Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE13
2009-01-29 15:21:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

FSC JANUARY 28: RUSSIA CALLS OUT GEORGIA FOR VD99

Tags:  PARM PREL KCFE OSCE GG RS XG 
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VZCZCXRO8269
PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0013/01 0291521
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291521Z JAN 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6166
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0670
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1225
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1165
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000013 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE GG RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC JANUARY 28: RUSSIA CALLS OUT GEORGIA FOR VD99
INSPECTION REFUSAL

REF: A. STATE 7188

B. MOSCOW 0148

C. BALDWIN-SILBERBERG JANUARY 26 EMAIL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000013

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE GG RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC JANUARY 28: RUSSIA CALLS OUT GEORGIA FOR VD99
INSPECTION REFUSAL

REF: A. STATE 7188

B. MOSCOW 0148

C. BALDWIN-SILBERBERG JANUARY 26 EMAIL


1. (SBU) Summary: Russia sharply criticized Georgia for its
refusal of Russian requests for Vienna Document inspection
and evaluation. Dismissing Georgia's defense of force
majeure as insubstantial, Russia said Georgia had only itself
to blame for the conditions it cited in refusing the
inspection and evaluation. Georgia answered that it could
hardly change the facts of the Russian invasion and
occupation and was thus justified in refusing the requests.


2. (SBU) The EU regretted Georgia's refusal, as did Turkey.
The U.S. called for use of the Vienna Document to enhance
transparency among the parties to the conflicts in Georgia.


3. (SBU) Russia announced a presidential decree banning the
supply of Russian arms and other military goods and service
to Georgia. Russia noted its concern over third-party states
providing Soviet and Russian arms to Georgia, which countered
by citing Russian arms transfers to separatists in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. The U.S. raised the right of states to
assist each other in maintaining their defenses.


4. (SBU) Russia reported it still lacked guidance on the
draft update of the Code of Conduct Questionnaire. The U.S.
and Azerbaijan repeated their opposition to the Russian
proposal for a single deadline for Vienna Document defense
planning submissions, while Germany expressed support. End
summary.

Russia Calls Out Georgia
--------------


5. (SBU) Disputing Georgia's repeated assertion that it "was
open for inspection," Russia (Ulyanov) raised Georgia's
recent refusal of Russian requests for Vienna Document
inspection and evaluation. Ulyanov noted that none of the
concerns cited by Georgia in support of its invocation of
"force majeure" were, per the definition of found in
FSC.DEC/6/97, "reasons which cannot be influenced by the

receiving State." Georgia had claimed that Russia's invasion
of Georgia, its continuing occupation of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, and the possibility of further Russian attacks
made it impossible to agree to the Russian inspection and
evaluation. Ulyanov dismissed Georgia's stated concern that
the inspection and evaluation could be used to obtain
information that would be used against it by charging Georgia
with launching the "large-scale military activities."
Ulyanov demanded that Georgia either comply with the request
or offer "serious" reasons for its refusal.


6. (SBU) Georgia retorted that its concerns fell squarely
within the definition of force majeure: Russia's invasion,
occupation, and continuing military threat were clearly
conditions that "could not be influenced by the receiving
state." Russia's citation of the Vienna Document after its
aggressive military actions, not to mention attempts to
undermine European security as evidenced by its suspension of
CFE, was cynical, Giorgadze charged. He said any other state
is welcome to conduct a Vienna Document inspection, noting
that Germany, Lithuania, and Belgium had recently done so,

USOSCE 00000013 002 OF 005


and Russia will be welcome to conduct an inspection as soon
as its forces have withdrawn from sovereign Georgian
territory.


7. (SBU) Giorgadze reprised earlier Georgian positions,
including Russian violation of the six-point peace agreement
by failure to withdraw forces to their positions prior to the
beginning of the August 2008 conflict and Russian and South
Ossetian separatist responsibility for ethnic cleansing in
the occupied territories.


8. (SBU) Giorgadze announced a January 26 MOU between Georgia
and the EU monitoring mission on Georgian military movements
near South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He said the EU head of
mission, Haber, had described the agreement as a "brave,
unilateral move to de-escalate the conflict." Giorgadze
invited Russia to reciprocate with transparency on its forces
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.


9. (SBU) Responding to Ulyanov's earlier report of Georgian
intransigence at the Geneva talks in refusing the Russian
suggestion of bilateral inspections of the occupied
territories, Giorgadze said Russia misinterpreted Georgia's
position, which does support inspections conducted by the
parties with the relevant international organizations.


10. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Reinohlova),on behalf of the
EU and several other states, "regretted any refusal of
verification activities" and called on all participating
States to fully implement the Vienna Document (FSC.DEL/8/09).


11. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour),per guidance (reftel A),
reiterated its support for fulfillment of international
commitments, including the Vienna Document, while noting the
document does recognize force majeure as a basis for refusing
an inspection or evaluation. Neighbour said the U.S.
understood the concerns of Georgia; at the same time, the
U.S. supports greater transparency and dialogue among those
involved in the conflicts in Georgia and Vienna Document
inspections and evaluations are important tools for
increasing transparency. Neighbour urged full implementation
of the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire package and the
renewal of OSCE monitoring throughout the conflict area.


12. (SBU) Turkey (Begec) said it "would have preferred a
different outcome" to the Russian request in light of its
preference for full compliance with international
obligations. Begec said an act of noncompliance could lead
other states to falter in their compliance.


13. (SBU) Ulyanov said Russia shared and supported the
assessments of the EU. He welcomed U.S. and Turkish support
for "unconditional fulfillment" of all Vienna Document
commitments. This episode confirmed Russia's belief that
participating States needed to continue efforts to improve
the CSBMs in the Vienna Document. He hoped there would be
further exploration of "a UK proposal for a more precise
definition of force majeure." He would return to the
subject, probably at the next meeting.


14. (SBU) Canada (Gosal) noted that it was in fact working on
a definition of fore majeure that it will present at the
Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting in early March.

USOSCE 00000013 003 OF 005



Russian Presidential Decree Bans Arms to Georgia
-------------- ---


15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) announced a presidential decree
that bans the transfer of military and dual-use goods to
Georgia, "especially Soviet and Russian types available for
export by others." The ban also includes training and other
services. Ulyanov said Russia was very concerned about the
transfer of Soviet and Russian arms by third- party states.
Russia would take such transfers into account in its
relations with these states. Ulyanov repeated his assertion
that transfers of arms and military equipment to Georgia
violates international norms, including the OSCE Documents on
SALW and Conventional Arms Transfers. Ulyanov said the
decree was partly in response to the failure of states to
support Russia's call for an arms embargo of Georgia
(FSC.DEL/155/08/Rev.1). He repeated the charge that arms
supplied to Georgia had facilitated its war of aggression
that resulted in many civilian deaths. NOTE: Ulyanov did
not specifically mention the possibility of sanctions against
third states, as mentioned in other reports (reftel B). End
Note.


16. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) answered that its arms
acquisitions violated no international norms; Georgia was
completely transparent about its arms holdings. Rather
Russia, Giorgadze charged, was the violator of international
norms, citing its invasion of Georgia and continued
occupation of Georgian territory in and around South Ossetia
and Abkhazia as well as its supply of arms to separatists in
those two provinces. Giorgadze mentioned in this context a
recent Russian press report that Russia planned to open a
naval base in Abkhazia.


17. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) asserted that democratic
states have every right to assist another democratic state in
building and maintaining its defense forces. Neighbour noted
that U.S. military assistance began in 2002 partly in
response to Russian concerns over Chechen terrorists
operating from the Pankisi Gorge area in Georgia. Neighbour
referred delegations to an earlier U.S. statement in the FSC
on arms supplies to Georgia (FSC.JOUR/564/Annex 6).

Bonn International Center for Conversion
--------------


18. (SBU) Peter Croll of the Bonn International Center for
Conversion (BICC) discussed its programs and publications,
particularly on the interrelation of security and economic
development. BICC has done extensive work with governments,
universities, and NGOs particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and
Central Asia. In responses to questions, Croll and a
colleague recommended OSCE support for marking and tracing of
ammunition, noting that a new U.S. administration could be
convinced to change its policy on this initiative. BICC
supports the work of the 2008 Biennial Meeting of States on
the UN Program of Action on SALW including the International
Tracing Instrument. BICC reports a lack of institutional
memory at the OSCE field missions, ascribing this in part to
preoccupation with project work at the expense of institution
building and norm setting. BICC also recommends greater
cooperation among international and regional organizations in

USOSCE 00000013 004 OF 005


SALW and ammunition projects. (FSC.DEL/5/09)

CCW Protocols and Amendment
--------------


19. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) announced the deposit of its
instruments of ratification on the Convention on Conventional
Weapons protocols on incendiary weapons, blinding laser
weapons, and explosive remnants of war, as well as an
amendment expanding the scope of the Convention to
non-international armed conflicts.

Albanian Ammunition Project Donation
--------------


20. (SBU) Denmark announced it was contributing 120,000 euros
to the ammunition demilitarization project in Albania.

Single Deadline for Defense Planning
--------------


21. (SBU) Germany announced support for the Russian proposal
for a single deadline for Vienna Document defense planning
submissions (FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.4/Corr.1). Azerbaijan and
the U.S. reiterated their opposition to the proposal for
failing to add value to the Document. Russia (Ulyanov) said
the value was in increasing the level of discipline in
implementation of a Vienna Document commitment. The chair
(Simonet),wondering "how mature the proposal was," said he
would enter into consultation with Russia and other
interested delegations.

SALW and Conventional Ammunition
--------------


22. (SBU) The U.S. announced the Department's Export Control
and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) workshop on
ammunition and dual-use brokering controls in Vienna February
2-4. Representatives from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia,
Montenegro, and Serbia have been invited. Representatives
from the Wassenaar and OSCE secretariats will address the
workshop (ref C).

Code of Conduct
--------------


23. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) reported the draft update of the
Code of Conduct Questionnaire (FSC.DD/14/08) was still under
review by the Moscow Interagency. Ulyanov hoped he would
have a national position within a few weeks. Addressing the
concern expressed by the FSC Code coordinator (Eischer,
Austria) and others that States may be hesitating in
preparation of responses to the current Questionnaire, due
April 15, Ulyanov recommended either using the current
Questionnaire or changing the due date to June 15.


24. (SBU) Eischer reminded that participating States had
agreed to host at least one Code awareness raising event each
year, like the 2008 seminar in Kazakhstan, and asked for
suggestions for the 2009 event.

Coming and Going
--------------

USOSCE 00000013 005 OF 005




25. (SBU) The UK announced its new head of verification,
Colonel James Watson would attend the FSC on February 4. The
USDel plans to meet with Watson and the UK delegation after
the meeting.


26. (SBU) The chair (Lebedel) bid fulsome farewell to Elli
Kytomaki (Finland) of the Conflict Prevention Center's FSC
Support Unit. She is moving to Geneva to work on the draft
Arms Trade Treaty.

Next Meeting
--------------


27. (SBU) The next meeting of the FSC will be on February 4
and will include a presentation by French General Henri
Bentegeat, chairman of the EU Military Committee, on EU
peacekeeping operations.
SCOTT