SEPTEMBER 17 HLTF REAFFIRMS NATO SUPPORT FOR U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000411

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 17 HLTF REAFFIRMS NATO SUPPORT FOR U.S.
EFFORTS TO FIND CFE SOLUTION WITH RUSSIA BASED ON THE
PARALLEL ACTIONS PACKAGE; ALLIES ASKED FOR VIEWS ON WAY
AHEAD, INCLUDING DECEMBER CFE DATA EXCHANGE

REF: STATE 95492

Classified By: Deputy POLAD A. "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).


1. (C) Summary: During the September 17 HLTF meeting and
related consultations the previous day, Allies welcomed the
U.S.'s detailed readout of A/S Rose Gottemoeller's September
3 discussion of CFE with Russian Disarmament Director Antonov
and expressed interest in the new ideas that were informally
discussed at the meeting. U.S. Rep Rich Davis indicated
that in light of Antonov's continued failure to engage in a
problem-solving way on CFE, the U.S. was considering at a
senior level what our next steps should be, and invited
Allied input. He explained that Antonov had proposed a
formal U.S.-Russian bilateral meeting at the end of
September, but the U.S. had demurred, preferring first to
take stock with Allies and in Washington. He noted that one
specific issue Allies need to consider is how to handle the
December CFE data exchange: two years out from Russia's
suspension, it was fair to ask whether NATO Allies should
continue to provide data, while Russia does not. No Ally
suggested it would be a good idea not/not to provide data,
and Turkey and Norway said Allies should continue to do so.
The Chair agreed that this question would be on the agenda of
the next meeting, which is scheduled for October 29.


2. (C) Summary continued: All Allies who addressed the
question of the way ahead focused on four common themes: CFE
is worth preserving and the Parallel Actions Package--which
Allies labored hard to agree--is the "only game in town" to
find a way forward; a unified NATO position is paramount; the
U.S.-Russia dialogue is the modality most likely to develop a
CFE solution, but that multilateral engagement between the
U.S., Russia, and a small, self-selected group of Allies is
potentially valuable, and; delaying multilateral engagement
with Russia is appropriate if the timing is not right for
results-oriented negotiation, as long as CFE stays on the
political agenda. Some Allies, particularly the Turks, have
clear ideas on next steps; many Allies appear to believe that
Moscow has not reached a conclusion about whether and under
what conditions it wants to keep CFE. In response to extended
discussion of and some confusion about the ideas Gottemoeller
raised informally with Antonov, the U.S. offered to circulate
a paper to Allies that described the concept of trial
implementation and how it differed from the Russian proposal
for provisional application. End Summary.


3. (C) Comment: It seems clear that Allies are unwilling to
surrender ground on principles like host nation consent or
the flank, and have not considered alternatives to the
present course: engaging Russia, demonstrating flexibility
within the Parallel Actions Package and waiting for Russia to
decide whether it is interested in negotiating seriously on
this basis. The new German HLTF Rep, for example, made clear
in private comments to the U.S. that Germany is not thinking
about how to find a way out of CFE and to a new agreement,
but rather of how to get A/CFE into force. It is also
notable that a number of Allies were represented by new or
substitute officials during a period of transition (including
the UK, Germany, Romania),which may have decreased the
robustness of discussion. End Comment.

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Debriefing U.S.-Russia Bilats
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4. (C) U.S. Rep Davis briefed Allies in detail, per Ref A, on
A/S Gottemoeller's September 3 discussions of CFE with
Antonov. He described the idea Gottemoeller had advanced
informally, of combining a period of trial implementation of
Adapted CFE with agreement on a specified timeline for
ratification of the Adapted Treaty by NATO Allies. He
distinguished this idea, which was focused on getting Russia
to resume Treaty implementation, from Russia's concept for
provisional application of the Adapted Treaty once a majority
of CFE states had ratified. He underscored that Gottemoeller
had made clear to Antonov that ratification of the Adapted
Treaty by the U.S. and many others was impossible while
Russia's suspension persisted. Gottemoeller had also made

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clear that this set of steps - a specific timeline for
ratification combined with trial implementation of Adapted
CFE by Russia and others - if agreed would become an integral
part of the Parallel Actions Package and would be considered
only in the context of agreement on all the elements of the
package.


5. (C) Davis said that Antonov had not rejected this idea,
but had focused instead on Russia's own ideas for provisional
application and, more importantly, on the flank. Antonov had
made clear that "ratification is not enough." Antonov
elaborated clearly and unambiguously on the language of the
Russian aide-memoire which cited the flank as an issue that
needed to be resolved as a "precondition" for any deal that
would be acceptable to Moscow. He asserted repeatedly that
legally binding limits on Russian forces within Russian
territory needed to be dropped in order to make agreement on
the parallel actions package possible. Davis noted that
questions relating to a definition of substantial combat
forces, Georgia, and Moldova had also been discussed in
familiar terms, but that the flank and ideas relating to
provisional application, trial implementation, and
ratification had been the core of the discussion. He said
that Gottemoeller had been disappointed by this Russian
response. She had urged Antonov to view the updating of CFE
as a process that would begin before entry into force of
Adapted CFE, and continue beyond it. Gottemoeller said that
not all issues could be addressed before Entry into Force
(EIF). The flank issue, which is critically important for
NATO Allies, was among those that we envisioned discussing
after EIF.

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Allies' Reaction
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6. (C) Trial Implementation and Provisional Application:
Several Allies expressed appreciation for this "latest U.S.
effort" to come up with a creative way forward. Either in
the plenary or on the margins, some Allies (Turkey, Czech
Republic, Romania, Norway, Canada) expressed reservations
about such an arrangement, in particular voicing concern
about the implications that any trial implementation
arrangement would have for other elements of the Parallel
Actions Package, such as the flank, Georgia, and Moldova (a
view likely held because they did not understand that it
would be an integral part of an agreed parallel actions
package). Most Allies who spoke on this set of issues, both
in the HLTF and on the margins, expressed varying degrees of
confusion about the distinctions between Russia's provisional
application, and the U.S concept for trial implementation as
part of a CFE package deal.

-- Romanian Acting Rep Barbulescu said that her government
could not consider provisional application at all; Romania's
constitution had changed since 1992, when the original CFE
Treaty was provisionally applied. She asked what trial
implementation would portend for Georgia and Moldova, and was
reassured that those issues would need to be resolved as part
of the package that included trial implementation.

-- Turkish Rep Ahmet Gun's concerns were clear and his
language was precise. Like Romania, he was concerned that
trial implementation, in the absence of a deal on Georgia and
Moldova, would betray basic NATO principles on host nation
consent (the point was also raised by Norway. U.S. Rep
emphasized again that Georgia and Moldova solutions would
remain part of the same package deal that triggered trial
implementation). Privately, Gun said he opposed trial
implementation of data and verification elements of Adapted
CFE, without including the flank, indicating that this would
suggest that the flank was no longer part of the Treaty.


7. (C) In the full HLTF and on the margins, members of the
U.S. team sought to make clear that the U.S. idea for trial
implementation was to get Russia implementing CFE again and
thus help create the basis for ratification of Adapted CFE by
NATO Allies; the Russians appeared to have in mind that
Allies would ratify Adapted CFE whether or not Russia was

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implementing the Treaty. To help clarify the concepts, while
also making clear that the U.S. had discussed an idea in
order to gauge Russian interest, and had not made a formal
proposal, U.S. Rep offered to put an explanation on paper and
circulate it to Allies through the IS. This was warmly
welcomed. (Comment. It is clear that Allies want to digest
this idea before reaching a conclusion about whether it has
merit or should be pursued further. End Comment.)


8. (C) A specified timeline for ratification: No Ally
commented explicitly on the idea of establishing a specified
timeline for ratification. However, nearly all who spoke to
aspects of this issue underscored that ratification would
simply be impossible unless there was agreement on the
parallel actions package, and Russia had resumed
implementation.


9. (C) Flank limits: Turkey and Norway made clear in
bilateral meetings on the margins that elimination of the
flank was a non-starter for their governments. Several
other Allies, notably Italy, which is otherwise very flexible
on addressing Russian desiderata, expressed irritation that
Russia continued to insist on a maximalist position with
regard to this issue. Italy asserted that Russia needed to
decide whether or not it wanted CFE and the rigorous approach
it represents, as well as the commitment to cooperative
security the Treaty epitomizes.

-- Ahmet Gun reiterated a point he has made previously: his
Parliament would not ratify A/CFE without the flank
provisions. Privately, he made clear that Turkey would
oppose ideas for trial implementation that suggested the
flank was no longer part of the Treaty. In response, U.S.
team explained that Gottemoeller had made clear to Antonov
that all three core elements of CFE were important --
limitations, verification, and data exchange -- but that in a
trial, we hoped for constructive ambiguity: all the CFE
states would affirm their support for the Treaty as a whole,
but agree as a gesture of goodwill to begin trial
implementation, for a specified period, of key operational
provisions.

-- Reassured, Gun postulated, on a personal basis, that
Turkey might be able to come up with some language for the
parallel actions package that would give voice to this
creative ambiguity. He underscored that for this deal to
work, Russia could not say publicly that the flank had been
eliminated, and Turkey could not say that the flank would
last forever. He appeared to have in mind language for the
parallel actions package that would state explicitly that
Russia had won agreement to review the flank provisions after
the Adapted Treaty entered into force.

No Ally hinted at the question of whether Allies should be
prepared to consider a deal where CFE's legally binding flank
limits are converted into political commitments.


10. (C) December Data Exchange: In the HLTF itself there
were only a few comments on the question of the December data
exchange. None suggested it would be a good idea for NATO
not/not to continue to provide data: Turkey, Italy, Norway
said that NATO needed to continue to maintain the high moral
ground on CFE. Gun was explicit: the fact that December
marked two years of Russian non-implementation was "of little
importance." What was important was to save the Treaty. A
failure to exchange data would be a step in the CFE "funeral
procession." The HLTF agreed to return to this discussion in
October.

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Allied Ideas on the Way Ahead
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11. (C) Discussion of the way ahead took place in light of
the U.S. debrief in the HLTF. However, it was plain both in
meetings on the margin and in the full HLTF on 9/17, that
Allies were not particularly surprised, nor discouraged, by
continued Russian rigidity on the key issues. A number of
Allies focused on the potential utility of a meeting between

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Russia, the U.S. and a self-selected "expanded group" of
Allies (which they rely upon the U.S. to arrange). Allies
remain interested in this idea, and most view it as second,
after the U.S.-Russia bilateral channel, in terms of
potential value to get CFE on track. Most are open to the
idea of a NATO-Russia discussion of CFE, which would involve
all Allies, but are under no illusions that an NRC(ACE)
meeting would be productive given likely Russian
representation.


12. (C) Turkey: The extensive U.S.-Turkish bilateral
meeting September 15 was detailed and substantive. Gun
introduced his successor (Tusel) and expressed appreciation
for A/S Gottemoeller's briefing of Amb Sensoy in Washington.
Turkey was open to a U.S.-Turkish bilateral meeting in
Ankara, but timing is a serious concern because of their
impending personnel changes. He asked if the team would be
led by A/S Gottemoeller and seemed interested to learn if
there would be political level representation. Gun expressed
strong support for U.S. efforts to work creatively with the
Russians as the best potential way forward on CFE. Initially
wary of the trial implementation idea, he was reassured when
U.S. team made clear that it would only occur in the context
of an acceptable deal on the parallel actions package as a
whole. Gun's comments on the flank made clear that Ankara is
thinking about a way to offer Russia an olive branch on the
flank, essentially via a public commitment to review the
continued application of the flank limits after entry into
force.

-- In terms of the way ahead, Gun was obviously disconcerted
by the U.S. suggestion that the U.S. did not believe timing
was favorable for an expanded group meeting with Russia, and
by the idea that NATO Allies should consider whether to
fulfill CFE's annual data requirements in December. He was
not surprised that Russia was not prepared to close on a
deal; his prescription is that NATO should remain patient,
active, and unified. He said he could envision the
following benchmarks for CFE in fall:

-- U.S.-Russia Bilateral meeting
-- U.S.-Russia-Selected Allies meeting
-- U.S.-Turkey bilateral meeting
-- Possible Turkey-Russia bilateral meeting.
-- Data exchange in December


13. (C) Romania: Apart from concerns about provisional
application, the substitute Romanian representative appeared
to be firmly in the mainstream of Alliance thinking: continue
to engage Russia on the basis of the parallel actions
package. Romania said it would have to conduct an
interagency review on the data exchange question and examine
the possible consequences of this action. The Romanian rep
implied that a trial implementation arrangement could be
acceptable, but we would need to think through the
implications of having multiple versions of CFE subject to
implementation.


14. (C) Canada: Canadian Rep Poupart said Canada was ready
to accept a "pause" in expanded group engagement with Russia
on CFE if Russia is not ready to move ahead. She reiterated
familiar, widely-held Allied concern that continued Russian
refusal to offer any compromises in order help find a way
ahead on CFE is the core problem. She said that Allies
cannot offer more on substance until Russia has taken a
serious step toward meeting NATO's concerns. She said Canada
will join consensus on the December data exchange, but
because Canada has no forces in Europe, Ottawa does not feel
it has standing to take the lead on this issue.


15. (C) Quad: With a substitute UK Rep and a new German HLTF
Rep at the meeting, discussion at the French-hosted HLTF Quad
meeting was desultory. Support for continued U.S.-Russia
engagement was the main theme. The French and U.S. teams
underscored the need to consider how CFE will be addressed in
the context of the December Ministerials, particularly in
light of the separate (but related) Corfu process.

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Bilats and Contacts
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16. (C) An extensive tour de table involving most Allies in
the HLTF revealed that a majority had been demarched by
Russia in July on Moscow's ideas for provisional application
of Adapted CFE. Many said explicitly that they had deferred
substantive comment until the questions raised by the
Russians could be discussed among Allies. A few expressed an
interest in discussing whether Allies should consider
coordinating their responses to specific questions raised by
Russia. Other Allies (GE, NO, CA) questioned whether
Russia's proposal was a sincere effort to move things forward
or a tactic to test the firmness of the Alliance position.


17. (C) The I.S. reported that in early August Russia had
indicated that it would like to discuss A/CFE within the NRC
format; however, subsequent interactions with the Russian
Mission at NATO had resulted in mixed signals about the
possibility of a CFE discussion in the NRC or NRC ACE. Most
Allies who commented on this agreed that if Russia requested
such a meeting, NATO should agree to it provided that the
agenda was well-prepared, substantive and balanced.

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Next Meeting
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18. (U) The next HLTF is currently scheduled for October 29.
DAALDER