Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO449
2009-10-13 18:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

MONTENEGRO AND BOSNIA MAP: A SNAPSHOT OF ALLIED

Tags:  NATO PREL BK MW GG UP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000449 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

BELGRADE PASS TO PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: NATO PREL BK MW GG UP
SUBJECT: MONTENEGRO AND BOSNIA MAP: A SNAPSHOT OF ALLIED
OPINION

Classified By: DCM John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000449

NOFORN
SIPDIS

BELGRADE PASS TO PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: NATO PREL BK MW GG UP
SUBJECT: MONTENEGRO AND BOSNIA MAP: A SNAPSHOT OF ALLIED
OPINION

Classified By: DCM John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: With the December 2-3 NATO Foreign
Ministerial quickly approaching, Allies are beginning to
seriously discuss whether and how to respond to the
applications of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
to join the Membership Action Plan process. While most
Allies do not believe that BiH is ready for MAP, there are
mixed views about how to handle Montenegro's application. Of
particular concern for some Allies is how a positive decision
on MAP for Montenegro could impact Ukraine and Georgia. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C/NF) In recent weeks, we have had a series of
discussions with Allies about how the Alliance should respond
at the December Foreign Ministerial to the Membership Action
Plan applications of Montenegro and Bosnia. While most
Allies acknowledged that their capitals were still reviewing
the questions involved, the following provides an initial
snapshot of Allied opinion on the subject.

--------------
What to do with Montenegro?
--------------


3. (C/NF) Allies generally acknowledge that Montenegro has
been heading in the right direction in its reforms, but have
not yet formed a common opinion on how they should respond to
Podgorica's November 2008 application to join the Membership
Action Plan (MAP). While most countries still do not yet
have a national position, several main camps have emerged.


4. (C/NF) Germany, which as little as six months ago sought
to downplay Montenegro's successes during its Individual
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) assessment, recently said it
was "quite positive" about granting Montenegro's MAP
application at the December Foreign Ministerial. Canada,
Hungary, and Slovenia also appear ready to make a positive
decision on Montenegro's MAP application in December.


5. (C/NF) Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania and the
Czech Republic -- while not opposed in principle to granting
MAP to Montenegro -- are concerned about the impact such a
decision could have on Georgia and Ukraine, countries that

sought unsuccessfully for years to join MAP. They fear that
the two countries would feel like they are being
"leap-frogged" by countries that have been on the NATO reform
path for a much shorter time. They also fear that it could
send the wrong signal to Moscow, leading it to conclude
(despite NATO summit assurances to the contrary) that it had
been successful in pressuring Allies to set aside the
possibility of a NATO future for these two countries. As a
result, supporters of Ukraine and Georgia might try to link
MAP for Montenegro with more forward leaning language for
Ukraine and Georgia. In other words, they would want to make
clear that Ukraine and Georgia would not still have to
through the MAP process at a later stage. We have urged
against this approach, which would reopen the divisive MAP
debates of the last two years. Similarly, we have urged
Germany to refrain from divisive language from their side.


6. (C/NF) France had wanted to hold off on Montenegro at
least until the spring to forestall the old debates over
Ukraine and Georgia. The French delegation has since told us
that it might agree to Montenegro MAP in December, if/if
France can be convinced that this can be accomplished without
reopening the old debates. Similarly, the Netherlands told
us that it had not received updated instructions from the
ones they had at NATO's Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April --
which was to avoid the enlargement debate.


7. (C/NF) The UK would also like to hold off on Montenegro
until the spring, but for different reasons. London admits
that Montenegro is ready for MAP, but hopes to leverage a

USNATO 00000449 002 OF 003


linkage with Bosnia to force BiH to make needed reforms. The
UK plan would call for language in the December ministerial
communique noting that the two countries will have the
implementation of their Individual Partnership Action Plan
(IPAP) assessed in the spring. According to the UK, the
December communique could state that "with a good IPAP
assessment" the two countries could then be invited to join
MAP. Poland has expressed some sympathy with the UK
position, but has noted that it would not block any emerging
consensus to offer MAP to Montenegro in December. (Note:
Although Germany has acknowledged that the completion of the
IPAP cycle is not a prerequisite for MAP, it has also said
that the UK suggestion is "not unreasonable." End Note)

-------------- -
The easier case - Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
-------------- -


8. (C/NF) BiH, which only applied to join MAP on October 2,
presents a far easier case. Few Allies are willing to
consider a positive decision for Bosnia at this time. While
Allies generally want to see BiH integrate into Euro-Atlantic
structures, they believe that the country is currently
trending in the wrong direction. Not only do they doubt the
current government's ability to carry out the reforms
necessary to be successful in MAP, they worry that the
country is too politically unstable. As a result, most
Allies will be reluctant to grant MAP until they see evidence
that the BiH is emerging from its latest political crisis.
Norway, for example, has said that it would want to see
visible progress in the implementation of reforms and not
just the passage of legislation before agreeing to grant MAP
status.


9. (C/NF) There are a few exceptions to this general trend,
however. Croatia wants to press for Bosnian MAP in December,
although its Mission to NATO is more realistic about Zagreb's
limited chance of success to push this issue through to a
positive answer. Although Madrid has said it has not
reached a final decision, the Spanish Mission told us that it
has historically favored a "regional approach" and therefore
might support MAP for both countries in December. Hungary
and Slovenia have informally said there is some merit in
rewarding what positive behavior BiH has demonstrated by
supporting its application for MAP. These countries,
however, are clearly in the minority.


10. (C/NF) Even if these issues were resolved, the problems
already identified in the case of Montenegro -- particularly
how to handle the related issue of Georgia and Ukraine --
would also apply to Bosnia.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C/NF) Getting consensus to grant MAP for Montenegro in
December will require that we press Allies on both sides of
the Ukraine/Georgia debate to stick to the hard-fought
compromises that have already been reached. Attempts by
supporters of those countries to press for more forward
leaning language could not only derail Montenegro MAP, it
could also lead to a refighting of the bloody battles Allies
fought over the last several years. Not only is it likely
that Ukraine/Georgia supporters would be unsuccessful in
achieving their goals, it might actually prove to be
counter-productive. Getting them to back off will require us
to make clear that we will continue to support Ukraine and
Georgia in their aspirations via their new Commission/ANP
mechanism. Similarly, we must push back against any efforts
by Germany or others to claim that our decision to pursue MAP
for Montenegro means that MAP must therefore also be the
ultimate path for Ukraine and Georgia. Only if both sides
abide by the agreed truce can we successfully put NATO

USNATO 00000449 003 OF 003


enlargement back on track in the Balkans.
DAALDER