Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE138
2009-06-04 15:44:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

FSC JUNE 3: ALLIES COOL TO RUSSIAN NAVAL CSBMS

Tags:  PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0732
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0138/01 1551544
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041544Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6415
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0767
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1324
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1262
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000138 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC JUNE 3: ALLIES COOL TO RUSSIAN NAVAL CSBMS

REF: A. 98 STATE 156529

B. FALLON-SILBERBERG JUNE 2 EMAIL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000138

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC JUNE 3: ALLIES COOL TO RUSSIAN NAVAL CSBMS

REF: A. 98 STATE 156529

B. FALLON-SILBERBERG JUNE 2 EMAIL


1. (SBU) Summary: France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.
reacted skeptically to Russia's renewed call for naval CSBMs
in the OSCE "maritime area." The U.S. said the measures were
unnecessary given Russia's ready access to naval exercises in
international waters and the high level of routine
cooperation among the Russian, U.S., and other navies.
Germany suggested existing CSBMs, the Global Exchange of
Military Information and Vienna Document Chapter IV on
"contacts," provided ample scope for further transparency and
confidence-building in the naval theater. In the Security
Dialogue, Finland described the history and outcome of
"Multinational Experiment Five" conducted by the U.S.,
several other countries, NATO, and the EU to test new
approaches to crisis management.


2. (SBU) In the working groups, Britain and Russia are
preparing a revision of their Best Practices Guide for Vienna
Document Chapter IV "contacts" visits. The U.S. provided
textual edits to the draft decision to hold a meeting of
heads of verification in December 2009. Turkey's
Food-for-Thought paper on liberalizing use of digital cameras
and GPS during Vienna Document inspections received some
tentative support. The chair will soon distribute a draft
decision on the agenda and modalities of a special meeting in
September 2009 to review the OSCE Document on Small Arms and
Light Weapons. Sensing tacit support, Germany requested its
proposal for an annual assessment of Code of Conduct
implementation be issued as a draft decision. Slovenia and
Norway joined the list of co-sponsors of the U.S.-authored
Food-for-Thought paper on an OSCE strategy for implementation
of UNSCR 1540. End summary.

Allies Nix Russian Naval CSBMs
--------------


3. (SBU) France (Simonet) reported Russia's renewed proposal
for naval CSBMs was being seriously studied in the capital,
but also confirmed its opposition to the concept. Simonet

suggested Russia's concerns might be answered by "improved"
information exchange on naval forces (under the GEMI) without
the creation of separate CSBMs. The UK (Hartnell) also
reported analysis in capital, but warned it was unlikely to
change its opposition to the proposal. Germany (Schweizer)
said that it was not prepared to reject in principle the
Russian proposal, but still needed to find the added value in
it when the OSCE already had the GEMI and Vienna Document
Chapter IV contact visits that could facilitate transparency
for maritime forces.


4. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour),drawing from standing guidance
(ref A),did not see any need for naval CSBMs, noting the
proposal has been repeatedly rejected because of a high level
of stability in the maritime environment and Russia's failure
to identify a maritime regional security problem that
required additional measures. Neighbour said that naval
activities usually occur in international waters where there
are no bars to observation, unlike military activities on the
ground that occur on sovereign territory and require
international agreements to allow access by observers.
Neighbour noted that NATO Allies have engaged with Russia on
naval issues, including maritime search and rescue.

USOSCE 00000138 002 OF 005




5. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) responded that the proposal for
naval CSBMs will remain on the table. Ulyanov said he would
wait for other delegations to receive further instructions
and hoped for a more focused discussion. He wanted to hear
"specific" reasons for rejecting naval CSBMs. It was true
the GEMI provided for exchange of some naval information: why
could participating States (pS) not go farther? Ulyanov said
the U.S. position was unclear. Did the U.S. believe naval
CSBMs were not needed because there was nothing of interest
in naval activities? This was not so. Did existing CSBMs
for ground forces reflect, for example, some particular U.S.
concern over artillery in the OSCE area? Why did the OSCE
insist on maximum transparency on land but not on water?


6. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) repeated that artillery and
other ground-based forces were situated on sovereign
territory and could not be accessed without OSCE transparency
measures, unlike naval forces in international waters that
can be easily observed by other vessels or aircraft. Ulyanov
replied that the U.S. had not explained its concern over
artillery as reflected in existing CSBMs. Besides, Russia's
proposals envisioned more than just observation of naval
forces.


7. (SBU) Latvia (Nilsons) said its general position was that
new proposals must have added values for the Euro-Atlantic
region and need to be examined in the context of existing
commitments and obligations. Under the current
circumstances, Nilsons said, when a "major commitment is not
being observed," there was a low prospect of success for new
obligations. Ulyanov warned it was wrong to try to link
different issues: this could be "a slippery path for Riga."


8. (SBU) Belarus (Krayushkin) offered unconditional support
for Russia's proposal, citing a "serious transparency gap" in
the naval area.

Multinational Experiment Five
--------------


9. (SBU) Finnish Captain (navy) Erkki Platan and Lieutenant
Colonel Mikko Lappalainen described the history and outcome
of Multinational Experiment Five (MNE5),an "extensive
research and development" effort to develop new crisis
management concept conducted by a "community of interest"
that included Finland, Sweden, the U.S., and other NATO
members. The 2006-2008 MNE5 sought improved methods in
conducting interagency and multinational planning and
enhancing civil-military cooperation through better
information sharing and logistics planning. A multinational
steering group, managed by the U.S. Joint Forces Command, led
interagency delegations from 16 countries, NATO, and the EU
trough an "effects-based approach" to multinational
operations in an African crisis scenario. Participants
focused on the implementation of new approaches.


10. (SBU) A seminar hosted by Finland at the conclusion of
MNE5 discussed development of more comprehensive approach to
crisis prevention and management based on national best
practices and multinational approaches. MNE6, planned for
2009-2010, will focus on complex crises that include
"irregular actions," non-permissive environments, and
transitions of responsibility from military to civilian

USOSCE 00000138 003 OF 005


actors and from multinational programs to local authorities.


11. (SBU) In response to questions from Germany and Austria
about an OSCE role in the MNE process, Platan said that OSCE
SYG Perrin de Brichambaut participated in the comprehensive
approach seminar in Helsinki and the OSCE would likely be
invited to participate in MNE6. Answering UK and Swedish
requests for examples of practical application of MNE lessons
learned, Platan said that some of the concepts developed
through the MNE for operations planning, intelligence,
information sharing, and logistics were already being used in
Kosovo and Afghanistan by NATO and EU forces.

Contact Visits
--------------


12. (SBU) Hungary (Haupt) announced successful Vienna
Document Chapter IV contact visits to a military facility and
airbase and the demonstration of new equipment, ambulance and
CBW variants of the BTR-80 vehicle, in May. Sixty-six
representatives of 32 participating States, the OSCE Conflict
Prevent Center, and the RACVIAC Center for Regional Security
attended.

Contacts BPG
--------------


13. (SBU) The UK announced that it was preparing with Russia
a revised draft of the Best Practices Guide for Vienna
Document Chapter IV contact visits.

HOV Meeting
--------------


14. (SBU) The U.S. proposed, per ref B, edits to the text of
the draft decision to hold a heads of verification meeting on
December 14, 2009:

- deletion of "in order to prepare subjects for discussion at
that meeting" from the preamble paragraph that reads
"Recognizing the advantages to holding a Heads of
Verification Center meeting outside the framework of the AIAM
in order to prepare subjects for discussion at that meeting."

- substitution of "on improving implementation of VD99" for
"on further ways and means to improve implementation of VD99"
in operative paragraph 3 that currently reads "Exchange of
views on further ways and means to improve implementation of
VD99."

The draft decision will remain on the working group agenda.

Digital Cameras and GPS
--------------


15. (SBU) Germany and Sweden gave tentative support to
Turkey's Food-for-Thought paper to permit during Vienna
Document inspections the use of digital cameras and GPS
devices (FSC.DEL/124/09). Russia (Ulyanov) reported that the
paper was being studied by Moscow but it might take some time
before guidance was developed. Russia had no firm views as
yet, one way or the other. Ulyanov suggested an important
use for the GPS devices would be determining the coordinates
of the inspectors within the area of inspection. He also

USOSCE 00000138 004 OF 005


suggested using different nomenclature to describe the "GPS
devices," as that phrase "created the impression that only
U.S. models" are used. Turkey (Begec) replied it would
consider amplifying the list of uses for GPS and alternate
language for "GPS devices" to describe what was meant to be a
generic description.

SALW Review
--------------


16. (SBU) The chair of the Informal Group of Friends of Small
Arms and Light Weapons (Schweizer, Germany) reported that he
had prepared a draft decision for the chair on the agenda and
modalities of a September 2009 special meting to review the
OSCE Document on SALW. Schweizer warned the decision would
need to be adopted before the summer recess at the end of
July if the meeting were to occur in September. He called
for substantive discussion on the decision at the June 17
working group in light of the expected absence of many
delegates from the June 10 working group because of the
conventional arms control meetings in Berlin. The chair
(Georgia, Giorgadze) said he hope to distribute the decision
by June 5.

Code of Conduct
--------------


17. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) announced that it inferred from
the absence of comment "tacit support" for its proposal for
annual assessment of Code of Conduct implementation
(FSC.DEL/437/07/Corr.1). Schweizer said he would ask the
chair to issue a draft decision. Russia (Ulyanov) confirmed
that it was considering the proposal, noting that the
criterion of "added value applies not just to naval CSBMs."

UNSCR 1540
--------------


18. (SBU) Croatia, France, Norway, Poland, and Slovenia have
become co-sponsors of the U.S.-authored Food-for-Thought
paper on an OSCE strategy for UNSCR 1540
(FSC.DEL/25/09/Corr.3). The U.S. (Silberberg) called for
further discussion of the paper and hoped other pS would join
the existing co-sponsors. Silberberg reminded delegations of
1540 Committee chairman Urbina's address to the FSC in
December 2008, encouraging the OSCE to provide leadership of
regional implementation efforts, including low cost steps
such as Best Practices Guides, lists of technical assistance
experts, and national points of contact.


19. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) reported it had, as promised,
consulted with the U.S. over the OSCE 1540 strategy and tried
to point out factual errors and weaknesses in the text.
Ulyanov asked if "complete information" will be included in
the paper. Silberberg replied that another approach would be
to address Russia's concerns in more specific proposals to
implement some of the measures suggested in the strategy,
such as the technical assistance roster. Italy (Negro),
responding to Turkish concerns over the strategy's proposal
to use OSCE field missions to assist 1540 implementation,
assured that any involvement of the missions would not exceed
their mandates as determined by the pS. Negro added that the
FFT was ultimately meant to lead to specific FSC decisions.


USOSCE 00000138 005 OF 005


Next Meeting
--------------


20. (U) The next FSC meeting will be on June 10.
Scott