Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO329
2009-07-30 10:41:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

RETHINKING U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

Tags:  MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL PTER XG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0034
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHNO #0329/01 2111041
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301041Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3251
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USNMR BRUSSELS BE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000329 


NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL PTER XG
SUBJECT: RETHINKING U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR IVO H. DAALDER. REASON 1.4(B/D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000329


NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL PTER XG
SUBJECT: RETHINKING U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR IVO H. DAALDER. REASON 1.4(B/D).


1. (SECRET NF) Summary: As the Department of Defense
conducts its Quadrennial Defense Review, we want to raise
serious questions about the consequences of further
significant reductions to U.S. forces currently stationed in
Europe. At issue are the envisioned reduction from four to
two Brigade Combat Teams, and the planned FY10 loss of one
and one-half F-15/ F-16 squadrons. We believe our European
friends will view this force reduction as preemptive and
unilateral retrenchment by the United States, just as the
Alliance launches its new Strategic Concept debate.
Furthermore, these moves could markedly diminish our ability
to reassure Allies in the aftermath of Russian aggression in
Georgia. They would also severely degrade our capacity for
Theater Security Cooperation and deployment preparation with
the Allies and partners who comprise 88 percent of our
ISAF/OEF coalition, with eventual negative impact on this and
future Alliance missions. Thoughtful consideration of all
aspects and outcomes of possible decisions -- some possibly
coming as soon as August 4 ) is needed. End Summary

2. (SECRET NF) The U.S. cannot face the threats of the 21st
Century alone. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
taught us, Europe is not just a staging ground for sending
U.S. troops to the field. To sustain the capability of our
European Allies to fight along-side us, we need to be where
they are. With NATO,s next Strategic Concept currently
under discussion, any withdrawal will be seen as a preemptive
and unilateral retrenchment by the United States, possibly
provoking a European strategic run for the door that commits
the Alliance only to do less with less. With our European
Allies straining to meet our objectives in Afghanistan under
the current financial crisis, such action will have serious
consequences both today and in the future. Ultimately, this
approach could leave the United States holding the bag with
even fewer capable Allies.


3. (SECRET NF) U.S. forces stationed in Europe also play an
indispensible role in reassuring Allies in the face of recent
Russian aggression in Georgia. The European theater has
already witnessed deep reductions in troop levels, a fact
that is not lost on Allies having angst over the Alliance,s
commitment to Article 5 mutual defense provisions.
Additional force reductions will only further complicate what
already promises to be difficult negotiations during the
Strategic Concept debate over this bedrock principle of the
Alliance. Furthermore, following President Obama,s call for
additional defense planning to help reassure Allies, these
reductions would dramatically reduce the immediate response
capability in Europe which could be called upon by that
planning. Beyond that, the fighter reductions alone could
remove our capability to support ongoing exercises in the
Baltics in conjunction with NATO air policing deployments,
which is the most visible sign of the Article 5 commitment
the Balts cling to today.


4. (SECRET NF) Like our Allies, we face severely constrained
resources. Forces stationed in Europe do not have to be
deployed and redeployed to conduct Theater Security
Cooperation and build partner capabilities, and can therefore
conduct these missions as part of routine operations. The
impact of losing this on-site force multiplier should not be
taken lightly. In the macro sense, 88 percent of ISAF/OEF
coalition partners are from Europe, as were 65 percent of OIF
coalition partners, and 65 percent of the world,s
expeditionary capability lies within Europe. In Afghanistan
today, the Romanian maneuver force teamed with the U.S. PRT
in Zabol province is just one very concrete product of the
relationship built between our forces in Europe and this
valuable pool of Allied/partner capability. Trying to
accomplish this partnering with CONUS-based forces would be
undoubtedly less effective, and would likely be more costly
in both money and impact on planned U.S. deployment rotations.


5. (SECRET NF) In short, America,s commitment to European
peace and security has been the cornerstone of U.S. foreign
policy since the Second World War. In today,s world of
mounting security threats, we need our European Allies more

USNATO 00000329 002 OF 002


than ever. Pulling forces out of Europe is not the way to
signal our desire to build international resolve to meet the
challenges of the 21st Century.


STEIN