DAS KROL MEETS WITH TAJIK AND KYRGYZ FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000276

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KG KZ TI LH
SUBJECT: DAS KROL MEETS WITH TAJIK AND KYRGYZ FOREIGN
MINISTERS AND LITHUANIAN POL DIRECTOR IN ATHENS

REF: DUSHANBE 1364

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol S. Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) In a series of meetings on the margins of the OSCE
Ministerial Council in Athens on December 1, SCA DAS George
Krol met with the Foreign Ministers of Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan as well as the Political Director from the
Lithuanian MFA ahead of Lithuania's 2011 Chairmanship of the
OSCE. Tajik FM largely complained about Uzbek behavior in
withdrawing from the power grid while the Kyrgyz FM pushed
for the Bishkek Initiative to play a role in addressing
Afghanistan issues. The Lithuanian Political Director
offered insights into dealing with Kazakhstan as it embarks
on its Chairmanship of the OSCE. End summary.

MEETING WITH TAJIK FOREIGN MINISTER
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2. (C) At the outset, Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrohon Zarifi
raised Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the Central Asia Power
grid, which he said Uzbekistan did before winter as a
calculated political move. He said no one, including
President Karimov, knows about the large number of
electro-transmission lines in Tajikistan and at this rate,
Tajikistan would be completely using its own power stations
by May. "We will suffer this winter, and the summer will
also be bad." Zarifi said that Tajikistan informed
Turkmenistan about limits to the summer water flow, but that
"no one will be able to convince President Karimov, it is not
logical." He said the Tajik President was tired of trying to
explain things to Karimov and asked the U.S. to speak to the
Uzbeks about the 'real situation.'


3. (C) DAS Krol told Zarifi he discussed Uzbekistan leaving
the power grid with both Uzbeks and Turkmen on a recent visit
to the region. He said Uzbek officials told him the
situation "had been developing" and Uzbekistan felt it had to
remove itself from the electrical grid because it was
damaging their system (Ref A). DAS Krol said Uzbek officials
claimed the situation was not permanent and there would be
developments to resolve it. He also told Zarifi that Turkmen
President Berdimukhamidov was sympathetic but realized the
situation depended on Turkmenistan's relationship with
Uzbekistan. Krol said the U.S. would have further talks with
Uzbekistan's senior leadership on the matter.


4. (C) DAS Krol told Zarifi the U.S. looked forward to
developing bilateral consultations with Tajikistan and added
that in the first part of next year, the U.S. may try to
bring a delegation to Dushanbe; he stressed, however, that
there would need to be a clear agenda ahead of time. On
upcoming elections, Krol said he hoped the government
welcomed the participation of election observers.


5. (C) Zarifi asked for the U.S. to fully engage in supplying
goods under the 'new agreement' and said Tajikistan will have
more capacity to assist, in terms of infrastructure, from
their airport, in the transmission of non-military goods to
Afghanistan. He also asked for help in eliminating
anti-personnel mines on the border with Uzbekistan, which he
said Uzbekistan did not want to recognize. Zarifi said
Tajikistan would like to construct a new bridge for which it
needs serious support in constructing a transmission line
through Afghanistan to Pakistan. He added that Tajikistan
also needed help with its minorities - as all their schools
had closed.

MEETING WITH KYRGYZ FOREIGN MINISTER
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6. (C) In his meeting with Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek
Sarbaev, the FM repeatedly emphasized Kyrgyz concerns that
the U.S. was preparing to exit Afghanistan within the next
three to five years. He said it was essential to put stable
and peaceful Afghan structures in place before a departure or
the U.S. would leave behind an unruly, lawless state. He
said President Obama's plan to increase troop strength in
Afghanistan was the correct decision, but also noted that
solving the Afghan problem was not only a question of having
military forces in place.

THE BISHKEK INITIATIVE
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7. (C) Sarbaev stressed the Bishkek Initiative as a powerful

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tool towards that end and said there were Taliban groups
watching the initiative's progress, groups that were
interested in coming to the table for dialogue. DAS Krol
asked Sarbaev whether he had discussed the Bishkek Initiative
with either the Uzbeks or Kazakhs in light of their thoughts
on discussions about Afghanistan. Sarbaev replied that the
Bishkek Initiative was not in competition with other
proposals. However, he noted that the Uzbek stance on
bilateral talks (vice multilateral) was not a good approach.
On the other hand, he felt that the Kazakh chairmanship of
the OSCE next year would help make Afghanistan one of the key
OSCE issues in 2010.


8. (C) Asked about Chinese opinion on Afghanistan, Sarbaev
said the Chinese were being cagey while they study the
proposals at hand. In his opinion, China will inevitably
become involved - economic interests in the areas are too
large for them not to do so. He said small indications of
such future Chinese involvement were already becoming evident
through articles in Chinese press, and beyond.

MEETING WITH LITHUANIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR
--------------

9. (C) In DAS Krol's meeting with Lithuanian MFA Political
Director Eitvydas Bajarunas and Ambassador at Large Rytis
Paulauskas, the conversation largely focused on best ways for
Lithuania to work with and manage Kazakhstan in the EU Troika
in the next two years. Calling Foreign Minister Saudabayev a
"night and day" difference from former Kazakhstani Foreign
Minister Tazhin, Bajarunas said the new state of affairs was
"quite depressing." In contrast to Saudabayev, Bajarunas
said Tazhin was open minded, open to suggestion, would not
hesitate to accept our ideas, and was accepting of the Human
Dimension. He said Tazhin was also open to the OSCE working
in Afghanistan, but he feared Saudabayev was less so.


10. (C) Bajarunas said the first real test of the Kazakhstani
chairmanship would be seen in Kazakhstan's reaction to the
approaching elections in Ukraine. The second test will be
the Geneva Talks and preserving the OSCE's role in the
discussions. Bajarunas said we will need to press Kazakhstan
to be more creative on Georgia. On OSCE involvement in
Afghanistan, Bajarunas said Lithuania would be quite
enthusiastic if Kazakhstan were to do something; especially
to combat the major drug trafficking coming out of Central
Asia.


11. (C) Paulauskas said Lithuanian was looking for the best
method of working with the Kazakhstanis in the OSCE Troika
and developed an understanding that Kazakhstan reacted badly
to anyone "trying to teach them." While Kazakhstan very much
wants to be (and wants to appear to be) independent of the
Russian Federation, Bajarunas pointed out that the
Kazakhstani Ambassador to the OSCE told him how much better
he understood the Corfu Process after receiving a briefing
from Russian diplomats. He also said there was concern that
Kazakhstan may use its year as Chair to try to downsize some
of the OSCE missions in Central Asia; therefore, we will need
continued engagement by the big powers, he said.


12. (C) In closing, Bajarunas said the Lithuanians "want to
continue to share their knowledge about Kazakhstan," but
added that because Lithuania is not well positioned in
Central Asia, the GOL would greatly appreciate U.S. briefings
in Vienna on the situation in Central Asia. DAS Krol assured
of our willingness to do so and said Lithuanian Embassy
officials in Washington were also welcomed to visit SCA.

FULLER