NOVEMBER 5 HLTF MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000522

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2019
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 5 HLTF MEETING

REF: STATE 113659

Classified By: Deputy POLAD A. "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).


1. (C) Summary: At the November 5 HLTF, Allies welcomed the
U.S. proposal to revise NATO's NAC Communique message on CFE
to reflect the Alliance's growing concern about Russia's
continuing suspension of implementation of CFE. Most Allies
also agreed in principle to the U.S.'s specific suggestion
that Allies provide CFE data to all Treaty partners,
including Russia, again this year, but record in the NAC
Communique and at the OSCE Ministerial that unless the
Alliance sees progress regarding Russia's implementation, it
will be difficult to do that again. Turkey and Germany,
however, remain averse to any language that would appear to
commit the Alliance to a timeline for further action on CFE,
and it is not clear whether they will accept the U.S. concept
for the Communique. Critical to achieving a positive NATO
response to our ideas were two U.S. messages: 1) that the
U.S. wanted a unified NATO approach, whatever it was, and no
Ally should act alone; and 2) that the U.S. had not given up
on finding a solution on CFE and believed we should continue
to try. These themes are the core of current NATO sentiment.


2. (C) In the Quad meeting, Germany strongly argued in favor
of responding positively in Vienna to Russia's proposed
Ministerial Council Draft Decision calling on the FSC to
conduct a review of Vienna Document 1999 (VD99). France
supported Germany's general approach, albeit less
passionately, while the UK said it would develop and
circulate compromise language that responded positively to
reviewing VD99 without a timeline or Ministerial mandate.


3. (C) In other bilateral and Quad contacts, France announced
that Security Policy Director Maisonnave would travel to
Moscow the following week to discuss Russia's European
Security Treaty, a follow-up meeting to a recent
Russian-French two-plus-two meeting of Defense and Foreign
Ministers in early October. Germany announced that FM
Westerwelle would give Secretary Clinton a paper on A/CFE
that recommends further flexibility on the flanks. On the
margins, both the Germans and UK (separately) proposed to
meet with the U.S. bilaterally at an expert level to discuss
next steps on CFE. End Summary.

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KEY OUTCOMES
--------------


4. (C) In the HLTF Plenary, Allies generally welcomed U.S.
ideas on the how the Alliance should approach the annual CFE
Data Exchange in December and how that position could be
incorporated into a fresh message to Russia. Most Allies
agreed with the U.S. assessment that simply repeating the
tired phrase from past NATO Communiques - "... the current
situation...cannot last indefinitely" - is not good enough.
Most Allies welcomed the U.S. proposal to revise NATO's
Communique language on CFE to send a strong message to Russia
reflecting our growing concern about Russia's continuing
suspension of implementation of CFE; however, Germany and
Turkey argued against any shift in the Alliance position that
implied a timeline for action.


5. (C) Most Allies agreed in principle to the four main
themes U.S. Del identified for the NAC Communique text on
CFE:

-- record Alliance commitment to CFE and continuing to seek a
creative way forward on all current issues, including those
related to Georgia and Moldova;

-- state that the Alliance will continue to provide data to
Russia this year and urge Russia to do the same;

-- record our shared assessment that unless Russia reverses
its failure to fulfill its Treaty obligations, it will be
difficult to provide data in the future.

-- express our readiness for an intensified engagement on CFE
next year.

Nevertheless, a number of Allies cautioned that translating
these themes into operational text will have to be done very

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carefully. Some Allies - notably Germany and Turkey -
remained skeptical about the third theme, which in their view
could commit the Alliance to future action as early as
December 2010.


6. (C) In addition to the four U.S. themes, Italy sought an
explicit endorsement of the Parallel Actions Package and a
call for Russia to return to full compliance, while Turkey
recommended a reference to prior NATO statements. In the
end, HLTF Chair Erdmann announced that the International
Staff would draft Communique language on the basis of the
U.S. themes combined with Italian and Turkish points.

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ALLIES SKEPTICAL OF MORE DRAMATIC STEPS
--------------


7. (C) Comment: It was very clear from all of the U.S.
team's discussions - in the plenary and on the margins - that
the U.S. proposal is as far as the vast majority of Allies
are prepared to go at this time, and it may be too far for
the Germany and Turkey. Erdmann wanted to get agreement at
this meeting on the themes and main message of the Communique
on CFE, but he explicitly did not/not want to draft text.
While most Allies considered that the U.S. language was
sufficiently open-ended to avoid any categorical judgments
about the future that Allies might regret, Spain and Romania
were wary, Turkey remained skeptical, and Germany stopped
just short of opposing the suggestion that the Alliance may
have difficulty providing data to Russia in the future. Only
in negotiation of Communique text will it become clear
whether Germany and Turkey are prepared even to hint that
Allies' operational approach on CFE might change if progress
with Russia in 2010 proves unattainable. End Comment.


8. (C) During the debate on the U.S. proposal, it was clear
that many Allies anticipated the U.S. would propose not to
provide data to Russia in December, and came armed for that
discussion. The exchange was indicative of Allies' worries.
A number of Allies (including The Netherlands, Germany,
Luxembourg, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and France)
expressed skepticism that the Alliance could deliver an
implied threat to withhold data from Russia without playing
into Russia's arguments about the failings of the CFE. NATO
should continue to hold the "moral high ground" on CFE
implementation and avoid any step that could cause NATO to be
blamed for hastening the demise of the Treaty. Some Allies
were also worried about committing now to a future action
that they had not fully studied from a legal perspective.
There were many nods around the room as the U.S. explained
the concept of countermeasures against Russia under customary
international law, even while Allies continued to implement
the Treaty in good faith. Others indicated their political
and legal systems differed from the U.S.


9. (C) A brief exchange between Italy and Spain highlighted
the extent to which a number of Allies - not just the key
players - have thought about how to engage Russia on CFE.
Italy affirmed the U.S. idea that we should use the
Communique to invite Russia, in a positive spirit, to join
NATO Allies in providing CFE data this year; Spain suggested
that we should call upon Russia to resume accepting on site
inspection requests as well as providing data. Turkey agreed
that we should call upon Russia to resume implementation
across-the-board, and initially Allies appeared to agree that
this was the right approach. Italy then rejoined that it
would be preferable to identify participation in the data
exchange as a specific cooperative step Russia could take to
signal its intentions, and that argument appeared to win the
day.

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WAY FORWARD ON COMMUNIQUE
--------------


10. (C) HLTF Chairman Erdmann reported that Secretary General
(SYG) Rasmussen wished to press for a succinct Ministerial
statement summarizing the deliberations of Ministers rather
than issuing the traditional, omnibus communique reinforcing
Allies' support for the full range of NATO policy. Under the
new formulation, a paragraph on CFE would only be included if
NATO Ministers discussed CFE. In addition, Erdmann noted
that if a CFE paragraph were included its length would need

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to be significantly shorter than in previous years in order
to match the format of the statement.


11. (C) Most Allies were not aware prior to this meeting of
the NATO SYG's determination to avoid addressing issues in
the Communique that are not actually discussed by Ministers
in December. All Allies who addressed the issue, in the
plenary and on the margins, argued that it was essential to
include a paragraph on CFE in the NAC Communique in order to
send a consistent message to the Russians. Virtually all
Allies agreed that Russia would interpret the omission of CFE
as an indicator of declining NATO engagement on CFE, rather
than as a sign of a fresh approach to communique drafting.
Canada suggested that if the NAC Communique text was a
genuinely transformed document that only addressed a handful
of issues, it would be important for NATO to issue a separate
statement on CFE. Several Allies noted that if the criterion
for inclusion in the Communique is that Ministers discuss CFE
in the NAC, then that is what should happen.


12. (C) HLTF Chair Erdmann and the I.S. will produce two
versions of Communique text on CFE: a short form based on the
four themes tabled by the U.S.(see para 5 above),and a long
form based on the existing Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration
paragraph plus two additional U.S.-suggested themes:

-- call on Russia to join us in providing data this December;
and

-- record our shared assessment that unless Russia reverses
its failure to fulfill its Treaty obligations, it will be
difficult to provide data in the future.

The I.S. will seek to get these two versions agreed via HLTF
deputies meetings later this month. However, a number of
Allies expressed skepticism that it would be possible for
Ministers to agree on a short NAC Statement as proposed by
the SYG. (Comment: On the margins, a number of Allies noted
that sometimes CFE is raised in the NATO-Russia context, but
not in the NAC; they recalled that this is because Allies
have an agreed position on CFE and do not feel a need to use
scarce minutes of NAC time to confirm it. They expressed
concern about the SYG's reported criteria for inclusion of
issues in the NAC text. End Comment.)

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BILATS AND QUAD DISCUSSION
--------------


13. (C) Franco-Russian discussions on European Security
Treaty: French HLTF rep Jacques Raharinaivo surprised Allies
by reporting that during the Russian-French two-plus-two
meeting of Defense and Foreign Ministers in early October,
Kouchner had asked Lavrov whether Russia had developed a text
of the European security Treaty. When the Russians suggested
Franco-Russian expert consultations on the matter, the French
agreed. Raharinaivo said Security Policy Director Maisonnave
would travel to Moscow the week of November 9.


14. (C) Bilateral Consultations: On the margins, both Germany
and the UK (separately) proposed to meet with the U.S.
bilaterally at an expert level to discuss next steps on CFE.
Romania returned briefly to the idea of a small group meeting
on the topic. Turkish HLTF Rep Tusel noted that Russia had
invited bilateral discussions with Turkey on CFE, but that
presently there is nothing to discuss. He added that Turkey
would prefer to hold off on bilateral discussions until there
is a clear way forward.


15. (C) Germany's new coalition government on CFE: German
HLTF rep Michael Banzhaf said that the new German
government's coalition agreement explicitly reaffirms support
for the CFE Treaty and underscores its importance. In a
private meeting with the U.S., he said FM Westerwelle would
give Secretary Clinton a paper on CFE at their scheduled
meeting November 5 (see para 17). He urged U.S.-German
expert consultations to brainstorm on CFE, arguing that one
approach would be to "de-link a CFE solution from the
Istanbul commitments." U.S. Reps welcomed the idea of
consultations, but cautioned that as a political matter a
resolution on Georgia and Moldova would be needed if all 30
CFE states, including the U.S., were to ratify the Adapted
Treaty.

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16. (C) Vienna Document 1999: In the Quad meeting, U.S. Rep
Davis turned attention from CFE to Vienna Document 1999 (VD
99),noting Washington's interest as to why Allies in Vienna
have responded so actively to Russia's most recent proposed
Ministerial Council Draft Decision on conducting a review of
the document. Davis reiterated the U.S. position and
indicated support for the UK Chair's draft language, which
could be expanded to incorporate some of Russia's proposed
language. UK HLTF Rep Michael Clark supported the U.S.
position, and proposed to move forward with a modified text
that reiterated support for continued FSC work on VD99
without succumbing to this "gambit to split the Alliance."
German HLTF Rep Banzhaf, and to a lesser extent French HLTF
Rep Raharinaivo, argued at length that a mandate to review VD
99 was necessary, and that it was important to respond
positively to Russia. Clark responded that there are other
ways to signal to Russia that the Alliance is listening to
its concerns, and that in the meantime the Alliance should
develop a position on VD99. In the end, all could agree that
of primary importance was to maintain Alliance unity.


17. (C) Paper on CFE delivered by German MFA State Secretary
Hoyer to Under Secretary Burns on 5 November in Washington.

-- Begin Text of German Position Paper on CFE - (note
internal numbering)

Position Paper on
Conventional Arms Control in Europe


1. Arms control is currently gaining new momentum. The START
negotiations demonstrate that progress on arms reduction is
possible if there is a strong political commitment between
partners. As we approach two years of Russian CFE
non-implementation the opportunity should now be used to put
conventional arms control in Europe back on track.


2. Nuclear and conventional arms control in Europe are
closely interconnected. A perceived conventional inferiority
may nourish claims to seek compensation with substrategic
nuclear weapons. Building confidence with conventional arms
control agreement could be an effective counter-argument.


3. The CFE regime remains a cornerstone of European security.
Today we see a new opportunity to move forward towards
agreement on the adapted CFE-Treaty. This will require a
reassessment by all concerned. We should reconsider our
approach of linkage to the fulfillment of the Istanbul
Commitments. Instead, we could focus on the already existing
fora to solve the problems of territorial integrity in
Moldova and Georgia.


4. The Parallel Actions Package continues to be the
negotiation basis for discussing further steps. Dialogue
with Russia could start with a discussion on the definition
of substantial combat forces and political declarations of
restraint on both sides in order to prevent destabilizing
concentration of forces.

-- End Text of German Position Paper on CFE --
DAALDER