Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE245
2009-10-30 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

FSC: TRYING TO MOVE RUSSIA ON VD99; GEARING FOR

Tags:  KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG 
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VZCZCXRO4722
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0245/01 3031326
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301326Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6680
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000245 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RADALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR ND CNTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC: TRYING TO MOVE RUSSIA ON VD99; GEARING FOR
ATHENS

REF: STATE 111008

Classified By: Arms Control Chief Chris Ellis, Acting; Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000245

SIPDIS


STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RADALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR ND CNTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC: TRYING TO MOVE RUSSIA ON VD99; GEARING FOR
ATHENS

REF: STATE 111008

Classified By: Arms Control Chief Chris Ellis, Acting; Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a "sidebar" with the Russians ) and in a
subsequent follow-up discussion ) Ulyanov was receptive to
the idea of working with the U.S. to "explore ways to
strengthen current arms control and CSBM instruments, but
not in exchange for specific language "to conduct a review of
the Vienna Document 1999." Ulyanov believed Moscow would
welcome working with the U.S. on considering individual CSBM
proposals, but he also said Moscow was compelled by the
imbalance of first to second and third dimension draft
decisions for Athens to press forward a draft Ministerial
Decision to review Vienna Document 1999 (VD99),especially
since "so many others have expressed support" for the Russian
language. Ulyanov expects to have a response to the U.S.
proposal from Moscow by early next week. Several Allies
(Italy, Turkey, Hungary, France, and Germany among others)
indicated at the October 28 NATO Caucus support for the
Russian proposal to review VD99 in order to keep Russia "on
board" the Corfu Process.


2. (SBU) Meanwhile, the October 28 Forum for Security
Cooperation wrapped up its Security Dialogue for the year )
with presentations by civil society groups on cluster
munitions and Gender-specific small arms and light weapons
issues ) and now turns its attention on preparations for the
December 1-2, Athens Ministerial. All FSC Chairman reports
should be circulated by the week's end. In Working Group
"B," Russia laid down a marker that the proposed draft
decision on Issues Relevant to the FSC was inadequate.
Georgia and Russia continued their exchange on the
significance of capturing the implications of the Tagliavini
report in the pre-Ministerial language. Working Group "A"
continued to have no movement. Meanwhile the U.S. briefed

the quad (France, Germany and UK) on the (reftel) response to
the Russian proposal for review of Vienna Document 1999
(VD99). The deadline for any amendments to the Chairman's
progress reports is November 11 (see para. 11). End Summary.


3. (C) Prior to the FSC plenary, the U.S. Del briefed the UK
(Gare),France (Simonet) and Germany (Risse) on the response
to Russia's proposed draft ministerial decision to review
VD99. France and Germany were appreciative of the effort,
but only the UK expressed satisfaction and support that the
U.S. drew on the language from the Draft "Issues Relevant to
the FSC," remarking that the phrasing was actually Russian.
The U.S. underscored the importance of not re-opening VD99 in
a way that may not be controllable or towards outcomes that
would not be in our interests.


4. (C) Subsequently the U.S. (Ellis) discussed with Russia
(Ulyanov) the U.S. proposal, clearly stating Washington "will
not agree to a separate decision on a review of VD99." While
appreciative of the U.S. proposal, and confident that Moscow
would agree to a joint effort "in which individual CSBM
proposals are advanced and considered on their own merits,"
Ulyanov noted Russia was compelled to table its draft
decision on a review of VD99, otherwise the imbalance of
ministerial decisions on the other dimensions would be
unacceptable. (NOTE: Ulyanov also stated ) without an
explicit linkage ) Russia's wholesale rejection of the U.S.
proposal to strengthen conflict prevention mechanisms. End
Note.) He said Russia was careful in drafting its language
to avoid controversial language (i.e., "negotiate"),and to
make the decision as broad as possible. He argued that the
U.S. proposal would fit within the Russian draft decision.
The U.S. countered that the Russian language was in fact more
limited in scope than the U.S. proposal, pointing out the
Russian draft language locks discussion into VD99, while the
U.S. offered Moscow flexibility to explore ways to strengthen
the current arms control and CSBM instruments as stand alone
measures, for possible incorporation into VD99, or another
OSCE instrument. Ulyanov said he would convey the U.S.
points to Moscow, and while the way ahead would probably be

USOSCE 00000245 002 OF 003


welcomed, we should not expect Russia to withdraw its draft
decision for VD99 Review.


5. (C) Comment: Ulyanov was sincerely appreciative of the
U.S. offer to identify together specific CSBM issues, well
aware of the USG's criteria (significance, balance, and
verifiability). Unfortunately, Russia has made gains with
those allies who are concerned that the Corfu Process was
wavering because there was nothing in it for Moscow. Several
Allies at the October 28 NATO Caucus expressed support for
the Russian proposal to review VD99 ) without discussing
either how to construct a quid pro quo or what would be
risked in a generic review of VD99. Because Russia was
careful to note it would not abandon VD99 during the process,
these allies believe they have nothing to lose by accepting
the Russian language. The tone is increasingly one of some
allies in the OSCE (e.g., Denmark, France, Spain, Germany,
Italy, Belgium, Hungary, Portugal and Greece) valuing
consensus for the sake of consensus. End Comment.

Security Dialogue: CM Victims and Small Arms Gender Issues


6. (SBU) The FSC Plenary had presentations from Stan
Brabant, Head of Policy for Handicap International on a
victim's perspective on cluster munitions' from Vanessa Farr,
Project Manager of Gender and Disarmament and Reintegration,
UNIDIR; and Sarah Masters, Women's Network Coordinator for
the International Action Network on Small Arms. All three
presentations detailed the impact of these weapons on people
and communities. Brabant challenged those OSCE states that
have not signed the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions to
do so. Farr reviewed the history of excluding gender
references to violence, security, and arms control issues to
the detriment of programmatic developments that do not direct
resources effectively on controlling small arms acquisitions
and the motives behind them. Masters noted the
disproportionate impact that small arms and violence have on
women and families, underscoring the importance of security
sector reform and gender roles in post-conflict resolution.


7. (SBU) The EU Presidency (Sweden) called for National
Action Plans in line with the 2008 EU comprehensive Approach
to Implement UNSCRs 1325 and 1820. Germany noted its efforts
towards humanitarian clearance of mines and unexploded
ordinance, including cluster munitions. The U.S. noted its
policy to reduce the humanitarian impact on civilians and
civilian infrastructure caused by cluster munitions,
including the June 2008 DoD Policy signed by Secretary Gates
and promotion of negotiations in the framework of the
Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Working Group "B"


8. (SBU) The two draft ministerial decisions, on Small Arms
and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition
(MC.DD/4/09/Corr.1) and on Issues Relevant to the FSC
(MC.DD/8/09/Corr 1),each received preliminary review from
Working Group "B." The SALW/SCA Draft Decision received
vocal support from France and Sweden. U.S.-proposed language
on the SALW/SCA draft was taken on board in OP.2, tiret 2 and
tiret 4, that respectively added flexibility to develop an
SALW plan of action "taking into consideration, as
appropriate," the survey of suggestions made at the OSCE SALW
Review Meeting; and to "take concrete steps" to implement the
International Instrument to identify and trace illicit SALW.
A revised draft will be circulated by the UK Chair.


9. (SBU) The draft Issues Relevant to the FSC was more
problematic. Russia (Ulyanov) challenged the reproduction of
the 2008 format, citing changes in the security environment
including the Corfu process. Ulyanov criticized the
reference (OP.2, first tiret) to "intensify the security
dialogue" without further explanation of what that would
entail. He expressed concern the paragraph suggested issues
that were "not directly related to European Security, per se,
and needed better elucidation on how to proceed." He argued
for restoring a "true discussion" over the role of arms

USOSCE 00000245 003 OF 003


control in European Security, including the need to improve
the mechanisms. Russia said it will circulate written
proposals to the draft. Georgia (Giorgadze) followed with
its own suggestion to revise the Security Dialogue insert
(OP.1, second tiret),to mention specifically the August 2008
conflict with Georgia, and the Tagliavini report. The UK
Chair after the not unexpected verbal exchanges between
Georgia and Russia, noted that there were "differences in
opinion" and ended the discussion by closing out Working
Group "B."

Working Group "A"


10. (SBU) Nearly all of the documents for consideration in
Working Group "A" were retained for the next agenda. Russia
(Geyvandov) noted it was waiting for final instructions on
the Agenda and Modalities of the 20th AIAM (FSC.DD/9/09),but
expected some proposed amendments; Application of digital
cameras for VD99 (FSC.DEL/124/09/Rev.1). (Note: on the
margins of the FSC Turkey (Bekar) noted that Azerbaijan was
opposed to the proposal on digital cameras, but that Ukraine
and Belarus now fully supported. End note.) The UK chair
retained on the agenda the Russian Food-for-Thought paper on
an analysis of the implementation of VD99 (FSC.AIAM/2/09).
Ukraine (Leshenko) introduced its own Food-for-Thought on
Interpretations of Some Provisions of the Vienna Document
1999 Chapter I, "Annual Exchange of Military Information"
(FSC.DEL/196/09),which would cover deployed or non-resident
combat units separated from their primary location. Ukraine
asked that the FFT be placed on the November 11 agenda for
WGA.


11. (SBU) The proposal for a draft decision on an update of
FSC Decision 15/02 on SALW was revised and circulated
following Spain's announcement of co-sponsorship
(FSC.DEL/193/09/Rev.1). The UK Chair noted all of the
Chair's Progress Reports would be in circulation by the
week's end, including on SALW, SCA, the Code of Conduct on
Politico-Military Aspect of Security, and CSBMs. Any
amendments delegations wished to make on the progress reports
should be received no later than November 11 in order for the
reports to be prepared in time for the Ministerial. The U.S.
announced it was circulating on behalf of the co-sponsors a
revised Food-for-Thought on Preparation of Best Practice
Guides for Implementation of UNSCR 1540: an OSCE Compendium
of Suggested Implementation Practices (FSC.DEL/246/07) to
account for the progress made since its original distribution.
FULLER