FSC-PC JUNE 17: GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA; OSCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000145

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC-PC JUNE 17: GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA; OSCE
UNSCR 1540 STRATEGY


1. (SBU) Summary: The OSCE, EU, and UN co-chairs of the
Geneva talks on Georgia lauded the ongoing discussions, but
called for concrete results and limited institutionalizing of
the process with detailed agendas and regular meetings,
particularly in light of the closing of UNOMIG and the OSCE
Mission to Georgia due to Russian vetoes. The EU Monitoring
Mission head commended Georgia for its MOU on troop movements
near the administrative border, and urged Russia to
reciprocate. The OSCE Conflict Prevention Center director
reported security in Georgia had deteriorated and regretted
the closing of the OSCE Mission to Georgia and the withdrawal
of the OSCE military monitors. Russia claimed to be confused
by the discussion: the Geneva co-chairs sounded reasonable,
but delegations were just repeating the same old arguments.
There would be no real progress in Geneva until the
sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were recognized as
necessary outcomes of the process.


2. (SBU) The U.S. called for further discussion support of
its Food-for-Thought paper on next steps in OSCE
implementation of UNSCR 1540 at the June 17 joint Forum for
Security Cooperation-Permanent Council meeting. Russia
criticized some of the paper's proposals, finding they
"invaded the competency" of the UN 1540 Committee or lacked
any "added value," but clearly supported a Best Practice
Guide and hoped that the first, U.S.-drafted chapter would be
quickly adopted. Italy, a co-sponsor of the
Food-for-Thought, reminded that the 1540 Committee had
invited regional organizations to assist with implementation
of the resolution and that the Committee's 2009 Program of
Work recommended some of the proposals contained in the
paper.


3. (SBU) The decision to hold a meeting of heads of
verification centers on December 14, 2009, was adopted. In
the working groups, Belarus and Kazakhstan supported the
Russian proposals for naval CSBMs modeled on the Vienna
Document provisions for ground-based forces. Italy
questioned the practicability of the proposals and warned
they would impose added financial burdens that would be borne
unequally by participating States. Several pS announced
their support for the Turkish proposal to liberalize use of
digital cameras and GPS devices, although Belarus opposes at
least the GPS provisions.


4. (SBU) Support is growing for the German proposals for
guidelines for briefings conducted during Vienna Document
verification events, although Austria is concerned that the
guideline could be used to refuse requests for information
not mentioned in the guidelines. The draft decision on the
agenda and modalities for a special meeting in September to
discuss review of the OSCE Document on SALW received
immediate support from Finland, Ireland, the UK, and Belarus.
Several states, including the
U.S., lack any instructions. Please see paras 26 and 28.
End summary.

Geneva Talks on Georgia
--------------


5. (SBU) At the June 17 joint Forum for Security
Cooperation-Permanent Council meeting, the OSCE, EU, and UN
co-chairs of the Geneva talks stressed that the process was

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working. OSCE Special Representative Christopoulos
highlighted the establishment of the incident prevention and
response mechanisms as a tangible achievement, and added that
the OSCE had played a critical role in facilitating the
resolution of outstanding gas and water supply issues in
Georgia.


6. (SBU) EU Special Representative Morel lauded the Geneva
process as the only forum in which all parties to the
conflict were represented, and argued that this gave the
process a unique role in resolving outstanding security and
humanitarian issues. Acknowledging that the situation
remained "fragile" and that trust and confidence remained
weak, Morel called for "creativity, flexibility, and
pragmatism" and urged a step-by-step, progressive approach to
stabilization and normalization, temporarily putting aside
status issues and focusing instead on security arrangements.


7. (SBU) Noting the need to ensure that the Geneva process
was both credible and sustainable, UN Special Representative
Verbeke urged concrete results, and encouraged all parties to
look to the August 12 cease-fire agreement as the Geneva
talks' foundation. Verbeke urged renewed political signals
showing all parties' commitment to the process, suggesting
that presidents or ministers could convene to reiterate their
support, and encouraged parties to consider "slightly
institutionalizing" the process, perhaps by circulating
background notes and introducing agreed, annotated agendas.
Above all, Verbeke said, it was important to avoid
re-negotiating every session as if it were the first. He
proposed regular meetings as a means of establishing a
minimal procedural framework.


8. (SBU) Verbeke argued that the Geneva process was now even
more important given the expiration of the UNOMIG mandate and
the impending closure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia. He
also made clear that the end of UNOMIG was not the end of the
UN in Georgia, and asserted that the UN and the OSCE would
continue to play active roles in Geneva, as their
participation was not predicated on having field presence in
Georgia, but was based on their identities as security
organizations.

EU Monitoring Mission
--------------


9. (SBU) EU Monitoring Mission Head Haber commended the
Georgian government for its adherence to the obligations of
its MOU on troop movements, noting that all minor infractions
had been corrected, adding that as long as the MOU was
observed, no Georgian offensive action against the separatist
regions was possible. Haber urged Russia to reciprocate in
order to boost confidence in the region and lower tensions.
Haber acknowledged that the EUMM's coordination with Russian
forces had improved, thanks in part to frequent use of the
hotline established under the incident prevention and
response mechanism for South Ossetia, but said freedom of
movement across the administrative boundary lines remained an
obvious problem, and criticized Russia for refusing to
provide access to the separatist regions.


10. (SBU) Haber concluded that the end of UNOMIG and the OSCE
Mission to Georgia would deprive the region of years of

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experience and expertise, as well as valuable monitoring of
the situation north of the Abkhaz administrative boundary
line. In the short term, however, the EUMM would not be
affected, as the three bodies' mandates had been conceived
independently, and the EUMM would continue to operate.

CPC on OSCE in Georgia
--------------


11. (SBU) OSCE Conflict Prevention Center Director Salber
noted that OSCE monitors had lately assessed the overall
security situation in the region as increasingly tense,
particularly near Perevi, and said Russia's deployment of FSB
border guards to the administrative boundary lines would
undermine stability and complicate cross-boundary movements.
Salber lamented the failure of participating States to extend
the mandate of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, and regretted
that the departure of the Mission's monitoring officers would
deprive the region of uniquely military expertise, noting
that the EUMM was largely staffed by civilian police. Salber
said the monitors' operations were severely curtailed and the
forward monitoring base at Karaleti closed June 6),but the
monitors will continue to patrol and report as long as
possible.

Russia Responds to EU and Allies
--------------


12. (SBU) The EU, through its Czech (Reinohlova) presidency,
the U.S. (Scott),Turkey (Begec),Norway (Vik),and Canada
(Gregory) expressed support for the Geneva process and again
called for Russia to honor its commitments under the August
12 and September 8 agreements. Russia (Azimov) responded
that it was left with "confused impressions." On the one
hand, Azimov said, were the relatively balanced statements
from the five ambassadors who had addressed the Council,
while on the other were the same old arguments from the
delegations around the table. As all were probably "weary"
of all this, Azimov urged delegations to look to the future,
bluntly stating that there was no longer a single Georgia, a
reality all parties should take into account.


13. (SBU) Azimov expressed sadness at the closure of UNOMIG
and the OSCE Mission to Georgia, but said Russia had done its
best to avoid this outcome, but had been rebuffed "by others"
despite presenting "mutually acceptable solutions. Azimov
declared that Russia would like to maintain international
observers in the region, but said this must be worked out
with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities, something
that "would not be a matter of bargaining in any way."
Azimov said Russia believed the Geneva process was important,
but described its "main purpose" as the working out of
security guarantees for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including
legally binding non-use of force agreements and an embargo on
arms for Georgia. Azimov closed by stating Russia would
continue to ensure security in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and
would take up "further measures" if necessary: Russia was not
interested in further conflict, but must protect the two new
"states."

UNSCR 1540 at the OSCE
--------------


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14. (SBU) The U.S. (Scott) called for discussion in both the
FSC and Permanent Council, through its Security Committee, on
OSCE support for further implementation of UNSCR 1540. Scott
noted the expertise available on non-proliferation in the
OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit and the CPC's Borders
Team. Scott highlighted the specific proposals made in the
U.S.-authored Food-for-Thought paper that proposes an OSCE
UNSCR 1540 strategy. This includes an information exchange
on national implementation efforts, identification of
technical assistance resources in the OSCE, a Best Practices
Guide, and continuing reporting on implementation. Scott
observed that while "some in the room" doubted the capacity
of the OSCE to contribute, the UN 1540 Committee had
specifically asked regional organizations like the OSCE to
help with implementation.


15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted it was one of the
"initiators" of 1540 and generally welcomed the efforts of
the U.S. and other co-sponsors of the FFT paper to further
implementation of the resolution. These efforts, however,
should: not interfere with the competence of the 1540
Committee; not exceed the actual requirements of the
resolution; be based on a recognition that the OSCE's
potential is not that great; and contain clear added value.


16. (SBU) Ulyanov, turning to the FFT paper, said it was
"rather raw," raises several questions, and needs substantial
further work. Addressing the specific proposals, he said:

- information exchange: Where is the added value in the
proliferation of reports already provided to the Committee in
New York? Discussion of just a few would overwhelm the
Security Dialogue; how would we handle 56 reports? How would
these discussions further implementation? In any case, the
reports are beyond the competence of the OSCE, dealing with
WMD, associated delivery systems, and export controls. There
were no experts on the delegations or even the Secretariat on
these matters.

- identification of technical assistance resources: Similar
concerns apply to this proposal. Why should pS submit this
information to the OSCE instead of directly to the 1540
Committee, although it is important for pS to help others who
need it.

- Best Practices Guide: No disagreement with this proposal;
the Guide would be useful.

- continuing reports on implementation: This misrepresents
the requirements of UNSCR 1810, which calls for continued
efforts by states who have not yet reported to the Committee;
yet there are none of these at the OSCE. Follow-up reports,
per 1540 and 1810, are purely voluntary.

- sharing work between the FSC and the PC Security Committee:
This has dubious value as the work of implementing the
resolution "requires a single master." The FSC can always
call on the ATU or Borders Team, if they actually have any
expertise.

- enlisting the OSCE field missions: It was "unclear" that
the field missions had any contribution to make. How much
would it cost to involve them in the work of implementing

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1540? Who will pay? Will the mandate of the missions need
to be changed?

- partnership with other IOs: The 1540 Committee has already
made direct contact with the IAEA, NATO, OPCW, and Interpol,
among others. Why should the OSCE then duplicate these
efforts.


17. (SBU) Ulyanov said he had already shared his doubts with
the U.S. and now awaited a response. He was open to other
ideas on 1540, subject to the caveats he had provided.
Useful work was still needed, he added, and the U.S. Best
Practices Guide should be completed and adopted soon.


18. (SBU) The UK (Cliff),a co-sponsor of the FFT paper,
supported further work as outlined by the U.S. and planned to
take the strategy forward under its chairmanship of the FSC
in the autumn. Italy (Negro),on behalf of the co-sponsors,
said in the working group that there was no intention to
trespass on the "competency of the 1540 Committee" but
instead to fulfill the mandate in UNSCR 1810 for regional
organizations to engage actively with the Committee to share
lessons learned and cooperate on the implementation of the
resolution.


19. (SBU) Negro said that the proposals contained in the FFT
were not very detailed yet, but were meant to be points of
departure for further work. He noted, with regard to
Ulyanov's and others' concerns about extending the mandate of
the field missions, that they already had some guidance in
the OSCE Principles of Nonproliferation (1994).

HOV Meeting
--------------


20. (SBU) The decision to hold a meeting of heads of
verification agencies on December 15 was adopted without
comment.

Naval CSBMs
--------------


21. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) asked delegations to comment in
detail on the first section of its naval CSBMs paper,
proposing an information exchange modeled on the Vienna
Document provisions for land-based forces. Kazakhstan
(Asanov) supported the paper, although it lacked final
instructions.


22. (SBU) Italy (Negro) was not ready to discuss in detail
the paper, but for the time being would refer to its 2008
comments. Negro said these included questions about
provisions for activities in international waters. For
instance, who would be the receiving state when vessels were
outside territorial waters? The area of application proposed
by Russia was too broad, he added, and would include the Red
Sea and North Atlantic, not waters "adjacent to the OSCE
area." Negro said the Russian measures lack reciprocity,
which is a major attribute of extant CSBMs that apply to all
pS. There would also be additional costs associated with the
Russian proposals.


23. (SBU) Austria (Eischer) wondered what kind of information

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would be expected from land-locked state lacking naval
forces. Geyvandov replied that, as with ground forces, some
pS would simply provide "nil" reports. As to the unequal
burden of reporting note by Italy, Geyvandov said this, too,
was the case with current Vienna Document reporting. He said
Russia was prepared to reconsider the area of application if
pS found it too broad.

Digital Cameras and GPS
--------------


24. (SBU) Belarus (Krayushkin) reported that use of GPS
devices on its territory was strictly controlled and it
routinely denied request for GPS use by visiting inspector;
it could not support at least the GPS provisions of the
Turkish paper that would liberalize use of digital cameras
and GPS devices in Vienna Document verification activities.
Austria, Finland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Kazakhstan
Canada, and Georgia supported the proposal.

VD99 Briefing Guidelines
--------------


25. (SBU) Serbia, Italy, and Turkey announced support for
Germany's proposed guidelines for Vienna Document
verification briefings by military commanders. Belarus
generally supported, but said it would provide some edits to
Germany. Greece and France reported they had earlier
provided edits to Germany, but lacked final instructions.
Austria (Eischer) feared that the guidelines might be
interpreted as bright-line norms and would inhibit the free
exchange of information in the spirit of the Vienna Document.
Germany (Schweizer) replied the guidelines were just that
and should not prove a constraint in pS wanted to provide
more information. The guidelines would not be politically
binding.


26. (SBU) Subject to additional edits expected from Belarus,
the proposal is gaining broad support. Mission understands
that the U.S. remains unopposed so long as the guidelines
remain voluntary.

Review of OSCE SALW Document
--------------


27. (SBU) The chair of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW
(Schweizer, Germany) repeated his call for adoption of the
draft decision on the agenda and modalities of a special
meeting in September to discuss review of the OSCE Document
on SALW and related decisions, as required by the 2008
Ministerial decision. Schweizer said the agenda reflected
the influence of the third Biennial Meeting of States on the
UN Program of Action on SALW in 2008. The decision is needed
soon to begin preparations for the meeting. Germany,
Ireland, Belarus, and the UK, under whose FSC chairmanship
the meeting would occur, echoed Schweizer's urgency. Finland
(Kangaste) supported the draft decisions, and is considering
helping to finance the meeting and sending a moderator. In
response to the chair's (Georgia) question, Turkey, Ukraine,
Canada, and the U.S. reported they lacked instructions.


28. (SBU) Mission understands that the U.S. is not opposed to
the meeting and will not block consensus unless instructed

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otherwise. This is likely to move forward at the FSC on July

1. COMMENT: As was the case with the March 2009 cyber
security workshop, active participation by U.S. experts as
moderators and keynote speakers may be the most effective way
of influencing the outcome of the meeting. End comment.

Departures
--------------


29. (SBU) Brigadier Marjan Grabnar of Slovenia announced his
departure from Vienna after five and a half years at the OSCE.

Next Meeting
--------------


30. (U) The next regular meeting of the FSC will be on July

1. The Annual Security Review Conference will be held on
June 23 and 24.
Scott