CFE/JCG: JANUARY-JULY 2009, END OF ROUND: RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000171

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH
OSD FOR ISA (KEHL, WALLENDER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2014
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: JANUARY-JULY 2009, END OF ROUND: RUSSIA
LOOKS BACKWARDS, NATO LOOKS FORWARD

REF: STATE 04933

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The 2009 winter/spring round of the Joint
Consultative Group (JCG) was dominated by Allied criticism of
Russia's failure to fulfill its obligations under CFE,
juxtaposed with Russia's counter allegations of "gross NATO
violations" and, after the Spring recess, a new focus on
presenting and defending its May 2009 Aide Memoire. The 2009
winter/spring round of the JCG commenced one day before the
inauguration of President Obama. Most States Parties seemed
sympathetic to the fact that building a new team in
Washington and reviewing policy would delay any substantive
discussions on CFE, particularly in light of competing U.S.
domestic priorities. Russia stepped up its activity after
introducing its Aide Memoire in early May.

2. (C) A series of high-level events in the early-summer,
including Germany's June 10 Meeting in Berlin on the Future
of Arms Control in Europe, the OSCE's Annual Security Review
Conference June 23-24, the OSCE informal Ministerial in Corfu
June 27-28, and the U.S.-Russia Summit meeting in July,
seemed to spark intensified exchanges in May, June and July.
The round ended with Allies continuing to maintain complete
unity and Russia sticking to its positions, with a growing
sense of cautious optimism that more frequent and substantive
high-level U.S.-Russia bilateral negotiations on CFE,
combined with other factors, will somehow lead to progress.
All USG objectives (e.g., contained Reftel) for the
winter-spring session were met or exceeded. The fall round
begins on September 8. Please see para 16 for fall issues.
End Summary.
--------------
Allies Pile-on and Record Serial Russian Non-Compliance
--------------

3. (C) Throughout the session, Allies remained united and
continued to emphasize the need for Russia to return to full
implementation. The winter/spring round saw Allies record 15
instances of Russia rejecting CFE inspections. Allied
interventions were always pre-coordinated, with a core group
of six to eight providing supporting interventions critical
of Russia. In February, USDel shifted tactics slightly.
Rather than simply drawing attention to Russia's
noncompliance, Allies also began to stress that 29 States
Parties were fully implementing the Treaty, that Russia was
alone as the outlier. In addition to rejected inspection
requests, Allies censured Russia for failing to provide
supplemental data in April for equipment located at
Kushchevskaya, and failing to provide supplemental flank data
in July. For the July flank data statement, Allies agreed to
a joint statement on behalf of all delivered by Belgium, the
Chair of the NATO Caucus that month, rather than a series of
individual statements.

4. (C) While criticizing non-compliance, Allies in Vienna
were also consistent in reaffirming Alliance support for the
Parallel Actions Package and the lead negotiation role for
the U.S. Although the lists of interventions on Russian
noncompliance were limited to Allies, Georgia and Moldova
joined in, particularly regarding Russia's failure to supply
data on Kushchevskaya. Both partners, on the margins, also
confirmed continued support for the U.S.-led negotiations on
the basis of the Parallel Actions Package.
--------------
Russia,s Approach
--------------

5. (SBU) Throughout the winter/spring round, Russia continued
to raise relatively consistent and long-standing criticisms
of NATO enlargement. Russian Arms Control Rep Mikhail
Ulyanov repeatedly castigated NATO's allegedly passive
negotiating posture and alleged reluctance to meet and talk,
underscoring Russia's desire for the U.S. to engage in what
he termed serious negotiations, including supporting talks in
Vienna.

6. (SBU) Indeed, from the outset of the session Russia began
to claim ownership of the Parallel Actions Package as a means
to end the CFE deadlock, rhetoric which became more focused
after the JCG debut on May 5 of Russia's Aide Memoire putting

USOSCE 00000171 002 OF 003


Russia,s positions in writing for the first time. He noted
that this had been presented to A/S Gottemoeller a few days
earlier. Responding to calls at the opening meeting for
Russia to return to full implementation, Ulyanov claimed that
Russia's resumption of implementation of the current Treaty
would disaggregate the package since implementation is part
of the current package.
--------------
Unsuccessfully Trying to Disaggregate Parallel Package
--------------

7. (SBU) At the May 5 meeting Ulyanov unveiled Russia's Aide
Memoire to the JCG. Ulyanov claimed that the document was
developed, in part, in response to several requests for an
official Russian reaction to the Parallel Actions Package.
He added that Russia wanted the Aide Memoire to serve as a
catalyst for intensified discussions. Ulyanov stressed that
there was much work to be done to flesh out the Parallel
Action Package and that work must be done in Vienna. Seeking
a greater role for the JCG in those negotiations remains a
consistent Russian theme. In addition, Russia's playbook
included discourse on the legal nature of Russia's
suspension, criticism for NATO's alleged failure to fulfill
its Istanbul commitments vis a vis A/CFE ratification, and
the Alliance's "misaligned priorities" regarding enlargement
and arms control.

8. (SBU) Ulyanov also began to refer to the Parallel Actions
Package proposal as the "Russian-U.S. package." At one point
he boasted that about 30 percent of the package's text was
Russian, implying that Russia had contributed to the current
package more than Allies. By mid-June Ulyanov was
consistently calling for progress by way of the Parallel
Actions Package, but always noting that an agreed package
would have to address Russia's concerns as identified in its
Aide Memoire.
--------------
Russia Puts it in Writing
--------------

9. (SBU) Following the June 10 German-hosted High Level
meeting in Berlin, Ulyanov lamented that Allies did not have
a clear understanding of Russia's position, provoking several
vigorous interventions by an offended Canada (Linteau).
Ulyanov used meetings in June and July to restate Russia's
position, proceeding paragraph-by-paragraph through the Aide
Memoire document. In doing so, he provided little additional
information on Russia's original points. Where he did
expand, he refrained from providing his comments in writing,
despite Allied challenges led by Germany and Britain to do
so, conceding at one point that his remarks were not fully
cleared in Moscow.

10. (SBU) At the closing plenary, Ulyanov went out with a
bang, but this time provided all of it in writing: three
documents for "homework" over the summer recess: Russia,s
response countering the U.S. December 2008 legal analysis on
Russia,s right to invoke a moratorium on the CFE Treaty;
renewing the proposal for provisional application of A/CFE
once the package is agreed; and further data regarding its
claims that NATO is in "gross violation" of the Treaty.
Pressed by the United Kingdom (Gare),he did admit that no
NATO state on a national basis was in non-compliance.
--------------
Looking Backward: Russia Claims NATO Gross Violations
--------------

11. (SBU) Although Russia reacted passively during the first
half of the round to Allied interventions on Russia's
non-compliance, beginning May 5 Russia (Ulyanov) began to
counter Allied criticism by resurrecting allegations of
"gross NATO violations" of core CFE limitations. Until the
final plenary, Ulyanov resisted Allied requests for him to
put his claims in writing and provide the JCG with the data
on which his allegations were based. At the July 13 meeting,
he referred all interested parties to Russia's interventions
at the Third Review Conference, which he said included all of
the necessary data and Russian arguments. Germany, Turkey,
Italy, United Kingdom, and the U.S. initially led Allied
statements to refute Russian contentions as baseless. After
several rounds of this, they referred to their previous
interventions on this spurious Russian distraction.
--------------

USOSCE 00000171 003 OF 003


Looking Forward - Prospects for the Future
--------------

12. (C) Allies remain solidly behind the current strategy of
focusing attention on Russian non-compliance. As stated in
other fora, Allies are also convinced that the current track
of bilateral negotiations provides the best chance of
overcoming the impasse. Though Allies understand that
first-order issues must be agreed in the high-level bilateral
track before Allies begin to reflect on the best way to
delegate work on specific issues (a point USDel has made on
numerous occasions),there is growing exhaustion over the
repetitive nature of Allied interventions and some
frustration over the fact that the JCG can not play a more
active role.

13. (C) Allies have been patient, allowing the new U.S.
administration time to assemble its team. They also
understand that post START negotiations must dominate
bilateral arms control discussions in the near term and why.
Nevertheless, results from the U.S.-Russia Presidential
Summit and the 9 July HLTF indicate that bilateral contacts
will likely increase in the fall, thus building a sense of
cautious expectation for forward movement on CFE, or at least
effort.
--------------
Azerbaijan vs. Armenia
--------------

14. (U) At the first three meetings, Azerbaijan and Armenia
exchanged charges and counter charges over alleged Russian
transfers of equipment to Armenia. Russia adamantly denied
any wrongdoing, and questioned the evidence provided by
Azerbaijan. The row dissipated as unexpectedly as it began,
and while a resolution was not found, this spat dominated
meetings in January.
--------------
What to Expect in September
--------------

15. (C) Pending the results of the late summer high-level
bilateral, and future such meetings in the fall, Mission
expects more of the same behavior from Russia, namely Russia
will: continue to trumpet their demands for changes to the
A/CFE regime (especially changing the terms of the flank),
deflect criticism of their own non-compliance by accusing
NATO of violations, and push for JCG work on specific issues
e.g., negotiating a definition of "substantial combat forces."

16. (C) The U.S., Germany, and other Allies repeatedly urged
Russia to look forward, rather than backward. All have
expressed hope for progress at the late summer high level
U.S.-Russia bilateral talks. The first JCG meeting of fall
session will be on September 8, right on the heels of the
high-level talks. Mission expects Russia will prepare a
statement on the results of the bilat for the first JCG
plenary, September 8. If the past is any guide, inter alia
it will aim at trying to reduce Allied confidence in U.S.
leadership on CFE. This is also before the first HLTF,
scheduled for September 17. Mission recommends at least a
cursory debrief for NATO Allies in Vienna on the results of
the high-level bilateral meeting for use in advance of the
first JCG plenary, as well as Washington guidance and remarks
for the opening plenary.
--------------
List of Reporting Cables
--------------

17. (U) For more details, here follows a list of post
reporting on the January-July Round: USOSCE 0010, USOSCE
0015, USOSCE 0016, USOSCE 0030, USOSCE 0040, USOSCE 0044,
USOSCE 0051, USOSCE 0061, USOSCE 0080, USOSCE 0093, USOSCE
0095, USOSCE 0098, USOSCE 0118, USOSCE 0122, USOSCE 0131,
USOSCE 0137, USOSCE 0144, USOSCE 0153, USOSCE 0156, USOSCE
0166, and USOSCE 0170.
Scott