OSCE WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS: SEPTEMBER 21 - 25, 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000211

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019
TAGS: MARR OSCE PGOV PREL GG RU
SUBJECT: OSCE WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS: SEPTEMBER 21 - 25, 2009

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Fuller for Reasons 1.4(B)&(D)

HCNM Vollebaek to Visit South Ossetia - from Vladikavkaz


1. (SBU) At the weekly U.S.-CiO meeting September 22, Greek
PermRep Marinaki said High Commissioner for National
Minorities Vollebaek intended to visit South Ossetia in the
near future, and had agreed to travel from Vladikavkaz,
reversing his long-standing demand for access from the south.
Vollebaek reportedly raised the matter with South Ossetian
representatives on the margins of the September 17 Geneva
discussions, following Russian DFM KarasinQ,s early September
suggestion that Vollebaek go to Geneva to see representatives
from both regions. While the Abkhaz refused to see
Vollebaek, the South Ossetians reportedly were "forthcoming"
enough to grant Vollebaek access to the region - as long as
he traveled from the north. Although ChargQ Fuller
questioned the decision, Marinaki insisted Vollebaek had
taken a practical decision, and argued that access to the
region was more important than how it was obtained.

Chairmanship Exploring UN-Like Arrangement for South Ossetia


2. (SBU) At the same meeting, Marinaki said Special
Representative Christopoulos intended to draft (by early
October) a framework for OSCE engagement in South Ossetia,
following favorable exchanges with DAS Kaidanow and Russian,
South Ossetian, and Georgian representatives on the margins
of the Geneva discussions. Under the proposed arrangement, a
Vienna-based team of three officers would report to
Christopoulos and travel to the region on a rotating basis,
with the aim of maintaining a nearly constant presence in
Vienna, Tbilisi, and Tskhinvali. The team would support the
OSCE's participation in the IPRM for the South Ossetia
region and focus on confidence-building measures, freedom of
movement, and humanitarian issues. When asked how the
arrangement might be funded, Marinaki said the Chairmanship
likely would seek an increase in the Conflict Prevention
Center's budget. She recognized that this would require
consensus, but said Russian DFM Karasin had told
Christopoulos in Geneva that he was "not against" a budget
increase. ChargQ Fuller noted the United States would
support the proposed arrangement, but cautioned the
Chairmanship against Russian attempts to insert status issues
into any budget discussions. On a related note, Marinaki
said the Greeks had urged the Kazakhs to quickly identify
their own special representative for the protracted
conflicts, and had suggested s/he attend the November 11
round of Geneva discussions (the last under the Greek
Chairmanship). Marinaki added that the Greeks would like to
see greater OSCE Troika involvement in South Ossetia (the
Troika encompasses the past, current, and immediate future
Chairmanships),and hoped Christopoulos would be able to stay
on in some capacity during the Kazakh Chairmanship. Marinaki
admitted she had not raised this with her Kazakh counterpart,
but said she rarely heard from him, adding that the KazakhsQ,
preparations were "not the most encouraging."

Corfu Process Turns to Arms Control/CSBMs


3. (SBU) OSCE PermReps met informally September 22 for the
third session of the Corfu Process, focusing on arms control
and CSBM instruments in the OSCE area. Paul Dunay of the
Geneva Center for Security policy made an opening
presentation which reviewed the state of various arms control
and confidence building instruments associated with the OSCE.

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Almost all Delegations reaffirmed the underlying value of
the CFE treaty, while recognizing the ongoing need for its
adaptation to current realities in European security
architecture. Most also supported the current form and
structure of the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99),while
recognizing the opportunity for some improvement. The
Russians assumed their now customary role as outliers,
calling for targeted updates to the "outdated" VD99 (naval
CSBMs and RRFs) and said progress on A/CFE could be achieved
through bilateral Parallel Action Plan (PAP) with the U.S. A
few delegations, notably Armenia and Moldova, noted the
challenges to the instruments posed by unrecognized
territories. Several others joined the U.S. in stressing the
underlying need to restore mutual trust and confidence as a
precondition for improvement in European security.

NATO Allies Debate Russian Attitudes to Corfu Process


4. (C) The September 23 NATO Caucus discussion on the
September 22 Corfu Process discussions again focused on
Russia's interest and motivation in the Corfu Process.
Summing up the results of the previous day's discussion,
Greek CiO Ambassador. Marinaki said delegations (both CFE and
non-CFE signatories) valued CFE, felt further progress on the
PAP was the right way forward on A/CFE, supported VD99 and
believed that OSCE needs a more comprehensive strategy on
CSBMs. Several Ambassadors commented on an improving Russian
tone; others, however, contended this masked little change in
substance. The Albanian Ambassador noted Russia's desire
for a treaty appears to remain unchanged and he (and others)
valued the clear U.S. statement against such a possible
outcome.

EU Supports OSCE Mechanism for South Ossetia, Recognizes
Obstacles


5. (SBU) Representatives of the UK, France, and Germany told
Poloff September 23 that while capitals' initial reactions to
a proposed OSCE arrangement for South Ossetia (a Vienna-based
team of three officers rotating through Vienna, Tbilisi, and
Tskhinvali) were positive, they believed the lack of security
guarantees and the South Ossetians' continuing hostility
toward the OSCE could present significant obstacles. The
British representative noted London likely would be reluctant
to second a British citizen to Tskhinvali under these
circumstances, and added that establishing the team under a
so-called "gentleman's agreement," while perhaps the only
feasible option given the difficulty of reaching consensus on
anything written, likely would raise flags. While all agreed
the maintenance of an OSCE presence in Georgia - however
small - would boost the organization's credibility, they
also recognized that a three-person team with no clear
mandate was a far cry from the proposals envisioned earlier
this year. They also wondered what Russia might hope to gain
from this, and agreed Russia likely would seek to shape the
proposal to its own ends.

Russia Assesses Proposed Mechanism for South Ossetia


6. (SBU) Reacting to the proposed OSCE arrangement for
South Ossetia, Russian PermRep Azimov told ChargQ Fuller
September 23 that Russia "understood" the three-person team
would report to Special Representative Christopoulos, but
would prefer that the team report to the Permanent Council (a
distinction in line with Russian attempts to impose PC
control on activities of the OSCE Secretariat and field

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missions). Nevertheless, Azimov said Russia could "agree" to
the proposal if Christopoulos himself reported to the
Council. Separately, Russian DCM Lukashevich told Polcouns
that the three-person team would, in Russia's conception, be
limited to two tasks: supporting the Incident Prevention and
Response Mechanism and preparing for the Geneva discussions.
It would have no assessment or monitoring role. Lukashevich
added that the deployment of the team should be synchronized
with the UN plan in Abkhazia. Azimov added that he
"understood" the budget of the Secretariat's Conflict
Prevention Center was sufficient to support the team this
year, but could need a two-percent increase next year.
According to Azimov, Russia could be "constructive" on this -
unless other participating States pushed for a zero-growth
budget (a clear reference to the United States, which has
successfully pushed for just that). The Greeks find the
Russian openness tantalizing, and no formal PC decision would
be required, but Russia has a say in implementation
chokepoints, including access to South Ossetia as well as
budget issues, and may use these to reinsert status issues in
the discussion.

Kazak Ambassador on CiO Plans


7. (SBU) During a tour d'horizon with the Charge September
24, Kazakh ambassador Abdrakmanov responded to nearly every
question that he was waiting for "confirmation" from newly
appointed FM Saudabayev. When pressed whether Kazakhstan had
finalized its priorities for its chairmanship, he indicated
that, as the result of the careful consultations they have
been holding - including with the Mediterranean and Asian
Partners - his country now realizes that its priorities may
not be those of the larger OSCE community and there will need
to be a balance. He reiterated Kazakhstan's support for
ODIHR and the Special Representative (SR) on Freedom of the
Media, and acknowledged that they would like the three SR's
on Tolerance (one of whom is Kazakh) to continue their
tenure. With respect to the SR on Conflicts (including
Georgia),he asserted that Kazakhstan does not want to "step
on the toes" of Greece and preferred to wait. In response to
the Charge's expressed concern that a new SR needed to start
working closely with Christopoulos on the Georgian case now
for continuity - the way the Greeks had worked with the Finns
a year ago - he then volunteered that their candidate is
still the Kazakh Secretary General of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization who won't finish his term until
December. (Note: The Greek CiO adamantly asserted two
days ago that the SCO SG was "no longer in contention.") He
then explained that there will likely be three Personal
Representatives of the CiO in 2010. For Transportation, they
have already offered the position to a prominent Lithuanian
politician - to reflect continuity with the 2011 CiO - and
are awaiting confirmation. On Environment, they are talking
with a British member of the EU Parliament. On Elections,
they are consulting with a Finn - to reflect a previous CiO.
As for the upcoming replacement for the SP on Trafficking in
Persons vacant at the end of the year, they are seriously
considering proposing their ambassador-at-large Madina
Jarbussynova. Both the Liechtenstein Dean of the Diplomatic
Corps and the Russian ambassador have respectively indicated
they believe the Kazakh chairmanship will be "prudent" and
"mild."

RF Deems Geneva Discussions Successful, Urges Non-Use of
Force Agreements


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8. (SBU) Following EU and U.S. statements at the September
24 Permanent Council meeting affirming support for the Geneva
process, Russian PermRep Azimov agreed that the September 17
discussions had proven "successful," and highlighted the key
role of Russian troops and border guards in contributing to a
decrease in the number of security incidents. He noted,
however, that the "main thing" remained the signing of
non-use of force agreements between Georgia and the "new
states" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Turning to a recent
proposal for a team of three officers based in Vienna and
operating in Georgia, Azimov said Russia was prepared to
"field" proposals for OSCE engagement in a "constructive
manner," subject to further consultation. In response,
Georgian PermRep Gaprindashvili thanked the EU and the United
States for their "continued, close attention" to the
situation and urged constructive talks on OSCE engagement in
Georgia. To counter AzimovQ,s assertions that security had
improved, he pointed out that incidents were still common,
and went on to remind Russia that its recognition of the
separatist regions had violated international law.

RF Highlights Shortcomings in European Parliament Elections


9. (SBU) Using the September 24 Permanent Council meeting
to draw attention to the September 22 OSCE/ODIHR Expert Group
Report on the Elections to the European Parliament, Russian
PermRep Azimov largely ignored the reportQ,s emphasis on the
high level of public confidence in the electoral process, and
instead pointed out that the report highlighted the need for
harmonization in European electoral legislation and
identified irregularities in the implementation of OSCE
commitments. Azimov claimed that ODIHR had been "mindful" of
Russian recommendations when it decided to send only a small
number of observers, and declared that it clearly was
possible to decrease the number of observers (to as few as
10) without sacrificing mission effectiveness. Clearly using
the report to try to validate RussiaQ,s long-standing push
for smaller, restricted election observation missions, Azimov
urged that the methodology be extended to participating
States "east of Vienna," and declared they were entitled to a
similar approach. He also argued that the OSCE should be
"sensible" in the ways it spends money and should be
"sensitive" to the views of host countries. The EU, for its
part, said member States would carefully study the report's
recommendations.

Kyrgyz Minister of Interior praises OSCE Police Reform
Assistance


10. (U) At the Sept 24 Permanent Council Kyrgyz MOI
Moldomusa Kongatiev gave an address to the Permanent Council
praising OSCE assistance on police reform in Kyrgyzstan. He
noted that Kyrgyzstan would likely seek continued OSCE
assistance on police reform up to and beyond 2012, citing
challenges such as international terrorism, organized crime,
religious extremism, rustling, and interethnic tension. He
conceded human rights problems in detention centers and
highlighted the importance of civil society oversight of law
enforcement. He also noted legislation signed Sept 10 meant
to strengthen this oversight and made reference to a pending
law "about citizens, participation in ensuring law and
order." The Swedish delegation/ EU presidency said that after
10 years of police reform assistance it was a good time to
take stock and emphasized the importance of civil society
engagement. The EU also expressed concern about charges
against MP Kadyrov, noted recent EU statements regarding

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violence against journalists, and highlighted concern about
past incidents involving disproportionate use of force by
police. Kazakhstan valued the OSCE's contribution to Central
Asian stability through its police and border programs. The
RF, while recognizing the Minister's desire to consolidate
progress beyond 2012, said that necessary to be in synchrony
with the OSCE's annual cycle of field mission mandate
renewals and reports to the PC.

Greek Chair of ACMF Recommends Rollover of Scales of
Contributions to Permanent Council


11. (SBU) The current Greek chair of the Advisory Committee
on Management and Finance (ACMF) reported at the September 24
Permanent Council on a lack of consensus among delegations
for a new Scale of Contributions as required by a PC Decision
last year. She recommended the current scales be rolled over
for an indeterminate period of time and that efforts to
determine new scales continue. The EU (approx 66% of OSCE
Unified budget),Canada (5.53%),US (11.5%) and Kazakhstan
(0.36%) all supported roll over in general principle. The
Kazakhs, who assume the ACMF chair 1 October, expressed
concern that leaving scales unresolved would complicate
adoption of the OSCE FY,10 budget by the end of the year.
Russia (6%) noted the difficulty in reaching agreement but
stated it was overpaying and called for capacity to pay based
on the UN system as referred to in last year's Decision. (
Note: In earlier informal discussions, we took the position
that last year's decision did not require adoption of the UN
standards but that the UN figures might serve as a starting
point for discussions). Russia also criticized the lack of a
transparent budget process as extra-budgetary items were not
included and urged the establishment of a fully unified
budget that would put all items (i.e., extra-budgetary
projects) under PC authority.

U.S. Hosts Informal Discussion on Energy Security


12. (SBU) On September 26 USOSCE poloffs hosted a lunch and
informal discussion on the prospects for a Ministerial
Council Decision (MCD) at the December 1-2 Ministerial in
Athens on energy security. Attendees included representatives
from the Russian Federation, Greece/CiO, Sweden/EU
presidency, EC, Slovakia, Turkey, Belarus and Romania. The
Slovaks, based on their perception of previous discussions,
outlined six potential issues which a MCD could touch on: (1)
specific regional dialogues; (2) taking advantage of the
triangle of producer, transit and consumer countries
present in the OSCE; (3) contribution of renewable/
alternative sources and efficiency to energy security; (4)
further cooperation on critical energy infrastructure
protection (CEIP); (5) confidence building and early warning;
(6) the use of OSCE crisis management mechanisms (existing or
otherwise) to mitigate economic or humanitarian impacts of
energy crises. Belarus expressed enthusiasm for regional
dialogues and CEIP. The RF, while expressing skepticism that
common ground existed to move much beyond the two existing
decisions on Energy Security Dialogue and CEIP, and
opposition to any invasive mechanisms, restrictive
measures, or new obligations, remained open to discussion
and to presenting ideas to Moscow for consideration. The EC
suggested that any new decision should foster dialogue and
cooperation on long-term issues such as the geopolitical
ramifications of emerging energy scarcity. The Slovak and
Greek delegations are planning to present a food for thought
paper next week in advance of opening the discussion up to a

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wider group of PS, and have asked for written contributions
by early next week for incorporation.

Russian Protest over NGO Participation


13. (U) During a September 24 meeting of the OSCE Human
Dimension Committee, the Russian delegate announced Moscow's
intense (and traditional) disappointment at the participation
of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society in the 2009 Human
Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw. The
speaker said Moscow's instructions specified the Russian
delegation would take appropriate measures in Warsaw if
the Friendship Society remained a registered participant,
which many people present assumed meant a walk out. He also
vowed Russia probably would block the agenda for the 2010
HDIM unless the NGO were disinvited. The representative
noted Russian courts have ruled the Friendship Society
condones terrorism, extremism, and the use of violence. He
said Russia has sent letters to ODIHR and the Greek
chairmanship concerning this matter, but the protests have
been ignored. (POL: LUKAS)

CiO's Proposal For HD Ministerial Decisions Met With Wide
Support


14. (SBU) In the same meeting of the Human Dimension
Committee on Sept 24, the CiO presented their six proposed
ministerial draft decisions (rule of law, gender, hate
crimes, Roma integration, media freedom, human trafficking).
While like-minded delegations welcomed the proposal as a
balanced package that builds on previous decisions and seeks
to capitalize on the work done in SHDMs, Russia and Belarus
denounced the quality of the drafts and called for more
balance in the number of decisions across the three
dimensions. Norway and the UK suggested adding a decision on
protecting Human Rights defenders and a declaration to
commemorate the 25th anniversary of the UK convention against
torture, respectively. Russia proceeded to criticize the
CiO's annotated HDIM agenda as too political, narrowly
focused and unbalanced. The CiO responded by clarifying that
the annotated agenda was not a consensus document and did not
in any way limit the discussion at the HDIM.

U.S. Pushes For Strategic Direction in Draft Decision on
Policing


15. (SBU) Key EU countries are moving toward introducing the
text of a decision on OSCE's police activities following
extensive discussions with the USDEL. The draft text simply
tasks the SG to do a report on policing activities followed
by a lengthy and time consuming review process, with no
guaranteed outcome. USDEL has pushed for the inclusion of
thematic priorities for OSCE's policing activities to
provide strategic guidance to the report and review process.
ChargQ Fuller expressed to Swedish Ambassador Bard-BringQus
our disappointment over the rushed process and said a simple
request for a report would not be a worthwhile Ministerial
decision. Following further discussions with the Swedes on
September 25, they will present their bare bones text next
week and we will follow with a food for thought laying out
our case for adding thematic priorities. The issue will be
formally discussed at the October 12 Security Committee
meeting.
CHRISTENSEN