Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE284
2009-12-18 14:56:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

OSCE/FSC: DECEMBER 2009 - END OF FALL SESSION AND

Tags:  KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG 
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VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVEN #0284/01 3521456
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADF08A52 MSI5171-695)
P 181456Z DEC 09 ZDS
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6771
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/SACEUR POLAD SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/USRAREUR POLAD HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS USOSCE 000284 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT PARA 8

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: DECEMBER 2009 - END OF FALL SESSION AND
AEMI

REF: A. STATE 93327

B. DTG 082106Z SEP 09
UNCLAS USOSCE 000284

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT PARA 8

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: DECEMBER 2009 - END OF FALL SESSION AND
AEMI

REF: A. STATE 93327

B. DTG 082106Z SEP 09

1. (SBU) Summary: This message constitutes an end of fall
2009 session report on the OSCE's Forum for Security
Cooperation (FSC). The last FSC plenary on December 16
denoted not only the end of the United Kingdom's FSC
Chairmanship but also a review of the FSC's accomplishments
and prospects in 2010 under Greece's FSC Chairmanship.
Russian priorities and expectations for the 2010 FSC are also
noted. We fully expect our efforts in 2010 to continue
looking for ways to manage Russia's promotion of
legally-binding European Security initiatives in the OSCE,
with particular emphasis on "ways in which to strengthen the
OSCE's politico-military toolbox." Russia's unrelenting
attention to the Vienna Document, and now the Code of Conduct
on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, is gaining momentum
among delegates. We will actively continue to explore ways
to facilitate Russia's positive contributions to the FSC. A
summary on the Vienna Document 1999, Annual Exchange of
Military Information is also provided below. We note that
the Russian Federation and Tajikistan notified delays in
their respective AEMI submissions. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
and Turkmenistan provided no VD99 data. End Summary.

The Final Plenary of 2009


2. (SBU) At the December 16 FSC plenary, Russia (Ulyanov
under Agenda Item I, General Statements) made an affable
intervention calling the autumn session "fruitful and
satisfying," singling out decisions on Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW),non-proliferation and the Athens Ministerial
Decision on Issues Relevant to the FSC. Russia went further,
praising the UK Chair as "the most effective and fair" since
France's Chairmanship in 1999! Ulyanov said he was now
"hopeful" that the FSC after the Athens Ministerial Decisions
was now primed to overcome the "protracted deadlock" that had
until recently characterized the forum, thus allowing the FSC

to "reacquire its status as the key European forum for
discussion of hard security issues."


3. (SBU) Ulyanov listed Russia's priorities for 2010: 1)
special sessions of the FSC emphasizing arms control issues
within the framework of "current security conditions"; 2) a
more informal, free exchange of opinions and arguments on the
principles that manage inter-state relations with emphasis on
the Code of Conduct; 3) an inventory of the OSCE's
political-military toolbox including "first and foremost
VD99"; and 4) attention to improve the procedures and
mechanisms for settling conflict as was initially envisioned
in the early 1990s but since disappeared from the FSC's
"field of vision." Ulyanov concluded there was an enormous
volume of work for the FSC in 2010, pledging Russia's close
cooperation.


4. (SBU) Ukraine underscored its commitment to strengthen the
OSCE's contribution to address WMD proliferation issues in
2010, following up on the just adopted Athens Ministerial
Declaration on Non-proliferation. Ukraine specifically
suggested the FSC consider a revision of the OSCE's
Principles Governing Non-Proliferation Principles
(DOC.FSC/6/96) as adopted at the FSC Plenary in Budapest

1994.

FSC Security Dialogue Autumn Wrap-up


5. (SBU) The Security Dialogue throughout the autumn session
as chaired by the UK was dynamic. Besides sober briefings
from (D/SACEUR) General McColl and (D/ISAF) General Dutton on
Afghanistan, the FSC engaged in discussions on Gender Issues
related to Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW),Cluster

Munitions, and Non-Proliferation Issues, including 1540
coordination. There was intense discussion throughout the
session on both Georgia-Russia issues stemming from the
Tagliavini Report and on Russia's attempt to press forward a
wholesale review of Vienna Document 1999. In contrast to
Ulyanov's gracious remarks noted above, throughout the Fall
Session Russia expressed clear disappointment in the FSC
Security Dialogue as generally irrelevant with the sole
exception of the occasional vitriolic exchanges between
Russia and Georgia. Russia throughout the fall session also
intermittently accused "some participating States" of
deferring to other forums and venues any pertinent security
discussions.


6. (SBU) At the opening of the UK Chairmanship in September,
UK Security Policy Director Paul Johnston placed emphasis on
further development of the FSC's Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW) agenda. The FSC Decision 11/09 (Expert Advice on
Implementation of Section V of the OSCE Document on SALW) and
Ministerial Decision 15/09 (tasking the development of a Plan
of Action among other activities) were solid accomplishments.
The incoming Greek Chair already flagged for USDEL as early
priorities development of an SALW Plan of Action and
preparations for the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States on
combating the illicit trade in SALW. Greece plans to
circulate a "Food-for-Thought" paper on SALW before the end
of the year.


7. (SBU) Non-proliferation assumed a larger role in the FSC's
fall session, mainly due to UK and U.S. attention to UNSCR
1540 and related issues, including the initial contribution
for a Best Practice Guide (BPG) on 1540 implementation (i.e.,
the U.S.-drafted chapter on Export Control and Transshipment)
and efforts to establish an extra-budgetary position for a
dedicated 1540 action officer within the International
Secretariat. These efforts are ongoing and will require the
U.S. and UK to continue not only close collaboration but also
leadership. Nonetheless, though the Ukraine-sponsored OSCE
Athens Ministerial Declaration on Non-Proliferation was both
remarkable and organizationally a positive political
statement, the core of the OSCE's role on Non-Proliferation
is evolving and may require some heavy lifting in 2010 to
keep it prominent on the agenda and appropriately balanced
with efforts in the Security Committee in 2010.

The FSC yet to come


8. (SBU) In informal USDEL consultations with the incoming
Greek FSC Chairmanship, Greece was frank about the limited
capacity Athens brings to the non-proliferation agenda and
also its reliance on the U.S. to take the lead in this area;
we noted our interests to keep non-proliferation a prominent
part of the FSC's agenda. Greece expressed willingness to
provide political support as necessary. Nonetheless, we
raised with Greece the importance of maintaining momentum
both on developing additional chapters for the UNSCR 1540 BPG
and the Security Dialogue on non-proliferation-related
issues. Finding ways to build more inter-institutional
interaction, such as invitations to IAEA and OPCW to brief
the FSC, is under consideration but we note it may not get
fully socialized prior to Hungary's turn as FSC Chair
following Greece.


9. (SBU) Greece asked if the U.S. would be willing to discuss
developments related to START-follow on negotiations and
Missile Defense within the framework of the Security
Dialogue. We noted that Missile Defense was an issue that
had direct relevance to OSCE participating States and could
bring in interesting points of view, especially if Russia
were willing to make a contribution. On the other hand USDEL
noted it could not commit to either request and it may be

premature to raise START in the OSCE unless it was in a
broader context, such as discussions related to the NPT
Review Conference. Nonetheless, we assured Greece that we
would report its interests on these topics for consideration
by Washington authorities.


10. (SBU) Greece plans to build on the UK's accomplishments
as set forth in the Athens Ministerial Decision 16/09, Issues
Relevant to the FSC. In a nuanced shift away from singling
out Vienna Document 1999 for more in depth attention, Greece
noted that the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military
Aspects of Security was better aligned to the
cross-dimensional aspects of European Security within the
Corfu Process. Greece intends to make harmonization of the
FSC's work and the Corfu Process a priority, acknowledging
the Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty as a
divisive maneuver and a challenge to the integrity of current
institutions and security regimes.

Annual Exchange of Military Information


11. (SBU) The December 15 AEMI will be remembered because
Russia (and Tajikistan) failed to provide their respective
VD99 data, citing delays for "technical reasons." Russia
(Ulyanov) pointedly informed the U.S. (Neighbour) to reassure
there were no political motivations behind the omission.
(Note: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan provided no
VD99 data, and Russia also failed to provide its
"CFE-one-pager" for the first time in two years. End note.)
Russia hoped it would submit its data at the latest by early
part of the week of December 21. The U.S. submitted its VD99
data under cover of diplomatic note (Number 2009/061, filed
as FSC.EMI/426/09) for the AEMI on December 15. The U.S.
Defense Planning data was submitted under diplomatic note
number 2009/060, filed as FSC.EMI/425/09. The U.S.
submission of the Conventional Arms Transfer data (per State
127974; DTG 151445Z DEC 09) was conveyed by diplomatic note
number 2009/062 filed as FSC.EMI/442/09.


12. (SBU) Comment: The 2010 FSC will need to find a way to
manage balancing priorities between the whole of the
political-military toolbox (important for developing
deliverables for the Corfu Process). By our count that
includes strengthening current arms control and CSBM
instruments (i.e., Code of Conduct, SALW, and
Non-proliferation will garner more attention),and the
still-open issue of what to "do" with VD99. It will also
continue to be a challenge to maintain balance among the new
and emerging asymmetric or cross-dimensional security issues
like cyber-security and conflict prevention and crisis
management. Russia will press in the FSC for a discussion on
the conflict cycle from early warning to rehabilitation.


13. (SBU) (comment cont.) We also note that there are VD99
proposals still to be addressed in 2010, including:

1) Ukraine's Food-for-Thought on Interpretations of Some
Provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 Chapter I, "Annual
Exchange of Military Information" (FSC.DEL/196/09),which
would cover deployed or non-resident combat units separated
from their primary location. (NOTE: Ukraine acknowledged to
USDEL their intention was to capture Russia's excess
equipment, including aircraft, reported in last year's data
as located in Ukraine, subordinated to Black Sea Fleet Units,
but actually located on Russian territory. According to
Ukraine Military Advisor Colonel Alex Taran, Ukraine accepted
as valid Russia's declaration of 18 ACVs, six pieces of
artillery, and two combat aircraft in excess of Black Sea
Fleet limits. END NOTE.);

2) Turkey's proposal for use of digital cameras for to


improve compliance and verification under Chapter IX of VD99
(FSC.DEL/124/09/Rev.1); and
3) The reemergence of Denmark's proposal for a VD99-plus (the
slightly-edited original version from June 16 was freshly
circulated among NATO-T members on December 10).


14. (SBU) These outstanding VD99 related issues in light of
the Ministerial Decision 16/09 attention to "strengthening"
the document, suggests that effective and timely coordination
among Allies is imperative if the FSC hopes to manage the
Russian European Security Treaty initiative within the proper
comprehensive framework. As the UK Chair (Gare) noted in
final remarks at this last plenary of 2009, the prospects for
the FSC's workload in 2010 is "frightening." End Comment.


15. (SBU) List of USDEL Reporting on Fall 2009 FSC issues: A)
USOSCE 00198, DTG 100921Z SEP 09; B) USOSCE 00201, DTG
111531Z SEP 09; C) USOSCE 00205, DTG 220627Z SEP 09; D)
USOSCE 00212, DTG 291123Z SEP 09; E) USOSCE 214, DTG 021133Z
OCT 09; F) USOSCE 221, DTG 1506382 OCT 09; G) USOSCE 00224,
161347Z OCT 09; H) USOSCE 00235, DTG 221414Z OCT 09; I)
USOSCE 00239, DTG 231306Z OCT 09; J) USOSCE 00245, DTG
301326Z OCT 09; K) USOSCE 251, DTG 101617Z NOV 09; L) USOSCE
00256 DTG 161644Z NOV 09; M) USOSCE 00260, DTG 201048Z NOV
09; N) USOSCE 00269, DTG 271005Z NOV 09; O) USOSCE 00274, DTG
110809Z DEC 09.
FULLER