DECEMBER 17-18 MEETING OF VCC EXPERTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000004

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2019
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL NATO
SUBJECT: DECEMBER 17-18 MEETING OF VCC EXPERTS

REF: A. A. STATE 132758

B. B. CSB-RS-08-0149-F041

C. C. AC/319-N(2008)0017-REV1

Classified By: A/DCM Walter Andrusyszyn for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).


1. (C/REL NATO) Summary: During meetings of Experts on 17
and 18 December, Allies de-conflicted the 2009 Vienna
Document 99 Verification Schedule. In addition, the U.S.
secured CFE quota inspections to Armenia and Ukraine, a Flank
inspection to Ukraine and two Additional Paid inspections to
Ukraine for the Treaty year beginning in March 2009. Should
Russia return to full implementation of the CFE Treaty, the
U.S. has secured two unrestricted Quota Inspections, eight
Flank Inspections and eight Flank Supplemental Inspections in
the Russian Federation. The U.S. has also secured two more
Additional Paid Inspections to Ukraine for the current Treaty
year.


2. (C/REL NATO) All Allies attended the U.S.-led meeting on
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and seemed to
welcome the U.S. initiative. Most Allies argued that a
decision on whether to declare MRAPs under VD 99, CFE and/or
GEMI should be made based on a vehicle's capability (ability
to hold a squad and travel cross country, etc.) not its
intended use. In the minority, Belgium noted that it had not
declared its Dingo 2, in part, because it intended to use
them only for peace support operations. France cautioned
Allies not to undermine standing Allied positions when
deciding whether to declare MRAPs.


3. (C/REL CZ) The Czech Republic's verification agency
approached USDel informally to initiate discussion on
potential implementation issues arising from future Russian
Federation verification activities conducted in the vicinity
of the planned U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense radar site.
The Czech side outlined potential verification issues and
expressed the need for both sides' verification agencies to
conduct additional consultations in the future.


4. (SBU) Experts agreed that further discussion on Russia's
new visa regime as notified in REF B should be held in
Vienna. Experts also agreed that discussion on Russia's
proposal to set concrete parameters for a Specified Area
should remain in Vienna. Experts will return to the five
remaining AIAM discussion papers and modalities for deploying
those papers at the AIAM at the next meeting of Experts in
January. Guidance requested in para 28. End Summary.

Vienna Document (VD) 99 Verification Activity Deconfliction
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5. (SBU) Experts opened their meeting on 17 December by
deconflicting the 2009 VD 99 verification activities
schedule. As was the case for 2008, the 2009 deconflicted
schedule mitigates Allies' tendency to concentrate
verification activities in the first two or three months of
the year. Most Allies seemed satisfied with the distribution
of activities despite the fact that the majority of
inspections and evaluations will fall between January and
August. Norway, however, noted that in some cases Allies had
scheduled two or more activities on sequential weeks to the
same country. Norway cautioned Allies to distribute their
activities more evenly so as not to overburden countries with
smaller verification centers (Armenia for example). In
response to Norway's comments, two Allies decided to adjust
their plans to avoid such concentrations.

CFE Allocations for the Treaty Year Beginning March 2009
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6. (C/REL NATO) The U.S. has secured the following CFE
inspection allocations for the Treaty year beginning March
2009:

-- For inspections of States Parties other than the Russian
Federation:
1 to Armenia
1 to Ukraine
1 Flank inspection in Ukraine
2 Additional Paid Inspections in Ukraine
-- For inspections of the Russian Federation
2 Unrestricted Quota Inspections
8 Flank Inspections
8 Flank Supplemental Inspections

(Note: Per REF A, USDel bid for all remaining inspection
quotas following Allies' bidding. After securing the
remaining six unallocated Flank and Flank Supplemental
Inspections for Russia, USDel noted that, the U.S. would, at
Allies request, be open to consultation on the execution of
these inspections should circumstances change (i.e. should
Russia return to full implementation.) End Note.)


7. (C/REL NATO) The U.S. also secured two more Additional
Paid Inspections in Ukraine for the current Treaty year.


8. (SBU) Following the bidding process, the IS requested
Allies to begin deconflicting the CFE inspection schedule.
Approximately half of Allies provided preliminary dates for
their activities. The IS intends to conclude the
deconfliction process at the January meeting. Mission
requests proposed dates for U.S. CFE inspections.

U.S. Meeting on MRAP Vehicles
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9. (C/REL NATO) After the VCC Experts Meeting, the USDel
(Meyer) chaired an informal working group to discuss the arms
control implications of fielding mine-resistant,
ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles in the CFE Area of
Application. USDel Member Alberque (OSD-ATL) delivered the
cleared talking points (REF A) to the informal working group,
and provided support to answer questions and conduct
bilateral discussions after the presentation.


10. (C/REL NATO) In response to the U.S. presentation, the UK
representative stated that they have already declared the
Cougar HE (UK nomenclature: Mastiff) as an armored personnel
carrier under the CFE and VD99. France noted that reliance
on squad size alone to exclude vehicles from the armored
combat vehicle definitions could have a negative impact on
NATO equities, such as counting the BRM-1K. USDel replied
that the MRAP is not a pre-existing type in the POET, while
the BRM-1K is a modified version of the BMP-1.


11. (C/REL NATO) The Belgian representative indicated that
Belgium has not declared the Dingo 2 vehicle in CFE, VD 99 or
GEMI since it is intended to support peace operations, not
offensive actions. The Czech delegate supported the Belgian
decision, but noted that the Dingo does not carry a full
squad. The Czech Republic said it had consulted with Germany
and Belgium before concluding that the Dingo is not
reportable. The Czech decision was based on the fact that
the Dingo 2 does not carry a squad, it is not tracked and
therefore not a combat vehicle, it is not in the mainstream
of their conventional armed forces but instead is only meant
for one mission, and it is deployed outside the AoA/ZoA.


12. (C/REL NATO) The French representative declared that they
will not count their new MRAP-like vehicle, the PVP, in
conventional arms control. The Spanish representative
indicated that Spain plans to declare their RG-31E (Category
II MRAP with expanded interior to carry a full squad) in the
summer of 2009. The Netherlands representative said they
declared their Bushmaster MRAP-like vehicle as an APC under
CFE and VD 99, though there are only small numbers in the
AoA. Canada had no information about their previous
declaration of the RG-31 MRAP vehicle as an APC under GEMI,
but stated unequivocally that vehicle capabilities, not
doctrine, should drive declarations. Italy supported this
statement, adding that they object when Russia attempts to
declare APCs as ambulances when they clearly are not. The
German representative told the group that they submitted an
F00 to declare their MRAP-like vehicles entering service, but
would not be declared them as treaty limited equipment and
encouraged other nations to do the same. The U.S. (Meyer)
noted satisfaction with the discussion and resolved to
continue the dialogue with Allies as needed in the future.


13. (C/REL NATO) In a bilateral discussion afterwards, the
Alberque spoke with the UK representative about the reasons
behind their declaration of the Cougar HE as an APC under
CFE. The UK representative reminded that, lacking a
definition of cross-country capability, and considering the
previous UK declaration of the Saxon as an APC, there was no
logical or legal argument to exclude the Cougar HE from
categorization as an APC. The two determined that further
dialog is warranted.

Informal BMD Conversation with Czech Republic
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14. (C/REL CZ) Following the formal session of the meeting of
Experts on 17 December, COL Gabriel Kovacs of the Czech Arms
Control Department (ACA) approached USDel members Wright
(DTRA-OSAE) and Shepherd (DTRA-OSEJ) with a request to
informally discuss the CSBM and CFE implementation modalities
associated with negotiated site of the U.S. Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) radar located on the territory of the Czech
republic. COL Kovacs noted he had been given permission by
the government of the Czech Republic to initiate discussions
between verification agencies within the parameters of
current arms control treaties and agreements; namely CFE, VD
99 and Open Skies. COL Kovacs also noted the need for
additional consultations once the political negotiations on
U.S.-Czech-Russian verification of the BMD site were
concluded.


15. (C/REL CZ) During the ensuing discussion it was
postulated that, in accordance with standard practices
established for current treaties and CSBMs, DTRA would need
to deploy liaison teams to support the Czech Verification
Agency (ACA) whenever the Czech Republic anticipated a
verification activity in the region of the Czech Republic
hosting the U.S. BMD site. The future BMD radar is to be
located on a small facility at the southwest corner of the
Brdy Military Training Area, an associated training area to a
declared site, Jince, Czech OOV number 4, for the 132nd
Artillery Battalion. The declared site and associated
territory, minus the radar site, will exceed 20 square
kilometers and will, therefore, be subject to helicopter over
flight during CFE inspections. The BMD radar site will have
a distinct perimeter with a cleared ground security zone of
500 meters and an aerial no-fly security zone of 4.5
kilometers. This no-fly zone will preclude direct over
flights of the radar site under CFE and Vienna Document. COL
Kovacs commented that he would expect the site would shut
down during Open Skies over flights. As such, ACA has
offered to provide DTRA-OSE operations center with Open Skies
flight plans so that the U.S. will have advance warning of
when and from where an Open Skies mission would approach the
radar site.

Impact of Russia's New Visa Regime on Verification Activities
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16. (SBU) Experts severely criticized Russia's changes to
their visa procedures as notified in REF B. Turkey opened
the salvo by characterizing Russia's notification as a "new
challenge in the wake of Russia's CFE suspension" and warned
that Russia was attempting to "limit the spirit of VD 99."
According to the Turkish delegation, the issue has been
forwarded to the Turkish MFA and the Turkish delegation in
Vienna. Turkey claimed it would reciprocate should Russia
actually enforce its new policy. The United Kingdom and
Norway added support for Turkey's position.


17. (SBU) Taking an even harder line, Canada argued that
Russia's new visa regime will prevent participating States
from conducting activities under the provision of paragraphs
85 and 112 of VD 99. Canada maintained that under the new
procedures, Canada would have to follow standard procedures
and submit a visa request for its team, including arrival
data and itinerary, to the Russian Federation ten prior to
arrival in Russia if it wanted to execute its right to select
a preferred POE other than Moscow, St. Petersberg and
Kaliningrad. (Note. Russia's Paragraphs 85 states that an
inspection request "will be submitted at least 36 hours, but
no more than five days, prior to the estimated entry into the
territory of the receiving state." Para 112 sets similar
timeline for evaluations requests at "not later than five,
but not earlier than seven days, prior to entry into the
territory of the receiving state." End Note.)


18. (SBU) Italy chimed in with support, but refused to go as
far as accusing Russia of non-compliance. Belgium added that
Russia's notification also restricts entry to airports only,
thus limiting participating States to air transportation
only. France proposed that the discussion be taken to Vienna
where Allies can coordinate a more effect response by
enlisting non-Alliance partners.


19. (SBU) USDel delivered points per REF A, and supported
France's call for discussions to continue in Vienna. USDel
opined that Allied conclusions (Russia may be attempting to
limit the spirit of VD 99, Russia has violated the provisions
of VD 99, etc.) seem based solely on Allied perceptions of
Russia's policy as noted in the F-41. Any discussion should,
therefore, begin with a request for Russia to clarify its
position and intentions.
E


20. (SBU) The discussion ended with a consensus that Allies
should raise the visa issue in Vienna as soon as possible.
(Note. Despite this strong agreement, no Ally, to include
the UK, who's delegation in Vienna had already attempted to
coordinate an Allied statement, commented on the specifics of
the next steps or volunteered to take the lead. End Note.)

Implementation Coordination
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21. (SBU) Experts have reached tentative consensus on the IS
working paper on Implementation Coordination
(AC/319-WP(2008)0009-Rev5). Experts agreed that, on a trial
basis for 2009, Allies would adopt procedures as stated in
option two of paragraph 8. Under this formulation, if a
non-Allied pS notifies their intent to inspect or evaluate a
given country ahead of a scheduled Ally, the first Ally
scheduled for a like activity to that country following a
four-week period will forfeit its assigned allocation.
(Note. This procedure is meant to eliminate any advantage an
Ally might find in rushing to be the first to inspect or
evaluate any given country. The four-week grace period,
which begins on the date of transmission of the non-Allied
notification, is intended to protect an Ally already having
committed resources for a planned activity at the time a
non-Ally transmits its notification. End Note.) While
agreeing to the process in principle, Belgium noted it would
have to consult with capital on the length
of the grace period before joining consensus. With Belgium's
concurrence, Allies can expect to reach consensus on this
paper at the next Experts meeting January.

AIAM Discussion Papers
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22. (SBU) Experts made additional minor changes to AIAM
papers on Size of Evaluation and Inspection Teams and Use of
Digital Cameras and GPS and the IS will issue new revisions
for consideration. France and Belgium supported U.S.
comments on the Definition of Defense and other Installations
resulting in this paper being withdrawn. Of the 15 issues
listed in REF C Annex 1, only five remain candidates for
inclusion in the AIAM with Alliance support. These include:

--Briefings by Military Commanders;
--Use of Digital Cameras and GPS;
--Inspection/Evaluation Quota System;
--Size of Inspection and Evaluation Teams; and
--Common Understanding of Force


23. (SBU) USDel deployed points per REF A on Russia's
proposal to set concrete limits on the size of a specified
area. Norway and France strongly supported the U.S. position
in opposition to limits. The United Kingdom, speaking in the
minority, commented that it could accept limits since the
time allowed for an inspection places practical limitations
on inspectors. In the end, Experts agreed that discussion of
should remain in Vienna.

Deploying AIAM Papers
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24. (C) USDel opened discussion on how to deploy coordinated
discussion papers at the AIAM by presenting the U.S. position
per REF A. While Allies welcomed a discussion to consider a
common approach, they did not support the U.S. view that
Allies should refrain from issuing the papers until the AIAM.
The U.S. contention that laying out Alliance positions in
total would suppress discussion was refuted by the UK,
Canada, Italy and Belgium. They claimed that withholding
papers from AIAM participants would hamstring delegates by
preventing them from consulting with capitals. Canada urged
Allies to issue papers no less than a month in advance in
order to give capitals time to digest the material and send
instructions to Vienna. USDel noted that, should Allies
agree to issue papers, Allies should limit the initial papers
to a description of the problem, and avoid proposing
solutions. (Note. Based on the results of this discussion,
it seems apparent that more consultation is needed. While
some Allies seemed to understand the importance of
coordinating Alliance actions, others were more concerned on
whether they would need to modify papers as presented in REF

B. End Note.)

Western Boundary of the VD 99 Zone of Application
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25. (SBU) USDel opened discussion on the Zone of Application
by deploying points per REF A. After a brief discussion,
Experts agreed that Allies should consider the western
boundary of VD 99's Zone of Application for the Russian
Federation to be identical to the definition of the Area of
Application for Russia found in the CFE Treaty.

December 18 VCC
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26. (SBU) The abbreviated 18 December VCC was pro forma for
the most part, with the VCC Chair (Miggins) and Allies
reporting on VD 99, CFE and Open Skies verification
activities. In addition, Allies discussed the deadline for
completion of verification activities in Albania and Croatia
in the run up to their membership in NATO. Based on past
experience, the Miggins predicted that Croatia and Albania
would announce their memberships no later than 5 April,
following the NATO Summit. Miggins cautioned Allies to take
this into consideration when planning verification activities
for 2009.


27. (C/REL NATO) Miggins also reported that there would be a
reinforced NAC on 3 February to discuss "Raising the Profile
of Arms Control." According to the Chair, the NATO Secretary
General would like a statement for the summit in April, and
that such a statement would likely require consensus in
several committees and in the VCC.


28. (SBU) Finally, Miggins announced that Experts would meet
from 3-4 February, ahead of the planned 5 Feb VCC and
Experts, to consider CFE data and discuss outstanding CFE
implementation issues. Miggins asked nations to consider
whether outstanding issues should be forwarded to the JCG-T
in Vienna. Mission requests guidance for this meeting.
VOLKER