JANUARY 29 HLTF: ALLIES WILLING TO WAIT FOR U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000052

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: JANUARY 29 HLTF: ALLIES WILLING TO WAIT FOR U.S.
LEADERSHIP ON CFE, BUT HOPE FOR CLEAR SIGNAL ON WAY AHEAD
BEFORE NATO SUMMIT

REF: STATE 7036 (29 JAN 09 HLTF GUIDANCE)

Classified By: Political Advisor Walter S. Reid for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. At the January 29 NATO High Level Task Force
(HLTF) meeting, two clear messages - pointedly directed at
the U.S. - emerged. First, Allies continue to place high
importance on a unified NATO strategy for retaining the CFE
regime and getting it back on track. Many specifically noted
that CFE is a critical component of the existing European
security architecture; they want to tell Russia plainly that
any future European Security Treaty concept needs CFE as one
pillar. Second, Allies are keen for the U.S. to continue to
play the lead role in resolving the CFE impasse, via
continued efforts to get Russia to agree to the Parallel
Actions Package. Allies expressed understanding for the
implications of the U.S. political calendar and realize that
the new team needs time to get organized, but at the next
HLTF, in mid-March, they expect to hear more regarding USG
plans to engage Russia on CFE. The Turks, specifically,
suggested this would be the right moment for a U.S.-led
"stocktaking" discussion. In discussions at the HLTF and on
the margins:

-- There was a common assessment that Russia - likely still
not certain what its goals are on CFE other than perhaps to
abolish the flank regime - is in a "wait and see" mode,
awaiting engagement with the new U.S. Administration while
also probing for differences among Allies through bilateral
discussions.

-- Allies want to ensure that CFE is included in the April
3-4 NATO Summit communique to emphasize its continued
importance. They believe the December Ministerial language
sends the right balanced message, barring any major
developments diplomatically or on the ground.

-- Most Allies have not thought seriously about changing the
NATO negotiating position as encapsulated in the Parallel
Actions Package and the March 28, 2008 NAC statement on CFE.
No ally suggested any alternative to the agreed sequencing:
first agreement on the Parallel Actions Package to enable
Russia to move on its commitments in parallel with Allies
proceeding with ratification of the Adapted Treaty and then,
after a/CFE enters into force, a review and consideration of
possible changes.

-- Germany, helpfully, did not circulate a paper at this time
related to plans for the Steinmeier-proposed June CFE
conference in Berlin. In the full HLTF, the German rep noted
the intention to have several rounds of consultations with
Allies before consulting with the Russians; on the margins he
offered that Germany would not circulate a paper before first
having a Quad discussion, including at a senior level. At
the same time, also on the margins, the Germans (supported by
the French) underscored the need for visible progress and
suggested that, aside from sustaining the current, agreed
process, the June meeting could serve as an opportunity to
explore new ideas.


2. (C) On other issues, all Allies who spoke on Georgia's
rejection of Russian Vienna Document inspection and
evaluation requests in January expressed understanding for
Georgia's reasons as a political matter, but also
disappointment at its decision. Allies stressed their hope
that Georgia's action would not undermine implementation of
the VDOC elsewhere or damage existing arms control regimes in
general. Allies agreed that current VCC papers could be
deployed on a national basis at the March Annual
Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) in Vienna with the
understanding that Allied participating States (pS) would
likely raise varying opinions on any issues for which there
was not yet consensus at the VCC. Regarding the Allied CFE
inspection plan for the new Treaty year, none disagreed that
Allies should continue to attempt to execute inspections of
Russia in accordance with the agreed schedule. END SUMMARY.

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CONTACTS and BILATERALS
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3. (C) Allies welcomed a briefing (per reftel) from U.S. Rep
Davis on the main themes of A/S Fried's December 17 CFE
meeting with Antonov in Geneva. The capsule version of that
meeting - that the Russians stuck to familiar positions,
although a frank discussion took place on Georgia and the
flank - elicited from a number of Allies (Turkey, Romania,
UK, Norway) the same reaction: that the Russians were marking
time, waiting to deal with the new U.S. Administration.
Norway, the UK, and Romania all expressed concern - based on
their own bilateral meetings with Russia - that the Russians
were visibly probing for differences among Allies, not trying
to find common ground, and that the Russians themselves may
not be certain, even now, what their goals are on CFE.

-- Norway: Norwegian rep Loken reported on a December 12
bilateral meeting in Moscow at the Director General level
during which Russia repeated its maximalist positions and
emphasized Russia's intent to abolish the flank and to
increase the involvement of other CFE States Parties via
bilateral discussions and broader negotiations. During a
bilateral discussion between the Norwegian and U.S. dels the
day prior, Loken specified that Antonov had pushed for Norway
to soften its insistence on retaining the flank limits by
claiming that Turkey was more flexible on the flank than
Norway. (Comment. In his December 17 meeting with Fried,
Antonov portrayed Norway as the more flexible of the two.
See below for more specifics on the U.S. bilat with Norway.
End comment.)

-- United Kingdom: UK Rep Ford noted that Nick Pickard, Head
of the FCO Security Policy Group, had a meeting on
counter-proliferation issues with MFA Director Antonov on
January 22 in Moscow. Ford reported that Antonov, who had
added CFE to the agenda, moved it to the top and "lectured"
Pickard for 90 minutes. Pickard stuck to the NATO position
despite Antonov's attempt to seek out intra-Alliance
differences via a line-by-line run through of the Parallel
Actions Package and insistence that issues pertaining to host
nation consent were above his pay grade. Ford noted that
following the CFE discussion Antonov was "charm personified."


-- Romania: Romanian rep Micula reported on January 19
non-proliferation and arms control consultations with Antonov
in Moscow. Russia's message on CFE was familiar: NATO's
position fostered a bloc-to-bloc approach; the Parallel
Actions Package had been walked back from the original
October 2007 version; there was no independent engagement by
each State Party; and the flank was a definite deal breaker.
Antonov stressed that "with no progress on the flank, Europe
could forget about CFE" and also attempted a line-by-line
review of the package. Micula stated that Romania avoided
the "trap" by noting that the U.S. was negotiating on behalf
of NATO and stressing the importance of both implementation
and the flank. Romania opined that Russia is in a "wait and
see" mode and attempting to pocket further gains.

-- France: During a meeting with the U.S., UK and Germany
the day prior to the HLTF, French rep Raharinaivo noted that
the French Director for Security and Disarmament would meet
with MFA Director Antonov in Moscow on February 10 on a range
of issues and expected the meeting would touch on CFE.

-- Germany: Also in the quad meeting only, German rep
Biontino noted that in a Russian readout following the
Fried-Antonov Geneva discussion, the Russians characterized
the U.S. proposal on Georgia as "unrealistic." The U.S. del
remarked that this reaction was consistent with Russia's
suggestion in Geneva that the U.S. proposals were
"ambitious."

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THE WAY AHEAD
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4. (C) The HLTF Chair (Erdmann) briefed in general terms on
plans for key upcoming events (Feb 6-8 Munich Security
Conference, Feb 19-20 Informal Defense Ministerial in Poland,
Mar 5 Informal Ministerial at NATO, April 3-4 NATO Summit,
March 25-26 Berlin Seminar on Conventional Arms Control at
RACVIAC in Zagreb, Croatia, and June 10 FM


Steinmeier-proposed high-level CFE experts meeting on "The
Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe") as a
framework for HLTF discussion of next steps on CFE. Key
themes that emerged from a poorly ordered discussion included:

-- Patience will have its Limits: In the HLTF and on the
margins, Allies expressed understanding for the implications
of the U.S. political calendar and the need for time for the
new team to get organized on a number of nonproliferation and
arms control issues, including START. They were reassured by
Secretary Clinton's public comments about the importance of
arms control. But they want to be sure the U.S. remains
committed to CFE and its leadership role in resolving the
impasse. Allies were clear about their expectation to hear
more from the U.S. delegation at the next HLTF, in mid-March,
regarding USG plans to engage Russia on CFE. Turkish rep Gun
emphasized Turkey strongly supported the Parallel Actions
Package, strongly encouraged the U.S. to remain engaged, and
he specifically suggested that the March HLTF would be the
right moment for a U.S.-led "stocktaking" discussion with the
Allies.

-- CFE at the Summit: Looking ahead to the NATO Summit in
April, Allies strongly supported including CFE language in
the communique, especially to avoid any hint to the Russians
that NATO attaches diminished importance to CFE. Those that
spoke to this issue (Italy, Romania, Germany, U.S., Czech
Republic, Netherlands, Poland, Belgium and Turkey) remarked
that the December Ministerial language is appropriate and
balanced, and should serve as the basis for CFE language in
April, barring any major developments diplomatically or on
the ground.

-- No Change to the NATO Position: The corollary to sticking
to the agreed NATO position (encapsulated in the Parallel
Actions Package and the March 28, 2008 NAC statement on CFE)
is that most Allies appeared not to have thought seriously
about changing the NATO negotiating position. On this point
the Turks, as well as Romania and Norway, were very explicit
with the U.S. on the margins: they agree with and staunchly
support the "forward-leaning" deal in the Parallel Actions
Package, which trades Allied ratification of Adapted CFE for
steps on the Istanbul commitments and resumption of CFE
implementation by Russia, together with a commitment to a
future review of the Adapted Treaty in which "any nation
could raise any issue, including the flank." But, Turkish
rep Gun made clear, Turkey is not about to go further than
that, particularly in a context where Russia has not resumed
Treaty implementation, and has said it will never resume
implementation of the flank limits (only, perhaps,
information and verification provisions).

-- (Comment: Just as no Ally suggested changes in the NATO
position, none at this stage appears ready to consider
changing the sequence of events that is built into it.
Turkey and others (Norway, Czech Republic, Greece, Romania)
were clear on sequencing: first the Parallel Actions Package
needs to be agreed so that Russia can move forward on its
commitments in parallel with the Allies who will undertake
ratification of the Adapted Treaty, and then, once a/CFE
enters into force, there can be a review of the Treaty to
consider possible changes. Most Allies recognize the scope
of the problem CFE faces if no deal is possible other than
one which eliminates the flank for Russia. But in the
interest of maintaining Allied unity, nobody is prepared to
take this on openly, recalling that only intense effort by
the U.S. made it possible for Allies to agree on the
forward-leaning Parallel Actions Package in the face of
divergent Allied priorities. In the main meeting and on the
margins, no ally suggested any alternative to that sequence.
The Germans - who have done the most thinking of any Ally
other than the U.S. about the way forward - were careful to
say in the quad meeting that their paper on Steinmeier's June
CFE conference was "only a first draft" and there was no
intent to negotiate future changes to the Adapted Treaty in
advance of its ratification. End comment.)

-- German Seminars: German rep Biontino commented at length
on the Steinmeier-proposed June seminar on the Future of Arms
Control in Europe. Berlin envisions this will be at the
Director General level and include all countries that could


eventually join a/CFE (that is, current CFE countries, plus
the Nordics, Balkans, and neutrals). Biontino proposed
elaborating the seminar objectives through several rounds of
consultations with Allies before consulting with Russia. He
explained that FM Steinmeier had announced this seminar
(without prior coordination) at the December OSCE Ministerial
because he wanted to stress to Russia the importance of arms
control, and because of Germany's desire to sustain ongoing
efforts. The objective, he insisted, was not to initiate a
separate process (he called the parallel actions package "the
best show in town"). Rather, Biontino remarked it would be
useful to take stock and openly discuss possible ways forward
through an informal exchange of ideas. We should seek to
'make progress now' in areas where agreement can be reached
while continuing to work towards agreement on issues that
will require longer to resolve. He argued that time was
limited, given the erosion of the CFE regime, and that
Steinmeier's initiative could explore possibilities for
compromise and identify steps to speed the pace of the
negotiations. The result might simply be a framework to keep
the process going. U.S. rep Davis remarked that whether the
German meeting was formal or informal it would be an
important part of the current process, and critical to
carefully consider goals and ensure the Alliance gets the
most out of it to achieve progress. Biontino also noted that
the upcoming seminar at RACVIAC in March was another in the
series of seminars and would focus on conventional arms
control in a strategic environment post-1996 and 1999 and the
implications of progress in technology.

-- CFE and the Medvedev Security Treaty: Several allies,
including Biontino, also stressed that the future of European
security cannot be envisaged without effective arms control -
without CFE. Biontino noted that the German June 10 seminar
is also, in part, an answer to Russia's security treaty
proposal. Several Allies - most insistently the Germans, on
the margins - noted that they did not want CFE to get caught
up in political issues such as Georgia. Many felt strongly
that there should not be a European security Treaty
discussion in the absence of a CFE pillar. The Belgian rep
(De Witte) was clear that Belgium had no interest in
discussing security architecture, institutions, or a treaty
with Russia, but very much wants to keep CFE. Greek rep
Daskarolis called for preserving the "acquis of the Parallel
Actions Package" and isolating CFE efforts from debates on
the future of European security architecture - debates that
Greece (OSCE CiO) argued should take place in Vienna at the
OSCE. Czech rep Zvonkova echoed the Belgian and Greek
sentiments. UK rep Ford stressed that CFE and other European
security issues were inextricably linked by the core
principles that underlie them and warned that by isolating
either there would be a serious risk of undermining these
core principles.


5. (C) The Chair (Erdmann) noted, with regard to the paper
on "Raising NATO's Profile in the Field of Arms Control,
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation," that the SYG's intent is
for an agreed document rather than a Chairman's Report. This
caught a number of Allies by surprise, and several stated
that moving from a chairman's paper to an agreed document
would require more than a head-nod. Several Allies (UK,
Turkey, Germany and U.S.) noted that the current CFE language
in the paper was a reasonable starting point but would need
to be reviewed and possibly revised, an effort that the
HLTF-D will undertake. (Comment: the CFE language is in
fact not the most controversial element of this paper, as
Allies were well aware. End comment)

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UNDERSTANDABLE BUT INEXCUSABLE
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6. (C) Georgia's rejection of Russian Vienna Document
inspection and evaluation requests was briefly discussed in
the HLTF and on the margins. All Allies who spoke on this
(Netherlands, France, Germany, Turkey, Greece, UK, U.S.)
expressed disappointment that Georgia had rejected the
Russian requests noting "we understand the reasons as a
political matter, but we cannot excuse the decision." Allies
underscored their hope that Georgia's action would not have
the effect of undermining implementation of the VDOC


elsewhere. The Turks were worried about a spillover effect
on other regional players - Armenia and Azerbaijan, for
example. The UK and U.S. underscored that Russia was in the
position of the pot calling the kettle black: Russia was
preventing transparency in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and had
been turning down inspections in key parts of the NCMD for
years. But all agreed that lack of transparency was the
wrong answer and that the preference was for the issue to be
addressed in Vienna without furt
her escalation.

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IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS
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7. (C) Preparation for the AIAM: The International Staff
(Miggins) noted that the VCC had requested HLTF guidance on
taking forward VCC papers to the AIAM. Miggins reported
there were four papers that had already achieved consensus.
Allies agreed that current VCC papers should be used to
enrich discussion at the AIAM and could be deployed on a
national basis, and not/not as a NATO position, with the
understanding that any topic without VCC agreement would not
get agreement in Vienna.


8. (C) CFE Inspections: Regarding the Allied CFE
inspection plan, U.S. rep reiterated (per reftel) that all
should continue to attempt to execute inspections of Russia
in accordance with the agreed schedule for the remainder of
the current Treaty year and the upcoming Treaty year. No
Ally disagreed. On the margins, the U.S. rep noted to France
that it was not clear whether or not France had notified
inspections in 2008 as scheduled. The French rep did not
appear aware of the situation; this matter should be further
pursued in the VCC or on the margins.

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MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS
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9. (C) On the margins of the HLTF, the U.S. met with quad
reps from Germany, France and the UK, as well as conducted
bilateral meetings with Turkey, Romania, and Norway. For the
most part, Allies previewed and discussed the same points
that they made in the main HLTF meeting with a few
exceptions.

-- Quad: Much of the discussion in the quad mirrored points
made in plenary; however, in the quad meeting there was a
deeper discussion of German plans and intentions for the June
10 CFE conference in Berlin. Germany (Biontino) helpfully
offered that Germany would not circulate a paper on the
meeting before first having a quad discussion, to include -
he noted after being prompted - at a senior level. He said
Germany had already informed the Russians of the date and
general purpose of the meeting. Asked by the U.S. about
possible flexibility on timing, Biontino suggested that it
would not be possible to shift the meeting to later in the
summer because Steinmeier did not wish to politicize the
meeting by scheduling it close to the German elections in the
fall. He noted that FM Steinmeier would likely send out
invitations in early April. Germany would need a clearer
idea of the purpose and goals for the meeting by then. The
U.S. and UK expressed concern about the apparent intention of
the German meeting, to identify the parameters of a future
renegotiation of the CFE Treaty, noting that it appeared at
odds with the current mainstream of Allied thinking. Germany
agreed that Alliance cohesion was important, but remarked
that it was also a "double-edged sword." The Germans,
supported by the French, underscored the need for visible
progress to halt further erosion of the regime, citing
Georgia's VDOC refusals as evidence of contagion. Germany
suggested that while the June meeting is intended to help
sustain the current, agreed process, it could also serve as
an opportunity to explore new ideas and any room for
compromise.

-- Turkey: Turkish Rep Ahmet Gun's basic message to the U.S.
delegation was unequivocal: Turkey stands solidly behind
every element of the NATO proposal and expects the U.S. to
remain in the leading role. Turkey does not want to change


NATO's position; Ankara thinks Moscow is taking a maximalist
view and playing wait-and-see. Gun sharply underscored that
changes to the Adapted Treaty could only be considered after
it has been ratified and entered into force. He also made
clear a preference to retain the U.S.-RF bilateral dialogue
as the way forward with Russia on CFE, but would be willing,
if the U.S. felt it would be helpful, to join in an expanded
format discussion among interested Allies, provided the
agenda was not exclusively focused on the flank and Turkish
participation was not limited to flank issues. Such an
enlarged group - maybe 8-11 Allies with Russia - would need
to engage on the full Parallel Actions Package agenda, he
said.

-- Romania: Romanian rep Micula delivered a similar (if
maybe tougher) message. Micula stressed that the recent
administration change in Bucharest meant that CFE would be at
the top of the agenda across key agencies. He noted concerns
with the potential legitimization of Russian forces in
Transnistria and Georgia, repeating Romanian preferences for
definitive timelines regarding Russian withdrawal from
Moldova and Georgia as necessary positive signals from
Russia. Regarding the German seminar, Micula expressed
concern with the timing and the context, offering that there
was a clear linkage to upcoming German elections. Romania
has no expectations of any serious evolution in the NATO
position or the situation on the ground between now and the
Summit that would support any changes to the December
communique CFE language.

-- Norway: The bilateral meeting with Norway resulted in a
wide-ranging, interesting and largely off the record
discussion especially with regard to the flank and to
existing political commitments between Russia and Norway.
The U.S. and Norwegian teams exchanged candid readouts of
their respective bilateral meetings with Antonov. EUR
expert Laurendeau recounted in detail A/S Fried's exchange
with Antonov on the status of Russia's political commitments
in the north. Asked by the U.S. whether they would stand by
their political commitments regarding equipment levels in the
north, the Russians had dissembled briefly, noting changes
that had taken place in the political situation since the
commitments were made, such as Baltic membership in NATO.
But then the Russians had indicated they expected Russia
would honor the commitments. The Norwegian team commented
that they had assumed that when Russia suspended CFE they
suspended the related political commitments as well, and had
not raised the issue in their bilateral meeting with Antonov
in early December. The U.S. team observed that in A/S
Fried's discussion in Geneva, it had appeared that the
Russian side was interested in whether the U.S. or its Allies
would consider political commitments as an alternative to the
flank limits. The U.S. team noted that A/S Fried had
responded consistent with the NATO position, underscoring
that Russia's military action in Georgia had if anything
heightened the importance Allies attach to the flank limits.
But Russian probing on this matter was of interest
nonetheless.


10. (SBU) NEXT MEETINGS. Allies agreed, largely in deference
to the U.S. transition process, that there was no need for a
meeting in February. The next meeting should be scheduled
prior to the April 3-4 Summit with sufficient time to
coordinate any CFE-related language. The next HLTF is now
set for March 12, 2009.
VOLKER