Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO62
2009-02-13 14:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

5 FEB 2009 VVC AND EXPERTS: TURKEY NEARLY SCUTTLES 2009 VD 99 VERIFICATION COORDINATION

Tags:  KCFE NATO PARM PREL 
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INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6260
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USNMR BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000062 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: 5 FEB 2009 VVC AND EXPERTS: TURKEY NEARLY SCUTTLES
2009 VD 99 VERIFICATION COORDINATION

REF: STATE 9988

Classified By: Political Advisor Walter S. Reid for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000062

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: 5 FEB 2009 VVC AND EXPERTS: TURKEY NEARLY SCUTTLES
2009 VD 99 VERIFICATION COORDINATION

REF: STATE 9988

Classified By: Political Advisor Walter S. Reid for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).

1. (C/NOFORN) Summary. Implementation coordination for 2009
dominated
discussions in the 5 February 2009 VCC and Experts, with
Turkey raising
unexpectedly strong objections to provisions that dictate
which Ally loses
in the event a non-Ally preempts an Allied verification
activity.
Turkey's objections seemed linked to the fact that under the
draft, which
most other Allies understood would be agreed, Turkey would
lose its
passive quota for an inspection to the Russian Federation as
a result of a
recent notification of intent to inspect Russia by
Switzerland. Turkey
finally consented to move the draft along, but resumed its
opposition in
the VCC. The paper has since been placed under silence which
ends
close of business, 16 February.

2. (SBU) Allies indicated their intention to table national
papers at the
AIAM, which will likely not mirror the papers discussed in
the Experts
meeting, and which are expected to be disseminated within a
week or two
prior to the AIAM.

3. (C) On the margins, France and Hungary indicated they had
already
consulted with Georgia on their upcoming VD 99 evaluation
visit and
inspection respectively, while France indicated some support
for the idea
of including Russian inspectors if the logistics could be
worked out in
short order. France also noted that it was considering
proposing in
Vienna a new CSBM consisting of reciprocal visits to Russia
and Georgia by
a team lead by mutually agreed neutral state. End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Implementation Coordination
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4. (SBU) Much to the surprise of Allies, discussion on the IS
working
paper on Implementation Coordination
(AC/319-WP(2008)0009-Rev7) dominated
the VCC and meeting of experts.

5. (SBU) Background note. Implementation coordination is a
NATO attempt
to mitigate the effects of the so-called "quota race," which
historically
resulted in participating States (pS) exhausting the limited
number o
f
passive quotas for VD 99 evaluation visits and inspections
within the
first few months of the calendar year. In late 2007 Allies,
who
historically conduct the largest number of inspections to pS
of interest
such as Russia, agreed to coordinate the allocation and
scheduling of
NATO VD 99 inspections for 2008. Most Allies were satisfied
with the
results of this experiment, agreeing to coordinate activities
for 2009.
During an extended review of the modalities for NATO
coordination, debate
has centered on provisions in paragraph eight of the
coordination paper,
which addresses the loss of an available passive quota in the
event a

non-NATO pS preempts a coordinated NATO activity. Despite the
extended
debate on paragraph eight, Allies allocated and deconflicted
the 2009
schedule in accordance with this IS working paper. End
background note.

6. (C/REL NATO) Turkish rep (Yuksel) opened the experts
meeting in strong
opposition to the compensation provisions found in paragraph
8 of the IS
working paper. Yuksel explained that Turkey considers
"something missing"
from the current version. Yuksel recalled that Turkey had
lost an
inspection to a non-Ally in 2008, and that since the last VCC
in January
2009, Switzerland had notified an inspection to the Russian
Federation.
Since Turkey was scheduled to inspect Russia in February,
according to the
provisions in revision seven, Turkey would lose an inspection
again.
(Note. Over the last several months, experts have debated
which Ally
should lose its quota in the event of an unplanned
inspection, but settled
on the following construction: "the Ally next scheduled after
a 4-week
period will lose its inspection/evaluation, unless otherwise
agreed
amongst affected Allies or unless otherwise coordinated
through the VCC."
The four-week period was added to protect an Ally that had
already
committed resources to an upcoming inspection. End Note)
Yuksel noted
that while Turkey had fully complied with IS instructions to
provide
locations, dates and guest inspectors for its desired
inspections and
evaluations, some Allies had not provided dates and are
listed on the
schedule in a column labeled "not fixed." As revision seven
calls for the
"next scheduled" Ally to lose its quota, Allies listed in the
category of
"not fixed" fall outside the provisions and are protected
from losing a
quota.

7. (C) Comment. To say that Allies where surprised with the
Turkish
position would be an understatement. Most Allies, including
USDel,
understood that experts had agreed in January to use the
paper, including
the text of paragraph eight, provisionally as a guide until
it was
formally approved in the VCC. Since Allies had only proposed
two minor
edits to revision six that fell outside paragraph eight, most
expected
revision seven to reach consensus in the experts meeting with
minimal
discussion. End Comment.

8. (C/REL NATO) Norway, the sole "unscheduled" Ally holding a
passive
quota for the Russian Federation, rejected Turkey's position,
repeating
its long standing position on the purpose of VD 99
inspections--that
inspections should be used to verify military activity.
Acknowledging the
fact that other Allies have different points of view, Norway
argued that
it cannot schedule an inspection until such time as it
receives
indications of military activity or suspects such activity.
Despite the
fact that the IS requested inspections dates from Allies,

Allies are under
no obligation to pre-schedule VD 99 inspections.

9. (C/REL NATO) An unmoved Yuksel reminded Allies that
coordination of VD
99 activities is optional, and that the VCC is not mandated
to deconflict
VD 99 scheduling. Furthermore, according to NATO procedures
the VCC, not
experts, may approve a working paper and then only after it
is placed
under silence. Therefore, Yuksel argued, the current paper
remains under
discussion, and any Ally has the right to introduce edits at
any time.

10. (C/REL NATO) Norway, Belgium, Spain, Canada, France,
Denmark, Italy,
Romania, and the U.S. attempted to placate Turkish concerns
by offering
potential compromises. Several Allies emphasized that the
provision for
the loss of a quota would only take effect in a case where
consultations
between affected Allies and within the VCC fail to address
the problem
equitably. Canada posed that if Turkey was concerned that
some Allies
where technically unscheduled, then those Allies could be
moved from the
"not fixed" column to week 52 as a place holder. Finally,
U.S. rep
(Meyer) proposed that Allies approve revision seven at
experts' level in
order to move the paper forward to the VCC. In turn, experts
could take up
Turkey's concerns at the next meeting as a preliminary
discussion for
revising coordination for 2010. The Chair finally called for
a recess so
the affected Allies (those holding passive quotas--Turkey,
Spain and
Norway) could attempt to find an equitable solution to
Turkey's quota
loss.

11. (C/REL NATO) Despite these attempts, Turkey held fast.
Yuksel opposed
Canada's proposal to move Allies on the schedule from the
"not fixed"
column to week 52 because Norway would still consider itself
free to move
forward if it received indications of military activity.
Likewise, Yuksel
rejected outright the idea of forwarding revision seven to
the VCC without
addressing Turkey's loss this year. Finally, Yuksel lamented
that the
three affected Allies could not agree to a specific solution
since there
are only two remaining quotas for three Allies and Turkey had
already
bought tickets and invited guest inspectors.

12. (C/REL NATO) As the discussion wound down in the experts
meeting, the
Chair indicated that there was no consensus to move the paper
forward to
the VCC. Belgium then questioned whether Allies would be
using procedures
from the new paper or from last year. Canada reminded Allies
that, if the
current paper was not approved, Allies would be back to
announcing
inspections on a first-come-first-served basis two meetings
in advance of
the desired period of inspection. After another round of
aggravated
interventions from Allies, Yuksel finally relented,
announcing that Turkey
would not block a decision to move the paper to the VCC.
However, he

cautioned that if it got that far, Allies could expect Turkey
to place
conditions on silence procedures; for example, an extended
silence of one
to two months. The Chair reissued the paper with one minor
uncontested
edit as revision eight and forwarded it to the VCC.

- - - - - - -
Into the VCC
- - - - - - -

13. (C/REL NATO) During the VCC Turkey reignited its
opposition to the
provisions in paragraph eight. USDel asked Turkey to clarify
its claim
that the provisions were unfair, to which Turkey repeated its
talking
points regarding "unscheduled" Allies. Finally Italy,
stating what all
seemed to be thinking, alleged that Turkey simply resented
the fact that
it would lose its passive quota to Russia and was trying to
stall the
paper just long enough to notify its inspection. Turkey
could do this
either by blocking the paper or by placing it under silence
for an
extended period or until it sent its notification. (Note.
According to
the deconflicted schedule, Turkey is scheduled for an
inspection in week
8, 16-20 February, and would therefore send its notification
the week
prior, 9-13 February.)

14. (C/REL NATO) Yuksel flatly denied that Turkey was basing
its objection
on its inspection schedule, and noted that the length of time
for silence
procedures could be one week, one month, or two months for
that matter.
In audible rumblings around the table, Allies complained that
any length
was fine, as long as it was long enough to allow Turkey to
notify its
intent to inspect. Turkey then said it only objected to
paragraph 8, and
that Allies could put paragraphs 1-7 and 9-11 under silence.

15. (C/REL NATO) In another twist, Canada said that it could
not accept
placing only part of the paper under silence and asked the
Chair
(Wiederholtz) whether the position taken by Turkey implied
that none of
the provisions in the paper were valid. (Note. The VCC Chair
Miggins was
recovering from a bout of the flu.) Wiederholtz conceded
that Turkey's
interpretation of the status of the paper was correct, that
the paper was
indeed not agreed, and that as a result none of the paper's
provisions
were agreed, to include those for allocating and
deconflicting schedules.
The implication, Wiederholtz lamented, was that Allies would
have to
re-bid for verification activities in accordance with
pre-2007 procedures.

16. (C/REL NATO) As the discussion vacillated back and forth
over which
procedures are in force, and whether Allies would have to
re-bid for
allocations, a determined Belgium provided some comic relief
by attempting
to align with the general discussion its position on whether
it would or
would not inspect Serbia. (Under the procedures proposed in
revision
seven Belgium would lose its quota to Serbia due to an

unscheduled
inspection by Austria. Under the old procedures Slovakia
would lose the
inspection.) With each new claim that the old/new procedures
were in
effect, Belgium intervened to make known its position,
indicating its
intent to conduct/lose its passive quota to Serbia.

17. (C/REL NATO) Norway lamented that it seemed the issue
could not be
resolved and expressed frustration over the expenditure of
time and
resources over the last several months in revising this
paper. U.S. rep
(Meyer) empathized with Norway, stating that the U.S. would
also be
extremely disappointed if all of the work and resources
expended by Allies
in December and January were now voided and wasted as a
result of Turkey's
position. Meyer proposed that, regardless of the final
status of revision
seven in the VCC, Allies agree to adhere to the published
2009 scheduled,
which was deconflicted in accordance with the new procedures
in December
and January. Despite some caution expressed by the Chair,
Allies rallied
in agreement to continue to execute the deconflicted 2009
schedule, at
least until the next VCC.

18. (C/REL NATO) Feeling the pressure of isolation, Yuksel
finally agreed
to return to capital to get permission to place the document
under silence
for one week. Yuksel asked the Chair to give him until the
following day's
close of business to get his instructions. (Note. While the
Chair and
several Allies understood this to be a formality, and stated
that the
paper would be placed under silence Friday, 6 February, USDel
understood
that Turkey would need the day to get instructions, and that
only with
Turkey's final approval would the paper go under silence. In
a follow up
call on Friday, the IS confirmed that this was indeed the
case as Turkey
agreed to place the paper under silence, but not until the
close of
business the following Friday, February 13. In the end, the
working paper
was placed under silence on Monday, 9 February for a period
of one week.
Turkey did not indicate whether it expected to break silence.
End Note.)

19. (C/NOFORN) Comment. Yuksel was visibly stressed, stating
that he was
under strict instructions from Ankara and that he had no room
to
maneuver. Ankara, who's position seemed clearly linked to
avoiding the
loss of its inspection quota for Russia, may resent the loss
of
inspections two years in a row, while perceiving that Norway
and other
"unscheduled" Allies remain exempt from losses by hiding in
the "not
fixed" column. If so, this position ignores the fact that
Allies who
remain unscheduled incur greater risk with each passing month
that an
unscheduled inspection from a non-NATO partner will exhaust
another
passive quota. As such, an Ally waiting for indications of
military
activity before scheduling its inspection is at greater risk
of losing its

quota than it would be if it schedule the inspection in the
first few
months of the year. Turkey's argument also makes light of
Norway's
long-standing minority, but technically valid position on the
purpose of
VD 99 inspections. Therefore, Turkey's claim that some
Allies are
protected from the loss of inspections is largely muted by
long-standing
national policy and the practical realities of implementing
VD 99
inspections.

20. (C/NOFORN) Turkey also seemed intent on delaying the
approval of
revision seven in order to preserve its inspection to Russia.
In response
to questions from Allies on why Turkey did not raise its
objections
earlier, Yuksel stated that the situation had changed since
January--in
other words; Switzerland had notified an inspection to
Russia, thus
placing Turkey's inspection at risk. Yuksel admitted that
Turkey had no
alternative proposals or edits, except to add a line to the
text
indicating that its provisions be considered for 2010
inspection/evaluation coordination. Finally, Yuksel stated
repeatedly in
the experts meeting that Turkey saw no reason for Allies to
rush to adopt
the document. In contrast to Allied calls to forward a good,
albeit
imperfect paper to the VCC, Yuksel held that the paper
contained a
significant gap and that it was the responsibility of the VCC
and experts
to ensure the paper was as perfect as possible. End Comment.

- - - - - - - - - - -
Implementation Papers
- - - - - - - - - - -

21. (C/REL NATO) As discussion on implementation coordination
consumed
most of the experts meeting, there was little time for
discussion of
AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4, on Implementation Issued for the
2009 AIAM.
Canada announced that it would table a Food for Thought paper
at the AIAM
on Force Majeure. Canada noted that its FFT would be based on
the paper it
developed for the VCC, but that the Canadian delegation in
Vienna was
consulting with several delegations and would incorporate
additional
comments and suggestions into the final draft. Canada also
noted that,
despite France's stated opposition to the paper the French
delegation in
Vienna had responded to the paper positively. Nevertheless,
in the VCC,
French rep said he had checked with the MFA and with the
French Del in
Vienna and he reaffirmed France's opposition to the Canadian
paper.

22. (SBU) Denmark also noted it would table a paper on the
size of
evaluation and inspection teams, as would Norway on the quota
calculation
system. Denmark and Norway also indicated their papers would
not be
identical to the papers developed for the VCC. Finally, all
three
indicated they expected their papers to be completed and
distributed one
to two weeks in advance, although Denmark noted it would
forward its paper

to the CPC and leave the timing of distribution up to them.

23. (SBU) Turkey noted that it was still considering whether
to table a
paper on digital cameras, and Germany, who drafted the paper
on Briefings
for Military Commanders, did not have instructions indicating
whether
Berlin would table naything at the AIAM.

24. (C) As it was obvious that Allies were no longer inclined
to discuss
the details of AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4, USDel took the
opportunity to
make the following points in both the experts meeting and the
VCC:

-- U.S. understands that the papers tabled at the AIAM will
be national
submissions. While we welcome the papers, we want Allies to
understand
that they should not consider the papers annexed to
AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4 to be agreed, because they are not.

-- The U.S. understands that Allies are agreed that we do not
want to open
VD 99. The papers, as drafted in AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4,
did not make
that clear. We would encourage those Allies tabling papers
to ensure that
their submissions and presentations clearly indicate that any
proposed
suggestions are voluntary standards or voluntary approaches
for the
proposes of transparency. Allies could expect the U.S. to
make comments
along these lines on any paper or presentation that does not
adequately
make this point. (Note. Allies seemed receptive to this
point; however,
some Allies are leery of "voluntary" measures, arguing that
many of the
existing voluntary measures are simply ignored by
participating States.
Therefore, in preparing U.S. guidance for the AIAM, it would
be helpful to
differentiate between the need to protect a specific U.S.
equity (i.e. a
measure we may choose not to implement) and the need to
preserve the
integrity of VD 99 (i.e. the text clearly indicates the
measure is
voluntary, but we would generally agree to implement it under
normal
circumstances.) End note.)

-- The U.S. would also encourage Allies for the purposes of
clarity to
ensure the language used in the papers remains consistent
with that found
in VD 99 (i.e. Use the specific term "specified area" vs.
"area" when
appropriate.)

25. (SBU) During the VCC, Turkey asked whether the U.S.
intended to raise
the issue of Russia's new visa procedures at the AIAM. U.S.
rep (Meyer)
said that while the U.S. would raise the issue if needed, the
U.S. was
under the impression that other Allies in Vienna had
indicated initially
their intent to bring this up either at the AIAM or in the
VCC.

- - - - -
Schedules
- - - - -

26. (C/REL NATO) U.S. announced its VD 99 evaluation to the
Russian
Federation had been rescheduled from week 5 to week 7, and

that its CFE
inspection for the Russian Federation in the 13th residual
year had been
moved from TB 48 to TB 50.

27. (C/REL NATO) Other changes to the deconflicted CFE
schedule for the
next treaty year are as follows:

-- Germany's bilateral inspection to Ukraine has been
rescheduled from TB
53 to TB 1.

-- Germany's paid inspection in Ukraine has been rescheduled
from TB 26 to
TB 51.

-- Portugal's inspection to the Russian Federation has been
rescheduled
from TB 53 to TB 6.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
About Georgia on the Margins:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

28. (C/REL NATO) USDel relayed the talking points ref
guidance regarding
Georgia's request for the U.S. to conduct a verification
activity in
Georgia soon to the VCC representatives of Hungary, Spain and
France.
Hungary, scheduled to conduct an inspection in week 12,
indicated that it
had already consulted with Georgia on its inspection. The
Hungarian
Verification Agency representative noted Georgia's
flexibility in allowing
Russian inspectors to accompany other teams, but was cool to
the idea of
the U.S. informing Georgia that it had consulted Allies
regarding
inspections. (Note. While he did not say why he was
hesitant, perhaps he
was taken off guard, it could be that since the NATO schedule
is already
agreed, it would be disingenuous to imply that Allies had
adjusted their
schedules to accommodate Georgia's request. End Note.)

29. (SBU) The Spanish representative, a Lieutenant Colonel
fresh from
their verification agency, was new to the VCC. He noted U.S.
points and
was ambivalent. He did not think Spain had discussed its
intentions with
Georgia and did not have an opinion on discussing our
consultations with
Georgia.

30. (C/REL NATO) The French rep (Paeyn) indicated that France
had already
requested to bring auxiliary personnel on their inspection
and had
consulted with Georgia. Georgia agreed to the French request
at no
additional cost to Georgia. Payne was intrigued by Georgia's
willingness
to take a Russian inspector, but said it was likely too late
for France to
arrange for a Russian guest inspector. Payne had no opinion
on whether
the U.S. should discuss Allied consultations with Georgia.

31. (C) Payne also reported that France was considering
proposing a CSBM
based on reciprocal visits between Georgia and Russia.
France would
request Russia and Georgia provide a list of pS that each
felt could serve
as a neutral observer. France would approach a mutually
acceptable
country and ask them to lead reciprocal visits in Georgia and

Russia with
their teams composed of observers from the neutral state and
an
unspecified number of Russians to Georgia and Georgians to
Russia. Payne
did not indicate when France might propose this new measure.
VOLKER