Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE231
2009-10-21 16:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

CORFU PROCESS SESSION V: IT'S THE CONFLICTS, STUPID

Tags:  PREL OSCE RU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000231 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PREL OSCE RU
SUBJECT: CORFU PROCESS SESSION V: IT'S THE CONFLICTS, STUPID

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Casey Christensen for reasons 4.(b)&(d
)

Summary
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000231

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PREL OSCE RU
SUBJECT: CORFU PROCESS SESSION V: IT'S THE CONFLICTS, STUPID

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Casey Christensen for reasons 4.(b)&(d
)

Summary

1. (SBU) The fifth session of the Corfu Process dialogue
made clear that the OSCE,s ability to provide early warning
and prevent, manage and resolve conflict is a key overarching
theme in the Corfu process. Most delegations noted that the
key stumbling block to the resolution of the protracted
conflicts is the lack of collective political will. The U.S.
proposal for a new conflict prevention and crisis response
mechanism received broad support ) with Russia voicing a
strong dissent to the possibility of pre-authorized and
CiO-dispatched conflict prevention missions. While Russia
also argued for agreement on a "unified approach" to conflict
resolution, many participating States (pS) highlighted the
importance of preserving the OSCE,s flexibility and avoiding
a "one-size-fits-all" approach. End summary.

2. (SBU) The fifth session of the Corfu Process dialogue
featured two presentations: Conflict Prevention Center (CPC)
Director Herbert Salber addressed the topic of conflict
resolution in the OSCE area, and High Commissioner on
National Minorities (HCNM) Ambassador Knut Vollebaek
addressed the links between national minority issues and
European security. Both presentations set the stage for a
discussion among PermReps on the root causes of conflict in
the OSCE, the available OSCE mechanisms to prevent, manage
and resolve conflict and the actual experience of protracted
and current conflicts in the OSCE area.

3. (SBU) Opening the session, Greek Ambassador Marinaki
remarked that the OSCE conflict resolution toolbox has proven
inadequate, as shown by the organization's failure to
adequately prevent the 2008 conflict in Georgia. Ambassador
Salber carefully outlined the tools, instruments and
mechanisms available in the OSCE, why they are not being
fully utilized and how some modest changes could improve the
organization's effectiveness. He noted the seeming
contradiction in the Helsinki Final Act between the
principles of territorial integrity and the right to
self-determination, but stressed that in the end it comes
down to the political will of the participating States,
especially those involved in a conflict, to seek a peaceful

solution.

4. (SBU) As the first speaker, the U.S. delegation presented
a Food for Thought paper on enhancing the capabilities of the
Chairperson-in-Office (CiO) to dispatch a small team to
monitor developments in potential conflict areas and
facilitate dialogue, information flow and humanitarian
relief. Many delegations commented favorably on the U.S.
paper, calling it "innovative" and a "needed step forward."
The Finnish director of policy planning, representing the
2008 CiO, said that had such a mechanism been available
during the Georgia conflict, the OSCE might have been able to
reduce tensions and prevent the outbreak of hostilities.
Russia and Belarus warned against ideas and efforts that
might undermine what they see as the OSCE's core strength )
its requirement for consensus. Russia also placed
preconditions on the launch of any OSCE mechanism: it must be
preceded by wide-ranging consultations with participating
States and have the explicit consent of the parties.
Ambassador Salber countered these arguments, saying the U.S.
concept is in line with other OSCE mechanisms and arguing
that its approval and activation would not erode the
consensus rule inasmuch as the establishment of the mechanism
would necessarily be by consensus.

5. (SBU) Many delegations cited the August 2008 conflict in
Georgia as an example of how the organization's conflict
prevention and resolution capabilities have eroded over time.
Most attributed the erosion both to the rise of other
capable players, including the EU and NATO, and the lack of
political will on the part of participating States to find a
peaceful resolution to disputes. Russian Ambassador Azimov
commented on the "double standards" of some States, which
were willing to support Kosovo's independence from Serbia but
refused to recognize the independence of the two breakaway
territories in Georgia. The Russian delegation did not
respond to a later challenge from Albania regarding Russia,s
own double standards in these two cases.

6. (SBU) A representative of the 2008 Finnish CiO used the
lessons learned from the Georgia experience to expound on the
OSCE's current strengths and weaknesses in the area of
conflict prevention. The OSCE's strengths are its valuable
toolbox, consisting primarily of CSBMs and field presences,
and the flexibility that permits innovative collaboration
with other international organizations. Weaknesses include a
consistent inability to respond in a timely fashion to early
warning signals; limitations on the activities of field
presences coupled with an inability to rapidly augment their
staff and resources as needed; and a diminishment of the

USOSCE 00000231 002 OF 002


impact of the OSCE's long-term investment in conflict-prone
areas. He articulated a vision for the OSCE that defines the
organization as a "first responder" and an effective host for
conflict resolution efforts, an initiator of international
cooperation in its area, and a global model for regional
crisis response.

7. (SBU) Russia,s intervention highlighted two major OSCE
"failures" - to prevent the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and
the Georgian military aggression in August 2008. Ambassador
Azimov advocated the need to agree on a "uniform approach" to
conflict resolution. In particular, he argued that we should
ensure the consistent application of norms and principles,
including the inadmissibility of the use or threat of force;
respect for existing conflict resolution and peacekeeping
mechanisms; and the protection of the civilian population in
conflict zones through the provision of humanitarian
assistance and a policy of non-isolation.

8. (SBU) A number of speakers also touched on the
Transnistrian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, commenting that
any lasting solution requires the political will of the
parties directly involved to settle their differences
peacefully. Moldova urged pS to use the theoretical dialogue
within the Corfu process to push for progress in specific
cases of conflict, and argued that the settlement process
should not be held hostage to biased or ineffective
negotiation or peacekeeping mechanisms. Azerbaijan, as it
has done in the past, took the opportunity to air its
grievances over Nagorno-Karabakh, reiterating its refusal to
consider CSBMs with Armenia until Armenia returns all of the
occupied territories. Armenia, for its part, emphasized the
importance of compromise to dispute settlement and lobbied
for the involvement of all parties to a conflict in
resolution efforts.

9. (SBU) In his presentation, High Commissioner Vollebaek
touched on the threats posed to European security by
inter-ethnic conflict and stressed the need to prevent
inter-state hostilities over national minority issues. He
noted that violations of minority rights and failures to
reach accommodation between majorities and minorities have
been the main cause of conflicts in the OSCE area. Vollebaek
therefore proposed that pS consider adopting a decision
codifying some or all of the provisions contained in his 2008
Bolzano Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State
Relations.

10. (SBU) Responses to this proposal were generally
positive, although several pS expressed the fear that the
process of turning the High Commissioner,s non-binding
recommendations into politically-binding commitments might
actually weaken them. Most shared Vollebaek,s concerns
about the threat of inter-ethnic conflict and emphasized
their support for the early warning and conflict prevention
work of the HCNM in this regard. Many delegations called for
further strengthening of the OSCE,s capacity for action in
the field of national minorities, as part of an overall
effort to sharpen the OSCE,s conflict prevention mechanisms.
Russia stressed in particular the need for the HCNM to
address the unprecedented problem of mass statelessness, and
to focus more attention on States "West of Vienna."

11. (C) Comment: Discussion at the fifth session of the
Corfu process showed that pS are in broad agreement that
conflict prevention and resolution is at the core of the
OSCE,s mandate. However, States recognize that one of the
OSCE,s main weaknesses is it ability to move from early
warning to preventive action. This session provided
substance for the continuing discussion of how OSCE can
enhance European security. There was broad support - except
for Russia and Belarus - for strengthening the OSCE,s
conflict prevention capabilities along the lines proposed by
the U.S. and Ambassador Salber. Discussion of providing the
CiO with pre-authorization to deploy a small mission and
other conflict prevention measures should make the list for a
continued focus during Corfu discussions at and beyond the
Athens Ministerial. End Comment.
CHRISTENSEN