JULY 9 MEETING REAFFIRMS NATO CONSENSUS ON CFE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000309

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: JULY 9 MEETING REAFFIRMS NATO CONSENSUS ON CFE

REF: A. USNATO 304

B. STATE 70159

Classified By: A/POLAD A. "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).


1. (C) Summary: Keying off of U.S. briefings on CFE
discussion at the U.S.-Russia Summit in Moscow and shared
experiences at the June 9 Berlin CFE meeting and the Corfu
Ministerials, Allies used a brief HLTF meeting to reaffirm a
general consensus on next steps with regard to CFE. Allies
reaffirmed the importance they attach to CFE; their support
for continued U.S. bilateral engagement with Russia to find a
CFE solution based on the parallel actions package; and
readiness to pursue some type of Allied small group
discussion with Russia in the fall if the U.S. considers that
desirable. All Allies welcomed A/S Gottemoeller's assurance
to the July 8 meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
that she and Russian negotiator Antonov planned a CFE meeting
at the end of August and expect to regroup on next steps at
an HLTF meeting September 17. End Summary.

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CONTACTS AND BILATERALS (AND SIDE MEETINGS)
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2. (C) Discussion regarding the series of arms control
events since the HLTF away day in May (including the June 10
Berlin high level meeting on "The Future of Conventional Arms
Control in Europe," the June 24-25 OSCE Annual Security
Review Conference, and the June 27-28 "Informal" OSCE
Ministerial on European security) were overshadowed by the
readout of President Obama's July 6-7 Summit discussions in
Moscow. Although all Allies were familiar with the general
points from the Summit as briefed to the NAC by A/S Gordon
and A/S Gottemoeller on July 8 (ref A),CFE-related points
were highlights of both the July 9 HLTF plenary and related
meetings the previous day. U.S. HLTF rep Rich Davis briefly
summarized for the HLTF: CFE was not a central issue at the
Summit, which focused on bilateral issues. However, CFE was
raised by Prime Minister Putin in his private meeting with
President Obama. Putin laid out in stark terms his concern
that the CFE Treaty is "unfair" to Russia and reiterated
familiar complaints
about the flank limits. In a meeting on the margins of the
Summit, A/S Gottemoeller and Disarmament Director Antonov
agreed to hold a meeting on CFE at the end of August or in
early September, when they are scheduled to meet on START
issues. Davis also provided a brief readout on
Gottemoeller's June 3 discussion with Antonov in Geneva, and
the June 11 roundtable discussion with DFM Grushko in
Washington, per ref B.


3. (C) A/S Gottemoeller provided a more detailed readout of
the Moscow meeting and her thinking on next steps on CFE
during separate meetings prior to the HLTF with the Turkish
delegation (Ahmet Gun) and the HLTF Quad (US, UK, Ger, FR).
Gun expressed high appreciation for Gottemoeller's special
effort to meet with him and invited her to come to Ankara at
any time to discuss CFE or other matters within her purview.
He expressed gratitude for her stated readiness to use her
robust schedule of START meetings to carry forward an
intensified effort to solve CFE, and responded with what he
characterized as a frank presentation "because we are family
here" of Turkey's position on CFE. It was Ankara's
assessment that Russia needed to make a choice about CFE.
NATO had taken a major step with the parallel actions
package, which Turkey absolutely supports. Now Russia needed
to reciprocate. Turkey did not consider Russia's aide
memoire a step forward. It merely recapitulated familiar
Russian positions (Gottemoell
er interjected that it was useful that Russia had written
down its views). What was needed was a sign by Russia that
it is serious about CFE, serious about working with NATO. If
Russia did not want to work with us to keep CFE -- which, Gun
stressed, is in Russia's interest even more than NATO's -- we
would lose the Treaty, and it would take "twenty-five years"
to negotiate a replacement, which would not be a document
that approached the caliber of CFE. Russia needed to help
find a way ahead on Georgia and on Moldova. Russia needed to
resume implementation of CFE, not offer, "as if it were a
concession," the idea of partial resumption of implementation
of the Treaty. But most of all, Russia needed to drop the

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idea that the flank limits must be eliminated "as a
precondition" for a CFE deal. Gun recalled that Turkey and
NATO had already addressed Russia's concerns about the flank
twice; Turkey had played a key role in the flank deal that is
contained in the Adapted Treaty. Turkey has already said
that onc
e the Adapted Treaty is in force, Turkey (and NATO) will be
ready to review the operation of the Treaty, including in the
flank, and consider adjustments. He stressed that as far as
Turkey is concerned, such a negotiation could begin "the day
after the Adapted Treaty enters into force." But, he
underscored, the Turkish Parliament will not ratify the
Adapted Treaty without the flank regime. Politically, it
cannot be done. Gottemoeller expressed thanks for Turkey's
strong support for U.S. efforts on CFE and promised to stay
in close touch. She expressed sympathy for the Turkish view
that Russia needed to engage seriously and constructively.


4. (C) A/S Gottemoeller's briefing to Quad Allies focused on
the CFE-related discussions at the Moscow summit; all
expressed thanks and offered their support for next steps.
The UK (Ford) noted that CFE negotiations would be competing
with START, and asked how this might impact momentum. Germany
(Reindl) asked what the U.S. was prepared to say regarding
expanded consultations with Allies, and France (Raharinaivo)
asked for Gottemoeller's assessment on what Russia expects
from NATO. Gottemoeller conceded that START will remain a
U.S.-Russia priority through December, but noted that a
robust negotiation schedule should allow for more frequent
contact, including on CFE; the momentum from START could
provide the stimulus needed to get CFE moving. Russia has
reaffirmed a commitment to working from the parallel actions
package, even as it waits for Allied reaction to its aide
memoire. In the mean time, the U.S. is open to the idea of
expanding consultations to include Allies.


5. (C) Following A/S Gottemoeller's departure, the Quad
discussion focused on the way ahead regarding an expanded
format. All supported the idea of future small group
discussions if the U.S. thought that would be useful, but
size, composition, and level of participation would be
particularly important. Ford noted the need for clarity on
whether the small group discussion is desirable for
negotiation or for discussion as this would affect decisions
on composition.


6. (C) In the HLTF plenary, Acting Chair Mike Miggins
reported that a member of the Russian delegation at NATO had
asked to meet with him to discuss next steps on CFE. The
Russian said he was acting on instructions from Moscow, and
posed a number of questions. Moscow wanted an indication of
NATO interest in Russia's aide memoire and was trying to
decide whether to engage on CFE beginning with the hard
issues, or the easier ones. Did Miggins think a numerical
solution on ceilings and the flank issue was possible?
(Miggins told the U.S. privately that the Russian did not
specify whether this was a reference to the Baluyevskiy flank
proposal, or something else.)

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HLTF REVIEWS BERLIN AND CORFU
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7. (C) In the main HLTF meeting, Allies exchanged views on
the German-hosted conventional forces seminar in Berlin June
10, and the CFE exchange with Antonov that preceded it on
June 9. No Ally dissented from the view that the German
seminar had been useful. The French underscored that the
German event had helpfully put CFE center stage and the
importance that all of Europe, not only NATO, attaches to the
Treaty. Several Allies indicated that the Berlin meeting had
been successful because it allowed NATO once again to
demonstrate that that Alliance is unified on CFE, and no
differences among Allies had been exposed. (Comment: On the
margins, many expressed a sigh of relief that the event had
come off without disaster, either a major confrontation
between Russia and NATO, or a departure from agreed Alliance
positions by Germany, which many had feared. End comment.)


8. (C) Discussion of Corfu took longer, and its results were
less conclusive. All expressed thanks to the Greeks for
hosting the NRC and OSCE Ministerial meetings. Greece

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described in some detail Athens' hopes for a constructive,
informal dialogue on security issues at OSCE in the fall (the
"Corfu process"),which could lead to agreement on a
Ministerial Decision for Athens that sets guidelines for a
future discussion. Greece suggested that there might be
value in developing such guidelines during its Chairmanship
rather than allowing the discussion to slide to 2010.
(Comment: Kazakhstan will take the Chairmanship of the OSCE
in January 2010. End comment.) Turkey (Gun) agreed that a
process had begun, but cautioned Allies on the need to ensure
that the parallel actions package remains separate and
distinct from any discussions on European security in the
OSCE. Others who spoke expressed doubt that Russia had
accepted the OSCE as the primary forum for discussions on
European Security. The Netherlands sai
d that Russia had agreed to discussions in the OSCE, but had
kept open the possibility of using another format. The
Netherlands assesses that absent sufficient progress, Russia
would want to move the discussion to another forum. None
disputed the International Staff's introductory comment that
the most that could be said of FM Lavrov's remarks at Corfu
was that they were less negative than his speech at the OSCE
ASRC one week earlier.

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WAY AHEAD
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9. (C) Discussion of next steps focused on the U.S.
announcement that it would again engage Russia bilaterally on
CFE at the end of August. Allies generally supported the
idea of a small group discussion with Russia some time this
fall, provided that it would complement bilateral
negotiations. While no Ally should be excluded, all Allies
who spoke agreed that a small, self-selected group would be
more effective in engaging Russia in an actual negotiation
than a group that involved most or all Allies plus Russia.
The latter would be effective in demonstrating NATO unity,
but the format would not be likely to elicit Russian
concessions. Several Allies indicated that they would like
to participate in such a small group: the UK, Norway,
Romania, Spain, Turkey, and Czech Republic. Others said they
would like to "contribute" to such a group: Italy, the
Netherlands, Canada, Portugal, Slovenia, and Greece (France
and Germany did not speak on this point but have made their
interest in participation clear previ
ously). Among these, some -- Canada, Portugal, and Slovenia
-- said that if the group was going to be about 10 or fewer
participants, they would be prepared to step aside.
(Comment: On the margins, Canada told the U.S. team that
their offer to not participate was intended to be helpful,
but that if the group included some Allies that did not have
a large stake in the outcome (read: Spain),Canada would have
to insist on participation as well. End Comment) The U.S.
said it would be in touch with Allies over the summer to
discuss the concept further.


10. (C) Turkey (Gun) recalled that Allies have been content
with the U.S.-Russia bilateral format and that it was Russia
that had suggested expanding the format to included Allies.
Turkey considers the expanded format a concession, and it
should be pursued as such. He also said that the meeting of
a small group of Allies with Russia should be preceded by a
meeting of the HLTF and perhaps could take place in late
September.


11. (SBU) With plans for the bilateral track and a possible
small group exchange established, the chair asked whether
there were plans to follow up on the informal large group
format of the Berlin meeting. The German rep (Reindl) said
that Germany had no plans for a follow on seminar. The
Canadian rep suggested that if another large event were to be
proposed, Russia should be asked to host it. No other Ally
spoke.


12. (SBU) Next Meeting. Allies agreed to remain in touch
over the summer months, and then review next steps at the
September 17 HLTF meeting following the U.S-Russia bilateral
meeting on CFE in late August.
DAALDER