CFE/JCG: MAY 12 PLENARY - RUSSIA ADVOCATES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000122

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2013
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: MAY 12 PLENARY - RUSSIA ADVOCATES FOR
ACTIVE JCG ROLE

REF: A. STATE 46848 (CFE: RESPONDING TO RUSSIAN
AIDE-MEMOIRE)

B. STATE 47107 (COMMENTS ON DRAFT JCG CONSOLIDATED
MATRIX)

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. Russia cited chapter and verse of Article
XVI of the CFE Treaty to support its contention that the JCG
should fulfill its mandate by contributing more proactively
to efforts to save the CFE Treaty. The Russian Chief Arms
Control Delegate (Ulyanov) argued that the JCG historical
mandate had been altered rendering the JCG ineffective. He
expressed surprise that most States Parties seemed content
with this, and asserted that, as a result, the CFE impasse
persists and Russia is not at fault. The U.S. stressed the
importance of the high-level bilateral channel and reserved
the option of addressing Russia's commentary in more detail
at a later date. Championing Russia's position, Belarus
recalled its May 5 appeal not to "sideline" the JCG.


2. (SBU) On compliance issues, the U.S. and the Czech
Republic (supported by six Allies) noted, for the record, two
additional inspection refusals and underscored that
compliance by all States Parties was essential to the
viability of CFE. The JCG agreed to cancel May 26 and June 9
meetings, but deferred discussion on a draft decision on the
duration of the present session to the next meeting. On the
margins, the U.S. del provided input on the draft
Consolidated Matrix per ref B to the Treaty Operations and
Implementation (TOI) Working Group Chair (Canada, Linteau).


3. (C) At the May 11 JCG-T, Allies briefly discussed Russia's
Aide-Memoire, which was distributed at the May 5 JCG.
Netherlands (Kleinjan) and Canada (Linteau) quickly ended
this unhelpful discussion by endorsing the U.S. intervention
at the May 5 JCG on this issue and commenting, to no
dissention, that this was a matter for detailed discussion at
the HLTF "Away Day" May 26-28. However, Allies will continue
to talk about the paper among themselves and with Russia,
seeking to influence their capitals. Inter alia, most NATO
delegations here will send a representative to the "Away
Day." Requests for Washington guidance paras 8 and 18. End
Summary.

JCG PLENARY

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
RUSSIA INVOKES JCG MANDATE IN EFFORT TO BROADEN DIALOGUE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (SBU) During the U.S.-chaired (Neighbour) May 12 JCG
Plenary, in a lengthy statement, Russia (Ulyanov) took aim at
a U.S. intervention from the week prior. The U.S., among
other points, had supported intensified, high-level efforts
outside the JCG focused on achieving agreement on a balanced
way forward on CFE. Ulyanov opined that the JCG had been
reduced to a "rostrum" for speaking on refused inspections or
lack of data, an "odd, if not exotic," approach that runs
counter to the interests of all States Parties, the
provisions of the Treaty, and the historic mandate of the
JCG. He also noted that Russia had deliberately decided in
the autumn of 2007 not to "suspend" its participation in the
JCG with the hopes it would serve as an active channel for
dialogue.


5. (SBU) Ulyanov argued that the JCG should focus on more
than just the technical issues of implemQtation, stressing
that any State Party could raise any issue. As evidence, he
cited Article XVI of the CFE Treaty drawing attention to
sub-paragraph 2(C),which he noted calls for the JCG to
consider (and agree to) new measures to enhance the viability
of the Treaty, and to paragraph 5, which provides for States
Parties to propose amendments for consideration. (Note.
Ulyanov conveniently did not make mention that paragraph 5
also limits the JCG in that it may only agree on improvements
to the viability of the Treaty that are "consistent with its

provisions." End note.)


6. (SBU) In addition to the JCG mandate, Ulyanov recalled the
historical role of the JCG in the late 90's when, he noted,
it regularly dealt with substantive matters including
critical statements by Hungary and Germany as well as much of
the negotiation of the Agreement on Adaptation. He suggested
the U.S. delegation should confer with "long-standing
diplomats" (specifying U.S. Ambassador Govan by name) to
check this fact, and then expressed surprise that most
delegations (except for Belarus and Armenia) seemed content
with the altered role of the JCG, which does not contribute
to overcoming the CFE crisis. Ulyanov's "bottom line" was
that the impasse persists and Russia is not to blame.


7. (SBU) Similar to the week prior, Belarus and the U.S. were
the only delegations to respond. Belarus (Krayushkin) noted
his support for the Russian statement and reiterated his
position from the previous JCG in which he called for the
inclusion of all CFE States Parties. Krayushkin expressed
appreciation for the senior level dialogue especially in
light of the geo-political factors at play, but again pleaded
- "Don't sideline the JCG."


8. (SBU) In a brief reply, the U.S. (Silberberg) stressed
that it stood by its comments from the previous week which
had emphasized the importance of the high-level bilateral
channel for achieving agreement on the basis of the package.
He also noted that Russia's considered statement merited a
considered response and reserved the option of returning to
the issue at a later date. Guidance request: Although USDel
believes U.S. interventions on May 5 and May 12 sufficiently
replied to Russia's assertions, greater detail to deploy at
the JCG on May 19 in a detailed response would be welcomed.
End guidance request.


9. (SBU) Ulyanov was quick to clarify his strong belief that
the U.S.-Russia dialogue is a "crucial" element in the
process but should not supplant other fora. In the interest
of maximizing our ability to resolve the CFE impasse, he
reiterated that some of the substantive issues require the
consideration of all States Parties.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FOR THE RECORD ) TWO MORE RUSSIAN REFUSALS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (SBU) The U.S. (Silberberg) and the Czech Republic
(Reinohlova) each noted Russia's refusal of respective CFE
inspection notifications for May, underscoring the importance
of compliance by all States Parties to the viability of CFE.
A number of Allies (Portugal, Romania, the United Kingdom,
France, Turkey and the Netherlands) echoed concerns with
Russia's continued noncompliance and stressed the
significance of transparency and cooperation.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TWO PLENARIES CANCELLED; FALL SESSION START TBD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (C) The Chair (Neighbour) returned to last week's
suggestion for cancelling JCG meetings on May 27 and June 9
due to CFE-related, out-of-town meetings. No objections were
raised and the meetings were cancelled. (Note. The June
23-24 ASRC is also cause for cancellation of another JCG
(June 23). At our urging, Greece as CiO intends to raise
this point with incoming Chair Armenia before the next JCG
meeting. While we do not expect any objections, the Chair
did not want to risk overloading the system with three
cancellations at once. End note.)


12. (SBU) Regarding the Draft Decision on the Duration of
the Present Session (JCG.DD/1/09),Russia (Ulyanov) offered a
preliminary reaction noting likely support for a final
meeting on July 21 but suggesting the JCG should meet on
September 8 vice September 15 as proposed, reserving his
position on this point. He remarked that the JCG normally
resumes immediately following the first PC of the session.

The Chair (Neighbour) noted Russia's comments and suggested
addressing the matter at the next JCG on May 19.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ON THE MARGINS:
JCG-T PLUS 6; GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA; RUSSIA; THE TOI MATRIX
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


13. (C) JCG-T PLUS 6: At the May 10 JCG-T plus 6, chaired by
Denmark (Petersen),the Chair raised the issue of how to
respond to the Russian Aide-Memoire, in part stemming from
Ambassadors' discussions at the NATO Caucus. The Netherlands
(Kleinjan),backed by Canada (Linteau) and subsequently
agreed by the Chair, helpfully noted there was not a need for
anything beyond what the U.S. had responded at the May 5 JCG
and stressed that this matter was best left for the HLTF
"Away Day." The U.S. (Neighbour) noted that Russia's
Aide-Memoire circulated at the JCG was the same as that given
to A/S Gottemoeller on April 24 and reported per ref A that
she would meet with Antonov on CFE on June 3. He also
stressed again that discussion of the package and its
individual elements should remain in those political
channels. None disagreed.


14. (C) GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA: On May 11, Georgia (Giorgadze)
informed the U.S. del that they were prepared to respond to
elements of the Aide-Memoire in the JCG. The U.S.
(Neighbour) assured him that the U.S. and Allies would not
and emphasized the view that discussion of the substance of
the Aide-Memoire did not belong in the JCG; Giorgadze noted
that Georgia would follow the lead of the U.S. and others.
On May 12 following the JCG, Moldova (Cuc) approached the
U.S. del to clarify that Moldova does continue to support the
Parallel Actions Package and was prepared to restate this
position if raised in the JCG. He seemed concerned that some
may interpret otherwise based on the Moldovan May 5 statement
on Istanbul commitments which did not mention the package
(JCG.JOUR/693/Corr.1).


15. (C) RUSSIA: Ulyanov told USDel (Neighbour) that at the
June 3 U.S.-Russia bilateral in Geneva, he expects Antonov
will emphasize more than before Russia's view that the JCG
must have a role in solving details of the CFE impasse. He
explained that Russia will never accept the Parallel Actions
Package unless all details are spelled out, which he asserted
would be a lengthy process since Russia will demand specifics
in annexes. He claimed that Antonov and his U.S. counterpart
will be absorbed by START and questioned when high-level
officials would have time to hammer out details, such as a
definition of "substantial combat forces." This work can
only be done in Vienna, he asserted. To accept anything less
than details, would be to accept vague promises, something
Russia will not do. In reply, USDel explained why the USG
sees this very differently. (Comment: Except for a heads up
of what Antonov may raise on June 3, all dels in Vienna have
heard this from Ulyanov many times before. End comment.)


16. (SBU) DRAFT JCG CONSOLIDATED MATRIX (JCG.TOI/1/09, 31 Mar
09): Drawing from ref B, U.S. del (Ducceschi) provided
corrections to U.S. data and input on Part 4 to the TOI
Working Group Chair (Linteau). He was receptive to using the
2008 format (which does not include the "version of" or "LAL
based on" columns) and undertook to pass the U.S. input as
well as that of others to the German delegation, the drafter
of the document. Separately, Ducceschi discussed U.S. input
with the German Military Advisor (Lutz Hecker) who indicated
he thought the columns in question had been agreed
previously, but admitted he was uncertain. Hecker noted he
would relay the U.S. input to the German Verification Center
as soon as the TOI Chair provided him with the final input
from other SPs.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Allies Will Talk about Russia's Paper, No Matter What
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


17. (C) Comment: Delegates here, no matter what we urge,
will talk among themselves and with Russia about its

Aide-Memoire, seeking to influence their capitals and
policymakers. Since most Allied delegations here are sending
a representative to the HLTF "Away Day," these discussions
may increase in the run-up to subsequent meetings related to
CFE. Sharing general thoughts on the substance of the paper
with Allies should help maintain Allied support for the lead
U.S. role and high-level U.S.-Russia "political track".


18. (C) Guidance request: In the context of upcoming
meetings, USDel would welcome any details on the substance of
the Aide-Memoire that may appropriately be shared with Allies
here (i.e., outside the JCG) to help shape their thinking to
support continued backing for the U.S. approach. End
guidance request.


19. (U) The next JCG Plenary will take place on May 19, under
the chairmanship of Armenia, and will be preceded by the
JCG-T on May 18, under the chairmanship of Spain. After
that, there will no JCG Plenary until June 2.



SCOTT