Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE272
2009-12-08 11:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

OSCE AND INCOMING CHAIR KAZAKHSTAN

Tags:  KZ OSCE PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0347
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0272/01 3421119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081119Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0076
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0018
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6750
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000272 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2019
TAGS: KZ OSCE PREL
SUBJECT: OSCE AND INCOMING CHAIR KAZAKHSTAN

Classified By: CDA:CFULLER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000272

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2019
TAGS: KZ OSCE PREL
SUBJECT: OSCE AND INCOMING CHAIR KAZAKHSTAN

Classified By: CDA:CFULLER


1. (C) SUMMARY: Although the Kazakhstanis reiterate on
every occasion their commitment to the principles of the OSCE
"acquis" and swear to protect the third dimension during
their 2010 chairmanship of the OSCE, their negotiating style
at the OSCE Ministerial Conference in Athens December 1-2
gave everyone a taste of what may come in 2010. To ensure
achievement of their highest priorities, they were not averse
to following hard-ball tactics, including bribery, verbal
abuse, and refusal to take "no" for an answer. The musical
theme of Kazakhstan,s proposal to host a high-level Summit
in 2010 played throughout the preparations and final
negotiations of the OSCE Ministerial in Athens December 1-2,
but Uzbekistan played the final, sour note, ensuring the
continuity of drama in the operetta in 2010. End Summary.

SAYING ALL THE RIGHT THINGS

2. (U) In OSCE meetings, the Kazakstanis continue to
convey all the right messages about "unswervingly" upholding
the principles of the OSCE "acquis" during their 2010
Chairmanship. At the Athens Ministerial, Secretary of
State/Foreign Minister Saudabayev emphasized that Kazakhstan
will guarantee equal efforts in all three OSCE dimensions;
protect the third dimension (human rights, democracy, and the
rule of law); support the work of ODIHR (Office of Democracy
and International Human Rights); ensure that the annual HDIM
meeting on the third dimension will continue as usual; and
continue the positive work of the OSCE field offices.

BUT NEGOTIATING HARD ON KEY ISSUES


3. (C) Behind the scenes, however, the Kazakhstani
delegation some times used hard-ball tactics to get their way
on two issues of greatest importance to them: adoption of a
ministerial decision to hold in Astana a high-level
conference on tolerance and non discrimination and adoption
of positive language to support their proposal to host a
Summit in 2010.


4. (C) The Kazakhstanis want the conference to be a
highlight for their 2010 Chairmanship in order to showcase
Kazakhstan,s domestic achievements on religious tolerance.
Laudable as these achievements are, the US and other
delegations asserted that the issue of tolerance for Muslims
must be balanced in the conference agenda by other issues,

such as the fight against anti-semitism and racism, as well
as other forms of intolerance. The Kazakhstanis worked hard
to delete from the draft decision broader language
reaffirming human rights principles and fundamental freedoms
and mandating during the conference a "comprehensive review
of the relevant OSCE commitments." At one point, to convince
the US delegation to drop insistence on this language, they
even offered to create a new position of Special
Representative of the Chair on Gender Equality and to appoint
a US citizen of our choice. USOSCE refused, and the decision
eventually passed with most of the broader language supported
by the US, the EU and Canada.


5. (C) Kazakhstan,s highest priority at the ministerial,
however, was to obtain positive language supporting their
proposal to hold a Summit in 2010--despite the lack of a
clear topic or concrete substance. Their passionate
insistence on a Summit complicated negotiations during the
run-up to, and during, the ministerial. The issue split the
EU, with France and Italy leading efforts to "deliver"
positive Summit language. They argued forcefully that a
Summit would bring visibility and credibility back to the
OSCE, which hasn,t held a Summit since 1999--an argument
which is supported by many countries, as well as the
president of the Parliamentary Assembly, Joao Soares.
Others, especially the UK, the Netherlands, the Czech
Republic, and Canada insisted along with the US that there
must be substance before any agreement on a Summit. In the
end, Kazakhstan and its supporters focused on the US as the
locus of the opposition and sought every means of pressure to
force agreement on some kind of endorsement of the Summit
proposal.


6. (C) At the end of a final negotiating session which
ran into 2 am on December 2, the last day of the ministerial,
the participating states agreed to carefully-crafted US
language in the final paragraph of the draft ministerial
declaration on the OSCE Corfu Process which contained a
series of caveats related to the summit. In four sentences,
the language welcomed Kazakhstan in the 2010 Chair; noted
"with interest" its proposal to hold an OSCE summit in 2010,
but pointed out that such a high-level meeting would require
adequate preparation in terms of substance and modalities;
agreed that if the ministers determined that the OSCE agenda
had advanced sufficiently to justify such a meeting, they

USOSCE 00000272 002 OF 002


would be willing to consider a summit; and tasked the
Permanent Council to engage in exploratory consultations on
the matter in the light of progress on the OSCE agenda.
According to the Canadian ambassador, who witnessed the scene
following the meeting, Kazakhstani OSCE Ambassador
Abdrakmanov angrily berated the Greek CiO, shouting that her
job had been to support the Kazakhstani proposal, that his
Minister would be furious with this language, and that he
intended to block consensus on the Corfu Process declaration
when brought to the Prepcom later that morning.


7. (C) Instead, during a hastily-arranged bilateral
with the US Head of Delegation just prior to the prepcom,
Minister Saudabayev won approval for new language which
remained true to the need to demonstrate progress on
substance, but provided a more positive tone: "We welcome
Kazakhstan in the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship, the first ever to
be exercised by a Central Asian OSCE participating State. We
note positively its proposal to hold an OSCE summit in 2010.
We point out that such a high-level meeting would require
adequate preparation in terms of substance and modalities.
We task the Permanent Council to engage in exploratory
consultations to determine the extent of progress on the OSCE
agenda to inform our decision." Abdrakmanov "worked" the
room extensively and pleaded with delegations to accept the
unusual circumstance of language renegotiated by the two
parties to replace that previously agreed to by all 56. The
language was approved shortly afterwards by the Prepcom.


8. (C) Crossing the USOSCE Charge in the hall later that
day, Saudabayev stopped, turned around, and came to grasp her
hand, expressing his happiness with the language.
Kazakhstani delight with the potential prospect of a Summit
will serve USOSCE well as we enter what all expect to be a
difficult year of the Kazakhstani Chairmanship of the OSCE.

STILL, TROUBLE LOOMS TO THE SOUTHWEST FOR KAZAKHSTAN


9. (C) There is still a coda to this little operetta.
When the Corfu Declaration moved from the Prepcom to the
Permanent Council for pro forma approval on the afternoon of
December 2, Uzbekistan called for it to be reopened. Citing
new instructions--which he did not explain--the delegate
stated that Uzbekistan could only agree to the declaration if
the words "note positively" the Kazakhstani proposal to hold
a Summit were changed back to "note with interest"--the
original US language. Abdrakmanov quickly agreed to the
change and the declaration was reaccepted, leaving all to
wonder why Uzbekistan would intervene so late in the process
and in such a way as to undermine Kazakhstan,s efforts for
positive language. Delegations have been so focused on
concern about what Kazakhstan might do as chair that they
have not paid much attention to the underlying political
currents among the five Central Asian countries--which could
also impact on Kazakhstan,s chairmanship as well. We may
get greater insight this week. The Uzbek Charge d,Affaires
has already requested to meet with the US CDA this week. It
should be an interesting year in 2010.

COMMENT


10. (C) Despite the hard-ball tactics, the Kazakhstanis
did not get all they wanted. They achieved their core
objective of a positive statement about the summit. But they
also had to live with language that holds their feet to the
fire on the institution,s "acquis." They had to swallow a
watered-down version of the Ministerial declaration language,
and they weren,t able to push their more limited version of
tolerance on us.
FULLER