Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE183
2009-08-06 07:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

OSCE'S FSC, END OF WINTER/SPRING ROUND: SHARP

Tags:  KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6021
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0183/01 2180733
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060733Z AUG 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6538
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1309
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1371
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0814
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 USOSCE 000183 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, NILSSON
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2015
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE'S FSC, END OF WINTER/SPRING ROUND: SHARP
EXCHANGES, SOME BREAKTHROUGHS

REF: A. STATE 07498

B. USOSCE 00095

C. USOSCE 00181

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Hugh Neighbour, Reason 1.4B/D

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 USOSCE 000183

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, NILSSON
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2015
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE'S FSC, END OF WINTER/SPRING ROUND: SHARP
EXCHANGES, SOME BREAKTHROUGHS

REF: A. STATE 07498

B. USOSCE 00095

C. USOSCE 00181

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Hugh Neighbour, Reason 1.4B/D


1. (C) Summary: During the winter/spring round of the OSCE's
Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC),the viability of Vienna
Document 1999 (VD99),the August 2008 conflict in Georgia,
and reflection on Russia's European Security Treaty proposal
pitted Russia against a majority of states. There were
frequent, sharp exchanges between Russia and Georgia and
others. Russia criticized the viability of VD99 and pushed
for a limited revision while others, led by the U.S., called
for greater political will in fully implementing existing
measures and commitments.


2. (SBU) In a more cooperative vein, other significant
activity included the first FSC workshop on cyber security in
March; progress on the U.S.-authored first chapter of the
1540 Best Practice Guide (BPG) which looks set for adoption
in September--with full Russian backing--after two years of
negotiations; adoption of a new Code of Conduct (CoC)
questionnaire, also after two years of effort; and agreement
by all to hold a conference in September 2009 to review the
OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light weapons (SALW).
Mission also coordinated U.S. support for a U.S.-UK led
project that helped Cyprus destroy 324 excess SA-7 MANPADs in
June. All USG priorities and objectives (Ref A) were met or
exceeded during the winter/spring round.


3. (C) Compromise proposals for a limited update of VD99, the
SALW review conference, and preparation for the OSCE
Ministerial in Athens are expected to feature prominently
during the fall round. Besides these topics, Mission expects
UNSCR 1540, cyber security, and tabled improvements for VD99
implementation to also remain at the forefront in the FSC.
Meanwhile, results from the informal OSCE Ministerial in

Corfu or "Corfu Process" reinforced the prospects for
prolonged dialogue on European security in at least two joint
FSC-PC sessions, and have FSC delegations gearing up to
support their COMs on this topic. Washington guidance for
the fall round is welcomed in paras 9, 20, 28, and 30-35.
End Summary.


- - - - - - - - - -
A "Dead Letter" vs. Political Will
- - - - - - - - - -


4. (SBU) Throughout the winter and spring Russia continued to
argue for a revision of Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) that
would incorporate its proposals for CSBMs on naval and rapid
reaction forces. Russia criticized the viability of the
"dead letter" at every opportunity, repeatedly linking the
failure of the OSCE to prevent the August 2008 conflict in
Georgia to VD99's outdated and dysfunctional measures. Two
months into the session Russia circulated a detailed critique
of VD99 for use at the 2009 Annual Implementation Assessment
Meeting (AIAM). In its assessment, Russia concluded that 50
percent of VD99 is non-functional and the remainder is
functioning at only partial capacity. By May, Russia
softened its tone and called for a "modest, limited revision"
of the document following a consensus-based approach and
targeting pre-agreed, specific measures.


5. (SBU) In addition to revising VD99, Russia resurrected
its proposals for naval and rapid reaction force CSBMs and a
single deadline for submission of defense planning data.
While all three proposals featured prominently in Russia's

USOSCE 00000183 002 OF 008


interventions during the March AIAM, Russia requested to have
its proposal for naval measures placed on the weekly working
group B agenda. Meanwhile, Russia's pitch for a single
deadline for submission of defense planning data became more
nuanced, arguing that a single deadline would allow the CPC
to engage the OSCE's 56 participating States (pS) who are
late in submitting their annual data, something that the CPC
currently does not have the remit to do.


6. (SBU) Countering Russian criticism of VD99, some
delegations, including the U.S., urged pS to demonstrate
greater political will by fully implementing existing CSBMs,
as well as the CFE Treaty. A large majority of pS also
questioned the utility or necessity of creating a naval CSBM
and called on Russia to identify what specific security
concerns such a CSBM would address. The proposals to adopt a
single date for submission of Defense planning data, while
falling well short of gaining traction, fared somewhat better
and drew supportive comments from some pS, including Germany.


7. (SBU) With the exception of a joint UK-Russian proposal
on a best practice guide for VD99 Chapter IV contacts,
progress on new CSBMs including improvements to existing
CSBMs virtually stalled. USDel expected up to five
pre-coordinated Allied proposals to be tabled in the AIAM
and/or FSC. However, Norwegian and Danish proposals, while
presented at the AIAM, were never forwarded to the FSC for
action. Turkey tabled a proposal for more liberal rules for
use of digital cameras and GPS equipment, and Germany tabled
a proposal for standards for briefings by military
commanders; but, at the end of round both proposals faced
serious opposition.


- - - - - - - - - - - -
Stagnation: Feeling Something Must Give
- - - - - - - - - - -


8. (C) The reason for this stagnation seems to be threefold.
First, Russia indicated that as a matter of principle it
would not support proposals for voluntary measures to improve
implementation. In fact, Russia all but killed Germany's
proposal on "guidelines for briefings by military
commanders..." by proposing towards the end of the session
such substantial edits to the text that Germany was at a loss
on how to move forward. Second, some pS, including Germany,
have said that, taking Russia at its word, they will not
support proposals that Russia is sure to oppose. According
to Denmark and Norway, this is in part why they never tabled
their AIAM proposals in the FSC. Finally, several Allies
remain convinced that agreeing to a mandatory decision for
improving VD99 implementation is tantamount to "opening" the
document for revision. According to the UK, its position on
not opening VD99 also played a role in stalling Danish and
Norwegian proposals.


9. (C) Comment: As a consequence, there appears to be a
feeling among many pS in Vienna that something will have to
give. Not surprisingly, Russia has tacit backing by Belarus
and Kazakhstan for limited revision of VD99. Many Allies and
others have noted on the margins that they would be open to
discussions, while other Allies have informally approached
USDel seeking consultation on possible formulas for breaking
the logjam. While an indication of U.S. willingness to
consider a limited package of revisions to the VD99 after 10
years would be received warmly, such a step would first have
to be carefully weighed at senior levels (see also Ref B).
End comment.



USOSCE 00000183 003 OF 008


- - - - - - - - - - - -
The August 2008 Conflict Lives On
- - - - - - - - -- - - -


10. (SBU) The August 2008 conflict between Russia and
Georgia remained a focal topic for planned and unplanned
discussion during the winter/spring round. In February, the
head of the European Union Monitoring Mission and CPC
Director argued their case to a Joint FSC-PC session for pS
continued support for international monitors in Georgia with
full access to the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions. In
another joint session in June, the OSCE, EU, and UN Co-Chairs
of the Geneva talks on Georgia addressed pS following the
closure of UNOMIG and the OSCE Mission to Georgia.


11. (SBU) Impromptu, direct exchanges between Russia and
Georgia flared repeatedly during the winter session.
Repetitive exchanges over the conflict's causes and
consequences were fueled with periodic news of new
complications, such as Georgia's decision to reject a Russian
VD99 inspection in February on the basis of force majeure,
and repeated incidents along the zone of conflict including,
inter alia, the temporary detention of OSCE MMOs by South
Ossetian Militia in February, an unannounced Russian
live-fire exercise along the zone in March, repeated
shootings, and the final closure of the OSCE Military
Monitoring Mission. Direct exchanges subsided in the spring
session owning in part to the fact that, as acting FSC Chair,
Georgia steered away from open confrontation, a point noted
by Russia at the end of round. Nevertheless, Russia used the
last meeting of the round to enumerate its lessons learned
from August 2008, with Georgia reserving its national right
to reply during the next session after the UK assumed the
Chairmanship.


12. (SBU) Throughout the round, Russia's message remained
consistent. Georgian President Sakashvili bore full
responsibility for the conflict, a line which was reinforced
by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov at the June Annual
Security Review Conference (ASRC). Russia decried third
party transfers of armaments to Georgia before and after the
conflict, alleging that pS providing arms to Georgia
contravened a number of OSCE norms and principles and created
"one of the most militarized states in the world." Russia
underscored its position by calling for an embargo of
offensive arms transfers to Georgia.


13. (C) All pS regretted the frequent sharp exchanges in open
forum. Georgia was privately criticized by many pS for its
sharp comments, and no pS supported Georgia's decision to
declare force majeure in response to a Russian VD99
inspection request. Russia's rhetoric, however, often turned
prevailing pS attitudes against it, and Russia found itself
isolated on arms transfers, the independence of Georgian
occupied territories, and the closure of the monitoring
mission.


- - - - - - - - - - - -
European Security Debate Leads to...
- - - - - - - - - - - -


14. (SBU) During the winter/spring round pS sought
clarification from Russia on President Medvedev's "European
Security Treaty" proposal and, at the same time, attempted to
broaden the focus to include all three dimensions. Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko addressed a Joint PC-FSC
session in February in an attempt to answer pS questions and
promote Russia's vision of European Security. Grushko cited
Kosovo, Georgia, and NATO centrism as examples of "new

USOSCE 00000183 004 OF 008


realities" that drive Russian motivation for a new, legally
binding instrument to affirm agreed principles. Most pS
found Grushko's comments less than enlightening.


15. (SBU) At the OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference
(ASRC) on June 23, Russian FM Lavrov ploughed familiar ground
on the rationale and outline of Russian proposals to
strengthen European security architecture. He argued there
were three factors contributing to impaired security: lack of
trust between governments, risks of internal ruptures, and
the inability of the international community to respond.
Lavrov urged participating States to recommit to
non-interference in internal affairs of other countries,
renounce the use of force to settle conflicts, adhere to
international mechanisms for regulating conflict and provide
support for international organizations dedicated to
preventing conflict. He said a new security architecture
would have four major building blocks: interstate relations,
arms control, conflict management, and new threats.


16. (SBU) The responses from pS to both presentations were
familiar. All reaffirmed their commitment to the principles
of the Helsinki Final Act. Many pS found Russia's credibility
lacking, considering its suspension of CFE obligations.
Other delegations, citing the August conflict in Georgia
specifically, called for greater political will in solving
frozen conflicts and urged Russia to agree to re-establish an
OSCE and UN presence in the disputed territories.


- - - - - - - - - - -
...The "Corfu Process"
- - - - - - - - - -


17. (SBU) As the round closed, a series of events outside the
FSC (the Berlin seminar on the future of arms control in
Europe, the OSCE informal ministerial in Corfu, and
U.S.-Russian bilateral Summit) provided delegations with a
sense of anticipation for reinvigorated discussions in the
fall. In particular, the advent of the Corfu process in
June, which includes an "assessment of current situation in
each of the three dimensions in order to develop a common
understanding of...priority common threats," has many
delegations speculating that the FSC will play a contributing
role in preparation for the Athens Ministerial in December.
The Greek CiO has already begun to outline plans to discuss
all three OSCE dimensions in the fall. According to the CiO,
FSC dels will be asked to support perm reps with an
assessment of the pol-mil dimension.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Cyber Security--An Unexpected Success Story
- - - - - - - - -- - - - - -


18. (SBU) March 17-18 the FSC held the first FSC workshop on
Cyber security with more than 200 civil and military
representatives gathered in Vienna. This was one of the more
broadly attended workshops held under the auspices of the
OSCE, with reps in attendance from Egypt, Japan, the Arab
League, and NATO, among others. Their key aim was to
identify ways to cooperate on enhancing cyber security and
examine the potential future role of the OSCE in addressing
this global problem.


19. (C) Initially considered by the U.S. a risky topic for
the FSC, the workshop proved a successful endeavor for
achieving U.S. objectives, which were to prevent the
militarization of cyber security, refrain from engaging in
discussions on constraining state capabilities, and keeping

USOSCE 00000183 005 OF 008


the focus on defensive remedies to ensure cyber security.
USDel assessed that a new CSBM introduced by the U.S. and
close Allies on cyber security may be in U.S. interest if the
U.S. wishes to take a proactive stance in the OSCE.


20. (C) Comment: A presentation on the outcome of the U.S.
60*day cyber review, even though it was done in the
Permanent Council, was well received and appreciated by FSC
dels. It was viewed by many pS as the first step after the
March workshop in breaking the U.S. silence on cyber security
in the OSCE. If the USG wanted to go further, a
carefully-considered, new CSBM introduced by the U.S. and
close allies on cyber security could be in U.S. interest for
three reasons. First, it would advance the U.S. approach on
cyber with the 56 participating States of the OSCE, half of
whom are not in NATO. Second, it would offer a positive
alternative to impractical Russian proposals that would treat
cyber security as an arms control issue and thus prevent
Russia from defining the debate. Third, it would allow the
U.S. to assert leadership in an area that matters to U.S.
interests. Such a CSBM could be centered, for instance,
around the U.S. recommendations at the workshop (see
preceding para) or the G-8's eleven agreed points on cyber
security. End comment.


- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Progress on 1540 BPG, More Work to Do on FFT
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


21. (SBU) The U.S. sponsored Food for Thought (FFT) paper on
a "Further Work on 1540" (FSC.DEL/25/09/Corr.4) gained broad
support, including eleven cosponsors. However, opposition
from Russia has prevented the FSC from pursuing an overall
strategy on 1540 based on the FFT. Russia criticized the
overall tone of the paper and attacked some of the paper's
specific proposals, finding they "invaded the competency" of
the UN 1540 Committee or lacked any "added value." In
conversations with the incoming UK Chair, Mission assesses
that movement forward on this initiative will likely depend
on addressing some or all of Russia's concerns, either
through a revision to the Strategy paper--a route the future
UK Chair prefers--or by drafting separate Del papers based on
the proposals from the FFT. In either case, the UK will
likely support moving either option forward this fall. In
addition, the UK is still working to obtain extra budgetary
funding for a 1540 coordinator.


22. (SBU) 1540 Best Practice Guide (BPG): Despite
aforementioned differences over the FFT, after two years of
on-off negotiations, Russia and the U.S. did resolve the
outstanding issues with the draft first chapter of the 1540
BPG just before the last meeting of the winter/spring FSC
session. What should be the final revision was then issued,
along with a draft decision that will permit publication.
Russia expressed its full support. It is expected that the
first chapter will be adopted soon after the fall session
opens in September. Canada circulated its draft chapter (Ch.
3 on physical security) for comment, but it received
extensive comments and Canada is reviewing its status.


- - - - - - - - - -- -
Decisions and Projects
- - - - - - - - - -- -


23. (SBU) Code of Conduct: After over two years of
negotiation, the FSC adopted a new Code of Conduct (CoC)
Questionnaire in April (FSC.DEC/01/09). Participating States
also took a decision to postpone 2009 CoC questionnaire

USOSCE 00000183 006 OF 008


submissions in anticipation of the new questionnaire's
adoption. The first responses to this questionnaire were
submitted in June.


24. (SBU) SALW: The FSC adopted a decision on the modalities
and agenda for a September 22-23 meeting to review the OSCE
Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (FSC.DEC/05/09).
The meeting, proposed by the Chair of the Informal Group of
Friends of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Germany),is a
response to the 2008 Ministerial decision to review the FSC's
document on SALW.


25. (SBU) HOV: Participating States agreed to hold a Heads of
Verification meeting December 14, 2009 in conjunction with
the annual exchange of military information (FSC.DEC/04/09).


26. (SBU) Turkey and Germany tabled formal proposals on
improving VD99 implementation that will remain in WG A for
the fall session. Germany's paper on Briefings by Military
Commanders (FSC.DD/05/09) has mixed reviews from pS. Germany
seemed prepared to address U.S. concerns, but elected not to
circulate a new revision after receiving substantial edits
(deletions) from Russia late in the session. Based on
Russia,s edits, Germany is now uncertain whether the
document will remain viable. Similarly, Turkey's paper on
the use of digital cameras and GPS (FSC.DEL/124/09) has run
into opposition from Ukraine and Belarus, which both oppose
references to GPS based on national legislation restrictions.
While Belarus has informally proposed compromise language
which would make the measure voluntary, it is unclear whether
such a change would be acceptable to Russia. Finally, a
UK-Russia proposed "Best Practice Guide for Implementation of
Chapter IV, Contacts" was redistributed as
FSC.AIAM/09/01.Rev1.


27. (SBU) Mission coordinated U.S. support for a U.S.-UK led
project to assist Cyprus in the destruction of 324 excess
SA-7 MANPADs. The project was deemed a success and concluded
with a public ceremony on June 12.


- - - - - - -
Looking ahead
- - - - - - -

-- Revising (or a limited update of) VD99


28. (C) Russia will likely continue its push for a revision
to VD99. Building traction will remain difficult for Russia,
especially when VD99 is viewed within the larger context of a
protracted discussion on European Security. However, should
Russia prove uncompromising on voluntary measures to improve
VD99 implementation, the U.S. could face a growing call by
some pS, including Allies, for a compromise approach that
includes limited revision. Denmark, supported by Norway, has
already informally circulated to a number of Allies a
proposal addressing apprehension over opening VD99. While
the proposal was uniformly rejected by the Quad in Vienna, it
is unclear whether Denmark will attempt to revive it this
fall. At the same time, Germany has indicated to the Quad
that it will soon circulate a non-paper assessing the current
state of affairs and proposing a package solution to
revision. Germany has also asked Mission for the U.S.
response to Russia's call for a limited revision.

-- The Corfu Process and European Security


29. (C) Further discussion on European Security, with
particular emphasis on the "Corfu Process," is expected to
remain a topic of interest in the fall. The CiO has

USOSCE 00000183 007 OF 008


indicated that it intends to hold weekly meetings to assess
the current state of affairs in the three security
dimensions. Three of those meetings will cover the
politico-military dimension and one of those is purportedly
scheduled as a joint FSC-PC meeting (Ref C). While focal
point for discussion will likey remain in the PC, the CiO
has called for an assessment of each dimension and expects
that FSC delegations will support Perm Reps on the pol-mil
aspects of the discussion.

-- 1540 Best Practice Guide (BPG)


30. (SBU) It is likely that the U.S.-authored chapter of the
1540 BPG will reach consensus early in the UK's Chairmanship
that begins in September. Mission recommends leveraging the
positive exposure generated by this accomplishment to entice
other delegations to consider authoring the remaining
chapters. In this light, Mission requests input as to which
delegations may be more receptive to U.S. overtures based on
their nation's involvement with 1540 in other forums.

-- Further Work on 1540


31. (SBU) Although the U.S. FFT on Further Work on 1540 has
gained solid support among pS, it does not seem likely that
Russia will back an overall strategy for the FSC without
significant changes. Ignoring Russia's concerns risks
stalemate, which in turn jeopardizes the support and momentum
we have already developed among a number of pS. USDel
recommends, therefore, that Washington deemphasize the
concept of an overall strategy for the OSCE, and increase
efforts to develop one or more of the proposals from the FFT
into one or more concrete FSC draft decisions.
-- VD99 Implementation


32. (SBU) Working Groups A and B will continue to discuss the
Turkish proposal on GPS and digital cameras, Germany's
guidelines for presentations by military commanders, UK and
Russia's BPG for Chapter IV contacts, and Russia's proposal
on naval CSBMs. Mission welcomes additional guidance as
required on any of these proposals.

-- SALW Conference


33. (SBU) The SALW Review in September will serve as the
first significant event on the fall agenda. Mission welcomes
Washington's participation and looks forward to a productive
event in which, like the cyber security workshop in March,
the U.S. takes a proactive role in articulating and educating
others on U.S. positions.

-- Cyber Security


34. (SBU) Participating States have repeatedly approached
USDel following the March Cyber Security workshop and have
stated they are waiting to table their own proposals on cyber
security for fear of putting the U.S. into an awkward spot.
Mission would welcome Washington's views on further cyber
security work in the FSC (please see comment para 20).
-- December's OSCE Athens Ministerial


35. (SBU) Mission welcomes Washington's input regarding FSC
goals and objectives for the OSCE Ministerial in Athens.


- - - - - - - -
Reporting Cables
- - - - - - - -


USOSCE 00000183 008 OF 008



36. (SBU) More details: For further details on FSC plenary
meetings over the past six months, here follows a list of
post reporting on the January-July Round:

USOSCE 00008, USOSCE 00013, USOSCE 00018, USOSCE 00034,
USOSCE 00036, USOSCE 00038, USOSCE 00041, USOSCE 00046,
USOSCE 00049, USOSCE 00050, USOSCE 00055, USOSCE 00064,
USOSCE 00065, USOSCE 00066, USOSCE 00071, USOSCE 00084,
USOSCE 00085, USOSCE 00119, USOSCE 00123, USOSCE 00132,
USOSCE 00134, USOSCE 00138, USOSCE 00139, USOSCE 00145,
USOSCE 00147, USOSCE 00154, USOSCE 00157, USOSCE 00167,
USOSCE 00172.


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