SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE OSCE MINISTERIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000262

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: OSCE RU PREL
SUBJECT: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE OSCE MINISTERIAL

Classified By: CDA CAROL FULLER FOR Reasons: 1.4, (B),(C),and (D).


1. (SBU) The November 24 Reinforced Permanent Council
provided participating States a final opportunity to outline
their expectations for the December 1-2 OSCE Ministerial
Council in Athens and sum up accomplishments under the 2009
Greek Chairmanship. Although the comments by Delegations
were generally positive, the specifics revealed some
continuing sharp differences in the expected tone, scope and
content of the Ministerial and raised some doubt that there
will be a solid statement of support for the Greeks,
signature accomplishment, a robust European security dialogue
known as the Corfu Process (CP). Proposed edits of key
Ministerial decisions by several delegations, notably the
Russians, solidified the view that positions on key issues
are still far apart.


2. (SBU) in his opening presentation Secretary General de
Brichambaut reviewed the &remarkable distance 8
participating States have covered so far in launching a new
dialogue on European security in the framework of the Corfu
Process: the 56 participating States have completed an
initial comprehensive assessment of European security and
also highlighted the enduring strengths of the OSCE. After
posing a number of questions about how best to proceed, he
suggested five broad areas that required further attention in
the next stage of the dialogue: the need to reconfirm basic
OSCE principles; redoubled efforts on protracted conflicts;
serious resumption of arms control efforts; new strategies
for transnational threats (including threats emanating from
Afghanistan); and reinforced efforts on rule of law,
including strengthened mechanisms to defend human rights and
fundamental freedoms. He emphasized the importance of
synchronizing a number of OSCE processes with one another as
well as with the work of other organizations, such as NATO
and the EU. He also gingerly touched on widespread interest
in a summit, noting the challenge will be to harness the
ambition a summit represents with the potential progress in
the security dialogue.


3. (SBU) Kazakhstan, as the next CiO, devoted its entire
intervention to its plans for a summit. A summit would
reinvigorate the dialogue and "strengthen and improve" the
OSCE. Many delegations noted that significant substance
would be a necessary precondition to any summit. France said
a summit would have three major goals: reaffirmation of
commitments in all three dimensions, provide an impetus to
resolve currently intractable issues (protracted conflicts
and CFE),and define principles and mechanisms for
confronting new transnational threats. The EU statement by
the Swedish Presidency simply stated an openness to a
"high-level meeting (motivated by substance."


4. (SBU) a large majority of the interventions began with
praise for the Greek initiative of launching the CP and
observations how it has revitalized the dialogue on European
security and refocused needed attention on the principles and
work of the OSCE. Many pushed for a balance in the
discussions among all three dimensions as topics are
identified. The Swedes, as EU Presidency, said the CP had
"great potential." Ukraine stressed the importance of OSCE
as an anchor for any European Security dialogue, while Norway
said the dialogue needed more structure and the next phase of
Corfu could provide that structure. Canada said the next,
higher level of the CP needed to produce results and
deliverables. Finland agreed on the potential for the CP but
emphasized improved implementation of commitments as a
prerequisite to progress. More tangibly, several felt the CP
could pave the way to better mechanisms on conflict
prevention with some, such as the Lithuanians and the Danish,
singling out the U.S. proposal made last month to empower the
Chairmanship to dispatch an expert team to trouble hotspots.
This clearly worried the Russians and their statement
stressed the lasting need for consensus on all things.


5. (SBU) Most delegations commented on the intention of the
Greek Chairmanship for the Ministerial to have an overall
political declaration, as well as a declaration and decision
on the CP. All voiced support for the trio of documents, but
often highlighting differing, at times competing, priorities.
The Swedes called for the CP documents to reflect "clear and
strategic" ambition and they pressed for the five themes
(conflict prevention, transnational threats, human rights,
arms control/CSBMs, implementation of commitments) which
they said "provide a solid strategic direction" for the
process. Russia welcomed the CP but emphasized that it must
respect existing OSCE structures ("As with doctors, first
rule is do no harm to the patient"). It should be more about
fortifying political will than reconfiguring OSCE structures.
Belarus agreed on preserving existing structures and urged
no new format either.


6. (SBU) Interventions also touched upon some of the other

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decisions facing Ministers when they arrive in Athens. Many
commented favorably on the transnational threats decision the
U.S. is cosponsoring with Russia, citing the symbolic value
of the cosponsorship team as well as its recognition of the
need for OSCE to adapt to a shifting threat environment. A
few (Russia and Belarus) decried the continued imbalance in
OSCE activities in favor of the human dimension, while
others, notably, Canada said that is a signature OSCE
strength. Others praised Kazakhstan's initiative to host a
tolerance conference in 2010, with Turkey calling it an
"important impetus." A substantial number praised the energy
security decision, although Russia cautioned that the OSCE's
role in that area has yet to be clearly defined. Several
urged progress on stalled arms control and confidence and
security building measures, with some, notably Germany,
noting that momentum in the CP could help jumpstart progress.
Lunch Discussion


7. (C) Over a CiO-hosted lunch, following the Reinforced PC,
for select ambassadors and high-level reps from capitals,
delegates expressed some optimism for the final stage of
negotiations for the Athens Ministerial. All focused on the
more positive tone in the Corfu Process which has facilitated
a real exchange of informal views on European security.
Germany and Russia had not yet seen the latest JCG revised
language on the CFE paragraph for the political declaration
and maintained their insistence on language for a review of
the Vienna Document. When questioned by the ChargQ about
possible Russian flexibility on language in the
counternarcotics decision to allow a limited training
project, Deputy FM Grushko expressed surprise that any
flexibility was expected. Germany had earlier expressed its
own skepticism. This Russian-sponsored decision will fail
without addition of two words: "in Afghanistan."

Comment


8. (C) Ministerial expectations are still teetering between
optimism that the OSCE is on to something with the CP and the
usual skepticism that this is just more talk about talk
leading to nothing new and failing to overcome growing
mistrust and divisions. The decision by S and some other key
Western European Ministers not to attend has sown additional
doubts about underlying commitments and interest in the OSCE.
Nevertheless, a critical mass of participating State still
feel the OSCE is best placed to tackle Europe's ongoing
unease over security fueled by the protracted conflicts,
Russia's grumbling and the search for a more effective
continental approach to transnational threats

FULLER