NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE ISSUES: WORK PLAN,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000490

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019
TAGS: PINR PINS PREL PTER PROP MOPS NATO RS CH AF
SUBJECT: NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE ISSUES: WORK PLAN,
INTELLIGENCE REFORM, AND THE CHINESE INTELLIGENCE THREAT

REF: A. PO(2009)0148

B. PO(98)101

C. PO(2009)0147

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Classified By: D/PolAd Alejandro "Hoot" Baez. Reasons: 1.4 (b),(c),a
nd (d).


1. (S/REL NATO) SUMMARY: At the October 28 meeting of the
North Atlantic Council (NAC),Allies were briefed on the
draft 2010 Work Plan for the NATO Special Committee. The
Special Committee serves as an advisory body on espionage and
terrorist-related matters. The incoming Chair of the
Committee said that the Committee was an important link for
NATO to the civilian intelligence services of member nations,
but that it had not changed to keep up with the recent
transformations seen elsewhere in the Alliance. He said the
Committee needed guidance from the NAC on the types of
information and advice it wanted from the Committee. Allies
differed over whether the Special Committee should focus its
efforts only on traditional subjects, such as the threat to
NATO from Russian intelligence services, or should expand its
reach to look at issues such as the threat to NATO forces in
Afghanistan from Al Qaeda. The French PermRep argued that
the Special Committee should not engage in an assessment of
the threat from Russian security services, stating that these
proposed topics appeared to have been drafted with a "Cold
War" viewpoint -- despite the fact that NATO recently
expelled two Russian diplomats for activities inconsistent
with their status. The NAC also discussed the broader issue
of NATO intelligence reform, with the UK PermRep arguing for
the appointment of an outside civilian to come in and look at
the issue with "fresh eyes." The Italian PermRep disagreed,
appearing to bristle at the recent proliferation of outside
experts being brought in to solve Alliance problems. While
welcoming the recently reconstituted NATO Headquarters
Intelligence Steering Committee, Ambassador Daalder suggested
that it needed a single chair who could bring together both
the civilian and military sides of NATO intelligence -- such
as the Deputy Secretary General. Allies were also briefed on
a Special Committee assessment of the Chinese intelligence
threat to NATO and NATO member states. END SUMMARY


2. (C/REL NATO) Admiral Branciforte, the head of the Italian
External Information and Security Agency and the incoming
chairman of the NATO Special Committee, briefed the October
28 meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the
Committee's draft 2010 Work Plan (ref A -- emailed to
EUR/RPM). Per its Terms of Reference (ref B),the Special
Committee serves as an advisory body to the Council on
matters of espionage and terrorist or related threats which
may affect the Alliance.

2010 Special Committee Work Plan...
--------------


3. (C/REL NATO) Branciforte said that during its Icelandic
chairmanship, the Committee had conducted an internal debate
on how to better serve the North Atlantic Council, adding
that this was a debate which would continue under the Italian
chairmanship. He said that an early draft of the 2010 Work
Plan had been released so that the Committee could get
political guidance from the NAC, particularly regarding
several innovative proposals such as: "on demand" threat
assessments, the establishment of a Special Committee
Permanent Staff element at NATO Headquarters (to be filled by
Voluntary National Contributions),and enhanced ties with the
Secretary General's Private Office.


4. (C/REL NATO) Branciforte also said that the Committee
needed guidance from the NAC to help it pare down a list of
12 possible "normal" threat assessments to the five that the
Committee would produce during 2010. The list of twelve
included:

-- Al Qaeda and Taliban capability in Pakistan and its impact
on NATO operations in Afghanistan;

-- Afghanistan: Provision of Logistical Support and Know-How

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to ISAF's Adversaries;

-- Threat to NATO Operations in Afghanistan from Iranian
Intelligence Services;

-- North Korean's U-turn on NBRC: What will be the Strategic
Impact of the North Korean Decision to Enhance their
Programme?

-- Al Qaeda Presence in Yemen: Threats and Risks to NATO
Countries;

-- Somalia: Impact of the Deterioration of the Security
Situation in Somalia on NATO Nations;

-- Kosovo: Links between Organized Crime and Political
Figures and Subsequent Risks for KFOR;

-- Modus Operandi of Civilian Cover GRU Officers targeting
the Advanced Technology Field and What Types of Advanced
Technology they are attempting to Acquire;

-- FSB Overseas Operational Activity using International
Counter-Terrorism and Law Enforcement Liaison. Consequent
Threats to NATO Countries;

-- Initiatives by Subversive/Antagonist Circles towards NATO
Targets;

-- Decision-making Process of Extremist Cells: the Role
played by Veterans and Religious Leaders; and

-- The Fight against Imperialism, Militarism, and Security
Policies: Shared Battlefronts of the NATO Countries'
Antagonist Mobilisation Front.

Leads to Vigorous Allied Discussion...
--------------


5. (C/REL NATO) Allied discussion focused on both the
short-term questions at hand, as well as the longer-term
reform of the NATO intelligence system. The Secretary
General welcomed the idea of "on demand" assessments,
although Greece questioned whether these could be done in the
three week timeframe envisioned in the Work Plan. Turkey
said that it was open to a permanent committee staff, but
cautioned that it would need to see the Terms of Reference
for the staff element before giving final approval. Italy
said that it could support a staff element, but only on the
condition that was made up of Voluntary National
Contributions.


6. (C/REL NATO) Allied differences and concerns were more
pointed during the discussion of the proposed "normal" threat
assessments for 2010. The Czech Republic said that it felt
some of the proposed topics went beyond the remit and
expertise of the committee, noting in particular those topics
linked to NATO's out-of-area operations. Lithuania made a
similar point, pointing out that some of the topics would
need to be heavily coordinated with NATO's military
intelligence channels. The Czech PermRep also said that he
did not believe the list reflected the Alliance intelligence
priorities which were set in 2008. Romania said that the
topics should be handled consistent with the Special
Committee's core expertise: counter-intelligence and
counter-terrorism. The UK agreed, arguing that it would be
better if the Special Committee focused on topics that played
to its strengths. In this regard, the UK said that the
proposed assessments of the threat from the Russian FSB and
GRU intelligence services were a much better fit for the
Special Committee than were the proposed topics on what Al
Qaeda was doing in Afghanistan or on the logistics of ISAF's
adversaries. The French PermRep took a very different
approach, complaining that the proposed assessments on Russia
appeared to have been drafted from a "Cold War" viewpoint --
despite the fact that NATO expelled two Russian diplomats
earlier this year for activities not consistent with their
diplomatic status. Other Allies -- such as Denmark and

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Iceland -- argued for a mix of traditional and newer topics.

Including On NATO Intelligence Reform
--------------


7. (C/REL NATO) Allies used the opportunity to discuss the
need for more far-reaching NATO intelligence reform, with the
Netherlands asking how Branciforte saw the division of labor
between the Special Committee and other relevant committees
such as the Economic Committee. Canada said that the NAC
would be best served by a holistic approach to intelligence,
which resulted both in a streamlining of the NATO
intelligence system and more coordination among the elements
of that system. Canada suggested that the Senior Political
Committee be appointed as the lead committee to oversee
intelligence reform.


8. (C/Rel NATO) The Secretary General said that he had
recently reconstituted the NATO Headquarters Intelligence
Steering Committee (NHISC) which would have civilian and
military co-chairs. He said the NHISC had been tasked to
conduct an audit of the NATO intelligence system and draft a
report with its results.


9. (C/REL NATO) UK PermRep Eldon said that until Allies knew
where NATO was going with intelligence reform generally, it
would be difficult to make specific recommendations for the
Special Committee. He said that the NHISC might be a part of
the solution to HQ intelligence reform, but expressed
skepticism that a working group of insiders would be
sufficient to conduct the reforms needed. He suggested that
the Secretary General appoint an outside civilian "owner" who
could look at the issue with "fresh eyes" and then make
appropriate recommendations. The Italian PermRep, however,
cautioned that there had already been a lot of talk in NATO
recently about bringing in outside experts to fix one problem
or another. (Note: This was likely a reference to both the
Strategic Concept Group of Experts and the recently agreed
Senior Officials Group tasked with looking at resource
issues.) He said that Rasmussen, who only took on the job of
being Secretary General in August, was himself a "fresh pair
of eyes." He encouraged further internal efforts to reform
NATO intelligence processes before turning to an outside
"intelligence czar."


10. (C/REL NATO) Ambassador Daalder agreed with those who
said that the role of the Special Committee could not be
divorced from the larger issue of NATO intelligence reform.
He welcomed the reconstitution of the NHISC, but questioned
whether it would not be better to have a single chair above
both the civilian and military intelligence representatives.
He added that perhaps this was a role the Deputy Secretary
General could take on.


11. (C/REL NATO) Poland said that the Special Committee
should maintain its important early warning role for the NAC,
adding that the Alliance needed unfettered intelligence which
was free from political interference.

Branciforte Responds
--------------


12. (C/REL NATO) In response, Branciforte said that the
Special Committee was an important link for the NAC to the
civilian intelligence services of member nations. Noting
that the Special Committee was one of the oldest in NATO, he
argued that it had not kept up with the changes that had
taken place within the rest of the Alliance. He suggested
that perhaps it was time to revise the Committee's Terms of
Reference. (Note: The Committee's Terms of Reference were
last revised in 1998.) He said that this was why the
Committee was looking to guidance from the Council on what
types of information and advice it should provide.

The Chinese Intelligence Threat
--------------


13. (S/REL NATO) A representative from the Canadian Security

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Intelligence Service briefed PermReps on a Special Committee
assessment of the potential intelligence threat to NATO and
its member nations from Chinese intelligence services.
(Note: The report -- ref C -- is classified at the NATO
Secret level. Those with appropriate NATO clearances may
obtain a copy from their NATO registry or sub-registry.)
HEFFERN