DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S DECEMBER 1, 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000283

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: PREL XH ZL NATO TU BK YI HR MW AM AJ IR
OSCE
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S DECEMBER 1, 2009
CONVERSATION WITH TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER DAVUTOGLU

Classified By: Carol Fuller, Charge d,Affaires. Reason 1.4.(d)


1. (U) Cleared by Deputy Secretary Steinberg


2. (U) December 1, 2009; 5:30 pm; Athens, Greece.


3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Deputy Secretary
EUR Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon
Jeff Hovenier, NSC
Jim Kuykendall (Notetaker)

OTHER COUNTRY
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu



4. (C) SUMMARY. In a meeting that lasted over one hour, FM
Davutoglu was almost exclusively interested in discussing the
MAP accession prospects for Bosnia. Deputy Secretary
Steinberg made it clear that the United States would need to
see more progress from all parties before we would support
extending MAP. Davutoglu was insistent that Turkey could
bring the Bosniak parties together and the Deputy Secretary
proposed that we work on a common approach, with the EU and
Spain, to try and push for real progress on measures to
improve the functioning of the Bosnian government in the next
2-3 months. The Deputy raised the topic of Iran and said he
hoped Turkey would be a supportive actor in what were sure to
be a critical next few months. The principals also briefly
discussed the Minsk Group meeting and the Ministerial
Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh, noting their agreement on the
positive direction the negotiations seem to be heading. END
SUMMARY.

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BOSNIA
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5. (C) In a frank but cordial exchange which took up the
vast majority of the meeting, FM Davutoglu was insistent that
Bosnia be extended MAP at the December NATO Ministerial. He
argued that:
- All the major parties involved (Bosnia, Croatia, and even
Serbia) have no objection to extending MAP to Bosnia.
- While constitutional reform is a &must8, extending MAP to
Bosnia is the best way to incentivize the needed reforms.
- The U.S. and Europe brought Bosnia into the UNSC and that
after 15 years and the horrible suffering the Bosnians have
endured, we are punishing them by not extending MAP.
- Turkey could bring the Bosniak parties together if MAP was
to be extended at the December NATO Ministerial.

6. (C) Deputy Secretary Steinberg, however, asserted that
the administration sees the situation in Bosnia differently
from Turkey. He noted:
- If NATO offers MAP to Bosnia now, there will be no
incentive left with which to push for further reforms.
- Reform in Bosnia will be a step-by-step process, and so far
the parties have not even taken the first step of coming to
the table.
- The Bosniaks are not even talking among themselves, but
that if they could reach a common position, there would be
some pressure that could be applied to Dodik.
- The bottom line is that the Bosnian leaders want others to
solve their problems so they don,t have to do the hard work
or take any political risk to solve their own problems
themselves, and the U.S. won,t support that mentality.
- The President has been clear on our position, which is that
the reform and MAP process is not compensation for their past
suffering, and that all the parties must show signs of
progress before the U.S. will support MAP for Bosnia.
- The best chance for MAP for Bosnia was this spring, and
that it was not realistic to expect such an important
decision, which would need to be made by the President, to
come together in the next 48 hours.

7. (C) A/S Gordon added that extending MAP to Bosnia would
be asking MAP to take on more than it could bear
(compensating Bosniaks for their losses in the war). If
Bosnia were to get MAP now, everyone would be happy for a
very short time, but ultimately none of the problems would be
solved and the biggest incentive we have would be gone.


8. (C) Looking forward, the Deputy Secretary proposed that
E

at the NATO Ministerial, allies welcome Bosnia,s interest in
MAP and state that they hope to see serious attempts by all
parties to agree on steps to improve the functioning of the
government before an invitation to MAP be extended to Bosnia.
He suggested that after the Ministerial, we identify a
common approach to dealing with all the parties in Bosnia,
get the EU and Spain on board, and try to work on real
progress in the next 2-3 months.


9. (C) In response to Davutoglu,s question about the
specific conditions were under which the U.S. would support
MAP for Bosnia, D(S) made clear that the U.S. wanted to avoid
setting specific benchmarks, but that the parties all needed
to come to the table and begin discussing the proposed
reforms in order for us to support MAP. Ultimately, all of
the reforms proposed so far are in the best interests of all
the parties involved.


10. (U) Both Davutoglu and the Deputy Secretary agreed that
working closely together on Bosnia is essential.

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IRAN
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11. (C) The Deputy Secretary raised the issue of Iran and
noted that we are moving into a very important period of time
in dealing with their nuclear program. He said the President
remains hopeful that his overtures will produce results, but
at the same time, this waiting game cannot go on forever. By
the end of the year, if there is still no progress, he said
the U.S. would have to go in another direction and he hoped
Turkey would be a supportive actor.


12. (C) Davutoglu said that President Ahmadinejad told the
Turkish Government that he had sent three offers to the White
House through &secret channels.8 He also relayed his
impression that Ahmadinejad believes in the sincerity of
President Obama, but that he is very unhappy that the U.S.
sends sanctions proposals to Russia, France, and others. The
Deputy underscored that to his knowledge, no such channels
had been established.


13. (C) Davutoglu emphasized that we need to deal with Iran
discreetly, and that the &carrot and stick8 method would
only work behind the scenes. He warned that if we threaten
publically, Iran would follow suit. The Deputy Secretary
countered that the U.S. had been negotiating for 11 months,
and tried for nine months to negotiate discreetly. He noted
that the President showed agreement in principle to an
approach that was extremely generous to Iran.


14. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that the IAEA Board of
Governors resolution in Vienna was a &shot across the bow8
and in explaining the Turkish abstention on that resolution
vote, Davutoglu said he agreed in substance with the
resolution, but not on its timing. Davutoglu also said that
Turkey is supposed to meet with Iran again in January to
discuss new ideas, and he hoped we would wait to see the
outcome of those meetings.

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OSCE Minsk Group Decision- Nagorno-Karabakh Process
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15. (C) Both principals agreed that the OSCE Ministerial
Statement, which stated that the Nagorno-Karabakh process be
governed by the Helsinki Principles, was a positive step.
Davutoglu said that while publically the message has been
that there is no linkage between Nagorno-Karabakh resolution
and Turkey-Armenia normalization, there is a linkage in
reality, specifically where Turkey,s Parliament is
concerned. He said that it would be important for the U.S.
to push all sides but that &now is the time8 for progress.
The Deputy Secretary reiterated that the U.S. does perceive a
large stake in all of these negotiations, and believes there
are lots of positive opportunities for Turkey, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan in these discussions.
FULLER