
support language in the final (Ministerial) document speaking
positively about holding a summit next year. We will then
proceed apace to develop a potential subject and a document
to come out of the summit." Saudabayev said President Karzai
had supported the idea when raised by Nazarbayev. Karzai, he
said, even promised to call his American friends on the

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matter and said a summit would give impetus to resolve
long-standing problems in Afghanistan. Saudabayev said that
Secretary Clinton, in a September meeting, also told him that
Afghanistan might be a good subject for a summit. Likewise,
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov was on board with the idea,
as were, "America's closest EU allies, France, Spain, Italy"
and Greece.


6. (C) "I am not a diplomat and therefore speak very
bluntly," Saudabayev said, adding that "whenever we start to
discuss the Summit, everyone refers us back to the U.S. Is
there something else you want Kazakhstan to do?" In response
to the Deputy Secretary's (semi) joking response that he
should speak with Kazakhstan's neighbor to the south-west
about the virtues of being a non-nuclear state, Saudabayev
said, "We are doing that as well!" He related his
president's conversation with Iranian President Ahmadinajad
on April 6 in Kazakhstan. He told him: the Iranian position
is a losing position. Your country is isolated. We
renounced the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world and
now have a strategic partnership with the world's greatest
powers, including the U.S. Ahmadinajad responded that Iran
was engaged only in a peaceful nuclear program which it had a
right to do. "Of course you have the right," Nazarbayev
reportedly said, "but show the world this - open up to the
world and we will even help you." Saudabayev said Kazakhstan
offered to create a nuclear fuel bank for Iran. "But since
you are trying to hide something," the President concluded,
"the world has reason to doubt your intentions." So you see,
Saudabayev told the Deputy Secretary, we are not timid with
the Iranians.


7. (C) The Deputy Secretary praised Saudabayev for President
Nazarbayev's advice to Ahmadinijad, adding the U.S was
excited about the Kazkhstani CIO and about the proposed
high-level conference on tolerance and non-discrimination.
He also explained that in a recent meeting between POTUS and
SRAP Holbrooke the two discussed the importance of increasing
the role of Afghanistan's neighbors in assisting the country
to become a source of stability, vice instability, for the
region. The Deputy Secretary said the U.S. wanted to deepen
cooperation with Afghanistan's neighbors by increasing
capacity and by training professionals and to assist them in
developing and exploiting economic opportunities.
Acknowledging that the U.S. would be seeking to increase
troop levels in Afghanistan, the Deputy Secretary said the
U.S. would be seeking approval from Kazakhstan for use of the
north-south air route.


8. (C) On the subject of the Summit, the Deputy Secretary
told Saudabayev the U.S. fully understood the importance of
the matter to the GOK. He noted that while summits can be
very useful if well planned-out, and can help to provide
impetus to move forward, the U.S. was concerned about how we
could make a summit successful when we could not even move
the Corfu process forward--a reference to the unclear outcome
of the difficult negotiations on the Corfu Declaration and
Decision still hanging in the balance. "I know you have
ideas for a high-level meeting on Afghanistan so we want to
see if we can define a set of outcomes that will reflect
well, not just on you or your Chairmanship in Office, but on
the whole institution. What we do not want is the creation
of an image in the outside world that the OSCE can't do
anything. The Russians are still unwilling to take a
decision on the Corfu Process; so we need to find a way for
all of our colleagues to engage and to make your year as
Chair as successful as it can be." Saudabayev said he
"absolutely agreed" and was opposed to holding a summit
simply for the sake of a summit. He said the Kazakhstani
delegation will present its plan for the year at a meeting of
the OSCE Permanent Council on January 14 in Vienna, after
which, he intended to travel to Washington where he "planned
not only substantive discussions on the content of a summit
but also so you can join us in our priorities and you can
warn us about certain issues."


9. (C) The Deputy Secretary assured Saudabayev that the OSCE
was very important to Secretary Clinton and to the State
Department. "We have a great stake in your success," he
said, which is why we are cautious because we want it to be a
full success. Saudabayev said the GOK had two goals for the
next year: (1) to hold an OSCE summit; and (2) for President
Nazarbayev to participate in a Presidential visit to
Washington where Nazarbayev will meet with and talk with
President Obama. Saudabayev concluded with a reference to
the Deputy Secretary's request for Kazakhstani support for

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U.S. use of the north-south air route into Afghanistan: we
will look at it and consider it, he said.


10. (C) The following day, the GOK requested a very brief
meeting with the Deputy Secretary to follow-up on the issue
of U.S. support for language in a Ministerial Decision on the
summit. The parties agreed to the following: Begin text:
""We welcome Kazakhstan in the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship, the
first ever to be exercised by a Central Asian OSCE
participating State. We note positively its proposal to hold
and OSCE summit in 2010. We point out that such a high-level
meeting would require adequate preparation in terms of
substance and modalities. We task the Permanent Council to
engage in exploratory consultations to determine the extent
of progress on the OSCE agenda to inform our decision." End
text. At this meeting, the Deputy Secretary made clear to
Saudabayev that if there is a summit in 2010, POTUS had made
no commitment to attend, and it was unlikely that he would be
able to do so.


11. (U) After all 56 participating States reached agreement
on the above language, Uzbekistan brought the matter before
the committee again and withdrew its support. In the end,
the text was adopted again by the Ministerial Council after
replacing the words "We note positively" with "We note with
interest. . ." to the great consternation of the Kazakhstani
delegation. Saudabayev later sought out CDA Fuller to
express his thanks for her support, while Kazakhstani
permanent representative to the OSCE Ambassador Abdrahkmanov
thanked any member of the U.S. delegation he ran into for
eventually supporting the positive language on the summit.
FULLER