Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE235
2009-10-22 14:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

OSCE/FSC: RUSSIAN PROPOSAL TO REVIEW VIENNA

Tags:  KCFE OSCE PARM PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1759
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000235 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH
OSD FOR ISA (KEHL, WALLENDER, ALBERQUE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: RUSSIAN PROPOSAL TO REVIEW VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999; MISSION REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE

REF: A. USOSCE 71

B. STATE 093327

Classified By: Acting Chief Arms Control Delegate Chris Ellis,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000235

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH
OSD FOR ISA (KEHL, WALLENDER, ALBERQUE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: RUSSIAN PROPOSAL TO REVIEW VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999; MISSION REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE

REF: A. USOSCE 71

B. STATE 093327

Classified By: Acting Chief Arms Control Delegate Chris Ellis,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) In an informal meeting with a small group of
delegations on the margins of the October 20 Joint
Consultative Group (JCG),Russian Head of Arms Control
Delegation Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov shared a draft proposal
that would task the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) to
conduct a review of Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) to identify
areas and provisions that require updating and further
development. Russia invited France, Germany, Spain,
Luxembourg, Belarus, Italy, Portugal, and Turkey to its
informal meeting. Ulyanov also shared the draft proposal
separately with USDel on the same day. Russia indicated that
it would continue to push its proposal in the FSC if it is
unsuccessful in Athens. Washington, please see guidance
request in paragraph 5.

2. (C) France called a brief Quad meeting (U.S., UK,
France, and Germany) before the October 21 FSC plenary to
share preliminary reactions to the Russian proposal.
Although no Quad member yet had official instructions from
capital, Germany and France appeared to lean in favor of
Russia's draft proposal. France (Simonet) said it could
support but not co-sponsor the proposal. Simonet's
preliminary instructions from Paris also suggested language
in the beginning of the draft that would, alongside VD99,
"underline the importance of the CFE regime, which forms the
cornerstone of European security." Germany mentioned that in
the small meeting Ulyanov emphasized the importance of
attaining consensus at 56 and, therefore, Russia had
refrained from inserting wide measures (such as naval CSBMs)
into the proposed text. Ulyanov advocated this proposal as a
small step, according to Germany. German rep Risse added
that the weight of the document should not be overestimated.

3. (C) The UK and U.S. were more cautionary. The UK (Gare)
was concerned that engaging on the Russian proposal would

only amount to failure. Gare also indicated that it looked
as though Russia had invited to its small group meeting only
those countries which perhaps "were easy to pick off the
Alliance." She also considered "poor timing" the
introduction of this proposal given ongoing START ) and CFE
) negotiations. USDel echoed the timing as premature since
participating States were still developing positions with
respect to the Corfu Process and European security, writ
large - of which VD99 was a key factor ) and warned of the
risk in getting ahead of our authorities. USDel also
observed that the Quad had not yet considered possible
collective benefit(s) we would want to see and what
provisions we would not want to risk losing in any process
that would "update VD99."

4. (SBU) Ulyanov privately assured USDel that the draft had
originated "in Moscow at top levels." He suggested the
proposal was "non-ambitious" since it only called for "a
review to identify areas" for improvement. COMMENT: On
several occasions Ulyanov has ambiguously ticked off those
VD99 chapters that Russia believes are not working well as
outlined in Russia's Food for Thought paper, "Analysis of the
Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999," distributed on
February 20 for discussion at the March Annual Implementation
Assessment Meeting (FSC.AIAM/2/09). Ulyanov delivered a
lengthy presentation following the AIAM at the March 25 FSC
wherein he called for a review of VD99, see ref a. He again
spoke at length on the same subject during this week's FSC
(septel). END COMMENT. Ulyanov said Russia purposefully
drafted the proposal with a weaker formulation in order to
avoid the need to negotiate. He also said Russia was not
obliged to a new version of VD99 by the end of 2010 in order
not to complicate work on "nonproliferation, START, and
additional issues."

5. (SBU) Ulyanov said he had meant "to avoid surprises," by
giving a limited number of FSC delegations, including the
U.S., an opportunity to review the draft proposal before he

USOSCE 00000235 002 OF 002


tabled it at the next FSC (October 28) as a delegation paper
with a view toward Athens. Russia will convene again the
small group of countries on October 27 to share feedback from
capitals. The German rep (Risse) asked for the U.S.
position, or, at the minimum, some specific points, by this
week's end, so that Germany could be aware in advance of the
small group meeting. Mission requests guidance on Russia's
proposal for Quad discussions and the October 28 FSC.

6. (C) COMMENT: Mission recommends working with Russia to
re-craft its proposal to call for an examination of
individual CSBM decisions adopted since the last VD99 to
determine whether they are more appropriate as stand-alone
measures or should be incorporated into Vienna Document or
another OSCE instrument. In line with Department guidance,
per ref b, this would provide minimal risk from getting too
far ahead of outcomes regarding the Corfu Process, European
security, and CFE. It would demonstrate to Russia and those
delegations inclined to support Russia's proposal some
activity without opening the door for the development of new
CSBMs when Russia is failing to show commitment to existing
obligations. In the meantime, it would give us time to
reflect on hard questions: Considering Russia is intent on
following through on some form of a VD99 review process, how
should we manage this apparently Moscow-driven initiative
(which seems to have gained support among those OSCE
delegations eager to show relevance to the FSC efforts on
"VD99: ten years later"? What can we not afford to lose?
END COMMENT.
-------------- Begin text of Russian proposal --------------
The Ministerial Council,
UNDERLINING the paramount importance of the Vienna Document
1999 for maintain and enhancing confidence and security in
the OSCE region,
NOTING the evolution of political and security environment in
the region as well as technological developments and
experience gained over the last 10 years since the adoption
of the Vienna Document in its present form,
RECOGNIZING that the CSBMs regime would benefit from taking
into account, to the extent necessary, the changed realities,

1. Tasks the Forum for Security Cooperation:
-- to conduct a review of the Vienna Document 1999 in order
to identify areas and provisions that require updating and
further development and to address the relevant findings, as
appropriate;
-- to report on the results of this work to the next OSCE
Ministerial meeting in Astana.

2. Underlines that the Vienna Document 1999 should be
further implemented in full until a new version is adopted.
-------------- End text --------------
CHRISTENSEN