Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO571
2009-12-04 18:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S DECEMBER 3, 2009

Tags:  OVIP STEINBERG JAMES PREL NATO MARR MOPS BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000571 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: OVIP STEINBERG JAMES PREL NATO MARR MOPS BK
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S DECEMBER 3, 2009
MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

Classified By: Deputy Executive Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. R
eason 1.4(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000571

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: OVIP STEINBERG JAMES PREL NATO MARR MOPS BK
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S DECEMBER 3, 2009
MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

Classified By: Deputy Executive Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. R
eason 1.4(d)


1. (U) December 3, 2009; 1500; Brussels, Belgium.


2. (U) Participants:
U.S.
Deputy Secretary James Steinberg
Amb. Ivo Daalder
EUR A/S Phil Gordon
EUR Deputy A/S Robert Wood
Special Assistant Amy Scanlon
USNATO PolAd Kelly Degnan (notetaker)

NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero
Director of the Private Office Jesper Vahr
NATO Spokesman James Appathurai
Political Advisor Jeff Rathke


3. (C) Summary. Deputy Secretary Steinberg discussed
Afghanistan and Bosnia's pending Membership Action Plan (MAP)
application with NATO SecGen Rasmussen in a December 3
signals check meeting at NATO Headquarters. Rasmussen called
President Obama's strategy on Afghanistan "the right one,"
predicting that it will create new momentum. He raised
Bosnia's MAP application -- a central topic of the December
3-4 Foreign Ministers' meeting -- noting his view that NATO's
response to Bosnia must be crafted carefully. End Summary.


4. (C) The Deputy Secretary thanked Rasmussen for his
leadership and outreach efforts in support of the President's
December 1 Afghanistan announcement. The SecGen said the
steps announced by President Obama will generate new
momentum, leading to increased contributions of forces,
development funds and commitment by the Afghan government.
Italy planned to announce an increase in troops, he said, and
seven other countries had publicly announced troop increases
since the President's speech.


5. (C) Rasmussen asked Steinberg for his assessment of
Bosnia's MAP application, noting NATO's Open Door policy
would be the main topic of the Foreign Ministers' dinner that
evening. Steinberg said the SecGen's November 27-28 visit to
the Balkans was an important display of NATO's interest and
engagement, as well as a reminder that NATO membership is a
serious step that requires a serious and functioning
government. Bosnia's future is in NATO, Steinberg stressed,
but Bosnia must first demonstrate the capacity to function as
a state. Granting Bosnia's MAP application because of the
past, as many Bosniaks expect, would send the wrong signal.
If they conclude they don't have to take action to get MAP,
it would only further Bosnia's dependency on the
international community. They need to take basic decisions
toward governance and not leave it to MAP to carry them
forward. Steinberg told Rasmussen he was concerned by the
Bosniaks' (other than Tihic) declining willingness to engage.
In his view, a strong message had to be sent that they need
to take positive steps to show they want to be part of the
solution. Without this message, Steinberg was confident the
Bosniaks would not engage, noting that some in Bosnia want
fundamental changes to the Dayton Accord, not modest reforms.
"We need to make clear that we expect them to do better."


6. (C) The SecGen agreed on the need to send a clear message,
adding that he had found little enthusiasm for reform or the
political process among Bosnian leaders he met during his
visit. He admitted he had been persuaded to soften his
initial skepticism by Bosnian arguments that MAP would create
a more positive atmosphere for reform efforts. The question
now was whether denial of a MAP invitation would create an
incentive or discouragement for Bosnian reform. Rasmussen
was concerned that rejecting MAP might embolden radical
elements in Bosnia and fuel accusations that the
international community was destabilizing Bosnia's internal
situation. Granting MAP would support moderates without
guaranteeing membership within a particular timeframe.
Bosniaks did not appear prepared to engage now in a political
process of reform, but they would have to do so if they were
in MAP.


7. (C) Rasmussen said he hoped ministers would reach a
decision on the issue at the Ministerial dinner. He agreed
that Bosnia's IPAP process offered a constructive mechanism
for encouraging reforms; Bosnia needed to use this process to

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move forward in order for its MAP application to be reviewed
positively in the spring. The Foreign Ministers Statement to
be issued following the Ministerial should convey an
encouraging message that NATO will keep Bosnia's MAP
application under active consideration for review in spring,
but that Bosnia still has more work to do.
DAALDER