Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE250
2009-11-05 09:23:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

THE OSCE'S CORFU PROCESS STARTS TO GROW LEGS

Tags:  PREL RU OSCE 
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FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6689
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000250 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL RU OSCE
SUBJECT: THE OSCE'S CORFU PROCESS STARTS TO GROW LEGS

REF: A. USOSCE 249

B. USOSCE 246

C. USOSCE 231

D. USOSCE 223

E. USOSCE 200

F. USOSCE 146

SUMMARY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000250

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL RU OSCE
SUBJECT: THE OSCE'S CORFU PROCESS STARTS TO GROW LEGS

REF: A. USOSCE 249

B. USOSCE 246

C. USOSCE 231

D. USOSCE 223

E. USOSCE 200

F. USOSCE 146

SUMMARY

1. (SBU) Following seven out of ten sessions of informal but
carefully developed dialogue among OSCE PermReps under the
umbrella of the Corfu Process (CP),a consensus has emerged
that the discussions have served a useful purpose,
particularly in three areas. First, the CP provides a strong
answer to the incessant Russian demands for a dialogue on
European Security (even if Moscow claims the CP is separate
from their initiative for a European Security Treaty).
Second, Europe is obviously not fully "whole, free and at
peace," and a better analysis and consensus on where it falls
short is clearly needed. Finally, the CP has revitalized the
political dialogue and breathed new life into the sclerotic
methods, procedures and reputation of the OSCE, offering a
constructive path forward on addressing Europe's frozen
conflicts. Yet, just as the CP has started to flesh out a
purpose, it has been buffeted by two other emerging factors:
the upcoming Kazakh Chairmanship of the OSCE and Astana's
desire to host a summit next year.

2. (SBU) The OSCE remains the only Euro-Atlantic and
Eurasian forum embracing a comprehensive concept of security,
involving human, economic and political-military dimensions,
and where 56 states participate on an equal basis. It is in
the interest of the United States to support and promote the
CP, both as a means of tackling the lingering security
concerns in Europe and developing a more effective regional
framework for confronting 21st Century security challenges.
USOSCE has put forward proposals that would deepen the
dialogue in Vienna next year and extend it to a wider range
of participants. While a challenge in some respects, the
Kazakh Chairmanship and its ardent desire for a summit also
present us with an opportunity to extend the influence of the
OSCE in Eurasia and to gain greater Russian buy in to the
organization. End summary.
Background

3. (SBU) Sensing an opportunity during its 2009 OSCE
Chairmanship, Greece has developed and nurtured a
comprehensive dialogue within the OSCE on the nature and
extent of continuing challenges to European and Eurasian
security in the 21st Century. Known as the Corfu Process, it
was launched at an informal OSCE Ministerial June 28-29,

2009, held on the Greek island of Corfu. Ministers agreed in
Corfu that the dialogue was worth pursuing and tasked their
Permanent Representatives in Vienna with following up. The
Greeks scheduled ten informal PermRep meetings beginning
early September to cover security challenges in each of the
three dimensions, as well as more generalized discussions
focusing on the work and accomplishments of the OSCE and the
causes of conflict.

4. (SBU) Contemplating the added workload, many delegations
initially wondered whether anything would really change,
suggesting privately this was another futile effort by the
OSCE to reinvent itself. Nevertheless, most delegations we
met with in the past week, especially during and after the
October 30-31 Ambassadors' Retreat, expressed pleasant
surprise at the altered atmosphere and attitudes of
participants. The discussions around the table, most
recently during a November 2 stocktaking session, were
remarkably responsive to the input and comments of other
delegations and indicated that a subtle, more nuanced
understanding of the concerns and priorities of every
delegation is beginning to emerge. Delegations have
frequently cited as factors in the change the active
engagement by the U.S., the civil tone employed by both the
Russian and U.S. delegations during meetings, and, most
recently, the positive remarks about the OSCE and the Corfu
Process at the Helsinki Commission October 28 by Assistant
Secretaries Gordon and Posner and ASD Vershbow.
Nevertheless, any sort of cohesion around specific outcomes
for the process is still hard to come by. In addition, the
continued impasse over CFE and CSBMs with Russia will likely
exert a negative influence. Delegations are now focusing on
how to take the process forward in 2010 and build on the
perceived progress.
Rubber Meets Road

5. (SBU) A key decision point for the CP will be at the
OSCE's annual Ministerial Council, to be held December 1-2 in
Athens. Participating States (pS) will be called upon to
approve a Ministerial Declaration that reiterates the
validity of OSCE principles and commitments--as well as the
concept of comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible
security--and pledges continuing strategic dialogue in the

USOSCE 00000250 002 OF 003


framework of the CP. In addition, there will likely be a
Ministerial Decision outlining the next stage in the Process.
Together, these two documents should strike a balance
between enough specificity to circumscribe the leeway of the
incoming Kazakh Chairmanship and flexibility to underscore
the need for continued and defined progress. Although the
Greeks have also proposed a political declaration, many
believe that this is mostly a "cover" to protect the Corfu
Process declaration: when no consensus is reached on the
political declaration-- as is likely--the Chair will plead
for consensus on the Corfu declaration.

6. (SBU) There is a general consensus emerging on what the
follow-on process for 2010 will involve. First, deeper and
more extensive discussions should be held, focused on several
key topics: conflict prevention and resolution; arms control
and CSBMs; transnational threats and challenges; human
rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy; need for greater
implementation of commitments; and ways to create, upgrade or
make better use of existing OSCE mechanisms/instruments
across all three dimensions. The informal CP meetings should
be on a more or less monthly basis, and involve a wider range
of participants, including from capitals, international
organizations and civil society. U.S. suggestions on a new
mechanism for more rapid and effective OSCE crisis response
and suggestions for an informal working group to look ahead
to possible concrete outcomes have, on the whole, been warmly
received. Second, a more formal process, such as joint
FSC/PC meetings or a "Committee of the Whole" might be
needed to approve any recommendations developed in the
informal meetings.
Russia

7. (SBU) The CP presents Moscow with a dilemma, which it has
so far opted to sidestep. Given the fact that the process
was launched in part to address Russian concerns about an
uneven security landscape in Europe --USOSCE has publicly
thanked Russia on several occasions for inspiring the Corfu
Process dialogue--Russia should have embraced the
reassessment the CP represents. However, in reaffirming the
central role of the OSCE and its comprehensive approach in
European security, the CP sidetracks Russia's intention to
confine discussions to hard security and produce a binding
Treaty on European security. Despite the insistence of an
overwhelming majority of pS that all discussions on European
security should be concentrated within the CP and the OSCE,
the Russians have insisted on the creation of a parallel
track in other fora. As if to underscore their ambivalence,
even as Russia participates, often in a somewhat reluctant
fashion, in the CP discussions, they have sent conflicting
signals on their intention to present a draft European
security treaty text in Vienna and elsewhere the week before
the Athens Ministerial.
Platform for Cooperative Security

8. (SBU) During the course of the CP discussions, Russian
representatives have insisted on a high-level meeting of the
five major European security organizations -- OSCE, NATO,
CIS, CSTO and the EU. Russia has suggested that this meeting
could take place under the auspices of the OSCE,s Platform
for Cooperative Security (PCS). Agreed to at the 1999
Istanbul Summit, the PCS encourages a mutually reinforcing
working relationship between the OSCE and other organizations
"concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security
within the OSCE area." Leaving aside the fact that neither
the CSTO nor the CIS would meet the criteria specified in the
PCS, we and some of our NATO allies have expressed concerns
about any steps toward such a meeting, which would put these
organizations on an equal footing with NATO. Although the
recent change in the Greek government seems to have weakened
plans to propose or support such a meeting on the margins of
the Athens ministerial, we remain uncertain whether the
Greeks have sufficiently internalized our opposition.
Frozen Conflicts

9. (SBU) Leaving aside tactical and process considerations,
the CP potentially carries with it the seeds for tackling
Europe's frozen conflicts -- Moldova/Transniestria,
Nagorno-Karabakh and even Georgia and its breakaway regions.
In establishing a common framework for considering the
factors that contribute to conflict and confrontation as well
as making more effective use of new or improved instruments
for resolution, the CP has played a valuable role in focusing
attention on needed next steps. It is still too early for a
firm conclusion, and the situation in Georgia remains bleak,
but the fact that the involved parties can sit in the same
room and freely express their perspectives and views-
generally without histrionics--is a meaningful step forward.
Kazakhstan and an OSCE Summit
x. (SBU) As this stage of the CP reaches its end game at
Athens, the incoming Kazakh Chairmanship and its plans to
host a summit in 2010 are increasingly roiling the waters.
Delegations are concerned about the Kazakh Chairmanship's

USOSCE 00000250 003 OF 003


suitability and capability to manage the CP, questioning
their exposure and experience, along with their potential
lack of even-handedness, given their apparent fealty to a
Russian-centric view of the world. In addition, in their
quest for a summit the Kazakhs seem prepared to hijack the
substance and purpose of the Corfu process, and use the
ongoing discussions under this framework both as a
justification for and an output of the summit. In particular,
they spoke about using the summit to launch: 1) "a process of
negotiations on issues related to the security of Europe,"
including new threats; 2) negotiations "on key issues of
security in Europe," such as CFE and CSBMs; and 3) reviewing
and strengthening instruments to assist in implementation of
existing commitments, especially in the human dimension. We
will need to push back firmly on any notion that the little
progress so far realized in the Vienna discussions is ripe
for any sort of high-level review or push. Unfortunately,
some countries appear ready to support the Summit idea.
However, there are indications that the Kazakhs may in fact
still be searching for the perfect topic and format to
showcase their president and country in a high-level meeting.
USOSCE continues to suggest alternatives to a Summit that
might satisfy this desire.
OUR NEXT STEPS

10. (SBU) We should arrive in Athens prepared to agree to a
CP Declaration and Decision that takes the process to the
next phase, to a dialogue that is more focused and deeper,
involving a wider range of participants. These documents
will represent the highlights of the Ministerial and solidify
the process of political dialogue for 2010. USOSCE will
continue to oppose using the CP as a justification for a 2010
summit. We should also hold firm against efforts to
subjugate the process to Russia's aims for a legally-binding
treaty and a high-level meeting of the five major European
security organizations.
FULLER